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FOREWORD 
TO THE 2018 INTERNET EDITION 
First published in 1990, Generals of the South is now out of print, and is 
easily available only through specialist libraries. The present version, 
almost thirty years after the original publication, represents a formal 
second edition and is offered to those who may be interested in the 
history of the Three Kingdoms, perhaps the most tumultuous and 
romantic of all Chinese history. 
 Though the essential thrust of information and argument has been 
maintained, the text as a whole has been lightly revised, and while the 
Bibliography is largely the same as in 1990, I have added some 
references to later works, including my own. The format is different, but 
the original pagination is indicated throughout, and the Index and cross-
referencing follows that model. 
 
Rafe de Crespigny 
Canberra, October 2018 
PREFACE 
TO THE 1990 EDITION 
I began to study the history of the Three Kingdoms some thirty years 
ago, and I have benefited greatly from the guidance of Hans Bielenstein, 
Gören Malmqvist, Fang Chao-ying, Liu Ts'un-yan, Donald Leslie, 
Patrick Fitzgerald, Wang Gungwu, Hsü Cho-yün, Miyazaki Ichisada and 
Miyakawa Hisayuki. 
 One of the pleasant features of work in this field has been the steady 
development of scholarly information and debate. In the early 1960s 
there was little material in Western languages apart from the massive 
translations from Zizhi tongjian by Achilles Fang, the brilliant essays of 
Etienne/Stephan Balazs, and the studies by Donald Holzman. Since then, 
largely as a development of Han studies, notably including the work of 
Hans Bielenstein, the publications of the Han Project at Seattle edited by 
Jack Dull, and the recent appearance of the first volume of the 
Cambridge History of China, there is a far greater quantity of scholarly 
publication on the nature of the first Chinese imperial state and, as a 
result, on the pressures which brought its disintegration at the end of the 
second century AD. 
 Many colleagues have been kind enough to read all or part of this 
work and give their advice and comments. I am most grateful to Hans 
Bielenstein of Columbia University, Donald Holzman, Yves Hervouet 
and Michelle Perazolli-t'Serstevens of Paris, Burchard Mansvelt Beck of 
Leiden, Bill Nienhauser of Wisconsin, Hans Stumpfelt of Hamburg, 
Michael Loewe of Cambridge, Clayton Bredt of Queensland and, in 
Canberra, to Bill Jenner, Mark Elvin, Igor de Rachewiltz and 
particularly Ken Gardiner and Greg Young. 
 Though one often takes their services for granted, I do offer most 
sincere thanks to Y S Chan and the Asian Studies librarians of the 
Australian National University: they have compiled and maintain a 
splendid collection, and my work would be impossible without it. 
 In the preparation of the book itself, I have been fortunate to have 
the assistance of Winifred Mumford, who prepared the maps, and May 
Wang, who has drawn the characters. Both of them have been tolerant, 
patient, very conscientious and most generous with their time and 
attention. 
Rafe de Crespigny 
Canberra, June 1990 
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INTRODUCTION 
The fall of the Later Han dynasty marked the end of the first period of 
Chinese unification. With a brief interregnum, the house of Liu had 
reigned over the empire for almost four hundred years, but when the 
central government at Luoyang collapsed in 189 the immediate chaos 
was succeeded by four hundred years of division. Except for some thirty 
years under Western Jin, the cultural world of China was divided 
between two or more rival states until its reunification by Sui at the end 
of the sixth century. 
 One could generalise almost indefinitely on the significance of this 
Period of Division. In the traditional Chinese view, the era of disunity 
was long considered a time when internecine warfare brought political 
weakness and allowed the invasion of barbarians into the heartland of 
east Asian civilisation; and earlier Western scholars tended to follow that 
political line, and look upon the period as comparable to the Dark Ages 
of Europe. More recently, Chinese and foreigners have begun to explore 
the history in more detail, and have recognised the value of the 
achievements of that time, not only in the literature, philosophy and art 
which was left as heritage for the future, but also in the energy and 
interest of the age itself. Among notable developments, the centuries 
which followed the fall of Han saw the adaptation of Chinese thought to 
absorb and comprehend the teachings of Buddhism, changes in the racial 
and social structure of the Chinese people and a vast expansion of 
colonisation over the south. 
 And besides this legitimate historical interest, the first years of 
division, the period of the "Three Kingdoms," is the great age of 
romance in Chinese literature, comparable to that of the Arthurian 
legend in Britain or the cycle which gathered about Charlemagne in 
France and Germany. For more than a thousand years the story and 
drama cycles, culminating in the celebrated novel Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms, have entertained and inspired the scholars, the poets and the 
common people of China. 
 The present volume is concerned with one aspect of that great 
tradition: the development of the state of Wu, under control of the Sun 
family, in the territory south of the Yangzi. The establishment of this 
separate state, and its maintenance for the best part of a hundred years, 
was a critical factor for the centuries that followed. On the one hand, the 
independence of Wu prevented Cao Cao, victor of the civil war in the 
north, from restoring the unity which had been lost by the last emperors 
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of Han. At the same time, however, by confirming and developing a 
Chinese presence in that frontier territory, the generals of Wu established 
the conditions not just for their own short-lived political survival, but 
also for the dynasties which took refuge there after the overthrow of 
Western Jin at the beginning of the fourth century, and which maintained 
their cultural heritage through the next three hundred years. 
 So the history of the state of Wu has broad implications for the 
whole history of medieval China. The viewpoint of the present work, 
however, is deliberately more restricted. It is necessary, of course, to 
consider the general pattern of events at the time, but I have sought to 
analyse them in terms of the interests of the Sun family and their 
associates, and from the perspective of the lands of the south. 
 This is the story of how one family in one region rose to local 
military power, and the time scale itself is very short. Sun Quan was 
born in 182 as the second son of an assistant county magistrate, and he 
placed his claim to the imperial title less than fifty years later. 
 Such remarkable fortune was based firstly upon the courageous 
career of Sun Quan's father Sun Jian, who rose from obscurity to 
second-rank command in the civil war, and then upon the achievement 
of Sun Quan's brother Sun Ce, who was obliged to build rather upon the 
reputation of his father than upon any substantial inheritance, but who 
conquered the territory south of the Yangzi and left it for the benefit of 
his brother. For his own part, Sun Quan is remembered as the leader of a 
remarkable group of strategists and fighting men, while his personality 
and statesmanship, less easy to assess, gave authority to the work of his 
most celebrated commanders, Zhou Yu, Lu Su, Lü Meng and Lu Xun. 
 These matters of personality, politics and war were played out in a 
particular physical and social environment. Firstly, the preconditions for 
a viable separate state had been established by a steady Chinese 
colonisation and development of the south during Han; and then, in 
more general terms, the prospects of success and survival in the civil war 
depended to a considerable degree upon questions of family and status. 
 The first great warlords of the time, men such as Yuan Shao, Yuan 
Shu and Liu Biao, came of distinguished official lineage and substantial 
landed property. Some of their spectacular but short-lived rivals, Dong 
Zhuo, Lü Bu and Gongsun Zan, sought unsuccessfully to establish a 
high position without the authority which such social rank could give 
them, but they could not maintain themselves in long-term rivalry 
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against the weight and prestige of the men of great family. Though Cao 
Cao, founder of Wei, came of notable family, it has been well argued 
that the edge which gave him success may be found in the fact that his 
father had been adopted by a eunuch at court, and the high rank and 
prosperity he could claim were thus in more need of energy and 
aggression to defend them.1 
 Elsewhere, in the long course of the civil war, the successful 
survivors were men, literally, on the margin: the Gongsun family of 
Liaodong in present-day Manchuria, the Shi of the far south, and the Sun 
family of the lower Yangzi. Each of these leaders had sufficient local 
prestige to establish a government, and they were far enough away from 
north China not to be swamped in the maelstrom of that central conflict. 
And one must also admire the achievement of Liu Bei, who came from 
the northeast of the empire, who claimed with limited justification to 
represent the old imperial clan, but who found acceptance and survival 
in the west. 
 It was the state of Wu, however, founded and governed by an 
undistinguished family from a frontier of the Chinese world, which 
outlived its rivals and established an empire in the lands beyond the 
Yangzi. The government of Sun Quan and his successors defied the 
power of the north for most of a century, controlling the best part of 
three provinces of Han, and developing that territory into a prosperity 
and culture which made the fortune of south China for the future. In 
some respects this achievement compares less well with the lost 
grandeur of Han, the splendour of Wei and the arrogance of Shu-Han, 
but in the context of the time, the place and the structure of society, 
limited success, rather than extravagant failure, was a triumph in the art 
of the possible. 
 In later times, the value and importance of the history of Wu was 
overshadowed by the romantic tradition, which found its chief tension 
and interest in the struggle between the "usurping" power of Cao Cao 
and his state of Wei and the "legitimate" heroes of Liu Bei and his band 
of brothers in Shu-Han. In this great contest, which owes as much to the 
dramatic arts as to those of the historian, the men of Wu have been 
reduced to bit players, frequently with no more than walk-on parts, and 
                                               
1 See, for example, Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers, 446 and 537-40, and de 
Crespigny, Man from the Margin. 
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sometimes, sadly, as foils and buffoons against whom the major heroes 
can display their wisdom, courage and skill. 
 Like most others, I was first introduced to the story of the Three 
Kingdoms by means of the novel and the dramas, and it was that 
splendid fiction which led me to investigate the history behind it all. 
Repeatedly, however, there is contradiction and confusion between the 
romantic tradition and the historical one, and the conflict is made even 
more confusing by the fact that the tales told to us by Chen Shou and his 
rivals, collected in the commentary of Pei Songzhi, are themselves a 
mixture of fact and fiction. In disconcerting fashion, the history 
presented by Sanguo zhi often differs from the fiction of Sanguo yanyi 
rather as an alternative form of romance than as a neat contrast of truth 
with falsehood. Pei Songzhi remarked upon the problem, and throughout 
the present work I have been faced with a kaleidoscope of possible 
stories. In a concluding chapter I discuss the historiography of the 
period, and in this respect, unlike the major school of modern criticism, 
which pays chief attention to the later tradition expressed in story cycles, 
drama and the novel, I give first consideration to the earliest chroniclers 
of that age. For this viewpoint, the later development of romance is no 
more than a supplement to the basic question of how it really was. 
 To deal with that basic question, I largely follow a narrative form. 
The first chapter discusses the situation in south China at the end of Han, 
and the eighth considers the nature of government, society and economy 
in the third-century state of Wu. The central chapters, however, offer an 
account of the development of the state, with particular attention to time 
and place, and with concentration upon the chieftains of the Sun family 
and the men and women who supported and served them. 
 I take this approach deliberately, for I strongly believe that if we are 
to understand any period of Chinese history we must have a clear picture 
of time and place. There is a general tendency in modern Sinology to 
present broad judgements on general themes, but such argument can be 
supported only on a firm basis of fact. As a first step to analysing and 
assessing the course of events, we need to know what those events were, 
and in the case of the Three Kingdoms there are many incidents which 
every schoolboy knows of, but which did not happen in the way they are 
commonly told. 
 So the purpose of this work is to give a picture of the period which 
saw the fall of Han and the establishment of an independent state in 
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south China. Such a picture must represent the social, political and 
economic factors of the age, but it must also include the time, the place, 
and the personal perceptions of the people concerned. Indeed, it is 
important who those people were: it was critical to Sun Jian's career that 
he came of obscure and distant background in a society which was 
dominated by gentry landowners and their clients; it is remarkable that 
Sun Ce achieved so much success before he reached his mid-twenties; it 
was vital for the fortunes of the family enterprise that Sun Quan was of 
sufficient age and authority to receive the allegiance of the various 
commanders who had served his elder brother, and it was significant for 
the state that he lived to rule it for so long. In such brittle dynasties, 
personality and individual relations played a very large role, too often 
neglected in the search for more general themes. 
 And after all, if the achievements of these people set a pattern for 
the future and caught the imagination of those who came after them, it is 
only fair to look for the facts which served as basis for the legend. Even 
after such a length of time and behind the refraction of romance, 
however blurred the view of history may be, the "third kingdom" of Wu 
presents a heroism of its own. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1: The provinces of Later Han 
and the territory of Wu in 229 AD 
 
 
  
 
CHRONOLOGY 
of the history of the Sun family and of the state of Wu 
155-229 
This table is concerned primarily with the history of the Sun family and 
the state of Wu; it does not offer a full survey of the history of China at 
the time. Some major events, not immediately relevant to the fortunes of 
the Sun family, are indicated in italics. 
Dates are given in terms of Western years AD. There is, of course, 
always some uncertainty and the possibility of confusion, notably 
because of the overlap at the end of the Chinese year and the beginning 
of the Western year. 
c.155 birth of Sun Jian 
172-174 Sun Jian on campaign against the rebellion of Xu Chang in 
Kuaiji; he receives commissioned appointment as an assistant 
county magistrate 
175 birth of Sun Ce 
182 birth of Sun Quan 
184 Sun Jian on campaign against the Yellow Turban rebels in 
Nanyang commandery and the storming of Wan city 
185-186 Sun Jian on campaign against the rebels in Liang province 
187-189 Sun Jian as Grand Administrator of Changsha 
189 death of Emperor Ling and regency of the He family; 
attempted coup by the eunuchs and death of He Jin; Dong 
Zhuo seizes power and places Liu Xie, Emperor Xian, on the 
throne 
190 Sun Jian joins Yuan Shu in the alliance against Dong Zhuo; 
Shi Xie holds power in Jiao province 
191 Sun Jian captures Luoyang from Dong Zhuo; Sun Jian attacks 
Liu Biao and Huang Zu in Xiangyang; death of Sun Jian 
192 Dong Zhuo killed in Chang'an 
193 Yuan Shu defeated by Cao Cao and retreats to Yang province; 
Sun Ce calls upon Yuan Shu; Tao Qian attacked by Cao Cao 
in Xu province 
194 Sun Ce joins Yuan Shu at Shouchun; Liu Yao appointed 
Inspector of Yang province; Sun Ce attacks Lu Kang in 
Lujiang for Yuan Shu 
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195 Sun Ce attacks Liu Yao south of the Yangzi; Liu Yao retreats 
to Yuzhang; Sun Ce seizes Danyang and Wu commanderies; 
Emperor Xian escapes from Chang'an 
196 Sun Ce defeats Wang Lang and captures Kuaiji commandery; 
Emperor Xian comes to Cao Cao at Xu city 
197 Yuan Shu proclaims himself Emperor; renouncing his 
allegiance to Yuan Shu, Sun Ce allies himself with the Han 
court under Cao Cao 
198 Lü Bu and Cao Cao defeat Yuan Shu; Sun Ce defeats Taishi Ci 
and Zu Lang in western Danyang; death of Liu Yao in Yuzhang  
199 death of Yuan Shu; Sun Ce defeats Liu Xun and captures 
Lujiang 
200 Sun Ce defeats Huang Zu and captures Yuzhang from Hua 
Xin; death of Sun Ce, succeeded by Sun Quan; Cao Cao 
defeats Yuan Shao at Guandu 
201 Liu Fu appointed as Cao Cao's Inspector of Yang province at 
Hefei 
202 death of Yuan Shao in north China 
203 Sun Quan attacks Huang Zu in Jiangxia and destroys his fleet 
204 mutiny in Danyang, put down; operations in Poyang; Cao Cao 
defeats Yuan Shang and captures Ye city 
205 conquest of Poyang; He Qi confirms control of the Min River 
valley in present-day Fujian 
206 Zhou Yu attacks Mo and Bao encampments in Jing province; 
operations against Huang Zu 
207 operations against Huang Zu; Cao Cao defeats the Wuhuan at 
White Wolf Mountain 
208 defeat and death of Huang Zu; death of Liu Biao; Cao Cao 
takes Jing province; Liu Bei is defeated at the Chang Slope 
and flees to Xiakou; Cao Cao is defeated at the Red Cliffs by 
the army of Sun Quan, commanded by Zhou Yu, in alliance 
with Liu Bei and Liu Qi; Sun Quan attacks Hefei without 
success 
209 Cao Cao demonstrates in strength at Hefei; He Qi establishes 
Xindu commandery south of the Huang Shan; Zhou Yu 
captures Jiangling city in Nan commandery 
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210 death of Zhou Yu, succeeded by Lu Su; first settlement of Jing 
province with Liu Bei; appointment of Bu Zhi as Inspector of 
Jiao province 
211 Sun Quan shifts his capital to Jianye; Cao Cao defeats the 
warlords of the northwest; Liu Zhang invites Liu Bei into Yi 
province 
212 Sun Quan fortifies Jianye and establishes the base at Ruxu 
213 Cao Cao attacks Ruxu, then withdraws 
214 Sun Quan captures Huan city in Lujiang; Liu Bei takes over 
the government of Yi province 
215 the second settlement of Jing province with Liu Bei; Zhang Lu 
surrenders Hanzhong commandery to Cao Cao; Sun Quan 
attacks Hefei without success 
216 Cao Cao takes the title King of Wei 
217 Cao Cao attacks Ruxu, Sun Quan makes a formal surrender, 
and Cao Cao withdraws; death of Lu Su, succeeded by Lü 
Meng; Lu Xun campaigns against the hills people from 
Danyang to Kuaiji 
218  
219 Liu Bei defeats Xiahou Yuan and captures Hanzhong 
commandery from Cao Cao; Liu Bei proclaims himself King 
of Hanzhong; Guan Yu attacks Cao Ren in Nanyang 
commandery and besieges Fan city; Lü Meng attacks and 
destroys Guan Yu; Sun Quan takes control of Jing province 
220 Cao Cao dies; Cao Pi succeeds as ruler of Wei; Bu Zhi is 
replaced in the south by Lü Dai; 
 10th month: Han abdicates to Wei and Cao Pi takes the 
imperial title; Sun Quan sends tribute to Wei 
221 Liu Bei proclaims himself emperor in succession to Han and 
in rivalry to Wei; Sun Quan establishes his capital at Wuchang 
in Jing province; Liu Bei embarks on campaign against Sun 
Quan; Sun Quan declares himself subject to Wei and is 
granted title as King of Wu 
222 Lu Xun defeats Liu Bei and destroys his army; Sun Quan 
breaks with Wei; Cao Pi sends armies against Sun Quan's 
positions on the middle and the lower Yangzi; Sun Quan 
restores the alliance with Shu 
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223 death of Liu Bei; Zhuge Liang acts as regent in Shu; Cao Pi 
withdraws from the attack against Wu; Wu capture Qichun 
commandery 
224 Cao Pi attacks the lower Yangzi, then withdraws 
225 Cao Pi constructs the Canal to Smash the Caitiffs and again 
attacks the lower Yangzi, again withdraws; Zhuge Liang 
conquers the southwest for Shu-Han 
226 Cao Pi dies, succeeded by Cao Rui under a regency including 
Sima Yi; unsuccessful attacks by Wu against Jiangxia and 
Xiangyang; death of Shi Xie, Lü Dai destroys the Shi family 
and takes all Jiao province for Wu; Quan Zong brings hills 
people south of Danyang under control 
227 Meng Da in Xincheng seeks to turn against Wei, but is 
destroyed by Sima Yi before Shu or Wu can assist him 
228 Zhuge Liang campaigns in the Wei valley; Wu forces ambush 
and defeat Cao Xiu of Wei in Lujiang; Gongsun Yuan takes 
control in the northeast; Sun Quan seeks alliance with 
Gongsun Yuan 
229 Sun Quan proclaims himself emperor; renewed treaty of 
alliance with Shu-Han 

  
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2: South China at the end of Han 
 
 
 
 
 

  
CHAPTER ONE * 
 
SOUTH CHINA UNDER THE LATER HAN DYNASTY 
GOVERNMENT AND GEOGRAPHY 
 
Introductory summary 
Han and the south 
Jing province and the middle Yangzi 
Jiao province and the far south coast 
Yang province and the lower Yangzi 
The enforcement of authority 
 
Introductory summary: 
At the end of the second century AD, southern China was formally under 
the authority of the imperial government of Han. The territory was 
divided into three provinces, with a substructure of commanderies and 
counties. One function of the present chapter is to present a geography of 
the southern provinces, with indication of local topography, 
communications routes and the products of the region. 
The most important development of the Han period, however, was 
the number of Chinese subjects who migrated into the lands of the south 
and placed increasing pressure on the non-Chinese people of the region. 
The consequence was almost endemic disturbance, while physical 
occupation of the ground was accompanied by cultural aggression, 
generally supported by official patronage, which integrated the territory 
still more firmly into the Chinese cultural sphere. [2] 
Few of the pioneer immigrants, however, had come to the south in 
order to expand the political control of the central imperial government; 
on the contrary, they were often seeking to escape it, and the unit upon 
which they based their fortunes was the family, the extended clan, or a 
local system of mutual defence. By the end of the second century AD, as 
the authority of the central government was weakened through political 
conflict and turmoil in the north, the new settlers in the south held no 
particular sense of allegiance to the unified empire. 
Furthermore, whereas in earlier times the lands beyond the Yangzi 
had been easily and naturally kept under the control of whichever power 
could dominate the northern plain, the increased population of the south 
brought the possibility of establishing a separate state, Chinese by culture 
                                               
*  In the first edition of Generals of the South, published in 1990, Chapter One 
occupied pages 1 to 69. The original pagination is indicated with brackets []. 
 CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
2 
and tradition but politically independent of the traditional heartland. 
Upon this demographic foundation the generals of the south would build 
their fortunes. 
Han and the south: 
Chinese civilisation, which first developed in the region of the Yellow 
River, spread by cultural influence, by colonisation and by conquest to 
the valley of the Yangzi and beyond. The expansion was gradual, and the 
movement was influenced and controlled by climate and by topography, 
but the essential fact was that the territory and the people could accept the 
Chinese style of cultivation, so the southern part of the subcontinent was 
steadily integrated with the cultural world of China. 
A central belt of mountains, spur of the great Kunlun massif, runs 
east from the high ground of Tibet to form the Qin Ling range [3] and the 
Daba Shan between present-day Sichuan and Shenxi, and the Tongbai 
and Dabie hills of eastern Hubei. This long divide separates the 
watersheds of the Yangzi and Yellow Rivers, and creates two major 
geographical regions within China. The northern climate is influenced by 
the cold dry air of the Mongolian deserts, but the south obtains many of 
its characteristics from the tropical maritime air of the southern and 
eastern seas. In the north, great deposits of wind-borne and water-borne 
loess have smoothed the contours of the hills and created the vast 
expanse of the North China plain; in the south the Yangzi and its 
tributaries, while swollen and liable to flood at the times of the mid-year 
monsoon, flow for the most part through narrow valleys among steep and 
rocky hills. 
For the purposes of man, the loess soils of the north offered easy 
tilling of dry crops such as millet and, later, wheat, while dykes, dams, 
canals and other earthworks were developed to irrigate the dry land of the 
Wei River and the west, to provide for transport and, most importantly, to 
control the flow of the Yellow River across the plain and bring great areas 
of fertile land, formerly liable to flood, under cultivation. Chinese 
civilisation was thus founded upon settled agriculture maintained by 
water control, and it is natural and appropriate that a leading role in 
legend was given to the Great Yu, master of the floods. 
In south China, in the Yangzi basin and beyond, such techniques 
were less critical to development, but they could be applied with great 
advantage. Water was brought to fill rice paddy-fields on the narrow river 
plains and in terraces built up the slopes, while flooded lands and 
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marshes by the rivers and lakes were drained and reclaimed. So the 
Chinese pattern of agriculture and irrigation, first established in the open 
country of the north, was extended through the lands of the south, even 
though the chief crop [4] farmed was different and the purposes of water 
control had largely changed. 
In Chapter 129 of his Shi ji "Records of the Historian," compiled at 
the beginning of the first century BC, Sima Qian summarised the 
difference between north and south:1 
... in the territories of Chu and Yue, land was broad and the population 
sparse. For their food they had rice, and for their soup they had fish. 
Some of them tilled with fire and weeded with water, and the fruit and 
shellfish were sufficient without need to purchase them in markets. 
The land is by nature abundant with things to eat, and there is no 
danger of famine or death. For this reason, even those who are weak 
or ill can manage to survive, there is no occasion to store up goods, 
and many of the people remain poor. 
Thus, south of the Yangzi and the Huai, there are no people cold 
or hungry, but there are also no families with as much as a thousand 
catties of gold. 
North of the Yi and the Si, on the other hand,2 the conditions are 
suitable for the five grains,3 for mulberry and hemp, and for the six 
kinds of domestic animals.4 The territory, [5] however, is not large, the 
people are numerous, and they often suffer from flood or from 
drought. So they are interested in hoarding things and storing them. 
                                               
1  SJ 129:3270; Swann, Food and Money, 447-448. 
2  The Yi and Si rivers were northern tributaries of the Huai; Sima Qian has thus 
defined the frontier between north and south on a line east-west from present-day 
northern Jiangsu, close to the "old course" (pre-1852) of the Yellow River 
3 There is disagreement among classical texts as to the enumeration of the five 
grains. One list contained common millet, spiked millet, beans, wheat and rice; in 
another version, possibly older, hemp was included in place of rice, which had 
gained importance as the Chinese moved towards the south. See Hsü, Han 
Agriculture, 81 ff, and Needham and Bray, Science and Civilisation VI:2, 432, and 
deC, Northern Frontier, note 25 at 452-453. In the present text, however, since 
hemp is mentioned immediately afterwards, it appears that rice must have been 
amongst the five. 
4 The six kinds of domestic animals are traditionally defined as the horse, the ox, 
sheep, pigs, dogs and chickens. 
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The latter part of this passage is of less immediate interest to us, though 
one may observe that across all north China, with its high ratio of people 
to land, there was an intensity and variety of economic effort, with 
manufactures and trade, which is here compared with the easier life of the 
south, where even the poor and the handicapped could manage to survive. 
In the description of farming in the south, "tilling the land with fire" 
has often been interpreted as reference to slash-and-burn agriculture, but 
it seems more likely to have described the burning of grass or stubble on 
established fields during fallow. And "weeding with water" surely refers 
to the flooding of a paddy-field before the sown rice has sprouted, in 
order to kill unwanted plants. On this basis, though Sima Qian may have 
felt some disapproval for the unorthodox techniques of the south, we may 
reasonably understand that an effective and sophisticated tradition of rice 
cultivation, including transplanting, had already been established in the 
south.5 It was upon this agricultural development that the immigrants and 
colonists of Han China were able to expand their influence over their 
non-Chinese neighbours. 
Sima Qian also gave more detailed descriptions of the various 
territories of the empire, but we shall consider those, and the parallel 
passages from Han shu, compiled at the end of the first century BC,6 [6] 
in separate sections. We have, unfortunately, no such regional 
descriptions from the time of Later Han,7 and incidental remarks and 
                                               
5 See, for example, Needham and Bray, Science and Civilisation VI:2, 591; Hsü, 
Han Agriculture, 120, and 301-302, and Nishijima, "Economic and Social History 
of Former Han," 568-574. There is reference to the transplanting of rice in the 
Simin yueling "Monthly Ordinances for the Four Categories of People" by Cui Shi 
of the second century: 5.5; Hsü, Han Agriculture, 222, referred to by Needham and 
Bray, Science and Civilisation VI:2, 594. 
6 Regional descriptions of the empire are given by SJ 129:3260-70; Swann, Food 
and Money, 437-448, and by HS 28B:1641-70, the Treatise of Geography. HS 
28B:1640 explains that this text was prepared in the latter part of the first century 
BC by the celebrated scholar Liu Xiang, supplemented by a discussion from his 
contemporary, Zhu Gan, on the customs of the people as influenced by geography. 
Ban Gu then incorporated this material into his Han shu. 
7 The Treatise of Administrative Geography of Sima Biao, preserved in HHS 
109/19-113/23, consists largely of a list of provinces, commanderies and 
kingdoms, with their subordinate county units, but without any such general 
description as in Shi ji and Han shu. 
  The local government of Later Han was arranged in a hierarchy of provinces, 
commanderies or kingdoms, and counties. These units will be referred to 
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discussions in the texts, often presented as part of debate at court, could 
be distorted by the influence of classical tradition or by the requirements 
of political argument. I have noted elsewhere how the region of Liang 
province in the northwest, devastated by insurrection and reduced to 
weakness and poverty in the second century AD, was still being 
described at that time in the splendid terms of the Yu gong chapter, "The 
Tribute of Yu," from the Confucian Classic of History.8 The situation had 
changed over time, but official scholarship was reluctant to recognise the 
fact. Considering south China at this period, it is disconcerting to observe 
how echoes from Shi ji, almost clichés, may be found in parallel passages 
of Han shu.9 [7] 
Indeed, though the earlier descriptions are valuable there is no 
question that the position of south China, and its relationship to the 
heartlands of the empire, was changing very considerably during the four 
centuries of Former and Later Han. The most striking evidence may be 
seen in comparison of the figures from the Treatise of Geography of Han 
shu, dated to 2 AD, and those preserved in the Treatise of Administrative 
Geography of Hou Han shu, originally part of the Xu Han shu of Sima 
Biao, which reflects the situation about 140. The figures have been 
discussed and analysed by the modern scholars Lao Kan and Bielenstein, 
and the general tenor of their information is clear: the registered 
population of the lands from the Huai River and the Yangzi basin 
southwards increased markedly in the first century and a half AD. Not 
only were there more Han Chinese in that area, but they were recorded in 
many areas which had not formerly been settled by such people, and they 
                                                                                                                   
frequently in the following pages. See also the section The enforcement of 
authority, and Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 90-104. 
8 See deC, Northern Frontier, 116, translating a portion of the memorial presented in 
129 by the official Yu Xu, urging the resettlement of Liang province after the 
ruinous Qiang rebellion of 107-118: HHS 87/77:2893. 
9 Compare, for example, the manner in which HS 28B:1665-70 deals with the lands 
of the south in similar terms to SJ 129:3270, translated above. In particular, HS 
28B:1666 describes the region of "Chu," with broad lands and sparse population, 
in close parallel to the text of SJ 129. The territory of "Chu" defined by HS 28B, 
however, relates essentially to present-day Hubei and Hunan provinces; the region 
described by SJ129 was far greater, comprising all of China south of the Yangzi 
and the Huai. 
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represented a far greater proportion of the whole population of the 
empire.10 [8] 
Bielenstein has argued that this increase in the south, matched by a 
decline in number of registered households and individuals in the north, 
particularly the northwest, may be accounted for chiefly by migration of 
Han Chinese within the empire. This was surely an important factor: the 
troubles on the northern and north-western frontiers of the empire drove 
many settlers away, while the open spaces described by Sima Qian were 
an opportunity and an invitation to the refugees. On the other hand, a 
many former Chinese subjects in the north disappeared from government 
registers as the authority of Han declined in that region, while conversely 
in the south many native people were brought under the control of Han 
through the establishment of new units of administration, an official 
process which was itself inspired by increasing numbers of the 
recognised Chinese settlers; and at a still more personal and basic level, 
there was certainly some intermarriage between the local people and the 
immigrants. 
The effects of this increased Chinese migration and control varied 
from one region of the south to another. The main stream of colonisation 
tended directly toward the south, with settlements spreading along the 
middle Yangzi basin and the valley of the Xiang past Changsha, and then 
across the Nan Ling divide. Further to the east, the lower Yangzi and the 
                                               
10 For the population in China in the first centuries AD, I use the figures given in the 
geographical treatises of HS 28A-B and HHS 109/19-113/23 as cited above, and I 
accept the amendments which Bielenstein provides in his article on "The Census of 
China." Both treatises list the administrative units of the empire, the one for 2 AD 
and the other for the period about 140 AD, and figures are given for the population 
of each of the commanderies and kingdoms in terms of households and 
individuals. Though some data given for later dynasties in other histories are 
concerned with taxation figures, it is clear that the two Han treatises seek to 
provide full lists of population based upon local government registers as reported 
to the capital. 
  Though the figures are impressively detailed, they cannot be considered totally 
correct: not even a modern census can claim complete reliability. The gathering of 
information and its presentation was consistent between the two dynasties, 
however, the figures are sufficiently comparable to be analysed in relation to one 
another, and the gross demographic changes which they show may be taken as 
evidence of an historical reality. 
  On the decline of registered population in the north of the empire during Later 
Han, see also deC, Northern Frontier, 145 and 244. 
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delta and lake region south to Hangzhou Bay had long been a part of the 
Chinese political and cultural ambit, but the hill and mountain country 
north of present-day Fujian presented difficulties, and there was less 
pressure of settlement in that region. Overall, naturally enough, it was the 
river valleys and stretches of level ground which gave favourable [9] 
conditions for Chinese colonisation, while the intermediate ranges of 
hills, where the slopes are too steep for farming, gave opportunity for the 
non-Chinese native people, and some Chinese refugees, to evade and 
resist the influence of Chinese culture and the attentions of the imperial 
government. Formal Chinese control thus followed the rivers towards the 
south, and people who would not accept that development were driven 
into the hills. 
The region of Jiao province, however, across the Nan Ling divide 
and extending westwards along the rivers and coastal region from Panyu, 
present-day Guangzhou, is a special case. Distant from the imperial 
capital, it was always a more marginal territory; and the expansion of 
Chinese control was largely a matter of conquest and administration, 
encouraged by an interest in trade; one does not find the same pattern of 
migrant colonisation which was transforming the region of the Yangzi. 
The region is discussed in more detail below. 
Not surprisingly, the Chinese advance south of the Yangzi was often 
resisted, and the records of Later Han have many references to warfare 
against "rebel barbarians." These, of course, reflect the perspective of the 
Chinese court, and there is little question that the so-called insurrections 
in fact represented the exasperated response of native people who saw 
their way of life, their homes and their families disrupted and destroyed 
by alien immigrants. From that point of view, though rebellion is 
generally regarded as a sign of weakness and disruption in the imperial 
power, many of the campaigns against rebels in south China may better 
be represented as the expression of a dynamic expansion.11 [10] 
In some areas the resistance was comparatively successful. The non-
Chinese people of Wuling commandery, and notably those about the 
region known as Wuqi, "Five Gorges," on the upper reaches of the Yuan 
River by the present-day Hunan-Guizhou border, brought catastrophic 
defeat to a large locally-recruited Chinese army in 48 AD, and the 
                                               
11 Bielenstein, RHD III, presents maps showing areas of disturbance during the time 
of Later Han, though he interprets them rather as indications of weakness than, as I 
argue, signs of energy and expansion. 
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tribesmen were defeated only after a full campaign by the great general 
Ma Yuan.12 There were disturbances in and about Wuling commandery 
throughout the period of Later Han, with a major outbreak in the early 
160s, and the Wuqi barbarians remained a factor to be reckoned with in 
the struggles of the Three Kingdoms period. 
Further south, in the valley of the Xiang, the most notable period of 
rebellion, very likely inspired by the process of Chinese settlement and 
colonisation, is recorded from 157, when there was a rising in the 
northern part of Changsha. Within a few years, there were disturbances 
throughout the hill country about the Xiang River basin, and the troubles 
extended across the Nan Ling to the south. The major group of "rebels," a 
mixed force of Chinese and barbarians, was defeated in 164, and by the 
following year the territory was largely pacified.13 The potential for 
disorder, however, remained, and over twenty years later the founder of 
the house of Wu was able to gain his first great success in dealing with 
insurrection in that same region.14 
At the administrative level, however, there was an acclaimed 
tradition of Confucian education. In the early years of Later Han, Xi 
Guang the Administrator of Jiaozhi, Ren Yan the [11] Administrator of 
Jiuzhen, Wei Li and Ci Chong, who succeeded one another as 
Administrators of Guiyang, and Zong [or Song] Jun in Wuling and 
Jiujiang, all attempted to teach the people Chinese customs and 
techniques, notably those dealing with marriage, costume, agriculture, 
silk-farming and schools.15 
                                               
12 On the barbarians of Wuling during Later Han, see HHS 86/76:2831-34, and for an 
analysis of the rebels and the campaigns against them, see Bielenstein, RHD III, 
67-73. Ma Yuan died in the course of this campaign but Bielenstein observes that 
the success of Chinese arms had already been ensured under his leadership. 
13 HHS 86/76:2833-34 and HHS 8:303-313. 
14 Chapter Two following contains the biography of Sun Jian, father of Sun Ce and 
Sun Quan, founders of the state of Wu. 
15 On Xi Guang and Ren Yan, see HHS 76/66:2460-62, the biography of Ren Yan in 
the Chapter on the Benevolent Officials (循吏 xun li), HHS 86/76:2836, and also 
the memorial of 213 presented to Sun Quan by Xue Zong, preserved in SGZ 53/Wu 
8:1251-53 at 1253. 
  On Wei Li and Ci Chong, see HHS 76/66:2458-60, the biography of Wei Li in 
the Chapter on the Benevolent Officials, and on Zong Jun, his biography in HHS 
41/31:1411-14 at 1412. The personal name of Wei Li may also be sounded Sa, but 
I have here followed Miyakawa, "Confucianization" (note 27 below). The surname 
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These dedicated officials, classified by Chinese historians as 
"benevolent," were not following any formal government policy, and they 
were surely far outnumbered by less energetic colleagues, but their work 
demonstrates that the expansion of Chinese culture to the south was more 
than a physical movement of people and a transfer of technology. Han 
shu records that the people of the Yangzi region believed in mediums and 
spirits, that they followed "wrongful customs and evil ceremonies,"16 so 
that their Chinese rulers were regularly concerned with matters of 
schooling, parental guidance and mourning rites, and also with direct 
attack upon local cults. 
Zong Jun, for example, magistrate of Zhenyang in Wuling 
commandery during the reign of Emperor Guangwu, found that the 
people there believed in shamans and spirits; he set up schools for them 
and prohibited their evil sacrifices. He then became Administrator of 
Jiujiang commandery, north of the present-day Poyang Lake, where there 
was a set of shamans who [12] organised the worship of two local 
mountains, compelling youths and maidens to become bridegrooms and 
brides of the mountains and refusing them for human marriage. Zong Jun 
eliminated this custom. A hundred years later, when Luan Ba was 
Administrator in Guiyang during the time of Emperor Shun, he was 
known for teaching the people the proper ceremonies of marriage and 
mourning, and for setting up schools. He later became Administrator of 
Yuzhang commandery, in present-day Jiangxi about the Poyang Lake, 
and there he put an end to the activities of another local cult which 
worshipped the spirits of mountains and rivers.17 
                                                                                                                   
Zong also appears as Song, but Zong is more probably correct: deC, Biographical 
Dictionary, sub voce. 
16 The phrase yin si 淫祀 is discussed by Loewe, Ideas of Life and Death, 109: 
  The precise significance of this expression may not be known for this period 
(c.30 BC). It generally implies practices of an impure or lewd nature, or religious 
abuses such as sacrifices to deities which were not acceptable. For later periods the 
term may imply sexual practices, but there is no direct evidence to prove that these 
were involved in shamanistic exercises of the Han period. 
17 See the biography of Luan Ba in HHS 57/47 at 1841-42. A man of Wei 
commandery, Luan Ba was a curious man with a remarkable career. He was at one 
time a eunuch in the imperial harem, but left that office because his virility 
returned. Expert in Taoist arts, he used his powers to control the gods of Yuzhang 
and destroy their cult. He was put to death about 170 for his opposition to the 
eunuch dominance of the court of Emperor Ling. 
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There were, of course, local cults in every region of China, but the 
records of archaeology and religious texts confirm the indications of the 
histories that the culture of the region of the Yangzi placed strong 
emphasis upon the concept of the wu shaman, with concern for the spirits 
of the dead and the spirits of nature.18 The great anthology Chu ci "Songs 
of the South" contains examples [13] of both these patterns of belief: the 
poems Zhao hun 招魂 "Summons of the Soul" and Da zhao 大招 "Great 
Summons," both appear as invocations to persuade the soul of the 
recently departed to turn back from the dangers and uncertainties of the 
journey into the unknown worlds of death, and to return to the certainties 
and pleasures of earthly life.19 And in the same collection, dating also 
most probably from the third century BC, the Jiu ge 九歌 "Nine Songs" 
have generally been interpreted as reflecting the spiritual and in many 
respects sexual union of the shaman with a deity such as the Lord of the 
East or a spirit of the Xiang River.20 
Though the term wu may be found as the description of presumably 
shamanistic practices in other parts of the empire, with a strong tradition 
in central Asia and the far northeast, there seems no question that the 
beliefs and customs of the Yangzi valley owed a great deal to the tradition 
of the pre-Han state and civilisation of Chu, and the religious strain 
continued into the Han period.21 There is good archaeological evidence, 
such as in the Mawangdui excavations, for the influence of such beliefs 
                                                                                                                   
  In the Tang commentary to Luan Ba's biography, extracts from the Shenxian 
zhuan by Ge Hong of the fourth century suggest that he came not from Wei 
commandery but from Shu, in the west, and a number of anecdotes enlarge upon 
his magical achievements. His record as a temporary eunuch, as a Taoist adept, and 
as a local administrator who founded (presumably Confucian) schools, is 
somewhat confusing, and it appears that Luan Ba, whatever his origins and reality, 
served as a focus for a number of popular stories. 
18 On the cult of wu 巫 "shamanism," see Loewe, Ideas of Life and Death, 104-108, 
and also his discussion of "The Case of Witchcraft in 92 BC," in Crisis and 
Conflict, at 81-90. On yin si "evil ceremonies," see note 16 above, citing Ideas of 
Life and Death. 
19 See the translations by Hawkes, Songs of the South, 101-114. 
20 See the translations by Hawkes, Songs of the South, 35-44, particularly poems (c) 
Xiang jun 湘君 "The Princess of the Hsiang," (d) Xiang furen 湘夫人 "The Lady of 
the Hsiang" and (g) Dong jun 東君 "The Lord of the East." 
21 For discussion on the early culture of the middle Yangzi and the state of Chu, see 
Chang, Archeology of Ancient China, 400-408, Blakeley, "Recent Developments in 
Chu Studies," and the important compilation of Cook and Major, Defining Chu. 
 SOUTH CHINA 
 
 
11 
into the highest levels of Chinese society, where it was both tolerated and 
accepted.  On the other hand, general acceptance of such religion among 
the people implied also an acceptance of its practitioners as leaders of 
society – and this presented an indigenous challenge to the sacred 
authority of the empire. 
Eastwards, by the mouth of the Yangzi, there was an added interest in 
divination and other forms of magic with a particular local [14] tradition 
of foretelling the future by interpreting the wind.22 More actively, the 
yuewu or yuefang "Magic of Yue" was particularly concerned with the art 
of putting spells upon people, animals, plants and things, either to prevent 
them from moving or to bring them to life. Among the biographies of the 
Chapter on Diviners and Magicians in Hou Han shu, we are told of Xu 
Deng and Zhao Bing, both men from the south of Hangzhou Bay. In a 
test of their powers, Xu Deng stopped a river from flowing, and Zhao 
Bing made a dead tree send forth shoots.23 And in the time of Sun Quan, 
at the beginning of the third century, the savant Wu Fan of Kuaiji was 
celebrated and respected for his ability to tell the future from calculation 
of the calendar and divination by the wind.24 
Across the Yangzi to the north, in the region of the Huai and notably 
in Langye commandery on the coast south of the Shandong peninsula, 
there was a strong tradition of supernatural arts and remarkable powers. 
The celebrated physician Hua Tuo came from Pei, in the southern part of 
the north China plain, and the earliest account of the Taiping jing "Classic 
of Great Peace" ascribes its origins to the Taoist teacher Gan Ji of 
Langye, who later travelled south to the region of the lower Yangzi and 
met his death at the hands of the jealous warlord Sun Ce.25 [15] 
                                               
22 See, for example, Ngo, Divination, magie et politique, at 94-95, rendering the 
biography of Li Nan from HHS 82A/72A:2716-17; at 87-92, rendering the 
biography of Xie Yiwu from HHS 82A/72A:2713-15; and at 186-190, describing 
the technique of this divination. 
23 HHS 82B/72B:2741-42; Ngo, Divination, magie et politique, 127-128, and 
DeWoskin, Doctors, Diviners and Magicians, 76-77. On the experience of the Wu 
general He Qi with this form of magic, see note 63 to Chapter Five. 
24 The biography of Wu Fan is in SGZ 63/Wu 18:1421-23. 
25 On Hua Tuo, see HHS 82B/72B:2736-40 and SGZ 29:799-804; Ngo, Divination, 
magie et politique, 118-126, and DeWoskin, Doctors, Diviners and Magicians, 
140-153. On Gan Ji [also known, probably mistakenly, as Yu Ji] and the Taiping 
jing see, for example, HHS 30B/20B:1080 and 1084; deC, Portents of Protest, 31-
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Unfortunately, though a few of these men are recorded in Hou Han 
shu, and there are later works describing the achievements of Taoist 
adepts, the information is often vague, or highly eccentric and anecdotal. 
In particular, official Chinese historians were concerned chiefly with the 
relationship of these men to the organised government of the state, 
whether a diviner is giving advice to the emperor or to one of his 
ministers, or a man of magic seeks to establish himself in rivalry to the 
imperial power. Too often, these latter are identified by the general 
expression yao "unorthodox and heretic, wicked and evil:" so that the 
phrase yaoze 妖賊 "heretic rebels" might be applied to a rising of 
religious rebels in any part of the empire. While the term wu generally 
appears to have some connotation of shamanistic beliefs and practices, 
the terms yao and yin 淫 are best understood as all-purpose descriptions 
of supernatural practices alien to official Confucianism. The 
Confucianists were not necessarily interested in the details of these 
heterodox beliefs, and the fact that Chinese texts describe a sect or 
custom as yao or yin does not, of itself, tell us anything about the content 
of the belief system or the conduct of its followers; all we know is that 
the Han authorities disapproved of them.26 
Throughout the centuries of Han, therefore, the lands of the Yangzi 
remained in many respects alien to the people of the north. In a classic 
model of colonial expansion, the native people of the region were 
oppressed both by the bureaucratic weight of the government of Han, 
with an apparatus of local administration backed by the ultimate force of 
the imperial armies, and also by the [16] superficially peaceful 
occupation of individual settlers from the north. Either they were 
compelled to accept a horde of new neighbours in their existing lands, or 
they were simply driven away into the less easily cultivated country of 
the hills and forests. In the losing struggle against this invasion, the 
native people sometimes resorted to force of arms, but they also sought to 
retain a measure of independence through the maintenance of their 
original culture. So the process of "Confucianisation" was in many 
                                                                                                                   
32 and 90-94, and Chapter Three at 200-212. For an early modern discussion of the 
popular Taoist tradition in this region, see the 1934 article by Chen Yinke. 
26 To use a modern comparison, a Han Confucianist would have used the term yao to 
describe all sects of Islam, Judaism and Christianity, and their rituals would have 
been similarly dismissed as yin si. They themselves might be concerned with the 
differences between them, but they were beneath the notice of an orthodox scholar. 
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respects a struggle to confirm the physical conquest of the region by Han 
through the suppression and elimination of the traditional culture of the 
south.27 
From this point of view, the officials who encouraged settled 
agriculture and established schools were carrying out a program for 
cultural and political control, and their reforms of marriage and the 
ceremonies of mourning were direct challenges to the authority of the old 
religion. Whether they knew it or not, and regardless whether their 
motives were truly humanitarian or merely a reflection of Sino-centric 
arrogance, when Zong Jun and Luan Ba put an end to the mystical 
marriages of youths and maidens with the spirits of the mountains, they 
attacked and destroyed the very basis of local belief. 
There is an occasional record of local resistance in these terms. In the 
time of Emperor Guangwu the Administrator of Kuaiji, Diwu Lun, was 
faced with a local custom of sacrificing plough-oxen. The local wu 
leaders had told the people that if they failed to kill their oxen, they 
themselves would bellow like cattle and then die, and the fear of such 
consequences made it impossible for the regular officials to prevent the 
custom from spreading. But the ox-pulled plough is at the core of the 
Chinese system of settled agriculture, and Diwu Lun took prompt, firm 
and effective steps to destroy the cult and restore good order.28 [17] 
More generally, however, resistance was either clandestine, 
maintained beyond the borders of effective imperial control, or expressed 
by physical rebellion. For the second century AD we are told that in 132, 
during the reign of Emperor Shun, the heretic rebel Zhang He ravaged 
half the counties in Yang province, and although that disturbance was put 
down there was another yaoze, Xu Chang, active in Kuaiji during the 
early years of the reign of Emperor Ling.29 These disturbances were 
important enough to be recorded in the imperial annals, but there is every 
reason to believe that the pattern of pressure from colonisation was 
countered at a local level by small-scale protest, described in reports and 
commentary as heresy and rebellion: cet animal est très méchant; quand 
on l'attaque, il se défend... 
                                               
27 For a traditional view of "The Confucianization of South China," see the article of 
that title by Miyakawa. 
28 See the biography of Diwu Lun in HHS 41/31:1395-1402 at 1397. 
29 On Zhang He, see HHS 6:260. On Xu Chang, see HHS 8:334-36 and Chapter Two 
at 80-81. 
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The final victory of the Han Chinese was determined by their weight 
of numbers, those population figures detailed by the Treatises of Han shu 
and Hou Han shu. In 2 AD there had been less than four million Chinese 
citizens living in the lower and middle Yangzi basin and the south, while 
the population of the whole empire was more than fifty-seven million. In 
the 140s there were almost seven and a half million people in the south, 
from a population overall of forty-eight million. In less than a hundred 
and fifty years, this region of south China had almost doubled its 
registered population: and the bulk of that addition came from 
immigration, with the development of new land under improved 
techniques of farming brought from the north. 
The same calculation, however, while it demonstrates the expanding 
authority of Han in the south, shows also the growing importance of that 
region to the empire as a whole. In the time of Former Han, the south of 
the Yangzi accounted for about seven percent of the people in the empire. 
By the latter half of the second century AD, south China represented 
almost fifteen percent of the [18] registered population. Though still a 
small proportion, this number of people might represent the critical mass 
which would permit men from the south to establish an independent state. 
That lay in the future, however, and other factors, notably those of 
geography and politics, logistics and leadership, had still to be called into 
play. For the time being we should consider the provinces of south China 
under the continuing dynasty of Later Han. 
Jing province and the middle Yangzi: 
Under the imperial administration of Later Han, the province or circuit of 
Jingzhou extended from Nanyang commandery in the north, with its 
capital at Wan, now Nanyang in Henan, southwards through present-day 
Hubei and Hunan. It thus encompassed the lower valley of the Han River, 
the marshes and lakes of the middle Yangzi, and the whole basin of the 
tributary Xiang River as far as the Nan Ling divide. On the west, the 
territory was bounded by the Gorge Mountains, running from the Wu 
Shan southwards to the Wuling Shan and the Xuefeng Shan on the 
present-day border between Hunan and Guizhou. On the east, Jing 
province was separated from Yang province by the Dabie Shan north of 
the Yangzi, and by the high ridges of the Mufu Shan and the Wugong 
Shan which lie along the provincial borders of present-day Hunan and 
Jiangxi. 
 SOUTH CHINA 
 
 
15 
The commandery of Nanyang, in the north of the province, was in 
some respects an anomaly. It occupied the basin of the Bai and Tang 
Rivers, which drain southwards to the Han, but the territory was much 
more closely associated with the region of Luoyang, the imperial capital, 
north across the hills of the Xiong'er Shan. In particular, Nanyang was the 
home country of that branch of the imperial [19] Liu clan which had risen 
in rebellion against Wang Mang and re-established the Han dynasty under 
the eventual leadership of Liu Xiu, Emperor Guangwu of Later Han. The 
ancestral tombs of the family from the time of Former Han were still 
maintained there, and in descriptions of that time the city of Wan was 
coupled with Luoyang for elegance, bustle and prosperity.30 
Apart from its imperial connections, Wan was an important centre 
for trade. To the northwest, the road by the Wu Pass along the Dan River 
led through the mountains into present-day southern Shenxi and the city 
of Chang'an, the Land Within the Passes and the capital district of Qin 
and Former Han. Westwards there was communication up the Han River 
to Hanzhong commandery and Yi province in present-day northern 
Sichuan. South was the lower Han River and the products of the middle 
Yangzi basin, and eastwards the line of the Ru and the Ying and other 
rivers tributary to the Huai gave access toward the lower Yangzi.31 Since 
Former Han, Wan city had been noted for its energetic mixture of people 
and for their interest in business and trade, and Wang Mang had 
recognised its importance as one of the five great provincial market 
centres.32 
In his geographical survey based upon the second century BC, Shi ji 
129, Sima Qian described the region of "Western Chu" as extending from 
the upper valley of the Huai across the north of the Dabie Shan and then 
curving south to the Yangzi. By doing so he recognised a southern 
hinterland for the trade which led through Wan city, and he saw some 
unity east and [20] west across the region of the upper Huai and the lower 
Han. Han shu 28B, in the parallel text compiled a hundred years later, 
identified the "Territory of Chu" with all the commanderies of Jing 
                                               
30 On Wan city, see HHSJJ 112/22:12b and Nandu fu "Southern Capital Rhapsody" 
by Zhang Heng of the second century AD, translated by Knechtges, Wen xuan I, 
311-336; also Nineteen Old Poems, No.3, translated by Diény, Dix-neuf poémes 
anciens, 13. 
31 SC 129:3269; Swann, Food and Money, 446; also HS 28B:1654. 
32 HS 24B:1180; Swann, Food and Money, 336. 
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province in the middle Yangzi, together with Hanzhong to the west and 
Runan to the east, but not including Nanyang, which was discussed with 
Yingchuan as a part of the "Territory of Han."33 The divisions and 
analysis of Han shu are based upon classical history and on contemporary 
theories of sociology and astrology, but one may observe echoes of the 
development of a southern axis from Nanyang into Jing province during 
the period of Former Han, while the northern region, about present-day 
southern Henan, had good access east and west as well as a dominance of 
the south. 
Besides its position as a centre of communications, Wan city had 
been the site of an imperial Office for Iron during Former Han.34 Under 
Later Han, these offices were not maintained and supervised so strictly 
by the central government, but the work continued and there is 
archaeological evidence of the impressive scale of the industry.35 
A according to Treatise of Geography of Han shu, the population of 
Nanyang commandery of 2 AD had been just under two million people. A 
hundred and fifty years later, at the time of the Later Han recording, the 
[21] figure was a little less than two and a half million, in a slightly 
enlarged territory. In a region so far north, close to the capital of the 
empire, this increase can hardly be regarded as colonisation and new 
settlement: some of the gain may be the result of natural increase in a 
prosperous region, and the remainder is surely a secondary effect of the 
shift of government to Luoyang, encouraging migration from all parts of 
the empire towards the new centre of power.36 Together with the capital 
                                               
33
 SC 129:3269; Swann, Food and Money, 446; also HS 28B:1654. 
34 HS 28B:1665-66; cf. HS 28B:1654. 
35 See, for example, Wang, Han Civilization, 126, describing the excavations of a 
Han dynasty iron foundry at present-day Nanyang in Henan, reported in Kaogu 
xuebao 48 (1978). The foundry, situated within the walls of the ancient city of 
Wan, was operative from the middle of Former Han into the Later Han period, and 
was probably one of several under the administration of the local office for iron. It 
had sixteen furnaces for casting and forging iron and steel, using ingots brought 
from outside or recycling old items. From the evidence of clay moulds, the 
products included farming implements from spades and pick-axes to axes and 
ploughs, axle-pins and bearings for carriages, and tripods, pots and basins. 
36 According to the Treatise of Hou Han shu, the population of Nanyang 
commandery was 528,551 households with 2,439,619 individuals, the population 
of Yingchuan was 263,440 households and 1,436,513 individuals, and that of 
Runan was 404,448 households and 2,100,788 individuals. The population of 
Henan was 208,486 households and 1,010,827 individuals. See the Treatise of 
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commandery Henan, Nanyang and its eastern neighbours Yingchuan and 
Runan in Yu province were among the most populous of the empire. 
Immediately south of Nanyang lay Jiangxia and Nan commanderies.37 
Jiangxia controlled the lower loop of the Han River and the marshland 
about its junction with the Yangzi at present-day Wuhan, and the capital 
of the commandery under Later Han was at Xiling, now Xinzhou, 
northeast of the modern metropolis. This lower reach of the Han was also 
known as the Xia River, and the commandery evidently took its name 
from a combination of the name Xia with that of Jiang, the Yangzi. There 
was an identifiable settlement, Xiakou, at the mouth of the Han River,A 
and the main stream of the Yangzi gave good access to the east, so 
Jiangxia was an area of potential importance. The commandery was, 
however, separated from the immediate north by the Dabie mountains, 
and the region as a whole was one of marsh-[22]land and seasonal 
flooding. In the second century AD Jiangxia had a population of 265,464 
individuals; this was a substantial increase, 21 per cent, above the 
219,218 recorded at the end of Former Han, but it is small compared to 
the territories further south. 
West of Jiangxia, Nan commandery extended from the twin cities of 
Xiangyang and Fan on the Han River south of Wan, now the combined 
city of Xiangfan, to the ancient metropolis of Jiangling, capital of the 
commandery, on the Yangzi by present-day Shashe. Much of the formal 
territory of the commandery was covered by mountain country in the 
west, and the Jing Shan extended an area of higher ground towards the 
line of the Han River, but there is open land along the river, and the 
modern railway curves across that plain. The Ju and Zhang rivers, 
flowing south from the Jing Shan ranges, join the Yangzi close to 
Jiangling and provided a route by water some distance towards the north 
near the intermediate city of Dangyang. The Han, on the other hand, 
curving eastwards towards its junction with the Yangzi, was of lesser 
value for communications between north and south, though it is likely 
                                                                                                                   
Administrative Geography at HHS 112/22:3476; 110/20:3421 and 34324; and 
109/19:3389. 
37 Jiangxia and Nan commanderies are listed in the Treatise of Administrative 
Geography, HHS 112/22:3482 and 3479; cf. the Treatise of Geography, HS 
28A:1567-68 and 1566. 
A The Han River at this time was also known as the Mian, so the name of the 
junction with the Yangzi is sometimes given as Miankou 沔口. 
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that there was considerable small-scale traffic through waterways in the 
marsh country between the two rivers. 
According to tradition, the capital Ying of the ancient state of Chu 
during the seventh and sixth centuries BC had been on the Yangzi in the 
region of Jiangling, but it now appears that the original Ying was north of 
the Han.38 Certainly later, and until the early third century, the capital of 
Chu, [23] still known as Ying, was in the vicinity of Yicheng in Hubei.39 
The debate on these early sites reflects the later division of Nan 
commandery under Han between two regions, that on the north about 
Xiangyang on the Han, and that in the south by Jiangling on the Yangzi, 
with open territory for communication by land and water between them; 
while the eastern part of the commandery, in that marsh region which lay 
between the Han and the Yangzi, and which tended to isolate Jiangxia, 
contained the wilderness of Yunmeng, celebrated as the hunting park of 
the rulers of Chu, and glorified in the rhapsody "Sir Fantasy" (子虛賦 
Zixu fu) by Sima Xiangru: 
Level plains and broad marshes, 
Rising and falling, splaying and spreading, 
Steadily stretching, distantly extended, 
Hemmed in by the great Yangzi 
And bounded by Shaman's Mountain ….. 
Bubbling springs and clear ponds 
                                               
38 At the beginning of the Zhou dynasty, the capital of Chu was at Danyang 丹陽: SC 
40:1691-92; Chavannes, MH IV, 340. There is, however, disagreement among 
modern scholars about the site of this early city. One theory, now generally 
rejected, placed it in the region of present-day Anhui province, near Danyang 
commandery of Han; the present debate is between the advocates of the Yangzi 
region, close to the putative site of the first Ying 郢, and those who would locate 
both early capitals further north on the Han River near present-day Xiangfan in 
Henan, close to the second site of Ying, also known as Yanying 鄢郢 (qq.v. below). 
Weight of opinion now supports the northern theory: Blakeley, "Geography," in 
Cook and Major, Defining Chu, at 10-13. 
39 SC 40:1695; Chavannes, MH IV, 345 and 337 note 1, and SC 40:1716; Chavannes, 
MH IV, 378. The later capital was sometimes identified as Yanying. 
  The capital of Chu was shifted twice more, in 278 and 241, first to the region of 
Huaiyang in present-day Henan (SJ 40:1735; Chavannes, MH IV, 414), and then to 
Shouxian in present-day Anhui, which new capital was again given the name of 
Ying (SJ 40:1736; Chavannes, MH IV, 416). For the history of all these moves, see 
Chavannes, MH IV, 337-338 note 1. 
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Where surging waters ebb and flow, 
On their surface bloom lotus and caltrop flowers, 
Their depths conceal huge boulders and white sand….. 
Dense forests and giant trees – 
Medlar, cedar and camphor, 
Cinnamon, prickly ash and anise tree..... 
Mandarins and citrons, breathing forth their fragrance.40 [24] 
West of Jiangling, up the stream of the Yangzi and through the great 
Gorges, lay the route to Yi province in present-day Sichuan. So far as one 
can tell, the river provided the one practicable way through the mountains 
at that time, for there were no county settlements within reach of one 
another except for the stations on the Yangzi. For major movement, 
whether peaceful trade or the manoeuvres of armies, the only effective 
resource was the Yangzi: the back-breaking labour of hauling junks 
upstream by men in trackers' galleries carved from the cliff face, and the 
swift but dangerous descent with the force of the river through snags and 
whirlpools.41 
The other major communication route through Jiangling led south 
across the Yangzi. The First Emperor of Qin had an imperial highway 
built southeast from his capital Xianyang, through the Wu Pass to Wan 
city in Nanyang, and then across the Han River at Xiangyang to reach 
Jiangling on the Yangzi. From Jiangling it continued south through 
Changsha and up the Xiang River. 
In his reconstruction of that route, Needham shows the road passing 
east of the present Dongting Lake. It is more probable, however, that the 
highway crossed the Yangzi in the near vicinity of Jiangling and led 
through the commandery of Wuling. The eastern route would have 
involved a traverse of the Yunmeng marshland, and the main expanse of 
the Dongting Lake at that time was concentrated further to the east, so the 
western route was more practicable than it appears at the present day.42 
[25] 
                                               
40 SJ 117:3004; Watson, Chinese Rhyme-Prose, 32, and Knechtges, Wen xuan II, 59-
61; slightly adapted. 
41 On traditional methods of tracking up the Gorges of the Yangzi, and the some-
times hair-raising descent, see, for example, Worcester, Junks and Sampans, 51-56, 
and Needham, Science and Civilisation IV:3, 662-664. 
42 Needham, Science and Civilisation IV:3, 8, 16 and Figure 711. Tom, Land 
Communications, 206 and map facing 212, however, shows the route going south 
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Wuling commandery, moreover, though not particularly large or 
populous in the time of Later Han, was the headquarters of the Inspector 
of Jing province, and this implies a significant position on the line of 
communications between north and south. As we have observed, the non-
Chinese people of the hill country to the west were active and effective 
even until the end of Later Han; Wuling may have gained in 
administrative importance from this, but the territory suffered also from 
the potential disruption. The commandery formally controlled a great 
swathe of territory from the Dongting Lake southwest up the valleys of 
the Li and Yuan rivers, which at that time appear to have flowed into the 
lake near its junction with the Yangzi, but the chief area of settlement was 
most probably in the narrow thoroughfare across the lower reaches of 
those rivers by Linyuan, the capital of the commandery, near present-day 
Changde, and Hanshou, headquarters of the Inspector, which lay a short 
distance to the east.43 
In population, Wuling was the smallest commandery of Jing 
province, but it had shown considerable increase during Later Han. In 2 
AD, Wuling was recorded with 185,758 individuals, but by the middle of 
the second century that figure had gained more than a third to 250,913, 
and that after losing one of its former thirteen counties to Nan 
commandery in the north. By contrast, Nan commandery remained 
relatively static: from 718,540 individuals in 2 AD to 747,604 in the 
140s; a [26] small gain which may well be accounted for by the transfer 
from Wuling of the border county Henshan, south of the Yangzi.44 
The records of increase on the middle Yangzi, however, pale into 
insignificance compared with the development which had taken place in 
                                                                                                                   
from Jiangling, through the area of Wuling, to cross the Zi River at Yiyang, by the 
present-day city of the same name. This seems most likely. 
43 HHS 112/22:3484. SGZ 46/Wu 1:1096 and 1097 PC note 2 quoting Wu lu, describe 
how Sun Jian passed that way on his march north from Changsha in 189, and 
killed the Inspector Wang Rui. 
44 Wuling and Nan commanderies are listed in the Treatise of Administrative 
Geography at HHS 112/22:3484 and 3479-80; cf. the Treatise of Geography, HS 
28A:1568-69 and 1594-95. 
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the three southern commanderies along the basin of the Xiang River and 
its tributaries.45 
Changsha commandery held a dominant position in the valley of the 
Xiang upstream from the Dongting Lake and the junction with the 
Yangzi. The territory is described by Shi ji as a centre for the production 
of lead and tin, though Sima Qian notes that the quantities produced at 
that time were not sufficient to justify their cost.46 The archaeological 
evidence from pre-Han times, however, demonstrates that Changsha was 
an important centre of the culture of Chu, and the records of such 
discoveries as the Mawangdui tombs just outside the present-day city of 
Changsha, which was at that time known as Linxiang and was the capital 
of the commandery, confirm the importance and wealth of the region in 
early Han.47 Faced with such finds of treasure, a modern scholar is hard 
put to reconcile the evidence of archaeology with the dismissive 
comments in Shi ji and Han shu, that "there is [27] no occasion to store 
up goods, and many of the people remain poor." 
During the second century BC this region had been at the southern 
frontier of the empire, facing the independent state of Nan-Yue across the 
Nan Ling divide. Nan-Yue was conquered by Emperor Wu in 111, and 
trade with the south was always prosperous, but the population of the 
region at the end of Former Han was not particularly large: some quarter 
of a million individuals in Changsha, a hundred and fifty thousand in 
Guiyang to the immediate south, and rather fewer in Lingling 
commandery to the southwest. By the middle of the second century AD, 
however, the registered population of Guiyang, which occupied the hill 
country of the Lei River, tributary to the Xiang, and the upper reaches of 
the Bei Jiang/North River on the other side of the Nan Ling watershed, 
had more than doubled, and was now more than half a million. 
Furthermore, Changsha and Lingling each registered over a million 
inhabitants, an increase of four and a half times for Changsha as 
                                               
45 Changsha, Lingling and Guiyang are listed in the Treatise of Administrative 
Geography at HHS 112/22:3485, 3482-83 and 3483-84; cf. the Treatise of 
Geography, HS 28B:1639, HS 28A:1594 and 1595-96. 
46 SJ 129:3268; Swann, Food and Money, 445. There is no mention of such 
production in the geographical treatises of HS and HHS. 
47 See, for example, Wang, Han Civilization, 81 and 128, on lacquer and iron work of 
the Warring States period found at Changsha; 81-83 and 103 and 105, on lacquer 
and gilded bronze of the Han period; and 52 and 207 on the food and the grave 
goods found at Mawangdui, together with Figures 274-278, 285-291 and others. 
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compared with the population recorded in Former Han, and a seven-fold 
increase for the region of Lingling. These numbers far outweighed those 
of the commanderies on the middle Yangzi, and they raised Changsha and 
Lingling to rank among the major territories of the empire. 
Such notable development reflects the importance of the imperial 
communications routes and the prosperity brought by trade with the 
southern coast. Under the empire of Qin, the highway which came south 
to Changsha had continued up the valley of the Xiang along the present-
day railway line southeast into Lingling. Just south of the county of 
Lingling, by the present town of Xing'an in Guangxi, the First Emperor 
had a canal cut across the watershed to link the Xiang River with the 
head-waters of the Li. This remarkable feat of engineering, the Ling Qu 
"Magic Trench," initially constructed to aid the movement of the First 
Emperor's armies in their conquest of the far south, was maintained 
throughout the Han period. It has been [28] restored on occasion over the 
last two thousand years, and it is still used for traffic between north and 
south.48 
So the main line of communications in the southern part of Jing 
province followed the course of the Xiang River and the highway 
established by Qin. The Han, however, supplemented this central axis by 
additional roads. One led through Guiyang on a more direct line to the 
south, and contributed to the development of that commandery, though 
there was no canal to aid the transport of goods, and the longer route by 
the Ling Qu canal was more effective. In addition, and primarily for 
administrative organisation and control, Later Han built roads into and 
through the mountain country between the rivers, so that Lingling was 
connected at the north with the upper reaches of the Yuan River in 
western Wuling, and on the southeast with Guiyang commandery. The 
Guiyang roads in particular were constructed by the Administrator Wei Li 
during the time of Emperor Guangwu, specifically to assert the authority 
of the imperial government, to ensure the collection of taxes, and to bring 
the people under the full authority of Han.49 
That same administrator, whom we have already noted for his 
energetic Confucianisation of the south, was also concerned to develop 
                                               
48 For a discussion of the working of the canal, see Needham, Science and 
Civilisation IV:3, 299-305. 
49 HHS 76/66:2459, cited by Ebrey, "Economic and Social History of Later Han," 
614. The character of this man's personal name, 颯, is also transcribed as Sa. 
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the prosperity of his territory, and he re-established the iron works at 
Leiyang, which had been the site of an Office for Iron during Former Han 
but had since fallen into decay.50 The new foundry was a local initiative, 
but it was the only source of iron recorded in that [29] region by the 
survey of the second century AD. It certainly supplied the requirements 
of Changsha and Lingling, and very likely those of the far south too. 
By the end of Later Han, therefore, these three commanderies in the 
south of Jing province had been greatly developed in Chinese terms. 
Immigration and colonisation brought frequent local disturbances, 
culminating in the 160s and the 180s with major rebellions of the native 
people, joined by Chinese settlers who sought to resist the force of 
government. Dealing with such troubles required the co-operation of 
governments in all three commanderies, and the river communication 
routes, despite rivalry from newly constructed local roads, also tended to 
encourage the administrative unity of the region. Surrounded by hills on 
three sides, and with comparatively limited access north across the 
Yangzi, Changsha, Lingling and Guiyang provided not only a line of 
communication to the south but formed an identifiable region of 
economic and political importance. 
Jiao province and the far south coast: 
The lands beyond the Nan Ling divide had been brought under control by 
the First Emperor of Qin. In a series of campaigns between 220 and final 
victory in 214, the imperial armies conquered and annexed territories 
covering the greater part of present-day Guangdong, Guangxi and 
northern Vietnam, and there was a brief occupation of part of Fujian.51 
With the fall of [30] Qin a few years later, however, Zhao Tuo, who had 
                                               
50 HHS 76/66:2459 and HHS 112/22:3483. HS 28A:1594 records an Office for Metal 
under the commandery of Guiyang, presumably maintained at Leiyang. 
51 Huainan zi 18:15a-b, describes these campaigns in some detail, and there are 
modern discussions and translations by Aurousseau, "La première conquête" and, 
more briefly, by Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 17-19. Five armies were sent out, of 
which four traversed the Nan Ling south from present-day Hunan, while the fifth, 
assembled in present-day Jiangxi in the Poyang region, moved eastwards across 
the Wuyi Shan divide to the Fuchun River, and then followed the coast south along 
the whole of present-day Fujian province to enter the Guangdong region from an 
easterly direction by the Jieyang pass near Shantou. As a result of this march, 
which was probably accompanied and assisted by a naval force, the Qin 
government established Minzhong commandery with its capital at present-day 
Fuzhou on the Min River: SJ 114:2979 and HS 95:3859; also below at 45. 
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been named as successor to the Commandant of Nanhai under the 
empire, took advantage of the disturbed conditions in the north to block 
the passes through the Nan Ling and establish an independent state. His 
kingdom of Nan-Yue continued under Zhao Tuo and his successors for 
almost a hundred years until it was conquered by the armies of Emperor 
Wu in 111.52 
Two maps found in Tomb Number Three at Mawangdui record the 
civil and military dispositions on the frontier of Former Han against Nan-
Yue in the early years of the second century.53 For the most part, however, 
the frontier was peaceful, and the government of Nan-Yue, under a royal 
house of Chinese origin and owing much of its support to immigrant 
settlers, confirmed the incorporation of this territory into the Chinese 
cultural ambit. 
In his description of the far south, which he considered as part of the 
territory of Southern Chu, Sima Qian observed that the people were for 
the most part non-Chinese Yue, a general term for the peoples of the 
southern and south-eastern seaboard. Panyu, the capital of Nanhai [31] 
commandery situated in the vicinity of present-day Guangzhou, was a 
major city, and Sima Qian refers specifically to trade in pearls, rhinoceros 
horn, tortoise shell, fruits and textiles. A hundred years later, the Han shu 
description of the "Territory of Yue" added references to ivory, silver and 
copper.54 Archaeological excavations in the district have confirmed the 
                                               
52 On the history of the state of Nan-Yue founded by Zhao Tuo, see SJ 113:2967-78 
and HS 95:3847-59, Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 23-27, and Yü, "Han Foreign 
Relations," 451-453. The discovery of a collection of tombs of middle-ranking and 
minor officials of Nan-Yue is reported in Kaogu xuebao 40 (1974), and that of a 
royal tomb in Kaogu 1984.3. 
53 Magnificent examples of early Chinese cartography, the maps are discussed by 
deC, "Maps from Mawangdui." 
54 SJ 119:3268; Swann, Food and Money, 446, and HS 28B:1670. Commentary note 
1 to the latter text quotes Wei Zhao of the third century, compiler of the official 
history of Wu (on whom see also Chapter Nine at 551-558), who defines the 
general term guo 果 "fruit" as longan and lychees. 
  Wei Zhao further explains the expression bu 布 "cloth" as referring specifically 
to that which was made from ge 葛, the dolichos or kudzu vine, a leguminous 
climbing plant, still valued in China for the fine fibres of its stem (Pueraria 
thunbergiana Benth.: Needham and Bray, Science and Civilisation VI:2, 536, and 
Bretschneider, Botanicon Sinicum II, 390). Yan Shigu, on the other hand, interprets 
bu as a general reference to fine textiles in various weaves and colours. At this 
time the Chinese possessed hemp and ramie but not cotton; their other cloths were 
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descriptions of Panyu as a centre for trade and for the manufacture of fine 
lacquerware,55 and have also revealed an important ship-building 
industry, capable of producing vessels which could undertake the coastal 
trade and the sea routes to the south.56 
Later Han brought further development of Chinese authority and 
settlement in the region of Jiao.57. In the eastern [32] part of the territory, 
Nanhai commandery extended up the North River to the border with 
Guiyang commandery in Jing province, and up the system of the Dong 
Jiang/East River along the coast as far as present-day Shantou. Cangwu, 
                                                                                                                   
silk, wool and sometimes felt, all of animal origin: Needham and Bray, Science 
and Civilisation VI:2, 532-537. 
55 For example, Wang, Han Civilization, 84-85. 
56 See note 64 below. 
57 There is some uncertainty about the title and administrative status of the territory 
controlled by the Inspector in the far south during Han. In the listing of the 
commanderies in the Treatise of Geography, HS 28B:1628-30, the territories are 
described as being under Jiao province (Jiaozhou), and the summary statement in 
the Treatise of Administrative Geography, HHS 113/23:3533, likewise refers to 
Jiao province. 
  Texts dealing with Later Han, however, contain several references to inspectors 
of Jiaozhi, and HHJ 15:464-65, supported by Song shu 38:1204, states that the 
territory was supervised by an Inspector of Jiaozhi until 203, when it was changed 
to become a province under a Governor: on this matter, see also Chapter Five at 
348. 
  In his commentary to HHSJJ 113B/23B:30b, Wang Xianqian observes that 
HHS always refers to the whole region as Jiaozhi, up until the change of 203. So 
Sima Biao's statement is an anachronism and the region, under an Inspector, was 
called Jiaozhi for almost all of Later Han. 
  This means, of course, that there was a province-level territory in the far south 
called Jiaozhi which was supervised by an Inspector, and among its subordinate 
units was a commandery also named Jiaozhi, headed by an Administrator. While 
the nomenclature is a little confusing, it is not unique: Yi province (Yizhou) in the 
west and southwest of the empire also contained a commandery called Yizhou: e.g. 
the Treatise of Administrative Geography, HHS 113/23:3512 and 3516. In most 
circumstances either the context of the passage or a reference to the Inspector or 
Administrator determines which level and region of government is being 
discussed. [There was also a period during Former Han and the beginning of Later 
Han that the name of Shuofang was given both to a commandery and also to a 
short-lived provincial administration in the far north of the empire: see, for 
example, HS 28A:1543 and HHS 1B:58.] 
  For the sake of clarity, and because most events in the far south which 
concerned the state of Wu took place after the rearrangement of 203, I refer to this 
territory, sometimes anachronistically, as Jiao province. 
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with its capital by present-day Wuzhou, controlled the lower reaches of 
the present-day Xi Jiang/West River, known at that time as the Yu River, 
and notably its northern tributary the Gui River, then known as the Li, 
which joined the Ling Qu canal. In 2 AD, the population of Nanhai 
commandery had been just under one hundred thousand, and during the 
next hundred and fifty years it multiplied two and a half times to a 
quarter of a million. In the same period in Cangwu the rise was even 
more impressive, from just under a hundred and fifty thousand 
individuals to more [33] than four hundred and fifty thousand – almost 
half a million and three times the Former figure.58 
Upstream of Cangwu, Yulin commandery controlled the main stream 
of the West River and its tributary the Liu.59 The capital of the 
commandery was at the river junction by present-day Guiping in 
Guangxi. Under Former Han, the population of the commandery had 
been some seventy thousand, half that of Cangwu, but we do not have 
figures for Later Han. The main stream of colonisation may have passed 
this territory by, though it is possible the region benefited from highway 
and water communication along the upper reaches of the West River from 
Cangwu and then across the divide to the commandery of Jiaozhi in the 
Red River basin about Hanoi in present-day Vietnam. 
Needham and other scholars have observed that the internal transport 
system of Han allowed goods to be moved by water more than two 
thousand kilometres, from the West River at Nanhai or Yulin in the far 
south, up the Gui/Li River and across the Ling Qu canal to the head-
waters of the Xiang, then down past Changsha and the Dongting Lake to 
join the Yangzi. From there ships and barges could go north up the Han 
River to Xiangyang and Wan city, with a short overland connection to 
Luoyang, or could travel downstream along the Yangzi and connect with 
the river and canal system about the Huai in the south of the North China 
plain. Paralleled and supplemented by the imperial highways and other 
roads, this was a remarkable system of communication; more extensive 
                                               
58  Nanhai and Cangwu commanderies are listed in the Treatise of Administrative 
Geography, HHS 113/23:3530-31; cf. the Treatise of Geography, HS 28B:1628 and 
1629. 
59  Yulin commandery is listed in the Treatise of Administrative Geography, HHS 
113/23:3531; cf. the Treatise of Geography, HS 28B:1628. 
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and flexible [34] than the Egyptian Nile, and better controlled than the 
Roman lake of the Mediterranean.60 
While this inland route was of great use to the government and 
immensely valuable to travellers and merchants, there was a natural, 
albeit sometimes dangerous, alternative: the sea-borne trade along the 
coast from the Red River delta to the Bay of Canton, then on to 
Hangzhou Bay, the mouth of the Yangzi and beyond. As Wang Gungwu 
has observed, "this trade was so much a part of the Chinese economy that 
there was rarely any need to refer to it,"61 but references to naval activity 
indicate considerable maritime competence. The Qin dynasty mounted 
operations along the coast of present-day Fujian during the third and 
second centuries BC, and the final victory of Han over Nan-Yue in 111 
was gained by a fleet collected at Panyu which pursued its enemies to the 
Gulf of Tongking. Likewise, at the end of Later Han, Sun Ce mounted an 
expedition by sea from Hangzhou Bay to the mouth of the Min River in 
196, and Lü Dai attacked the Shi family in Jiaozhi by both land and sea 
in 226. Such enterprises required numbers of ships and seamen and 
provide good evidence, albeit indirect, for the existence of an active 
merchant marine which could be commandeered in time of need.62 The 
remains of ancient shipyards at Guangzhou, old Panyu, demonstrate the 
capacity of vessels constructed there in the time of Nan-Yue,63, and 
though conquest by Han reduced official [35] interest in this field, there 
were local traders, Chinese and more often Yue people, who maintained 
the enterprise. 
                                               
60 Needham, Science and Civilisation IV:3, 306, and Bodde, "State and Empire of 
Ch'in," 65. 
61 Wang, "Nan-hai Trade," 29-30. 
62 SJ 114:2980; HS 95:3860 and SJ 114:2982; HS 95:3861, also SJ 113:2976; HS 
95:3858. On Sun Ce see Chapter Three at 169-170, and on Lü Dai see Chapter 
Seven at 445. 
63 On the shipyards of Qin and early Han excavated at present-day Guangzhou, and 
on the nature of ships at that time see the articles by scholars of Guangzhou City 
and of Shanghai Communications University in Wenwu 1977.4, and also Wang, 
Han Civilization, 122. The building platforms at the yards are estimated to have 
been suitable for the construction of vessels of sixty tonnes, thirty metres long and 
eight metres wide. 
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The shoreline between present-day Guangzhou and Hanoi, generally 
under the authority of Hepu commandery,64 had an erratic history under 
Han. There was incentive for expansion, for shipping naturally passed 
through the Hainan strait, and Xuwen county, at the tip of Leizhou 
peninsula, was a useful transit port.65 Still more important to the 
government, the fisheries of this southern coast, and Hainan in particular, 
were a source for pearls. Separated from the West River by hills and 
mountains, however, the narrow, humid and unhealthy stretch of coast 
between the peninsula and the Bay of Canton discouraged Chinese 
settlement. In 2 AD the population of Hepu was recorded as just under 
80,000, and it had increased very little, to some 86,000, by the Later Han 
count. 
Hepu county, capital of the commandery, which lay west of the 
Leizhou peninsula facing the Gulf of Tongking, had land access north 
across the low and narrow watershed to the West River in Yulin. During 
Former Han, Hepu was the base for long-distance sea traffic, for we are 
told that officials of the emperor's private apartments were sent on 
missions as far as India to exchange the gold and silk of China for 
precious stones, curios and trinkets, while the pearls they brought back 
were as large as two inches diameter, far more valuable than those 
collected locally.66 After these goods had been assessed and traded in the 
market at Hepu, they were sent with the [36] local production of pearls 
by portage to the West River, then followed the rivers and canals to the 
north. Under both Former and Later Han, the supply of pearls to the 
imperial court was a major concern of local administrators, and officials 
and private traders acquired great fortunes from the trade.67 
During the 170s and 180s AD, the government of Emperor Ling of 
Later Han sought for a time, by the establishment of Gaoliang 
commandery, to bring the isolated territory east of the Leizhou peninsula 
                                               
64 Hepu commandery is listed in the Treatise of Administrative Geography, HHS 
113/23:3531; cf. the Treatise of Geography, HS 28B:1630. 
65 On Xuwen county in Han, see the article by scholars of the Guangdong Provincial 
Museum in Kaogu 1977.4. 
66 HS 28B:1671. 
67 Yü, Trade and Expansion, 178. 
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under more effective control. The development, however, was short-
lived, and the new unit disappeared a few years later.68 
There were similar attempts to establish an imperial presence on 
Hainan island. At the end of the second century BC, immediately after 
the conquest of Nan-Yue, Emperor Wu sent troops and colonists, and two 
commanderies were proclaimed, named Dan'er and Zhuyai. Dan'er 
"Drooping Ears" probably referred to the adornments of the natives, but 
Zhuyai "Shore of Pearls" gives the real reason for the enterprise: the trade 
was valuable, but there was still more to be said for direct access to the 
centre of production. 
Han shu describes the people of Hainan as living a simple life, with a 
basic peasant economy supplemented by hunting. Because officials sent 
from central China abused and provoked the natives, however, there were 
frequent rebellions, and during the following [37] reigns the imperial 
positions were gradually withdrawn. Dan'er commandery was abolished 
in 82 BC, and Zhuyai in 46.69 At the beginning of Later Han a county 
named Zhuyai was re-established, probably on the northern shore of 
Hainan island, and Emperor Ming is said to have received tribute from 
the Dan'er people.70 There was, however, no serious attempt to restore 
Chinese authority until the time of the Three Kingdoms and the empire of 
Wu.71 
These failures of colonisation and control reflect the distances 
involved and the difficulties of the country. To this day, Hainan and the 
adjacent coastline are known for endemic tropical diseases, notably 
                                               
68
 The Wuhu people were brought under the control of the imperial government in 
170, and their territory was made into a new commandery: according to HHJ 
15:464, the name of the commandery was Gaoxing, but it was evidently later 
changed to Gaoliang. In 178, however, these people rebelled, and the trouble 
spread throughout the region, In 181 the newly appointed Inspector of Jiaozhi, Zhu 
Jun, succeeded in quelling the disorders (HHS 86/76:2839, HHS 71/61:2308-09 
and HHS 8:345), but the commandery of Gaoxing/Gaoliang is not mentioned again 
in the texts of this period, and it is probable that the establishment was abandoned. 
69 HS 28B:1670 describes the island of Hainan and the two commanderies of Dan'er 
and Zhuyai. On their establishment, see also SJ 113:2977 and HS 95:3859; on their 
abandonment, see HS 7:223; Dubs, HFHD II, 160 (Dan'er), HS 9:283; Dubs, 
HFHD II, 310 (Zhuyai) and HS 64B:2830-35, also HHS 86/76:2835-36. See also 
Schafer, Shore of Pearls, 8-14, Wang, "Nan-hai Trade," 21, Yü, Trade and 
Expansion, 192, and Yü, "Han Foreign Relations," 453. 
70 HHS 2:121, and on Zhuyai county of Later Han see HHSJJ 113B/23B:27a-b. 
71 In 242: SGZ 47/Wu 2:1145; Wang, "Nan-hai Trade," 33. 
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malaria, and the effects were equally feared in earlier times. During the 
Tang period the Gate of Ghosts, a narrow gap between crags on the West 
River, still embellished by a stele ascribed to the great general Ma Yuan 
of Later Han, was viewed as the entrance to a land of strange and deadly 
air, and a popular saying claimed that for every ten men who went out 
only nine would return.72 Under Han, the same conditions applied, and 
Hepu was used as a place of banishment for criminals and their 
associates. 
The coastal region of present-day Vietnam had been formally under 
Chinese administration since the conquests of Qin at the end of the third 
century BC, and Former Han benefited from the expansion [38] and 
consolidation in that region which had been achieved by Zhao Tuo and 
his state of Nan-Yue.73 The major administrative units were the 
commanderies of Jiaozhi on the Red River delta, with its capital at 
Longbian by present-day Hanoi, Jiuzhen with its capital at Xupu near 
Thanh Hoa in northern Vietnam, and Rinan, based upon Xiquan near 
present-day Quang Tri.74 
At the beginning of Later Han imperial authority was confirmed by 
the campaigns of Ma Yuan against the rebellion led by the Zheng (or 
Tr'ung) sisters in the region of the Red River between 40 and 43 AD.75 
Though they were themselves of Chinese descent, the heroic pair are still 
remembered in Vietnam as symbols of national independence and 
resistance; but Ma Yuan, General Who Calms the Waves, who enforced 
Chinese culture at the point of the sword and melted the sacred bronze 
drums of the Yue chieftains in order to cast a triumphal horse for 
presentation at Luoyang, was celebrated centuries later as a god and a 
hero.76 
                                               
72 Schafer, Vermilion Bird, 31. 
73 SJ 113:2969 and HS 95:3848 record Zhao Tuo's conquest of the western kingdom 
of Oule [Au Lac], in the region of the Red River delta; Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 
23-27; Schafer, Vermilion Bird, 15. 
74 Holmgren, Colonisation of Vietnam, 23-52, has a detailed reconstruction of the 
river systems in the delta and the sites of counties in Vietnam under Han. 
75 HHS 86/76:2836-37 and HHS 24/14:838-39; Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 37-41, 
Holmgren, Colonisation of Vietnam, 11-16, and Schafer, Vermilion Bird, 81. 
76 On the Tr'ung sisters in later centuries, see Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 334-339 
Appendix K. On the later fame of Ma Yuan, see, for example, Schafer, Vermilion 
Bird, 97-99, and on local traditions of his putative quasi-magical works, Stein, 
"Lin-yi," 147-202. 
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To the west of Chinese territory, the backbone country was inhabited 
by mountain people, probably the ancestors of the present-[39]day Moi 
tribes and perhaps related to the more advanced and powerful Cham and 
Khmer to the south.77 They appear to have been rather a source of 
exploitation than of concern to the Chinese administrators and the people 
of the delta and coastal plain, and the chief threat to Han control came 
from the settled inhabitants of the regions they sought to occupy. 
For a hundred years after Ma Yuan put down the rebellion of the 
Tr'ung sisters, imperial authority remained largely intact, despite endemic 
small-scale rebellion which was blamed most commonly on the 
corruption and greed of the alien governors from the north. In 136, 
however, there was a great uprising, chiefly by the Cham people from the 
south, which overwhelmed the greater part of Rinan commandery and 
made heavy inroads into Jiuzhen. In addition, when troops were raised in 
Jiaozhi to oppose the rebels, these men in turn broke out in mutiny, and 
the whole imperial position in the region was threatened. 
Discussions at court recognised that resources in the far south were 
inadequate to deal with the problem in military terms, but a proposal that 
an army should be raised in Jing province was wisely rejected. On the 
one hand the tropical conditions, heat and disease, would exact a great 
toll in non-combat casualties, and it was doubtful such an army could be 
effectively deployed. It was known, moreover, that there was discontent 
in the south of Jing province, so the disruption wrought by a major 
conscription might well bring another mutiny and even more serious 
trouble closer to home. The rebellion in the south was demonstrating the 
limits of imperial power, and the senior official Li Gu argued that the best 
solution was to attempt to settle the affair by administration, diplomacy 
and disruption of [40] the enemy through intrigue: an old and well-tried 
recipe for dealing with barbarians on the frontiers.78 
                                                                                                                   
  HHS 24/14:840 tells us that Ma Yuan was a connoisseur of horses. After his 
destruction of the rebellion in the south, he took the captured drums, symbols of 
alien religion and power, and melted them down to produce a bronze statue of the 
ideal horse. He presented it to the Emperor at Luoyang, and it was set up by the 
Hall of All-Embracing Virtue in the Southern Palace: Bielenstein, Lo-yang, 25-26. 
77 Schafer, Vermilion Bird, 16-17. 
78 HHS 6:266-68, HHS 86/76:2837-39; Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 61-62, and 341-342, 
where his Appendix L translates the memorial of Li Gu. See also Loewe, "Conduct 
of Government," 310-311, and Yü, "Han Foreign Relations," 454-455, also Wang, 
"Nan-hai Trade," 26. 
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The program was successful, at least insofar as it brought an end to 
active warfare, and Han control was formally restored. There were, 
however, continued disturbances in the region of present-day Vietnam 
during 144, 157 and 160, and conflicts with the mountain people of the 
north in present-day Guangxi and Guizhou.79 At the extremity of the 
empire, Rinan commandery below the 16th parallel appears to have been 
lost, and the non-Chinese state of Linyi was established in the region of 
Huế, extending south beyond present-day Da Nang.80 Further around the 
coast, on the Mekong delta, the kingdom of Funan traded regularly with 
Han. With a developing political authority along the eastern coast of the 
Malay peninsula and dominance of the regional trade, Funan was 
powerful enough and sufficiently distant to avoid any military ambition 
or confrontation.81 [41] 
We have no figures for the population of Jiaozhi commandery under 
Later Han, but in 2 AD there had been almost three quarters of a million 
people registered, more than all the rest of the province put together, and 
it seems certain that the number of inhabitants must have reached above a 
million during the second century AD. Jiuzhen commandery increased by 
about a quarter, from 166,013 to 209,894, and we are told that Rinan 
gained more than 40 per cent, from just under 70,000 to just over 
100,000: this last figure, however, probably reflects the situation at the 
                                               
79 Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 63-67. 
80 There is a description and history of Linyi in Liang shu 54:784-87. For modern 
discussion, see Stein, "Lin-yi," particularly at 130-147, and also Kuwada, "On 
Rinan and Linyi." 
  The commentary of Liu Zhao to the Treatise of Administrative Geography, 
HHS 113/23:3533 note 2, observes that Linyi in the fifth century occupied the 
territory of Xianglin county in Rinan under Later Han. Stein argues, surely 
correctly, that the new state represented a formation of the local people who had 
long inhabited the region considered to lie within the territory of the empire: they 
were not "beyond the frontiers" but local groups which gained their independence 
at this time. 
81 On Funan, see Liang shu 54:787, Pelliot, "Fou-nan," and for a discussion using 
modern scholarship on Southeast Asia, Hall, Maritime Trade and State 
Development, 38 and 48-68. 
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time of greatest prosperity, before the rebellion and partial withdrawal of 
the late 130s.82 
Jiaozhi commandery was the most important in this territory. Though 
the delta of the Red River did not extend so far into the Gulf of Tongking 
as it does at the present day, the area was broad and fertile, providing a 
prosperous hinterland for trade and influence by land and sea. There were 
communications by land: northeast across the modern frontier into the 
upper reaches of the West River; and northwest into Yi province, where 
present-day Kunming in Yunnan was administered by Yizhou 
commandery, and where Later Han claimed suzerainty over the Ailao 
people and the new commandery of Yongchang about the Dali Lake. 
Longbian, moreover, was a major entrepôt for the South China Sea, with 
contact east along the coast to Nanhai, and south to the peninsulas and 
islands of southeast Asia and the straits which led to the Indian Ocean.83 
The earliest description of the sea trade, preserved in the Treatise of 
Geography of Han shu, emphasises the importance of Hepu commandery, 
and sailing distances were apparently counted from [42] that territory.84 
By the first centuries AD, however, the natural advantages of Longbian, 
with its fertile and open ground for settlement, and its access to a network 
of transport routes, had given it pride of place. The descriptions of the 
city under the rule of Shi Xie at the end of Han, and the records of 
Jiaozhi's population and prosperity, indicate a dominant position as 
market for goods brought by land and sea, with a flourishing trade from 
the coast of China to the lands of southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. 
Such trade was essentially seasonal, based upon the alternation of the 
monsoon, with ships sailing south during winter across the end of the 
calendar year, and north in the summer. In theory it would have been 
possible for vessels to leave the coast by Cape Varella and sail due north 
towards Hainan or even more easterly to landfall by the Bay of Canton. 
In practice, however, apart from the normal difficulties of navigation 
                                               
82 Jiaozhi, Jiuzhen and Rinan commanderies are listed in the Treatise of 
Administrative Geography, HHS 113/23:3531-33; cf. the Treatise of Geography, 
HS 28B:1629 and 1630. 
83 Yü, Trade and Expansion, 177-178; also Chapter Five at 344-347. Some scholars 
identify Longbian with the city described by the Greek geographer Ptolemy as 
Cattigara/Kattigara: e.g. Zürcher, "Tidings from the South," 30-31. 
84 HS 28B:1671, discussed by Wang, "Nan-hai Trade," 17-23. For another study of 
the sea-borne foreign trade of Han, see Han Zhenhua, "Sea communications." 
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away from land, the reefs and shoals of the Paracels and other petty 
islands made the risk too great, and most voyages followed the curve of 
the coast to call first at Longbian. 
There is no evidence of direct official involvement in this overseas 
enterprise during Later Han, and the bulk of the trade was probably 
carried in non-Chinese Yue ships or in those of foreigners from the south 
and east. In the time of Emperor Huan, however, there was a series of 
officially recognised visits from the distant lands of the west, arriving by 
sea from the south of Rinan. Groups from India were received at the 
court in 159 and in 161, and an "embassy" from Daqin, the empire of 
Rome, arrived in 166. These may have been no more than groups of 
private merchants seeking favourable terms for trade, while the court [43] 
accepted the imposture for the sake of its own prestige. Irrespective of the 
true status of the travellers, however, they did come from very distant 
lands, and the record of their visits shows the range and extent of Han 
China's communication with the world beyond its southern seas.85 
Yang province and the lower Yangzi: 
During the Han period there was minimal attempt at government 
interference with the trade and the people along the coastline of present-
day Fujian. An outpost of the empire was maintained by the counties of 
Dongye and Houguan, at the mouth of the Min River by present-day 
Fuzhou, which probably served both as a communications point and as a 
                                               
85 The "embassies" from India (Tianzhu) are cited in HHS 7:306 and 309 and in HHS 
88/78:2922. That from Daqin is cited in HHS 7:318, HHS 88/78:2920 and HHJ 
15:7a-b. In 159 Emperor Huan overthrew the government of the General-in-Chief 
Liang Ji in a coup assisted by the palace eunuchs, and took power for himself, but 
by 166 his government was under criticism and pressure from scholars and 
officials who objected to his policies and to the eunuchs' influence at court: see, for 
example, deC, Huan and Ling, 11-14 and 69-85. The arrival of embassies bearing 
tribute from distant regions was a useful source of propaganda for the regime. 
  The texts on Daqin have been discussed in a multitude of secondary works in 
Western languages, of which I mention here only Hirth, China and the Roman 
Orient, 47, 82, 94-95 and 173; Pelliot, "Deux itinéraires," 132-133; Yule, Cathay 
and the Way Thither, 281; Shiratori, "Geography of the Western Region," 145; 
Needham, Science and Civilisation I, 197-198, and III, 174-175, Wang, "Nan-hai 
Trade," 28, and Raschke, "New Studies in Roman Commerce with the East," 853-
855. See also Lu Bi, SGZJJ 30:62b, citing Ding Qian. I was fortunate to be able to 
consult Dr Donald Leslie and Dr K H J Gardiner, whose work on The Roman 
Empire in Chinese Sources was published in Rome in 1996. 
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place for gathering toll on local [44] and passing commerce.86 Something 
was known of Taiwan, then called simply Yizhou "Barbarian Island," but 
there was no official interest. Further north, from the time of Emperor 
Shun the county of Yongning occupied the mouth of the Ou River by 
present-day Wenzhou in southern Zhejiang. None of the coastal 
settlements, however, appear to have exercised more than nominal 
control over their hinterland, and there was no drive to do so. The greater 
part of the mountain country of south-eastern China, including all of 
Fujian and great areas of eastern Guangdong, south-eastern Jiangxi and 
southern Zhejiang, lay beyond the frontiers of the empire and even 
beyond the interests of Chinese colonists. 
There is, however, good archaeological evidence to demonstrate a 
long relationship between central China and the lower Yangzi, and during 
the Zhou period there was a kingdom of Yue, with at least a sinicised 
ruling class, in the region of Hangzhou Bay. At the beginning of the fifth 
century BC, Yue defeated the rival state of Wu whose base territory was 
in the region of the Tai Lake and whose capital was at the city of Wu, 
present-day Suzhou, and Yue continued as an enemy of the great state of 
Chu [45] until its final defeat in 334 BC.87 When Chu was in turn 
overthrown by Qin in 223, the former territory of Yue was made into the 
commandery of Kuaiji, with its capital at Wu. Immediately afterwards, an 
army of Qin moved eastwards from Jiangxi across the dividing range of 
the Wuyi Shan, then followed the coast southwards to the region of 
present-day Guangdong.88 On its way the expedition conquered two small 
states of the Yue people in the neighbourhood of present-day Wenzhou 
                                               
86 On the county of Dongye, and its neighbouring county of Houguan, see 
Bielenstein, "Colonisation of Fukien," 121-122. The reference to the two places in 
HHS 112/22:3488, is seriously corrupt, and must be elucidated by means of the 
commentary in HHSJJ 112/22:47a-b. 
  The name of the county of Houguan, also known as Dong houguan, was 
evidently derived from its original function as a military colony: the term houguan 
may be rendered as "the office of a captain," or "company," and it appears as the 
name or part of the name of a number of county units along the northern borders of 
the Han empire: deC, Northern Frontier, note 38 at 457-458, and Loewe, RHA I, 
76 and 96. The prefix dong "Eastern" served to distinguish it from other places of 
the same or similar names in the north and northwest of the empire. 
87 On the history of Yue and Wu, see SJ 41; Chavannes, MH IV, 418-448, and SJ 31; 
Chavannes, MH IV, 1-33. On the history of the state of Chu, see SJ 40; Chavannes, 
MH IV, 337-417, and Cook and Major, Defining Chu. 
88 See note 52 above. 
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and Fuzhou, and the commandery of Minzhong was proclaimed to 
control the region of Fuzhou. 
With the fall of Qin, these territories regained their independence, 
and two new states emerged: Min-Yue by Fuzhou and Dong-Ou by 
Wenzhou; both rulers were recognised by Han with the title of king.89 
About 138, however, we are told that Min-Yue invaded Dong-Ou and 
besieged the capital. Dong-Ou asked for help from Han, and then 
requested that "the state should be transferred" to China Proper. The 
people were brought north to the region of Donghai between the Yangzi 
and the Huai, and the land was left vacant for occupation by Min-Yue. 
Another generation later, following the conquest of Nan-Yue by 
Emperor Wu of Former Han, Min-Yue, now also known as Dong-Yue, 
shared its fate. A combined force of armies from Yuzhang and ships from 
Hangzhou Bay destroyed the state, and again the people were shifted 
north to the Huai and the Yangzi. 
One cannot believe that the entire population of Fujian and southern 
Zhejiang was transferred to the north; almost certainly, [46] those 
involved were the royal and noble families of the two states. Their 
departure, however, removed the cultural and political leadership of the 
native people, and the county settlements maintained thereafter by the 
Han empire were sufficient to prevent any future development of 
renewed political independence. For the next three hundred years no 
Chinese armies operated along the rivers of Fujian and east of the Wuyi 
Shan, and there was no cause for them to do so. The people lived in small 
scattered communities among the mountains, they were in no position to 
cause trouble, and they offered no interest to the imperial government. It 
was, indeed, not until the time of Emperor Shun of Later Han, in 138, 
that the former territory of Dong-Ou by present-day Wenzhou was raised 
from the status of a subordinate military district to become the separate 
county of Yongning.90 
Further north, the area about Hangzhou Bay was reasonably settled, 
with several counties along the southern shore and extensions of 
colonisation in the valleys of the major rivers to the south, notably the 
Puyang and the Zhe, which flow into the Qiantang estuary by present-day 
                                               
89 On the history of these two states, see SJ 114 and HS 95:3859-63. 
90 HHS 112/22:3488, the Treatise of Administrative Geography. On the Han county 
settlements by the mouth of the Min River, see also Bielenstein, "Colonisation of 
Fukien," 101-103. 
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Hangzhou. From south of the bay, north to the mouth of the Yangzi, the 
Han commandery of Kuaiji also controlled the region of the Tai Lake and 
the low-lying, often marshy, but fertile land about it. The population of 
the commandery in 2 AD was just over one million.91 
At this time, the coastline at the mouth of the Yangzi was by no 
means so far advanced as it is now. The site of the present-day metropolis 
of Shanghai was still in the shallows of the sea, [47] Chongming Island, 
which now guards the mouth of the estuary, did not exist, and the turn of 
the coast to the north appears to have been close to present-day Rugao in 
Jiangsu. The Yangzi, moreover, had determined its course only within the 
previous few hundred years, for there is evidence that at least two other 
streams, the so-called Middle and Southern Jiang, had flowed through the 
region of the Tai Lake during the first millennium BC, before the main 
channel of the river was finally concentrated into the more northerly 
course of the last two thousand years.92 
In this region, the Shi ji of Sima Qian, referring to the region of 
Eastern Chu, and the discussion on the "Territory of Wu," in the Treatise 
of Geography in Han shu, both describe the region of the "Three Jiang 
and the Five Lakes" as low-lying and damp, so that many men died 
young. It was, however, naturally prosperous, with profit from the 
production of sea salt and from copper in the Zhang Hills to the west, 
while the city of Wu was among the greatest of the empire.93 
                                               
91 On Kuaiji, later divided to form Wu commandery [below at 49], see the Treatise of 
Administrative Geography, HHS 113/23:3488-91; cf. the Treatise of Geography HS 
28A:1590-92. 
92 For references to the Northern Jiang, now the main course of the Yangzi, to the 
Middle Jiang and to the Southern Jiang, and also to a Branch Stream 分江水, see 
the Treatise of Geography of Han shu, HS 28A:1590-91 sub Piling 毗陵, 1592 sub 
Wuhu 蕪湖, 1590 sub Wu 吳, and 1592 sub Shicheng 石城; also the discussion in 
HSBZ 28A (3) at 11a, 20a, 10a and 19a. 
  For reconstructions of the courses of these streams, see Yang Shoujing, Lidai 
yudi yange xianyao tu (Qian Han), 47a-48b, and Worcester, Junks and Sampans, 5. 
It appears likely that the Southern Jiang and the Branch Stream had ceased to flow 
by the end of Former Han, and the Middle Jiang was probably no more than a relic 
by the end of Later Han. See also Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, 24-25 and 51-52. 
  On the general outline of the coast in this region of Hangzhou Bay, the Yangzi 
estuary and the seashore north to Shandong, I accept the delineation of Zhongguo 
lishi ditu ji II, 24-25, 51-52, and III, 27-28. 
93 SJ 129:3167; Swann, Food and Money, 444-445, also HS 28B:1666-68. 
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West of Kuaiji, on the southern bank of the Yangzi lay Danyang 
commandery, with its capital at Wanling, at the place of [48] the same 
name in present-day Anhui.94 In this region, the Yangzi flows northeast 
past present-day Wuhu, the limit of tidal waters, and the greater part of 
the commandery was spread between the line of the river and the high 
ground now known as the Huang Shan to the southeast, with a couple of 
isolated counties across that watershed. 
Under Qin and early Han, Danyang had been known as Zhang, so the 
Zhang Hills mentioned in the Han shu text cited above may be identified 
as this territory.95 Under Former Han, Danyang was the site of an Office 
for Copper, evidently based on the local production, and this region of the 
southeast was known for the quality of its mirrors – some mirrors from 
the time of Wang Mang have the proud inscription that they are made of 
Danyang copper – and during the second century of Later Han there was 
a distinctive style of design showing gods and goddesses and spiritual 
animals, or human figures with horses and carriages. The pattern spread 
over the rest of China, and Kuaiji was noted as a centre of production.96 
In general terms, some pottery from the lands south of the Yangzi is 
distinctive to that region, notably a "hard pottery" made from dense clay 
which required firing at a higher temperature than common grey pottery. 
Specifically in Kuaiji, there has appeared the earliest evidence for the 
development of celadon glaze. The vessels excavated from tombs in the 
area of Nanjing and Wuhan during the 1950s, and dated to the years of 
the kingdom and empire of Wu in the third century, were previously 
regarded as the first examples, [49] but kilns from the late second century 
have been discovered more recently in the region of Shaoxing, south of 
Hangzhou Bay: their design lends itself to the development of 
comparatively high temperatures with good circulation of air, and among 
the potsherds are some green-glazed stoneware, the standard celadon.97 
                                               
94 Danyang commandery is listed in the Treatise of Administrative Geography, HHS 
112/22:3486; cf. the Treatise of Geography, HS 28A:1592. 
95 The name of the commandery was changed in 109 BC (HS 28A:1592). 
96 Wang, Han Civilization, 105.  
97 Wang, Han Civilization, 143 and 145, and Needham, Science and Civilisation 
V:12, 523-527. See also Nanjing Museum, Selected Cultural, Relics, figures 127 
and 128, Ni Zhenkui et al., "Inscribed Porcelain of Sun Wu," and Ye Hongning and 
Cao Jueming, "Origins of Porcelain in China," discussing the excavations of kilns 
in the neighbourhood of Shaoxing and the evidence for the development of 
celadon. 
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During the reign of Emperor Shun of Later Han the territory of 
Kuaiji was divided to form Wu commandery, and Wu city became the 
capital of the new administrative unit between the mouth of the Yangzi 
and Hangzhou Bay, with extension up the Zhe River to the southwest and 
the minor county of Fuchun. The southern part of the former 
commandery, which retained the name Kuaiji, had its capital at Shanyin 
near present-day Shaoxing, on the southern shore of the bay. 
The records of Later Han for the last years of Emperor Shun show 
the population of Wu commandery just over 700,000 and that of 
truncated Kuaiji as just under half a million, a combined total of 
1,181,978, and an increase of some fourteen per cent from the count in 2 
AD. One has the impression of natural increase rather than substantial 
migration, and indeed the number of counties in the region was reduced. 
In particular, the city of Qiantang, by present-day Hangzhou, which had 
been the headquarters of a county administration under Former Han, lost 
that status at some time during Later Han. Qiantang was evidently 
restored to its former position by the end of the dynasty, and the 
settlement, on the strategic site which later became the capital of 
Southern Song and was praised by Marco Polo as the greatest city in the 
world, certainly retained its local importance, but such a [50] reduction 
can hardly be regarded as a mark of interest or concern on the part of the 
imperial government. 
In similar fashion, though the population of Danyang rose by more 
than fifty per cent between the Former and Later Han, from 405,171 
individuals in 2 AD to 630,545 in the 140s, the formal area of the 
commandery did not increase, and the number of counties was reduced 
by one. 
Across the Yangzi from the corner of Danyang and the neighbouring 
region of Wu commandery, Guangling in Xu province occupied the 
northern shore of the broad Yangzi estuary as it was formed at that time. 
The capital of Guangling was at the county of that name, by present-day 
Yangzhou in Jiangsu, and it appears that there was canal construction and 
waterways leading north towards the Huai, roughly on the line of the 
present Grand Canal but meandering to the east through the Sheyang 
marsh.98 
                                               
98 Needham, Science and Civilisation IV:3, 271-272, and Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, 
45. 
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The estuary, however, was not so sheltered as it is now, and the 
centre of the empire lay not in the north but well to the northwest. The 
transport link into Guangling, therefore, was primarily a local one, and 
the main line of communication between the southeast and central China 
went by crossing-places of the Yangzi further upstream and southwest of 
present-day Nanjing. At the same time, however, the hills and marshland 
south of Dantu, Qu'a and Piling, in Wu commandery opposite Guangling, 
allowed only a comparatively narrow strip of open ground along the 
southern shore of the estuary, and these counties held an important 
position for both river- and land-borne communications towards the 
centre of Wu commandery and the further region of Kuaiji. [51] 
Upstream and southwest of Danyang, occupying the greater part of 
present-day Jiangxi province, was Yuzhang commandery.99 Sima Qian, 
describing the territory as part of the region of Southern Chu, referred to 
its local production of gold but observed that, like the tin of Changsha, 
the cost of extraction was greater than the market value. His comments 
were followed by Han shu in its section on the Territory of Wu, and this 
region, like that to the northeast, shared the description that "the land 
south of the Yangzi is low-lying and damp, and many men die young."100 
During the Han period, the area of the present-day Poyang Lake was 
indeed for the most part marshland, watered by the rivers of all present-
day Jiangxi and notably by the Gan flowing from the south and west. 
These streams mingled in the marshlands of Poyang, but where they 
joined the Yangzi there was a great lake and marsh, Pengli, extending 
north and south of the main stream. Chinese settlements were scattered 
about the lake and the marshlands, and counties had been established to 
the south, in the valleys of the tributary rivers.101 
In this region, the speed of Chinese settlement had been remarkable. 
In 2 AD Yuzhang had eighteen counties and a population of 351,965 
individuals. For the middle of the second century, the Treatise of Later 
Han listed twenty-one counties with a population of 1,668,941 
                                               
99 Yuzhang commandery is listed in the Treatise of Administrative Geography, HHS 
112/22:3491; cf. the Treatise of Geography, HS 28A:1593. 
100 SJ 129:3268; Swann, Food and Money, 445, also HS 28B:1668. 
  On the gold resources of Poyang county of Yuzhang in Former Han, see HS 
28A:1593. 
101 For a reconstruction of drainage patterns in this region, see Zhongguo lishi ditu ji 
II, 24-25 and 51-52. 
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individuals, an increase of almost five-fold. Yuzhang had thus an increase 
in the numbers of Chinese citizens comparable to that of Changsha and 
inferior only to that of Lingling, [52] and it was the largest and most 
populous commandery south of the Yangzi. 
This great advance of colonisation also increased the importance of 
the lake and river system of Yuzhang as a communications route towards 
the far south. In the west, the county of Yichun in Yuzhang was only a 
short distance across the mountains from Changsha commandery in Jing 
province and the north-south traffic along the Xiang River,102 but the most 
important development was further south along the main stream of the 
Gan. By that route, a traveller from the region of the Huai and the lower 
Yangzi could enter Yuzhang by the junction at the Pengli Lake and then 
travel up the Gan River, past the capital of the commandery at Nanchang, 
by the present-day city of that name, to Gan county in the far southwest. 
From there a road was maintained across the mountains to Qujiang in 
Guiyang commandery of Jing province, which lay on the upper course of 
the North River, and this gave access downstream to Nanhai 
commandery and Panyu its capital. 
During the Tang dynasty in the year 809, the scholar and official Li 
Ao followed just this route on his way to take up an appointment. He 
journeyed southeast from Luoyang across the Huai to the Yangzi, then 
south to Hangzhou and the Zhe River and over a mountain pass to 
Hongzhou on the Gan River south of the Poyang Lake. He arrived there 
on 12 June, and crossed the Great Yu mountain pass at the head of the 
Gan River exactly one month later, on 12 July. By 17 July he and his 
family were at Qujiang, and a little over a week later, on 25 July, they 
came to Guangzhou.103 [53] 
During Han, the route up the Zhe River would have been neither 
practicable nor desirable, and access to Yuzhang commandery was 
effectively limited to the water and narrow land paths through the lake 
and marshland by the Yangzi. The old road of Han across the Great Yu 
pass had been bypassed for an easier way at the beginning of Tang, but 
                                               
102 Sun Jian, Administrator of Changsha, based on the Xiang River, was thus able to 
send assistance to Yichun county when it was attacked by rebels about 189: SGZ 
46/Wu 1:1096 PC quoting Wu lu; Chapter Two at 105. 
103 The route of Li Ao is described, with a timetable taken from his diary, by Schafer, 
Vermilion Bird, 22-24. 
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the official Zhang Jiuling, supervisor of that later work, left verses 
describing the abandoned road the east of the pass: 
Forbidding in the extreme, a hardship for men. 
An unswerving course: you clambered aloft 
On the outskirts of several miles of heavy forest, 
With flying bridges, clinging to the brink 
Halfway up a thousand fathoms of layered cliffs.....104 
So the route was not inviting, with echoes of the trestle ways and 
galleries by which the Chinese in the northwest of the empire had 
developed the Bao-Ye and other routes across the Qin Ling between the 
valleys of the Wei and Han rivers.105 It cannot have been easy for major 
transport, nor for the movement of an army; but it was convenient for 
traders with light and valuable goods, such as pearls and other exotica 
from the south, and it confirmed the authority of government in the 
region, with at least the potential for military operations. 
Immediately north of the Yangzi, in the two remaining 
commanderies of Yang province, Lujiang and Jiujiang, the causes of 
Yuzhang's success in colonisation and development may be seen and 
explained. Under Former Han, the territory of those commanderies had 
been divided into three, Lujiang, Jiujiang and the kingdom of Liu'an in 
the north of present-day Anhui. The total number of counties was thirty-
two and the combined population was 1.4 million. Under Later Han, 
Lujiang and [54] Jiujiang had absorbed the territory of Liu'an, the number 
of counties was reduced to twenty-eight, but the population of the area 
had fallen to 857,109, a loss of more than half a million.106 
Similar decline can be observed across the whole region north of the 
Yangzi as far as the basin of the Huai. In Runan, just north of Lujiang, the 
registered population had fallen from two and a half to just over two 
million; in the neighbouring territory of Pei, formerly more than two 
million, the loss was almost half; and in Xu province, which occupied the 
coastline from the Shandong peninsula south to the Yangzi estuary, the 
population had been reduced by forty percent, from some 4.8 million to 
                                               
104 The verses are translated by Schafer, Vermilion Bird, 22. 
105 On the trestle gallery engineering of Han roads, see Needham, Science and 
Civilisation IV:3, 20-24, and Jupp, Historical Research of Plank Roads. 
106 Compare HS 28A:1569, 1568 and 28B:1638-39, with HHS 112/22:3485-86 and 
3487; also Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, 24 and 51. 
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2.8 million, while the number of counties had fallen by half, from over 
130 in the Former Han list to 62 under Later Han.107 
In his discussion of the causes for the fall of Wang Mang, Bielenstein 
explains this catastrophic drop in the registered population to the 
breaking of the banks of the Yellow River and consequent flooding across 
the southern part of the North China plain.108 The demographic evidence 
for his argument is impressive: it appears that the flood, which extended 
across this region for much of the first part of the first century AD, and 
was only brought under control in the time of Emperor Ming of Later 
Han, drove the people [55] to take refuge north, west and south. In the 
short term, banditry and rebellion were brought about by the disruption 
and despair of homeless refugees moving into the heartland of the 
empire, but in the longer term the errant waters also drove men and their 
families south across the Yangzi, notably to Yuzhang and to Danyang, but 
also no doubt to the new lands of Jing province a little upstream. 
Lujiang commandery, immediately north of Yuzhang, with its capital 
at Shu, near present-day Lujiang in Anhui, lay close against the ranges of 
the Dabie Shan, and occupied the eastern end of the low watershed, the 
Huaiyang Shan, which divides the Yangzi from the Huai.109 It thus 
provided the most direct route by land from north to south on this side of 
the divide, and its position on the intermediate stretch of the Yangzi gave 
it considerable strategic importance. Under Former Han, Lujiang 
commandery was the site of an imperial Office of Towered Warships, 
probably a naval training depot and surely a dockyard for construction 
and maintenance. Ships from that base could operate not only on the 
lower Yangzi, but also upstream into the neighbouring territory of 
                                               
107 Runan and Pei are listed in the Treatise of Administrative Geography, HHS 
110/20:3424 and 3427, also the Treatise of Geography, HS 28A:1561-62 and 1572.  
  The figure for the population of Pei, then a kingdom, at the time of the Later 
Han count, is given as 200,495 households and only 251,393 individuals; in 
Former Han it had been 409,079 households and 2,030,480 individuals. The 
number of individuals recorded for Later Han is impossibly small, not only in 
terms of the alleged decrease from Former Han, but also in relation to the number 
of households. Bielenstein, "Census," 159 has suggested that the figure for 
individuals for Later Han should read 1,251,393; he is surely correct. 
108 Bielenstein, "Census," 140, and RHD I, 146-151. 
109 Lujiang commandery is listed in the Treatise of Administrative Geography, HHS 
112/22:3487; cf. the Treatise of Geography, HS 28A:1568. 
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Jiangxia, probably with a patrol area as far as the mouth of the Han; and 
it is probable this arrangement continued for much of Later Han.110 [56] 
Jiujiang, with its capital at Yinling, near Fengyang in Anhui, was on 
the further end of the Huaiyang Shan, which thereafter disappears into 
open country of lakes, marshes and flood-lands to the east.111 On the 
borders of Lujiang and Jiujiang were large lakes, the Chao near present-
day Hefei, and the Quebei further north, just south of the Huai.B Shi ji and 
Han shu both remark that this was a useful transport route between the 
Huai and the Yangzi, and that Hefei was an important metropolis and 
market. Han shu refers also to the city of Shouchun, in the north of 
Jiujiang by the Huai River near the Quebei lake, as sharing in the trade 
and prosperity of Hefei.112 
Hefei was an important junction for two alternative routes. West of 
the Chao Lake, one ran due south along the course of the modern railway 
past Shu city in Lujiang to the area of Huan city close to the Yangzi by 
present-day Anqing, with access upstream south and west towards 
Yuzhang and the middle Yangzi beyond. The other route went almost due 
east, passing north of the Chao Lake, and reached the Yangzi on its north-
flowing reach between present-day Wuhu and Nanjing. There were 
crossing places and river ports at Liyang county on the Yangzi and in 
Fuling nearby to the north, and goods and people could then move either 
by land into Danyang or downstream towards the mouth of the estuary. In 
                                               
110 The Office of Towered Warships is identified as a shipyard by Nishijima, 
"Economic and Social History of Former Han," 582, and ships may indeed have 
been built there. 
  One of the training possibilities for conscripts of the Former Han empire was as 
a sailor or marine in a Towered Warship: Yen Keng-wang, Regional and Local 
Administration I.1, 204, and deC, Northern Frontier, 48. It is probable that the full 
establishment at Lujiang was a base which acted as the headquarters of naval 
activities on the Yangzi, as a supply and construction point, and served also as a 
training establishment for conscripts. The regular system of conscription used by 
Former Han was largely abandoned by Later Han (see below), but the function of 
the headquarters and the dockyard may well have been maintained, and there was 
presumably training for volunteers. 
111 Jiujiang commandery is listed in the Treatise of Administrative Geography, HHS 
112/22:3485-86; cf. the Treatise of Geography, HS 28A:1568. 
B  The regular transcription for the first character of the name of the latter lake, 芍陂, 
is shao. Traditionally and locally, however, it is known as Quebei: personal 
communication from Dr William Crowell. 
112 SJ 129:3268; Swann, Food and Money, 445, also HS 28B:1668. 
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that sense, despite the need for occasional portage, Hefei was the chief 
communications link between central China and the lands of the 
southeast and south, and despite the general loss of population, the [57] 
cities of this region appear to have maintained their prosperity through 
Later Han.113 
We have already observed the depopulation of Xu province, which 
extended along the coastline from the mouth of the Yangzi across the 
lower Huai and north to Shandong. In Later Han, that region appears to 
have been comparatively unimportant to the imperial government. 
Langye commandery, however, just south of the Shandong peninsula, 
was a centre of popular religion, with charismatic teachers and frequent 
rebellion or other disturbance. There was certainly some trade in ideas up 
and down the coast, and the celebrated Gan Ji, whom we have mentioned 
before and whom we shall consider again, was involved with the 
doctrines of the Taiping jing "Classic of Great Peace" which influenced 
north China, and he also taught in the territories of Kuaiji, Wu and 
Danyang. 
More importantly, however, immediately north of Jiujiang and 
Lujiang, Yu province was one of the great regions of the empire, and both 
Pei and Runan were still large and important. From Hefei and Shouchun 
there was excellent communication to the north, for the tributaries of the 
Huai River flow generally southeast and give good access upstream 
towards the Yellow River and Luoyang. 
This natural river system was enhanced by the great system known 
as Hong gou, often rendered as the "Wild Goose" but better understood as 
the "Vast" or "Grand Canal." As far as it can be reconstructed for Han 
times, the Hong gou comprised two sets of works, both focussed upon the 
city of Rongyang by the Yellow River north of present-day Zhengzhou, 
where a great imperial granary held supplies for transit upstream to 
Luoyang. From Rongyang, one canal, the Langtang Qu, curved south to 
link the upper reaches of [58] several rivers tributary to the Huai, 
improving their capacity for transport, and joining them to the Yellow 
River. A second canal, still longer, led eastwards from one natural 
waterway to the next as far as the city of Xiapi in Xu province, where it 
joined the Si River which flowed south into the Huai. This waterway, 
                                               
113 On the road routes of this region, see Tom, Land Communications, map facing 
212. 
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named Ban or Bian, and described variously by the texts as a river or a 
canal, was later developed into the Bian Canal of Sui and Tang, an 
essential part of the modern Grand Canal.114 In Han times it was a conduit 
for the great overflow of the Yellow River in the time of Wang Mang, and 
these waterways were the scene of important flood control works during 
Later Han, designed to prevent a repetition of that disaster.115 
From the imperial capital and the region of the Yellow River, 
therefore, there was good communication by waterways southeast 
towards the Huai. About the lower reaches of the Huai in Xu province, 
there was the possibility of continuous water transport from Xiapi down 
the Si River and then south through the rivers, canals and lakes of 
Guangling to the Yangzi. More directly, however, communications could 
follow rivers such as the Ru and the Ying to the Huai near Shouchun and 
then south past Hefei and the lakes, by occasional portage to the Yangzi. 
From there, as we have seen, there were water and land routes to the 
furthest south, an impressive system for government and mercantile 
transport. On this basis, however, in more troubled times at the end of 
Later Han, the cities of Jiujiang and Lujiang became of major strategic 
importance in frontier war between north and south, and their prosperity 
was overshadowed by uncertainty and devastation. 
[59] 
The enforcement of authority: 
In the sections above we have considered the dynamics of colonisation 
and demography, the migration of the Han people to the south, and the 
routes by which traders, officials and armies could travel. It must be 
emphasised, however, that Chinese civilisation was based upon peasant 
agriculture, and though people might move into the south, at the end of 
their journey they sought a place for cultivation and settlement. 
For the most part, agriculture in the south was based upon rice grown 
in paddy fields, stretched along the river valleys or extended a short 
distance up the hill-sides by terracing. Local enterprise, sometimes 
assisted or encouraged by government, saw the construction of small-
scale dams, irrigation canals and other works for the maintenance of the 
crop within its sunken fields, and the yearly round of sowing, 
transplanting, weeding and harvest, just as among the millet and wheat-
                                               
114 Needham, Science and Civilisation IV:3, 270. 
115 HHS 2:116, and 76/66:2464-65; Bielenstein, RHD I, 147-150. 
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fields of the north, represented the basic occupation of the people and the 
regular limit of their individual horizons. The traders and officials, the 
generals and the soldiers, were small in number and almost superficial in 
their importance compared to the unending concerns of farming, food and 
clothing. 
The Later Han government of south China echoed this priority of 
settlement. The administrative units changed little during two centuries, 
and there were few new centres of local authority. Though the 
commandery of Yuzhang, for example, multiplied its population almost 
five times, the number of counties in the region increased by only three, 
from eighteen to twenty-one. In central and eastern China, the 
government of Later Han had abolished many counties of the Former 
[60] dynasty,116 and even in the expanding south counties were set up 
rather to supervise newly settled regions than to initiate colonisation or 
intensify local control. Despite changes brought by migration, the 
southern frontiers were not particularly important to the central 
government, and policy was conservative rather than expansionist. 
Throughout the region the administrative hierarchy followed that of 
the settled central territories of the empire.117 Each of the largest units, the 
provinces, was supervised by an Inspector, whose rank was expressed in 
terms of his formal salary of Six Hundred shi of grain. The provinces 
were divided into commanderies and kingdoms, governed by an 
Administrator or by a Chancellor. In real terms, a kingdom was 
distinguished only by the fact that a member of the imperial Liu family 
had been granted nominal enfeoffment over a commandery-level 
territory, and though the titles of their senior officials varied, the 
                                               
116 On this economy by Emperor Guangwu, and on the counties abolished at the 
beginning of Later Han, see Bielenstein, RHD I, 141-145 and his map 19. 
117 In the following discussion I rely largely upon Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, based on 
the Introduction to the Table of Officials, Excellencies and Ministers of HS 19A, 
on the Treatise of Officials of HHS 114/24-118/28, and on other early texts, and on 
Yen Keng-wang, whose Regional and Local Administration gives particular 
attention to items of anecdotal evidence and the records of stele. 
  Though my renderings of official titles are based upon those of Bielenstein, 
who himself followed the system devised by Dubs for his History of the Former 
Han Dynasty [HFHD], I have made some amendments which reflect more clearly 
the situation of Later Han. A more detailed survey is an appendix to my 
Biographical Dictionary of Later Han to the Three Kingdoms. 
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administrators of commanderies and the chancellors of kingdoms were all 
appointed by the court and were responsible to the central government. 
Commanderies and kingdoms, in turn, were divided into counties; 
some counties gave their titles to Marquises of the empire, and were then 
headed also by Chancellors, while regular counties, depending upon 
population, were administered by Prefects, for counties of more than ten 
thousand households, or by Chiefs, for those of lesser size. The formal 
rank and salary of these magistrates, including chancellors of 
marquisates, ranged from One Thousand to Three Hundred shi, while the 
salaries of Administrators and Chancellors of kingdoms were Two 
Thousand shi, close to the status of a minister at the imperial capital. [61] 
The contrast between the rank/salary of an inspector at Six Hundred 
shi, and that of an administrator or chancellor, at Two Thousand shi, was 
deliberate. An inspector was given authority over a wide region, but in 
normal circumstances he did not have executive powers. Local 
government was under the control of the commandery or kingdom, and 
the inspector had the right only to report wrongdoing: higher authority in 
the central government would then investigate the situation and decide 
upon appropriate action. There were two exceptions: firstly, because of 
the distance from the capital, the Inspector of the province of Jiaozhi was 
granted the Staff of Authority, with special powers which permitted him 
to take action without first reference to the throne;118 and there were 
special provisions in time of widespread rebellion or other disturbance – 
this is discussed below. [62] 
Despite the difference in rank and the formal limitations of power 
upon the inspector, provincial headquarters were at least of comparable 
importance to the commanderies and kingdoms, if only through the 
ability of the Inspector's staff to interfere and criticise, and their capacity 
to take a broader view of the affairs of the region as a whole. By the later 
years of the dynasty the effective influence of the two offices was very 
similar. The biography of Taishi Ci, later a lieutenant of Sun Ce, contains 
an amusing anecdote which tells how, as a junior officer of Donghai 
commandery, he tricked his opposite number in the service of the 
                                               
118 On Jiaozhi province see note 57 above. On the Staff of Authority and the special 
powers of the Inspector, see HS 28A:1543, commentary note 1 quoting the scholar 
and statesman Hu Guang (91-172 AD), and commentary to the Treatise of 
Officials, HHS 114/28:3618, quoting Dongguan Hanji [cited there as Dongguan 
shu]. 
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Inspector of Xu province, and so arranged that the commandery's 
argument in a particular dispute should be heard first and favourably by 
the central authority. Specifically, we are told that "at this time the 
commandery had a disagreement with the provincial office, but no 
judgement had yet been given on the matter, and the side which first 
obtained a hearing at the capital was sure to come out best."119 
In time of military emergency, however, the situation became quite 
different. It was a basic rule of Han that local officials could not take 
military action outside their borders; thus county officials could deal with 
banditry or trouble with the natives only within their counties, and the 
administrator of a commandery or kingdom could operate only within his 
territory. If a rebellion or other disturbance became so widespread as to 
involve more than one commandery unit, then the inspector of the 
province was empowered to take command and to co-ordinate the raising 
of troops and their use in action. In these special circumstances, an 
inspector had formal right to give direct orders to an administrator. 
At the very end of Later Han, moreover, in the last years of the reign 
of Emperor Ling, a change was made to allow the appointment of 
Governors to some of the provinces; these were men of ministerial rank 
who could exercise direct control over the commanderies within their 
territory. The experiment had been tried, briefly, at the end of Former 
Han, but though the direct line of command increased the effectiveness of 
local government, it had the considerable danger of permitting provincial 
authorities to gain such power as might make them independent of the 
throne.120 In the civil war at the end of Later Han, position as governor of 
a province offered an excellent base for political and military power, 
while the contradictions of the former inspectorate system were shown, 
by contrast, to have served the interests of a centralising government very 
well. 
The source and quality of local troops was uncertain. Under Former Han, 
there had been a regular system of [63] conscription whereby men were 
called up about the age of eighteen, received basic training, served for a 
time on guard duties at one place or another in the empire, and might be 
required to spend time on full frontier service, or pay for a substitute. 
                                               
119 SGZ 49/Wu 4:1186-87. 
120 HHS 8:357, HHS 75/65:2431 and SGZ 31/Shu 1:865; also deC, "Inspection and 
Surveillance," 59-60, 62-63 and 67. 
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After these first years of experience, able-bodied men remained available 
for local or more distant service as part of a militia. 
Later Han, however, largely abandoned this system. There was still 
conscription, but for citizens of the inner commanderies and kingdoms of 
the empire the training was rudimentary, and conscripts were used only 
for the most basic guard duties. Major operations were carried out by 
professional soldiers drawn from garrisons on the frontier or from the 
Northern Army stationed at the capital, aided by large numbers of non-
Chinese auxiliaries, and also by the citizen militia which was maintained 
in the frontier regions.121 
The difference was reflected in the arrangements for assistance to the 
head of a commandery. Under Former Han, each had one or more 
Commandants, the equivalent position in a kingdom being held by a 
Commandant of the Capital; where a commandery had more than one 
commandant, each was set in charge of a region, designated by direction 
as north, south, east, west or central. For Later Han, however, we are told 
that the office of commandant was retained only for frontier 
commanderies and other territories of particular military concern and 
responsibility.122 It is probable that those [64] commanderies which had a 
commandant also maintained a regular and properly trained militia, but 
within the empire, where there was no immediate need for skilled 
soldiers, security was left to a small local guard under the commandery or 
county office, supplemented on occasion by largely untrained citizen 
levies, and commanded by the administrator of the commandery or the 
                                               
121 I discuss this question in Northern Frontier, 48-50, where I follow the argument of 
He Changqun, "Abolition of the Corvée System;" cf., however, Bielenstein, 
Bureaucracy, 114. More recently, Lewis, "Han Abolition," has developed the 
subject further. 
122 HHS 118/28:3621, Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 96, and Yen Keng-wang, Regional 
and Local Administration I.1, 153, with a table of appointments at 167-171. 
  On the northern and western frontiers of the empire there were also Dependent 
States (屬國 shuguo), controlling territory largely inhabited by non-Chinese 
peoples, and these were under the administration of commandants: deC, Northern 
Frontier, 2-3. The system, however, was not used in the southern provinces of the 
empire. 
  As examples of short-term appointment of commandants to regions within the 
empire affected by rebellion or banditry, we may note the arrangements made for 
Langye commandery between 155 and 165, for Taishan between 155 and 162 
(HHS 7:301, 311 and 314), and for Jiujiang in 145 (HHS 38/28:1275). 
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magistrate of the county. From the point of view of the imperial 
government, the chief danger in the inner regions of the empire was local 
banditry, and if the people were untrained, so too would be the bandits. In 
the days of Former Han and Wang Mang there had been some fear of 
insurrection or mutiny by malcontents at the time of the autumn reviews: 
better a blunt, weak weapon than one which could be too easily turned 
against the ruler. 
Unlike the frontier regions to the west and north, no substantial 
garrisons were maintained in the far south, and most disturbances were 
handled by troops recruited locally. Nevertheless, as settled Chinese 
territory lay close by that of the non-Chinese people in the hills, it was 
very likely necessary to employ commandery commandants. We have 
evidence that such officers were appointed in Jiaozhi and Jiuzhen in the 
far south, and the special circumstances of Jiao province may have 
required all that region to maintain military commandants, with the 
accompanying apparatus of conscription and training.123 [65] 
Further north, we have records of commandants for eastern and 
western regions of Kuaiji, and it seems likely the system was regularly 
maintained in that frontier territory.124 Elsewhere, however, there is no 
evidence for such establishments, though it could be argued that any of 
the commanderies south of the Yangzi, whether in Jing or Yang province, 
faced unassimilated non-Chinese peoples on their borders. The absence 
of any reference to commandants, however, compels one to assume that 
such appointments were not made, and that for the most part the relations 
between Chinese and barbarians were matters of no great military 
concern. There was substantial local recruitment to deal with the 
insurrections of the second century, as in southern Jing province during 
the 160s and in Kuaiji in the 170s, but these were ad hoc arrangements, 
and the early record of the commandery troops dealing with insurrection 
in Jing province does not give the impression that they had been well 
trained. By the end of the dynasty, however, the sheer number of 
rebellions and the need for soldiers to deal with them would have meant 
                                               
123 E.g. HHS 7:302 and HHS 44/34:1504, cited by Yen Keng-wang, Regional and 
Local Administration I.1, 162. The first item refers to a commandant taking action 
against specific disturbance; but the second is a passing reference not associated 
with any particular incident or campaign. 
124 Yen Keng-wang, Regional and Local Administration I.1, 162. 
 CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
52 
that large numbers of the civilian male population had experience in the 
use of arms. 
Finally, we may observe one further development in the growing 
times of trouble. Whether sponsored by the government or not, and 
increasingly in times and places where government failed to provide a 
proper sense of security, groups of people, Chinese or non-Chinese, were 
banding together for mutual protection. The natural unit was the family 
or clan, but the more powerful of these tended to attract weaker groups or 
individuals by [66] commendation, and local leaders thus gathered 
clients, retainers and dependents who enhanced their prosperity and 
power.125 
Such a development under Later Han may be observed even in the 
affairs of peace, for in a subsistence economy the great landed families 
could bind their tenants to their interests by rent and usury, they could 
hire retainers, and they could afford the luxury of education, the route to 
office in government. Members of powerful families could expect to be 
recommended for the imperial service by the officials in charge of their 
commandery or province, while those with less influence might take 
service among the more junior, locally-recruited police and clerical 
offices of the county or commandery and seek for notice and recognition 
there. In turn, tenure of these positions, at whatever level, gave an 
opportunity to influence local government in the interests of the clan, for 
any magistrate would be anxious to obtain the help of those who held 
local power, and would be careful in his dealings with men whose 
relatives might at some time hold jurisdiction over his own native place 
and people. Such linkage between gentry and officials was a constant 
concern of the central government, it was one of the chief problems 
which the inspectors of provinces were appointed to control, it was a 
                                               
125 Already in the 170s and 180s military officials of Han found it useful to 
supplement imperial troops with personal retainers. Zhu Jun, for example, 
collected his own men in Kuaiji before he went to deal with a rebellion in Jiao 
province about 180: HHS 71/61:2308. Later, of course, leaders of every level relied 
on personal followers as a nucleus for their armies. 
  On this development, see Ebrey, "Economic and Social History of Later Han," 
622-631, the discussion by Tang Changru, Wei-Jin nanbeichao shilun cong, 3-29, 
and the review of that work by He Changqun. At 629 Ebrey cites specifically the 
groups about the Poyang region who were involved with Sun Ce, but similar local 
and clan groups among the people of Wu and Kuaiji also sought to oppose the 
young warlord: Chapter Three at 170-171 and 183-184. 
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major factors limiting the powers and capacities of the imperial [67] 
regime, and it had much to do with its ultimately fatal weakness. 
Naturally enough, the most powerful families were to be found in the 
region of the capital and in the prosperous territories of the North China 
plain, where great clans had developed economic and social dominance 
though their extensive manorial properties, with speculation in grain, 
specialism in cash crops such as indigo, and experiments with new 
techniques of farming and labour. The situation on the open frontier of 
the south, where rice cultivation was often developed upon newly-
claimed or colonised land, limited the opportunities for gentry authority, 
and distance from the capital restricted their opportunities for influence in 
the central government. We are nonetheless told that members of the Xu 
family of Yangxian in Wu commandery had been recommended for office 
since the earliest years of Later Han, and Xu Yu became Grand 
Commandant, most senior position in the bureaucracy, in 181, while the 
Zhou family of Shu county in Lujiang supplied many imperial officials, 
including two Grand Commandants.126 In more limited terms, the Lu 
family of Wu county in Wu commandery had been local leaders for 
generations and produced several officials;127 while the Gao and Yan 
clans of Wu commandery, the Jiao and the He of Kuaiji, held substantial 
influence at county or even commandery level.128 
During the latter part of the second century, moreover, as disturbance 
continued and the power of government seemed [68] increasingly 
uncertain, people became even more concerned to gather together for 
protection and support. Throughout the empire there were leaders, large 
or small, who held private authority, not necessarily reinforced by official 
commission, and whose forces, first gathered for mutual defence, could 
be deployed for more ambitious action.129 From that point of view, as 
                                               
126 HHS 76/66:2471-72; and HHS 8:345 and SGZ 54/Wu 9:1259. 
127 SGZ 58/Wu 13:1343 and PC note 1 quoting Lushi shi song, a clan record of the Lu 
family, and see also Chapter Eight at 502-503. 
128 On the Gao family, see HHS 37/27:1250 Tang commentary note 1 quoting the Hou 
Han shu of Xie Cheng. On the Yan, notably White Tiger Yan the opponent of Sun 
Ce, see Chapter Three at 167 and SGZ 56/Wu 11:1310. On the Jiao, who acted as 
patrons of Bu Zhi, future Chancellor of Wu, see SGZ 52/Wu 7:1236. On the He, 
see SGZ 60/Wu 15:13 and Chapter Three at 170. 
129 Already by the middle of the second century, Cui Shi's Simin yueling, "Monthly 
Ordinances for the Four Categories of People," suggests that the third month is the 
time to prepare security measures against thieves who may appear during the food 
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central government collapsed after the death of Emperor Ling in 189, the 
empire was already prepared for civil war. 
In one important respect, however, the conflict that came at the end 
of Later Han differed from that which had developed two hundred years 
earlier after the destruction of Wang Mang. When Liu Xiu, founding 
Emperor Guangwu of Later Han, had made himself master of north 
China, he had to deal with only one major rival, Gongsun Shu, in present-
day Sichuan. China south of the Yangzi had produced no major political 
or military grouping, and the whole territory fell naturally into the hands 
of the victor in the north. 
By the end of Later Han, however, the process of colonisation and 
settlement across the Yangzi had brought a new pattern to the empire. 
During these two centuries, the weakness of imperial power along the 
northern borders with the steppe, and the static oppression of great landed 
families in central China, encouraged more enterprising subjects of the 
empire to seek their fortunes in the south. Sometimes aided by the force 
of government, but often seeking to escape such interference, these new 
settlers brought new energies and new techniques of settled [69] 
agriculture against the open frontier. In a quiet aggression that would 
continue for two thousand years, colonisation from the north usurped the 
land and displaced the native peoples. For the future of China, this 
development confirmed the dominance of Han Chinese and their culture 
on the land-mass of east Asia. In more immediate terms, however, by the 
end of the second century AD the growing prosperity and population of 
the south had created a new balance of power. Where the lands beyond 
the Yangzi had formerly been subordinated to the political and economic 
dominance of the north, there was now a possibility that the people of the 
south, while still bound to the heartland through language and culture, 
could break from the unified empire and establish political independence 
in their own interest. 
                                                                                                                   
shortages and famines of spring (3.6; Hsü, Han Agriculture, 220), and in the ninth 
month the family should put its weapons into repair and practice military skills, so 
as to be ready for the attacks of bandits driven by the misery of the coming winter 
(9.1; Hsü, Han Agriculture, 225). See also He Changqun, Lun Liang-Han tudi 
zhanyou xingtai de fazhan, 60-61. 
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FOUNDER OF THE FAMILY : SUN JIAN 
 
Introductory summary 
His birth, his background and his early career (c.155-184) 
The rise to high command (184-189) 
The war against Dong Zhuo (189-191) 
Civil war and the last campaigns (191-192) 
A note on the Great Seal of State 
 
Introductory summary: 
Sun Jian was a man of undistinguished lineage from an isolated region by 
present-day Hangzhou. He came to note as the leader of troops against 
rebels, first in his own region of Wu and Kuaiji, then in operations 
against the great uprising of the Yellow Turbans in 184, and he later held 
command in the northwest. 
Appointed Administrator of Changsha commandery, Sun Jian 
brought swift military order to the region and established personal 
authority. In 189, the death of Emperor Ling was followed by chaos in 
the capital which gave opportunity to the frontier general Dong Zhuo to 
seize power. This usurpation, however, brought widespread rebellion and 
marked the beginning of the civil war which ended the power of Han. 
Sun Jian brought an army north to join the conflict, and took service 
under Yuan Shu, one of the great gentry commanders in the "loyal rebel" 
alliance. As fighting commander of Yuan Shu's forces, Sun Jian fought 
his way to Luoyang and drove Dong Zhuo west to Chang'an. Soon 
afterwards, however, the alliance broke up [71] and north China became 
an arena for contending warlords. Sun Jian was sent by Yuan Shu to 
attack Liu Biao the Governor of Jing province, but he met his death on 
that campaign. 
 
His birth, his background and his early career (c.155-184): 
Sun Jian was born, probably in 155,1 in the county of Fuchun in Wu 
commandery in Yang province of Later Han. The site of Fuchun city is 
                                               
*  In the first edition of Generals of the South, published in 1990, Chapter Two 
occupied pages 70 to 145. The original pagination is indicated with brackets []; 
indexing and cross-references refer to those pages. 
1  There is confusion among the texts about the years of Sun Jian's birth and death. 
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now Fuyang, on the northern bank [72] of the Fuchun River, some thirty 
kilometres southeast of present-day Hangzhou. 
We do not have a great deal of information on Sun Jian's early life. 
According to Wu shu, the official history of the state founded by his son 
Sun Quan, the family had a lineage over six hundred years old, traced 
back to the celebrated general Sun Wu, who served the ancient state of 
Wu at the end of the sixth century BC and who was credited with 
authorship of the military classic The Art of War. Descendants of Sun 
Wu, putative ancestors of Sun Jian, continued as officials of Wu until the 
destruction of that kingdom about 473. Wu shu adds that the Sun family 
had a burial ground to the east of the city of Fuchun, and that wondrous 
signs were seen about the graves.2 
                                                                                                                   
  According to Wu lu, quoted in the commentary to the biography of Sun Jian in 
SGZ 46/Wu 1:1101 PC, Sun Jian was thirty-seven sui at the time of his death. 
  The main text of SGZ 46/Wu 1:1100 gives the date of his last campaign – 
against Liu Biao – as the third year of the Chuping 初平 reign period (192/193): 
below at 135. Yingxiong ji, also quoted by PC, gives the date of Sun Jian's death as 
the seventh day of the first month of Chuping 4 (25 Feb 193). This could be 
reconciled with the main text of SGZ if the operations had begun at the end of 
Chuping 3; but it is clear from other sources that they commenced twelve months 
earlier. 
  The Hou Han ji chronicle of Yuan Hong at 27:3b refers to Sun Jian's death in 
the fifth month of Chuping 3; but the dating of Hou Han ji in its present form is 
often erratic. 
  At ZZTJ 60:1928, Sima Guang sets the date in Chuping 2 (191/192), and in his 
Kaoyi commentary he notes that a memorial of Sun Jian's son Sun Ce, written 
about 197 (translated and discussed in Chapter Three), refers to the death of Sun 
Jian when Sun Ce himself was seventeen. Since Sun Ce died in Jian'an 5 (200/201) 
at the age of twenty-six sui, Sun Jian should have died nine years earlier. Sima 
Guang also cites the Han ji of Zhang Fan and Wu li, both cited in SGZ 46/Wu 
1:1107 PC note 5, which give the date of Sun Jian's death as Chuping 2 (191/192). 
  If this is correct, and if we can accept the statement of Wu lu about his age at 
that time, then Sun Jian was born in the Chinese year Yongshou 永壽 1, largely 
equated to 155 AD. 
  On the other hand, while the campaign against Liu Biao did begin late in 
Chuping 2, and Yingxiong ji is certainly wrong to date Sun Jian's death to Chuping 
4, it is possible that it correctly identifies the day as the seventh of the first month – 
that is, at the beginning of Chuping 3. In that case, Sun Jian died on 7 February 
192 and, following Wu lu, he was born in Yongshou 2 (156). 
  My own slight preference is to disregard the account of Yingxiong ji and to 
accept the statements by Sun Ce and Wu lu: so Sun Jian's dates of birth and death 
were 155 to 192 AD. 
2  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1093 PC note 1; deC, Biography, 20. 
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Naturally enough, the official chroniclers of the new state of Wu 
were duty-bound to recount something of the father of their first emperor, 
and it is not surprising if those who went to look for material were 
supplied with tales of an ancient lineage and of portents appropriate to 
the head of a great house. 
It is possible that the Sun family of Fuchun were descended from the 
legendary Sun Wu, but after so many centuries there can have been 
limited relevance or value to the claim. More significantly, perhaps, the 
fact that the distant Sun Wu was the only famous forebear ascribed to the 
family implies that no other relative had risen to high office since the fall 
of the ancient state in the fifth century BC, and it is almost certain that no 
member of the clan had held any substantial post under the Han dynasty. 
In Sanguo zhi, as in other standard histories, it is common practice to 
mention the ancestry of the subject of a biography and to indicate the 
titles and official careers of his relatives. And where the main [73] text of 
Sanguo zhi fails to give this information, the commentary of Pei Songzhi 
is often able to quote private clan records, local histories or more general 
works.3 The fact that the chroniclers of Wu identify no officials of Han 
who could be related to Sun Jian strongly suggests that his family had 
played a very small part in the three and a half centuries of the history of 
the dynasty. 
Though Sanguo zhi mentions his ancestor Sun Wu, there is no good 
account of Sun Jian's father. An anecdote preserved among some tales of 
marvels suggests that he was called Sun Zhong, but neither Wu shu nor 
Sanguo zhi record the personal name of the man who was, after all, the 
                                                                                                                   
  On Sun Wu, see his biography in SJ 65:2161-62. On his book Sunzi bingfa, see 
Griffith, Sun Tzu, and Minford, The Art of War. 
3  SGZ 54/Wu 9:1259, for example, describes the offices held by earlier members of 
the family of Zhou Yu, including two men who became Grand Commandant, 
highest position of the Han bureaucracy, and also Zhou Yu's father Yi, who became 
Prefect of Luoyang, capital of the empire; while SGZ 58/Wu 13:1343 PC note 1 
quotes the Lushi shi song, evidently a clan record, describing the positions as 
Colonel and commandery Commandant held by the grandfather and father of Lu 
Xun; and SGZ 60/Wu 15:1377 PC note 1 quotes the Jin shu of Yu Yu on the early 
family history of He Qi, including the fact that his father Fu served as magistrate 
of the small outlying county of Yongning in present-day Fujian. 
  On this basis, any position held by an ancestor of Sun Jian, no matter how 
unimportant, would surely have been mentioned. 
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grandfather of an emperor.4
 
At the [74] least, we must regard this as an 
indication that the family into which Sun Jian was born was obscure and 
unimportant. 
Concerning Sun Jian's mother we are told only that 
when his mother was pregnant with Sun Jian, she dreamt that her 
intestines came out of her and wound around the Chang Gate of 
the city of Wu. She woke up and was afraid, and told the elder 
women of her neighbourhood. The neighbour women said, "How 
do you know that isn't a good sign?" Then Sun Jian was born, and 
                                               
4  In the fifth-century compilation Yi yuan, attributed to Liu Jingshu of the Liu Song 
dynasty, 4:1a, translated by Straughair, "Garden of Marvels," 77-78, we are told 
that Sun Zhong of Fuchun, who became the father of Sun Jian, was a worthy man 
who earned his living by growing melons. One day, a beautiful three-year-old child 
appeared before him, and asked for one of his wares. Sun Zhong served him with 
courtesy, and then some men standing, impressed by his fine conduct, by revealed 
themselves as divine officials, and offered Sun Zhong a choice: whether his 
descendants should hold the rank of marquis for many generations, or whether they 
should be emperors, but for only a few generations. Sun Zhong chose to have his 
family become emperors. There were celebrations, a suitable grave-site was chosen 
for the family, and the spirits changed themselves into the form of white geese as 
they left. 
  Yi yuan mentions an alternative version of the tale: that Sun Jian was mourning 
his father's death when he was approached by a man who gave Sun Jian that 
choice. Sun Jian, as in the first account, chose the imperial alternative; the man 
showed him a suitable spot for his father's grave, and then disappeared. 
  The story of Sun Zhong and the melons is cited again by Meng qiu B:23a-b. 
This work, compiled by Li Han of the tenth century, is basically a list of common 
sayings and the anecdotes which explain them. There, the expression "Sun Zhong 
offers melons" is listed and discussed in terms of the first version from Yi yuan, 
that a small work of goodness may earn a great reward. 
  So there was a folk tradition of this nature, and it was collected into Yi yuan. 
On the other hand, the story is not endorsed by Chen Shou or Pei Songzhi, and it 
has no useful connection with any facts in the history. Even the emphasis on the 
matter of the grave site is contradictory: Wu shu, as we noticed above, says that the 
Sun family had long been resident at Fuchun, and possessed an established burial 
ground. There were wonderful lights and clouds there, but no melons, children, or 
messengers from on high. 
  In such circumstances, it is difficult to give credence to any details of the story, 
and the personal name of Sun Jian's father must remain undetermined. 
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he was not a boy of ordinary appearance; he was generous, 
intelligent and fond of unusual behaviour.5 
The city of Wu, present-day Suzhou, was about a hundred and fifty 
kilometres from Fuchun, and the Chang Gate, chief entrance on the 
western wall, was one of the celebrated sights of the region, so the future 
mother may well have seen the place in reality before [75] it appeared in 
her dream. One must, however, sympathise with her, experiencing one of 
the more dubious portents of future greatness. Despite Sun Jian's fine 
appearance, moreover, the interpretation of the dream can have been 
made little clearer by the facts that he was born the second of twins and 
his elder brother Sun Qiang also grew to manhood.6 
Fuchun lay in a frontier region. Though it was close to the centres of 
Chinese population along the shores of Hangzhou Bay, the county was 
situated at the edge of the hill country of northern Zhejiang, where few 
Chinese settlements had been established up to that time.7 The area as a 
whole had been part of the Chinese world for centuries, but it was not a 
region of great interest during the Han period, and major development 
had followed the routes south from the middle Yangzi towards present-
day Guangdong, rather than to this corner of the east. Though there 
[76>77] was trade and other contact with the non-Chinese peoples of the 
                                               
5  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1093 PC note 1 quoting Wu shu. A more detailed and slightly 
different account and interpretation from a fourth-century text is provided by 
Cutter and Crowell, Empresses and Consorts, 213. 
6  The biography of Sun Jian's nephew, Sun Ben, in SGZ 51/Wu 6:1209, says that 
Sun Ben was a son of Sun Qiang, who was the twin of Sun Jian. Though Sun 
Qiang lived long enough to sire Sun Ben and his brother Sun Fu, he died while 
they were still children. 
7  Fuchun was on the Fuchun river, southwest of present-day Hangzhou. 
  To the north, the county of Yuhang in Wu commandery was across a watershed 
in a separate valley due west of Hangzhou. 
  To the south, the county of Taimo (or Damo) in Kuaiji, west of present-day 
Jinhua, was on a tributary of the Fuchun river upstream from Fuchun county and 
further into the mountains. It is likely, however, that Taimo was connected to the 
main part of Kuaiji across a low watershed to the Puyang River along the line of 
the present railway, rather than downstream past Fuchun, which was in a different 
commandery. 
  West of Fuchun, the county of Yuqian in Danyang commandery, close to the 
present-day city of the same name, lay in a different valley. Like Taimo, it was an 
extension of Chinese authority from a different hinterland, not a territory which lay 
between Fuchun and the gradually expanding frontier with the non-Chinese. 
  See HHSJJ 112/22:50a, 49a, 45b and 39a, and Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, 51-52. 
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hills, and some immigration of Chinese from the north, Fuchun under 
Later Han was something of a backwater. 
The Sun family had evidently been in this region for some 
generations, for they had an established grave site across the river to the 
east of the city. Legend tells us that strange lights appeared above the 
tombs, and there was a multi-coloured cloud which reached to the 
heavens and spread out for several li. More practically, the family burial 
ground, whether or not it was the site of wonderful omens, is evidence of 
some stability and status in the community. 
Sun Jian's biography says that while he was still young, no more than 
fifteen or sixteen, he became a junior civil officer in the county 
administration. This, in itself, may show the position of his family. Had 
Sun Jian [78] belonged to one of the great clans of the region, he could 
have gained entry into the civil service by recommendation to the throne, 
he might have served a short time in the local office of the Administrator 
of Wu commandery, but he would then have been nominated as a "Filial 
and Incorrupt" candidate by the commandery administration or even as 
"Abundant Talent," a recommendation from the province.8 A young man 
of great family, with local influence and with relatives already among the 
bureaucracy, would treat the local administrators as senior and respected 
members of his own class, and could expect to receive their favour, 
patronage and recommendation almost as a right. 
Sun Jian had no such position and no hope of such consideration, but 
his family was at least sufficiently well known for him to gain 
appointment in the local county office. If he had [78] come from the 
poorest classes he would not have had sufficient time free from the daily 
struggle for subsistence to be able to offer his services, and it is unlikely 
he would have been given employment. As it was, for a young man of 
some ambition and leisure, office in local government could be the first 
step to a political career and, even should he rise no higher, the contacts 
that he made and the influence he could gain through his service would 
provide a degree of protection against the possibility of petty oppression 
in the future. To a large extent, in imperial China, an official position at 
any level was as much a means of personal and family insurance as it was 
an opportunity for public service. 
                                               
8  On recommendations as "Filial and Incorrupt" (xiaolian) and "Abundant Talent" 
(maocai), see deC, "Recruitment Revisited," 9 and 20-21, and Bielenstein, 
Bureaucracy, 134-137. 
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In Han times, the term li 吏 served as a general description of any 
junior officer in the civil administration. In provinces, commanderies and 
counties, the holders of these low-ranking posts were appointed locally, 
and the term could refer to a clerk in the office or to a yamen runner. Sun 
Jian did not occupy an important post, and from his later career as a 
fighting man we may guess that he held his initial position as a policeman 
or guard at the county offices. 
According to Sun Jian's biography, he first gained effective notice at 
the age of seventeen sui, and if he was born in 155 the incident must have 
taken place in 171. At that time he went with his father on a trip to 
Qiantang, which lay northeast from Fuchun, at the mouth of the Fuchun 
River by present-day Hangzhou.9 As they travelled, they learnt that the 
local pirate, Hu Yu, had set up a camp close by, had [79] robbed travellers 
of their goods, and was now dividing shares with his band. None of the 
boats on the river dared to go past. Sun Jian asked permission of his 
father to attack them, but his father replied only that "This is nothing to 
do with you."10 
Nevertheless, Sun Jian climbed up on the bank and went alone, 
carrying his sword, towards the bandits. When he came in sight of them, 
he waved his arms and pointed to one side and then the other, as if he was 
giving signals to soldiers deploying to attack. Persuaded that Sun Jian 
was the leader of government troops come to capture them, the pirates 
scattered in flight. Chasing after them, Sun Jian caught one man, cut off 
his head and returned with the evidence of his success. His father was 
most surprised. 
The pirate Hu Yu was only a petty criminal, the defeat of his band 
was a matter of no more than local significance, and there is no reference 
to the skirmish anywhere else in the histories. According to his 
biography, however, as a result of this exploit the county office appointed 
Sun Jian as a temporary Commandant, so he had now made a name for 
himself and had gained a post as a military officer. 
                                               
9  Qiantang was a county seat under Former Han (HS 28:1591), but the county had 
been disestablished for most of Later Han. The town, of course, remained, but it 
was probably administered by the neighbouring county of Yuhang (note 7 above). 
  Toward the end of Later Han, probably about this time, Qiantang was restored 
to county status: in 185 the general Zhu Jun was rewarded with title as Marquis of 
Qiantang, and that was probably a county fief: HHS 71/61:2310. 
10  非爾所圖也: SGZ 46/Wu 1:1093. 
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The account of this incident contains the only reference to Sun Jian's 
father in the official histories of the time, and it is noticeable that his 
reaction to Sun Jian's fine ambition is not enthusiastic. "This is nothing to 
do with you" is a curious speech from the father of such a hero. While the 
evidence is unsupported, and any passages claimed as direct speech must 
be doubted, there was at least a tradition that Sun Jian's father was a man 
of no great hardihood, and there are indications which suggest he was a 
merchant. The trip to Qiantang need not have been the first that he had 
made, and his disapproval of his son's proposed sortie and his preference 
for minding his own business fit very well with the [80] traditional 
picture of the Chinese trader. In the Confucian view, merchants were the 
least valuable class of society, and if the merchants were regarded with 
disdain by officials, they would have few feelings of public spirit. On the 
other hand, if Sun Jian had hopes of an official career, it would not have 
been difficult for the son of a reasonably prosperous merchant family to 
obtain his appointment to a minor post in the local government.11 
Sun Jian's appointment as a junior officer came at just about the 
same time as the outbreak of the rebellion of Xu Chang, a man who 
pretended to supernatural powers and made a rising at Juzhang in Kuaiji 
commandery, now in the region of Ningbo on the south of Hangzhou 
Bay.12 According to the Annals of Emperor [81] Ling in Hou Han shu, the 
                                               
11  On the status of merchants in Han, see, for example, Ch'ü, Social Structure, 113-
122. There was some attempt to restrict the entry of merchants into the 
bureaucracy, but it does not appear to have been consistently or effectively 
maintained, and in any case appears to have been applied specifically to those 
individuals who had registered as traders in a market, not to their relatives and 
descendants: Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 132. 
12  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1093 describes Xu Chang as a yaoze "heretic rebel" (Chapter One at 
15) who proclaimed himself "Emperor of the Brightness of Yang," and who was 
assisted by his son Xu Shao. The Lingdi ji of Liu Ai, quoted in commentary note 2 
to that text, adds that Xu Chang named his father as King of Yue, while HHS 
8:334, the Annals of Emperor Ling, says that Xu Sheng of Kuaiji named himself 
King of Yue. Yue was the name of the ancient state and the people of that region 
below Hangzhou Bay, and Eichhorn, "Chang Chio und Chang Lu," 298, describes 
the rebellion as a nationalist revolt of the Yue people. It seems more likely, 
however, that the name was taken from the region rather than from the people, and 
Xu Chang's forces included a substantial Chinese component. 
  Dongguan Hanji 3:5b says that the names of the rebels were Xu Zhao, who 
called himself General-in-Chief, and his father Sheng, who was named King of 
Yue. HHS 58/48:1884, being the biography of Zang Hong, son of Zang Min, and 
HHS 102/12:3258, the Treatise of Astronomy, agree. 
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rebellion broke out in 172 and was not put down until 174. According to 
Sun Jian's own biography, the commandery administration appointed him 
a Major and had him raise troops in Wu commandery. He gathered more 
than a thousand men and took part in the campaigns which destroyed the 
rebels. 
Both these early military offices held by Sun Jian were a little 
unusual. In the first instance, after the defeat of Hu Yu and his [82] 
pirates, Sun Jian evidently held temporary appointment as commandant 
in Fuchun county. It was not a substantive post, and he may have been no 
more than a senior assistant to the regular commandant. Formally 
speaking, he was still a civilian official, but his duties required him to 
supervise the military security and the police of the county, as well as the 
annual conscription for military service. 13 
                                                                                                                   
  By changing the character Zhao to Shao, Chen Shou avoided the tabu on the 
personal name of Sima Zhao (211-265), posthumously entitled Emperor Wen of Jin 
(JS 2:32 and 44), so there is no real incompatibility. 
  Nevertheless, whereas HHS and Dongguan Hanji refer to the rebels as Xu 
Sheng and his son Shao/Zhao, SGZ and Lingdi ji say that the rebels were Xu 
Chang, his son Shao/Zhao, and Xu Chang's father (unnamed, but presumably Xu 
Sheng). ZZTJ 57:1831 says that Xu Sheng called himself Emperor, so Sima Guang 
has combined the differing accounts, but his Kaoyi commentary does not discuss 
the matter. 
  There is one particular reason to suggest that Xu Chang was the name of one of 
the rebel leaders. According to the apocryphal book Chunqiu zuozhu qi, "Helpful 
Forecasts from the Spring and Autumn Annals, which was in circulation during 
Later Han, the dynasty was to lose its dominion because of/by means of xu chang: 
漢以許昌失天下. 
  Tjan, White Tiger Discussions I, 117, matches this prophecy with the change of 
the name of the capital of Cao Pi, first Emperor of Wei, from Xu to Xuchang in 
221, soon after he had compelled the abdication of the Han Emperor Xian in his 
favour: SGZ 2:77. SGZ 2:64 PC quotes from a long memorial presented at that 
time by the Assistant Court Astronomer Xu Zhi, discussing the prophecies which 
foretold the succession of Wei to Han, and including a reference to the passage 
from Chunqiu zuozhu qi, which he duly interprets in relation to the city of 
Xu/Xuchang (now Xuchang in Henan). On the political background of this 
memorial, see Leban, "Managing Heaven's Mandate," particularly at 328, and 
Goodman, Ts'ao P'i Transcendent, 101-102. 
  It is possible that the rebel of the Xu surname, operating in Kuaiji fifty years 
earlier, took the personal name Chang because he expected to fulfil the prophecy – 
or he devised the prophecy to match his own name. 
  See also deC, Huan and Ling. II, 473-475, note 41 to Xiping 1 
13  On county commandants during Later Han, see Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 100-
101. 
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From this experience of minor para-military authority, Sun Jian was 
called up by the commandery office, given rank as a major, and sent to 
recruit troops against the rebels. Such "recruitment" was actually a press 
system: in normal times there was regular conscription for short-term 
military service, generally a period of basic training followed by a year of 
largely unskilled guard or [83] garrison duty, and in local areas there 
were small units at commandery and county headquarters composed 
largely of volunteers, as Sun Jian had been. Fully trained regular soldiers 
were generally stationed only at the capital, on the northern frontier or in 
special camps, again in the northern part of the empire.14 In time of local 
emergency, such that presented by the rebellion of Xu Chang, extra 
troops had to be levied on the spot, and Sun Jian was given a special 
commission and a small escort, and sent to seize any man of military 
experience as a conscript for the campaign.15 
With the men collected by this means, Sun Jian did well enough to 
attract the notice of the Inspector of Yang province, Zang Min, who had 
                                                                                                                   
  The expression jia 假, which I render as "temporary, is understood by 
Bielenstein as "acting:" see, for example, Bureaucracy, 121, referring to an 
"Acting Major" and an "Acting Captain." I note, however, that Bielenstein also 
renders the term xing 行 as "Acting, as in the status of the first appointments to the 
post of General Who Crosses the Liao: Bureaucracy, 120; on this I agree with him: 
e.g. Northern Frontier, 4. In such context, xing may be understood as an 
abbreviation for xing 行...shi 事: "to practice/act in the affairs of such and such an 
office." 
  The term jia, on the other hand, appears as a prefix to the ranks of major and 
captain in HHS 114/24:3564, and the Treatise of Officials there explains it as fu'er 
副貳 "assistant." 
  It is possible the terms xing and jia were commonly used as synonyms, but I 
suggest that jia may have had a sense of exceptional appointment, where a man 
was being given a post to which he was not formally entitled by virtue of his 
current substantive rank; there is perhaps an analogy to the use of "brevet" ranks in 
the British Army before the Second World War. 
  By this interpretation, the prefix jia to Sun Jian's appointment as a county 
commandant recognises that he had not yet received a commission as a member of 
the regular imperial bureaucracy and was not formally entitled to the substantive 
post. 
  One may note that the term shou 守 also appears as the qualifier for an office, 
and may likewise be rendered as "acting;" it too appears to have brevet 
significance comparable to jia. 
14  On the military recruitment and conscription system of Later Han see Chapter One 
at 62-65 and deC, Northern Frontier, 45-50. 
15  Bielenstein, RHD II, 69 and 207 ff, has earlier examples of this emergency press. 
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command of the counter-insurgency. Zang Min recommended Sun Jian to 
the capital, and an imperial letter appointed him Assistant of Yandu 
county in Guangling commandery, on the sea-coast near present-day 
Yancheng in Jiangsu.16 
We have observed that commissioned entry into the imperial civil 
service could be obtained through recommendation from the 
commandery or provincial government as a "Filial and Incorrupt" or 
"Abundant Talent" candidate. An "Abundant Talent" nominee could be 
employed at once, but [84] since only one recommendation was allowed 
to each of the thirteen provinces in any year, together with a few more 
from very senior officials at the capital, not many candidates gained entry 
by this means.A The more common route of entry, as "Filial and 
Incorrupt" from a commandery, admitted the future official to a position 
among the gentlemen cadets who attended court as ceremonial guards of 
the emperor. In theory, the time spent at the palace gave the emperor and 
senior court officials the opportunity to observe and judge the character 
of the candidate; in fact, by the later years of Han the probation was no 
more than a matter of form, and recommendation from local government 
was an effective means of entry into the imperial service. 
The principle behind the procedure of recommendation and 
appointment was that any person who wished to hold senior rank must 
receive the commission of the emperor. The lowest positions in the 
government, both in the capital and in the empire as a whole, could be 
filled by local and general recruitment, but those who held such posts 
were in much the same position as non-commissioned officers in an 
army: no matter how long they served they could not rise above a certain 
rank. On the other hand, men who had received the imperial commission 
could be appointed to any office in the empire, and could rise through 
successive posts at the capital or in the provinces to reach the highest 
positions in the bureaucracy. The gap between locally-appointed, non-
                                               
16  On the county of Yandu, see HHSJJ 11/21:21b. The coastline of present-day 
northern Jiangsu, like all the region of the Yangzi delta, has been extended 
eastwards by the silt brought down the Yangzi and the Huai. As a result, though the 
ancient site of Yandu is now forty kilometres inland, during Later Han the city was 
very close to the sea. The character yan no doubt refers to a local industry of salt 
collection from pans laid out in the tidal waters. 
A  I present a detailed account of the system in "Recruitment Revisited" at 10 and 20-
21. 
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commissioned officers and officials with commissions from the capital 
was generally bridged by the process of recommendation. 
Up to this time, though Sun Jian had commanded troops in the 
government service, all his appointments had been made by local 
administrations, and he had no imperial recognition. When Zang Min 
sent in his report on good conduct, however, and Sun Jian received a 
letter from the imperial government to grant him [85] the post at Yandu, 
that document represented his commission into the imperial civil service, 
and Zang Min's recommendation, though not in the usual form of 
candidacy, had gained Sun Jian a vital step in his career. 
It was about this time that Sun Jian was married. He was age 
nineteen by Western reckoning, and he was established in a respectable 
position. His wife the Lady Wu, whose personal name is not recorded, 
came from the city of Wu, capital of the commandery, but her family had 
moved to Qiantang. Her parents both died when she was young, and she 
lived with her younger brother Wu Jing and other relatives. The Wu 
family may have been of somewhat higher status that Sun Jian's, and we 
are told that at first the relatives disapproved of Sun Jian as an unreliable 
man of poor background. Sun Jian, though quite taken by the beauty and 
character of the Lady Wu, was humiliated and angry at the rejection of 
his suit, but the Lady Wu was concerned that he might take revenge upon 
her family and persuaded her kinfolk to approve the marriage. Sun Jian's 
new status in the government service would also have reassured the Wu 
family that the alliance was a worthwhile investment. The Lady's brother 
Wu Jing became one of Sun Jian's leading associates, and the Lady 
herself had considerable influence in later years.17 
The first son of the marriage was Sun Ce, born in 175. The second 
son, Sun Quan, future Emperor of Wu, was born in 182. Two more boys, 
Sun Yi and Sun Kuang, were born in later years, and also at least one 
daughter. At the same time, Sun Jian acknowledged one son, Sun Lang, 
by another woman, possibly a recognised concubine, perhaps a more 
casual acquaintance, and the history refers to two other daughters, 
                                               
17  The biography of the Lady Wu and that of her brother Wu Jing is in SGZ 50/Wu 
5:1195-96, the chapter on the consorts of the imperial Sun family; it is translated 
by Cutter and Crowell, Empresses and Consorts, 122-124. 
  In contrast to my earlier interpretation of the Lady Wu's motives for marriage, I 
accept the reading of Cutter and Crowell, Empresses and Consorts, at 122, 
endorsed by Chittick, "History and the Three Kingdoms," 91. 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
68 
probably not born to the Lady Wu.18 It does not appear, however, that 
there were major [86] strains between Sun Jian and his wife, and the 
Lady Wu and her brother were important advisers and allies to the Sun 
family in years to come. 
Sun Jian served as Assistant at three counties one after another, first 
at Yandu, then at Xuyi and then at Xiapi. The site of Xuyi is now north of 
the town of the same name in Jiangsu, south of the Hongze Lake, and 
Xiapi was east of present-day Picheng in northern Jiangsu; both were in 
the kingdom of Xiapi in Xu province, and Xiapi city was the capital.19 It 
was the practice of Han that commissioned officials should not take part 
in [87] the government of their native regions, and Sun Jian's postings 
were all the north of the Yangzi, three hundred kilometres from his 
homeland. He was presumably given his recommendation and first 
appointment in 174, when the rebellion of Xu Chang had been crushed, 
                                               
18  At the end of the biography of Sun Jian, SGZ 46/Wu 1:1101 gives the names of his 
four sons Ce, Quan, Yi and Kuang; the commentary to that text quotes the Zhi lin 
of Yu Xi, which adds the information that a younger son, whose name was Lang, 
with the alternate personal name of Ren, was born to Sun Jian by a concubine. 
  The situation with regard to daughters is more uncertain. The biography of the 
Lady Wu, in SGZ 50/Wu 5:1195, says that she bore Sun Jian four sons and one 
daughter. The commentary of Lu Bi to this passage, however (at JJ 1a-b), cites the 
Qing scholar Qian Dazhao, and notes that there are three sisters of Sun Quan, son 
of Sun Jian, referred to in the texts: 
 a. an elder sister was married to Hong Zi, who is described as admiring the 
abilities of Zhuge Jin in that man's biography, SGZ 52/Wu 7:1231; 
 b. an elder sister, married to a man of the Chen family, bore a daughter who was 
given in marriage by Sun Quan to Pan Mi: SGZ 61/Wu 16:1399 PC note 1 quoting 
Wu shu [my earlier interpretation of the relevant passage is corrected by Cutter and 
Crowell, Empresses and Consorts, 213 note 4]; 
 c. a younger sister was given by Sun Quan to be the wife of the warlord Liu Bei 
in an effort to confirm their alliance about 209; she left Liu Bei and returned to Wu 
about 211: e.g. SGZ 32/Shu 2:879, and SGZ 36/Shu 6:949 PC note 2 quoting Zhao 
Yun biezhuan; also Chapter Five. 
 It seems likely that it was the younger sister of Sun Quan who was the child of Sun 
Jian and the Lady Wu. The two elder were probably both half-sisters of Sun Quan 
and his brothers: the man of the Chen family is not mentioned otherwise, and Hong 
Zi was not distinguished. 
  Once again, we are not told the personal names of any of these female 
members of the Sun family, not even that of Sun Quan's full sister, the wife of Liu 
Bei. 
19  On the counties of Xiapi and Xuyi, see HHSJJ 111/21:23b and 22b. 
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and for the next ten years he remained an official in the local 
administration of Xu province. 
Yandu and Xuyi were comparatively minor counties, with a 
population less than ten thousand households. Xiapi was larger, with a 
more considerable population and greater importance. The head of the 
county administration was a Prefect, who had slightly higher rank and 
salary, and the Assistant presumably shared some of that prestige.20 
Despite this, Sun Jian had gained no real promotion in the service, he was 
still only an assistant magistrate, and he held no independent 
responsibility. On the other hand, Jiangbiao zhuan, the local history of 
the lands beyond the Yangzi, compiled in the third century and quoted in 
the commentary to Sun Jian's biography, tells us that 
Wherever Sun Jian went he gained a good reputation, and the officers 
and people loved and trusted him. There were always hundreds of his 
old friends from his home district and [88] young adventurers who 
came to visit him. Sun Jian looked after them and cared for them like 
his own family.21 
In 184 Sun Jian was thirty years old by Chinese reckoning, he held a 
minor post in the imperial service at Xiapi, he was experienced in war, 
and he had gathered a small group of friends and followers who might be 
prepared to support him in the future. 
The rise to high command (184-189): 
The Chinese year which began on 31 January 184 was a jiazi year, first of 
a new series in the sexagenary calendar. This year was also the beginning 
of the end of the power of Han, as major disorder in two parts of the 
                                               
20  On prefects, chiefs and their assistants, see the discussion in Chapter One at 60 and 
Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 101. The system of Han distinguished between the heads 
of counties which contained more than ten thousand households, whose title was 
ling "Prefect," and those of smaller number, which were headed by a zhang 
"Chief;" I normally refer to both offices by the generic term "magistrate." 
  The Hou Han junguo lingzhang kao of Qian Dazhao, in ESWSBB II, 2074, 
produces evidence that the county of Xiapi was headed by a Prefect, and though 
the supplement to that work, compiled by Ding Xitian, in ESWSBB II, 2081, shows 
that at some stage the county was headed only by a Chief, it appears that in the 
latter part of Later Han it was a prefectural office. 
  Neither Qian Dazhao nor Ding Xitian make any comment on the size or status 
of the other two counties in which Sun Jian served, and the commentary of Ma 
Yulong, quoted in HHSJJ, which is sometimes also helpful, has nothing more to 
offer. 
21  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1094 PC note 3 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan; deC, Biography, 31. 
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empire disrupted the administration of the provinces and strained the 
resources of the government at the capital. In the east, there was the 
rebellion of the Yellow Turbans led by Zhang Jue, and northwest there 
was rebellion in Liang province.22 
Under such pressures, the armies of Emperor Ling were barely able 
to hold their own, but the difficulties of the empire gave Sun Jian the 
opportunity he was fitted for, and his achievements first against the 
Yellow Turbans and then in the northwest gave him rank and honour 
which he could never have expected in normal times of peace. 
Zhang Jue was a man from Julu commandery in Ji province, in the 
south of present-day Hebei. For several years he had used a form of 
Taoism to cure the sick by confession of sins and faith [89] healing, and 
as people came to follow his teaching he and his brothers Zhang Bao and 
Zhang Liang planned rebellion against the Han. The religion and politics 
of the Zhang brothers were based on belief in an apocalyptic change to 
the order of the world, and they told their followers that in the jiazi year, 
beginning of the new cycle, the sky would become yellow, and that under 
this new heaven the rule of Han would end and a new era of government 
begin. The characters jiazi became a symbol of the coming change and 
later, when the followers of Zhang Jue went to battle they wore a yellow 
cloth bound about their heads as a badge. From this came the name 
Yellow Turbans.23 
                                               
22  Michaud presents a survey of the Yellow Turban rebellion, but a more detailed and 
imaginative account is provided by Chapter Three of Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao," 60-118. 
See also ZZTJ 58:1864-75; deC, Huan and Ling, 174-189, Cambridge Han, 338-
340 [Mansvelt Beck, "The Fall of Han"], and deC, Imperial Warlord, 35-39, and 
Fire over Luoyang, 402-415. 
  On Liang province, see Haloun, "Liang-chou Rebellion," and deC, Northern 
Frontier, 146-162. 
23  The Yellow Turban movement, like orthodox and other rebel movements of this 
time, was strongly influenced by the concept of the Five Powers. 
  From the beginning of Later Han, it had generally been accepted that the 
dynasty ruled under the auspices of the Power of Fire, whose associated colour is 
red, and that the government which succeeded it would represent the Power of 
Earth and the colour yellow: according to the theories of the Five Powers, Fire 
produced (i.e. was succeeded by) Earth. On these speculations, see Cambridge 
Han, 360-361 [Mansvelt Beck, "The Fall of Han"]. 
  It was thus quite appropriate for Zhang Jue and his associates to adopt the 
colour yellow as a badge, though the claim that the colour of the sky would change 
from blue to yellow may be considered rather a general sign of heavenly approval 
of their cause than a direct aspect of the theories of the Five Powers themselves. 
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By the second half of the second century AD, confusion in the 
imperial government at the capital, tension in the social and political 
pattern of the provinces, and several outbreaks of widespread plague had 
produced a discontent and unease among [90] the people which found a 
degree of solace in unorthodox religions, and which was reflected even in 
Confucianism by the superstitions of the New Text school and beliefs in 
the miraculous powers of sacred texts. At the court in Luoyang, Emperor 
Huan, predecessor of Emperor Ling, had held state sacrifice to Huang-
Lao and the Buddha,24 while in the provinces there were heterodox sects 
which maintained their independence or opposition to the government: 
Xu Chang, whose forces Sun Jian had fought in the early 170s, was only 
one of their number.25 With its belief in a new order of nature, [91] and its 
                                                                                                                   
  We should note that though the term 黃巾 huang jin is commonly rendered as 
"Yellow Turbans," a convention which I follow, the headgear involved was almost 
certainly not a true turban à la Sikh, but rather a simple band of coloured cloth tied 
about the forehead. The custom can still be seen observed by mourners at 
traditional Chinese funerals; it gained international celebrity from Japanese 
Kamikaze pilots in the Second World War and its later adoption by Yukio 
Mishima; and it was used by students of the democracy movement at Tiananmen in 
1989. 
24  For further discussion, see deC, "Politics and Philosophy," 73-80. 
25  SGZ 8/Wei 8:264 PC note 1 quoting Dian lue, says that in the Xiping and Guanghe 
periods of Later Han (172-178 and 179-183) there were a great number of yaoze 妖
賊 "heretic rebels." One was Zhang Jue, another was the Rice Sect of Hanzhong, 
on which see Chapter Six at 357, while a certain Luo Yao was active in the region 
about Chang'an in the lower Wei valley. 
  There are earlier references to yaoze in the annals of Hou Han shu: for example 
in Yang province in 132 (HHS 6:260), in Youfufeng in 150 (HHS 7:296), in Bohai 
in 165 (HHS 7:316), and of course the Xu group in Kuaiji in 172-174. 
  On the background of these sects, see the articles by Stein, "Remarques sur les 
mouvements du Taoisme," and by Seidel, "Image of the Perfect Ruler." 
  One must be aware, moreover, as in Chapter One at 15, that though a group of 
rebels may be described as yao by the official histories, such a description tells us 
no more than that they were alien to the established state cult of Confucianism. 
Except for the Yellow Turbans and the sect of Zhang Lu, there are no details of 
their beliefs. Indeed, though we may assume that there were some similarities of 
faith and superstition common to these movements, there is certainly no reason to 
assume that any one of them would be in philosophical, religious or (least of all) 
political agreement with another. 
  Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao, 69-70, notes there is a gap of more than ten years between 
the record of the rising of Xu Chang, defeated in 174, and the outbreak led by 
Zhang Jue. He suggests this is evidence of Zhang Jue's long-term control over the 
followers he was gathering, requiring them to avoid local small-scale risings in 
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plan for a new beginning, the Yellow Turban sect of Zhang Jue was to 
prove the most dangerous of these enemies of Han. 
In preparation for his revolt, Zhang Jue sent disciples to gain support 
and organise followers throughout the North China plain. They had 
converts even at the imperial court, and though many who accepted 
Zhang Jue's teachings were unlikely to join in active rebellion the 
conspirators were able to make their plans while government officials 
were either ignorant of their intentions or intimidated by their power. 
Zhang Jue intended that his followers should rise together throughout 
the empire, but the threat was discovered before the call to arms had been 
issued. As Yellow Turban sympathisers in Luoyang were arrested and 
executed, the revolt in the provinces had to begin ahead of time, in the 
second month of 184.26 Despite the premature call and an inevitable lack 
of co-ordination, tens of thousands of men rose in rebellion, government 
offices were destroyed and the imperial armies were immediately forced 
onto the defensive. 
The Yellow Turban forces were concentrated in three areas. The 
group led by Zhang Jue and his two brothers gained their support from 
the region just north of the Yellow River, near Zhang Jue's home territory 
of Julu and his base in Wei commandery. A second major rising took 
place in Guangyang and Zhuo commanderies in You province, in the 
neighbourhood of present-day Beijing. The third centre of rebellion was 
in the three commanderies of [92] Yingchuan, Runan and Nanyang. This 
force had evidently been intended to co-operate with the traitors inside 
                                                                                                                   
preparation for the great rebellion to come. I suspect this assumes too much 
forethought and discipline, and I incline to believe the hiatus was partly a matter of 
chance: while there may have been a number of small-scale disturbances, as SGZ 8 
implies, they were adequately controlled by the local authorities without need for 
attention by the court. Certainly, however, the great uprising of Zhang Jue must 
have been planned for months and even years ahead. 
26  The Biography of Sun Jian at SGZ 46/Wu 1:1094 says that the rising took place on 
the jiazi 甲子 day of the third month. The Annals at HHS 8:348, however, say that 
it was in the second month, and the government had made a response early in the 
third month, well before the jiazi day; the year was jiazi, not the day. 
  Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao," 79-88, discusses the question of the date originally 
planned for the rising, arguing that Zhang Jue and his peasant followers would 
have intended to rebel after the sowing season in north China, probably in the fifth 
month, mid-summer. 
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Luoyang in an attempt to seize the capital, but even without that support, 
the rebels in this region were a major threat.27 
In the first weeks of the uprising, the government of Emperor Ling 
was chiefly concerned with finding and executing the traitors at the 
capital and with the immediate defence of the city.28 In the third month, 
when these preparations had been made, three armies were sent out to 
deal with the rebellion. One was sent east against Zhang Jue. The other 
two, commanded by Huangfu Song and by Zhu Jun, were sent against the 
rebels in Yingchuan, Runan and Nanyang.29 
Zhu Jun was a man from Kuaiji commandery, and according to Sun 
Jian's biography he recommended Sun Jian's appointment as an Associate 
Major in the Army, to call up troops and join his forces. 
The Treatise of Officials of Hou Han shu describes a Major in the 
Army as the second in command of a battalion; on occasion a Senior 
Major was appointed, with a large or small force according to 
circumstances. As an Associate Major, conscripting his own following, 
Sun Jian's new appointment was [93] of the same type as his earlier 
service in the campaign against Xu Chang.30 With widespread rebellion to 
deal with, imperial commanders were anxious to gain any troops that 
they could, and the territory of the lower Yangzi, not directly affected by 
Zhang Jue's insurrection, was close enough to be a convenient source of 
recruits.31
 
Zhu Jun must have heard of Sun Jian as a loyal fighting man 
                                               
27  On Yingchuan and Runan commanderies, see HHSJJ 110/20:1b-11a. On Nanyang 
and its capital Wan, now Nanyang in Henan, see Chapter One at 18-19. 
28  At this time were re-established Commandants of the Eight Passes: HHS 8:348. 
These stations which defended the approaches to the capital had been disused since 
the early years of Later Han, but their garrisons were now restored and fully 
manned. 
29  Biographies of Huangfu Song and of Zhu Jun are in HHS 71/61:2299-2308 and 
2308-13; that of Huangfu Song contains much of the information on the course of 
the Yellow Turban uprising. Another biography of Zhu Jun, from the Xu Han shu 
of Sima Biao, is quoted extensively by SGZ 46/Wu 1:1094-95 PC note 3; deC, 
Biography, 33-34. 
30  On the two levels of appointment as Major, see HHS 114/24:3564; my "Senior 
Major" (部別司馬 biebu sima) is rendered by Dubs/Bielenstein as "Major with a 
Separate Command." Sun Jian's position, marked by the prefix 佐 zuo, was 
evidently a junior one: cf. note 12 above, discussing xing, jia and shou. 
  Some texts refer to this office as jun sima 軍司馬 "Major in the Army," but 
most give the title simply as sima "Major." I believe they refer to the same rank. 
31  From the argument in note 24 above, there is no reason to believe that the rebellion 
of Xu Chang of the early 170s had any connection with the sect of Zhang Jue in 
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from his own region, and there were certainly other officials who were 
given special commissions with authority to impress men for the 
emergency. Having collected his troops, Sun Jian marched to join Zhu 
Jun's army with a thousand men under his command. 
According to his biography, some of Sun Jian's contingent was made 
up of the young men from his own district who had gathered to him at 
Xiapi, 32 and besides these he also called up travelling merchants or 
peddlers and the trained soldiers of the region of the Huai and Si Rivers, 
the area about Xiapi. So the force with which he went to war was made 
up partly of men who were prepared to accept him as a personal leader 
and partly of wanderers, men who were not settled on any particular 
piece of land and so had few rights to consideration in a subsistence 
peasant economy. The rest of his band was made up of those men of 
military age who had served their term as conscripts under basic training 
but who remained liable to summons. All these, whether personal 
followers, unplaced persons or citizen levies, were raised and 
commanded by one man, and as this impromptu method of recruitment 
continued in the wars that followed, any military leader was considered 
to have some interest and rights in the men that he [94] led, while the 
troops looked more to their immediate commander than to the general or 
the empire that he served. 
The fighting against the Yellow Turbans of Yingchuan, Runan and 
Nanyang was frequently fierce, with varying success. In the third month 
of 184, soon after the rebellion had broken out, the Yellow Turban Zhang 
Mancheng defeated and killed the Administrator of Nanyang, and in the 
fourth month, at the beginning of summer, the imperial army under Zhu 
Jun was defeated by the Yellow Turban Bo Cai in Yingchuan, while the 
Administrator of Runan was defeated by another force of rebels. 
In the middle of the year, however, the tide turned. In the fifth month 
Huangfu Song and Zhu Jun combined their armies to defeat Bo Cai, and 
in the sixth month they destroyed the Yellow Turbans of Runan in a battle 
                                                                                                                   
the early 180s. In any case, some of the troops recruited in this region by Sun Jian 
and other emergency commanders had presumably shown their hostility to such 
rebels on the previous occasion. 
32  SGZ 51/Wu 6:1205, being the biography of Sun Jian's youngest brother Sun Jing, 
says that when Sun Jian first went into action, Sun Jing gathered some five or six 
hundred local and family followers and went to join him. This probably refers to 
Sun Jian's recruitment of followers at this time, implying that Sun Jing was 
responsible for a considerable component of his elder brother's forces. 
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at Xihua, now Xihua in Henan. The two generals then went separate 
ways, Huangfu Song to join in the attack on the rebels north of the 
Yellow River, and Zhu Jun to deal with the Yellow Turbans of Nanyang. 
By this time, a new Administrator had defeated Zhang Mancheng 
and killed him. The Yellow Turbans, however, had managed to capture 
Wan city, capital of the commandery, and took refuge there. For the next 
several months, the core of the campaign was the fighting in and around 
the city, until Wan was finally stormed and the defenders massacred in 
the eleventh month, midwinter at the beginning of 185. 
Sun Jian followed Zhu Jun throughout his campaigns, and his 
biography states that wherever he faced none could [95] withstand him. 
An anecdote from Wu shu, however, quoted in the Pei Songzhi 
commentary to Sun Jian's biography in Sanguo zhi, tells of one occasion 
that was not unalloyed victory, and is a little more interesting for that:33 
Sun Jian was following up a success and had gone a long way in 
advance. Then his party had the worst of it in a skirmish near Xihua. 
Sun Jian was wounded and fell from his horse, and he was lying 
among some bushes. The men of his command were fled and 
scattered and did not know where he was. 
The horse Sun Jian rode was a piebald. It galloped back to the 
camp, pawed at the ground and neighed impatiently. Then his 
officers and men followed the horse to the bushes and found Sun 
Jian. 
They brought him back to the camp, and after about two weeks 
his wound was sufficiently healed that he could go out and fight 
again. 
The biography of Sun Jian also tells how he led the attack on Wan city, 
being the first over the wall in the final successful breakthrough. In the 
biography of Zhu Jun, however, which contains a detailed account of the 
protracted campaign, there is no mention of Sun Jian, so it appears the 
biography has magnified his exploits. On the other hand, he had proven 
to be a successful military commander, and after final victory at the end 
of the year he was mentioned in dispatches to the throne and was 
promoted to be a Senior Major. 
The capture of Wan city was the last great defeat of the Yellow 
Turbans. Their forces in the North China plain had been destroyed in the 
field by the imperial armies during the summer, their strongholds were 
                                               
33  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1094 PC note 2 quoting Wu shu. 
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besieged and captured, and the three Zhang brothers were dead. The 
remaining, scattered rebels were pursued by commandery and county 
forces in various mopping-up [96] operations, and in the twelfth month of 
the Chinese year, mid-February of 185, the government issued a 
proclamation to celebrate the victory, and changed the reign title to the 
slogan Zhongping "Pacification Achieved." 
Certainly, the armies of Han were triumphant, and it was a 
remarkable achievement to remove so quickly the threat of Zhang Jue's 
rebellion. The cost, however, was very high. Over wide areas official 
buildings had been destroyed, magistrates had been killed, and whole 
districts were cut off from the writ of the central government. The enemy 
had been slaughtered in their hundreds and thousands, more innocent 
people had been left homeless or destitute by the wars, and the economy 
and society over great parts of this most populous region of the empire 
were left in ruins and without resources. Unrest remained, bandits 
appeared in every district, and the government, unable to put down all 
these lesser disturbances, was forced to patch up the situation as best it 
could. A long period of consolidation was needed to restore some 
measure of peace and prosperity, but that breathing space was not given. 
For peace had been achieved only in the east. In the winter of 
184/185, while the Yellow Turbans were still active, a mutiny broke out 
among non-Chinese auxiliaries stationed in Jincheng commandery in 
Liang province. The mutineers were joined by tribesmen of the Qiang 
people, and their forces overwhelmed the local authorities and occupied 
the capital of the commandery. The Administrator was captured and 
killed, and some Chinese officers joined the rebels. By the spring of 185 
the imperial position in Liang province was completely overthrown and 
the rebel forces, now a mixture of mutineers, Qiang tribesmen and local 
Chinese, advanced down the valley of the Wei and attacked Chang'an, 
ancient capital of Han.[96] 
In this new crisis, Huangfu Song, conqueror of the Yellow Turbans, 
was given command of an imperial army in the west. He was unable to 
defeat the rebels, however, and after four months he was replaced by 
Zhang Wen, who had lately been Excellency of Works, one of the highest 
posts in the civil administration. At last, in the eleventh month, mid-
winter of 185/186, the rebels were defeated in battle at Meiyang, near 
present-day Wugong in Shenxi, and turned back to the west. Zhang Wen 
divided his army, sending a detachment under Dong Zhuo against the 
Qiang while his main force besieged the rebel leader Bian Zhang in 
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Yuzhong near present-day Lanzhou. Neither attack was successful, 
however, both divisions were forced to retreat, and the rebels remained 
secure in Jincheng.34 
When Zhang Wen took over command from Huangfu Song in the 
eighth month of 185, Sun Jian was appointed a member of his staff. 
There is no account of what he had been doing in the few months since 
the defeat of the Yellow Turbans in Nanyang, but many troops were 
transferred from the east to deal with the threat from Liang province, and 
Sun Jian may already have served under Huangfu Song before he was 
noticed by Zhang Wen. Very likely he had been recommended by Zhu 
Jun to Huangfu Song and then to Zhang Wen. Sun Jian's own biography 
says that Zhang Wen went to the west in the third year of Zhongping, 
186, and that he sent in a memorial with a request for Sun Jian's services, 
but other sources for the history of the rebellion make it clear that 
Huangfu Song was replaced by Zhang Wen in 185, not in 186, and Sun 
Jian would have joined Zhang Wen's staff at that time. The reference to 
the third year rather than the second year of Zhongping is miswritten.[97] 
The account given in Sun Jian's biography, however, both about the 
course of the campaign against the rebels and about Sun Jian's part in the 
enterprise, is quite unsatisfactory. The main item is a story designed to 
show Sun Jian's dislike and distrust of Dong Zhuo, the man who later 
usurped the authority of the imperial government at Luoyang. 
According to this, Zhang Wen brought his army to Chang'an, and 
from there he summoned Dong Zhuo. Dong Zhuo, however, was slow to 
come and when he did arrive he was discourteous and insubordinate. Sun 
Jian was in attendance on Zhang Wen, and he presented a lengthy 
argument, with historical examples and allusions from the classics, 
urging that Dong Zhuo should be executed for his refractory conduct 
towards a superior officer. Since the speech is described as being 
delivered in a whisper to Zhang Wen alone, it is difficult to see how it 
could have been recorded at the time, and it is impossible to rely upon the 
account as it is presented. It is, perhaps, just possible that at some stage in 
                                               
34  On the campaigns of Huangfu Song and Zhang Wen, including the battle of 
Meiyang and the manoeuvres which followed, see deC, Northern Frontier, 150-
151. 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
78 
the campaign Dong Zhuo objected to his orders, and Sun Jian urged 
Zhang Wen to punish him.35 
In fact, however, Dong Zhuo was Zhang Wen's most successful 
commander. He had done well in the earlier abortive campaign under 
Huangfu Song, and he played a great part in the victory of Meiyang 
which eventually caused the withdrawal of the enemy to the west. 
Furthermore, in the commentary of Pei Songzhi to a later part of the 
biography of Sun Jian, there is an extract from the book Shanyang gong 
zaiji which contains a record of a discussion of this campaign by Dong 
Zhuo himself. Like any version of direct speech in the histories, the 
passage must be suspect, but Dong [99] Zhuo is said to have been 
speaking with the historian Liu Ai, and Liu Ai may well have kept a note 
of the incident.36 
According to this account, when Zhang Wen proposed to send Zhou 
Shen and Dong Zhuo in command of separate columns to the west, Dong 
Zhuo suggested the two should nonetheless co-operate, and that he 
should stay back as a reserve while Zhou Shen went forward against the 
enemy. His idea was that the rebels would be afraid to commit 
themselves against Zhou Shen for fear they would be attacked by Dong 
Zhuo's men. Dong Zhuo was concerned that if they advanced 
independently, the rebels would be able to watch them both, concentrate 
their forces where they wished and attack them separately. This is indeed 
what happened: each of the two divisions were caught by the enemy in 
                                               
35  The incident is recorded in SGZ 46/Wu 1:1095; deC, Biography, 34-36, with a 
shorter version in HHS 72/62:2330; cf. ZZTJ 58:1882; deC, Huan and Ling I, 197-
198. 
36  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1098-99 PC note 8 quoting Shanyang gong zaiji; deC, Biography, 
45-47. 
  The conversation is said to have taken place about the time Sun Jian was 
leading his troops to attack Dong Zhuo during the civil war in 190-191. Liu Ai, 
described as Chief Clerk to Dong Zhuo, was a historian, author of annals of the 
reign of Emperor Ling (Lingdi ji: note 12 above) and of the reign of Emperor Xian, 
and he is known to have been in Chang'an as late as 195, after the death of Dong 
Zhuo. 
  Duke of Shanyang 山陽公 was the title granted to Liu Xie, the former Emperor 
of Han, after his abdication in favour of Cao Pi in 220: HHS 9:390 and SGZ 2:76; 
Fang, Chronicle I, 10. He was awarded the dynastic title Xian only after his death 
in 234: HHS 9:391; Fang, Chronicle I, 443. The "Parallel Annals" (載記 zaiji) 
compiled by Yue Zi of Jin are thus a history of the last years of Han, with a title 
adapted to the prejudices of the successor dynasties. 
  See also deC, Northern Frontier, 157-158. 
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unfamiliar country with extended lines of communications. Dong Zhuo 
was surrounded by the Qiang and had to trick his way out; Zhou Shen 
was caught by a counter-attack and abandoned his baggage train as he 
fled.[100] 
Dong Zhuo went on to say that Sun Jian had proposed much the 
same strategy to Zhou Shen as he had to Zhang Wen: that Zhou Shen 
should use the majority of his troops to establish a secure base while Sun 
Jian went forward with a detachment. The enemy would be tied down by 
the threat of the main attack, and Sun Jian and his troops could raid their 
strong points and communications without interference. The rebels would 
be afraid to engage any part of the imperial forces in a major battle, 
because they could be held in that engagement and crushed when the 
main body came up. Like Zhang Wen, however, Zhou Shen refused to 
accept the strategy. 
The plan that Sun Jian proposed to Zhou Shen is also mentioned in 
Hou Han shu, and that account is clearly based on Shanyang gong zaiji. 
Surprisingly, however, the main text of the biography by Sun Jian in 
Sanguo zhi makes no mention of his proposal. Instead, we are told that 
when the rebels heard how Zhang Wen's great army was coming against 
them, they 
separated and scattered and all begged to surrender. Then the army 
came home, but the imperial advisers held that since they had not 
actually engaged the enemy, it was not appropriate to give any 
rewards.37 
But this is quite wrong. The imperial army had actually fought a battle at 
Meiyang, but the rebels had not been scattered and they did not surrender 
in any numbers. The account in Sun Jian's biography is contradicted by 
all other records of the rebellion. It may be that the biographer sought to 
explain why Sun Jian received no immediate reward when he came back 
to the capital, or he may have been so concerned to show Sun Jian's 
disapproval of Dong Zhuo that it would have been embarrassing to 
describe them as suggesting similar strategies. In either case, this shows 
how unreliable such a text can be when the hero of the story is a [101] 
minor figure in the events described, and when those events occurred at a 
distance of time and space. 
We may note, moreover, that Sun Jian not only served as a staff 
officer at this time but also appears to have commanded troops in battle. 
                                               
37  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1095; deC, Biography, 36. 
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Not only did he accompany Zhou Shen and offer to act as an advance 
guard, but in the record of conversation in Shanyang gong zaiji Liu Ai 
refers to an embarrassing defeat by rebels outside Meiyang, presumably 
before Dong Zhuo's success. Dong Zhuo observed that Sun Jian had poor 
quality troops at that time, but was nonetheless a good commander. 
Sun Jian returned to the capital in 186, and he was there appointed 
Consultant in the civil administration. 
A Consultant, as the title implies, held position as an adviser at the 
imperial court. With salary ranked at Six Hundred shi, the post was not a 
high one, and Sun Jian would have lost rank in the transfer. The 
rank/salary of a full Major in the Army was One Thousand shi, and a 
Senior Major was higher. This, however, was Sun Jian's first position in 
the regular civil service, and the office of Consultant was often used as a 
holding position for men being considered for substantial appointment.38 
                                               
38  The office of Consultant is listed in the Treatise of Officials, HHS 115/25:3577. It 
was often held by men of scholarly achievement, with appropriate functions. In 79, 
for example, Consultants took part in the debate on Confucian theory held at the 
White Tiger Hall (HHS 3:138; Tjan, White Tiger Discussions I, 6); and in 112 
Consultants were sent to pray for rain to break a drought (commentary to HHS 
103/13:3278). 
  Appointments from the post were commonly to other advisory positions, to the 
university or the imperial secretariat, or as inspectors or magistrates in the 
provinces. On several occasions, a consultant received swift promotion, reaching 
high office after only one or two transfers. 
  Quite frequently, however, an experienced official who had left office for a 
time (occasionally in formal disgrace) would be appointed as a consultant and then 
returned once more to high rank. For example, about 185 Lu Kang the 
Administrator of Le'an was dismissed and punished for lese-majesty when he 
protested the extravagances of Emperor Ling. He was restored to office as a 
consultant, however, and was soon afterwards appointed Administrator of Lujiang 
commandery: HHS 31/21:1113-14. 
  Earlier, in 159, Chen Fan the Director of the Imperial Secretariat presented a 
memorial on behalf of some dissident officials. Emperor Huan was extremely 
annoyed and Chen Fan was compelled to retire to his own estates. Some time later, 
however, he was recalled as a consultant, and within a few days he had been 
promoted to high office as Minister of the Household: HHS 66/56:2161. 
  The closest parallel to Sun Jian's appointments at this time appears in the 
biography of Duan Jiong, a celebrated military commander one generation earlier. 
Though he had distinguished himself as a junior officer on the frontier, Duan Jiong 
was punished for exceeding his authority and sentenced to a term of convict 
labour. He was then appointed a consultant, and in 156 he was named a General of 
the Household and sent to put down rebellion in the eastern commanderies of 
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Certainly, [102] this is what happened here, for in 187, just a few months 
after his return from Liang province, Sun Jian was appointed 
Administrator of Changsha commandery, with salary of Two Thousand 
shi. The rank was the highest that could be held in the bureaucracy 
outside the capital, and the territory was a key region of the empire. 
With its capital at Linxiang near the modern city of Changsha, the 
commandery controlled the lower basin of the Xiang River in present-day 
Hunan. Immediately to the south, the upper reaches of the Xiang were 
governed by Lingling commandery, and the valley of the tributary Lei 
River was under Guiyang commandery. As at the present time, the Xiang 
and its tributaries provided the main communications route from central 
and northern China through the Nan Ling ranges to the rich and exotic 
lands of the far south. The registered population of Changsha, over a 
million at this time, reflected both the wealth of communications through 
the region and the related migration into the south which was a feature of 
the [103] demography of Later Han, and it made Changsha one of the 
larger commanderies of the empire.39 
The territory, however, was a troubled one. According to Sun Jian's 
biography, a rebel leader of Changsha, Ou Xing, had taken title as a 
general and was attacking and besieging cities with an army of more than 
ten thousand men. When Sun Jian was sent to the commandery as 
Administrator, however, he worked out a plan of attack and destroyed Ou 
Xing and his followers within a month of his arrival. He then turned 
against the rebel leaders Zhou Chao and Guo Shi, who had been making 
trouble in Lingling and Guiyang and had been in alliance with Ou Xing. 
Sun Jian went outside the borders of his own commandery to pursue 
them and destroy their forces. 
According to another source, the Annals of Emperor Ling in Hou 
Han shu, the rebel Guan Gu of Lingling had given himself title as 
General of Peaceful Heaven and was ravaging Guiyang. In the tenth 
                                                                                                                   
Taishan and Langye. He did well, and was enfeoffed as a marquis. See HHS 
65/55:2145; Young, Three Generals, 64-65, and for a similar incident in Duan 
Jiong's career a few years later, also HHS 65/55:2147; Young, Three Generals, 68. 
Duan Jiong, it may be observed, was an excellent fighting soldier, but few would 
have claimed that he was a man of scholarly distinction. 
39  On Changsha commandery and its neighbours Lingling and Guiyang, see Chapter 
One at 26-29. 
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month of 187 he was attacked and beheaded by Sun Jian the 
Administrator of Changsha.40 
So there is some disagreement about the names of the rebel 
chieftains that Sun Jian defeated, but there is no real problem about the 
course of events. Most likely there had been groups of rebels and bandits 
active in Changsha and the neighbouring territories for some time, at 
least since the troubles with the Yellow Turbans further north in 184. By 
187 the disturbance had become sufficiently serious to attract the 
attention of the central government, and Sun Jian, as a man of proven 
military experience, was sent to restore order. It is said that as he came to 
his new post he issued orders saying, "Treat the good people carefully 
and mildly [104] and keep the official documents according to 
regulations. Leave the robbers and killers to me!" 
The names of the bandit leaders are not of great importance. The 
organisation of such groups is seldom long-term, and it is easy to imagine 
that the rebels of the three commanderies Changsha, Lingling and 
Guiyang had operated in a loose alliance. When Sun Jian came to 
Changsha, he first settled the immediate problem of Ou Xing and then 
turned against the other groups. By the time he did so, Guan Gu had been 
replaced by Zhou Chao and Guo Shi, and it was these men who were 
destroyed by Sun Jian. The records of the court, far from the scene of this 
varied action, could easily be confused over the names of such minor 
figures, but the essential point is that by the end of 187 Sun Jian had put 
down the troubles in the basin of the Xiang. 
As Administrator of Changsha, Sun Jian was responsible for civil 
administration as well as the military security, and in normal times such a 
post would have been held by a regular civilian official. Sun Jian, 
however, had been appointed on his military record and his 
administration was unusual. Once his position was established he was 
also able to support his colleagues in Lingling and Guiyang against the 
rebels within their borders, and his biography asserts that all three 
commanderies acknowledged his authority. 
Strictly speaking, without special permission Sun Jian had no 
authority to take action outside the borders of his own territory, but it 
appears that for the most part he was acting under appropriate supervision 
                                               
40  HHS 8:354 and SGZ 46/Wu 1:1095; deC, Biography, 36-37. 
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from the provincial authorities.41 He was [105] not particularly concerned 
about these niceties, however, claiming that the exceptional disorder and 
the spread of rebellion demanded exceptional measures. It was, for 
example, about this time that the magistrate of Yichun county in Yuzhang 
was attacked by bandits and asked for assistance. Sun Jian made ready to 
go, but one of his clerical officers objected: though Yichun was just 
outside the eastern borders of Changsha, it was not only in a different 
commandery but also in a different province. Sun Jian replied, 
I have none of the civil graces. Warfare is my work. If I cross borders 
to attack some rebels, that is simply giving help to a neighbour. Even 
if I am committing a crime, why should I feel ashamed?42 
According to his biography, he was enfeoffed as Marquis of Wucheng as 
a reward for his good work, so we may judge that the court approved his 
policy. 
The enfeoffment was a particular honour. Marquis was the highest 
noble rank that could be awarded to a man who was not a member of the 
imperial Liu family, and it was by no means the regular expectation of a 
commandery administrator. Often enough, a marquis would receive only 
a village or district as his fief, but Wucheng was a county in Wu 
commandery, just south of the Tai Lake. With the title there came also an 
income based upon the tax revenues of the territory, and although he had 
no practical authority [106] in his fief, and would not necessarily be 
expected even to live there, the generosity of the Han government had 
clearly made the fortunes of Sun Jian and his family. This was an 
exceptional combination of ability and good luck for a young man of 
undistinguished origins from the distant countryside; in 187, Sun Jian 
was some thirty-two years old by Western reckoning. 
                                               
41  From the relationship and later incident with the Inspector of Jing province Wang 
Rui discussed below, Sun Jian was accompanied, and nominally supervised, by 
that officer on his campaigns in Lingling and Guiyang. This was the normal 
requirement for an administrator operating outside his own commandery. Sun Jian, 
however, took the leading role and received credit for the success of the imperial 
forces. 
42  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1096 PC note 2 quoting Wu lu. Yichun lay near the present-day city 
of that name in Jiangxi. Yuzhang commandery of Later Han was under Yang 
province. 
  Wu lu also says that the magistrate of Yichun was a nephew of Lu Kang, 
Administrator of Lujiang commandery On further connection between the two 
families of Sun and Lu, see note 14 to Chapter Three. 
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Sun Jian remained Administrator of Changsha for another two years. 
By his successes against the rebels he had justified his remarkable 
promotion and his high civil appointment, and he was evidently regarded 
as a valuable supporter of the dynasty. When chaos came to the imperial 
capital in 189, and civil war to the empire in the following years, Sun 
Jian controlled the lands and the people of his own commandery, he had 
established his influence with the administrators who were his 
neighbours, and he was prepared to bring an army north to aid the 
emperor. 
The war against Dong Zhuo (189-191): 
In the fourth month of the sixth year of the Zhongping reign period, on 13 
May 189, Emperor Ling died. He had been brought to the throne as a 
child, and he was only thirty-four sui, some thirty-three years old by 
Western reckoning, when he died. He left two sons, Liu Bian, aged 
seventeen sui, the child of his Empress the Lady He, and Liu Xie, aged 
nine sui, born to his concubine the Beauty Wang. The Empress He had 
killed the Lady Wang, and Liu [106] Xie was brought up under the care 
of the emperor's natural mother, the Empress-Dowager Dong, his 
grandmother. Hitherto, neither boy had been named Heir to the throne, 
but it is said that on his death-bed Emperor Ling nominated his younger 
son Liu Xie, and entrusted him to the eunuch Jian Shi, who was with him 
at the time, and who had been given command of troops at the capital.43 
The power of the widowed Empress He and her clan, however, 
depended upon the succession of the boy Liu Bian, and they forced that 
succession through in a matter of hours. Within a few weeks, Jian Shi and 
the Dowager Dong were dead, and the General-in-Chief He Jin, brother 
of the Lady He, now Empress-Dowager, controlled the government.44 But 
then He Jin thought to turn against the eunuchs.[108] 
                                               
43  HHS 8:357. Events at the capital following the death of Emperor Ling are 
recounted in HHS 8, the Annals of Emperor Ling; in HHS 10B:449-50, the record 
of the Empress He and the Beauty Wang; in HHS 69/59:2247-53, the biography of 
He Jin; in HHS 78/68:2537, the biographies of the eunuchs; and in other places. 
They are summarised in the chronicle of ZZTJ 59:1894-1905; deC, Establish 
Peace, 2-26. 
  On the age of Liu Bian, see deC, Fire over Luoyang, 437 and 458. 
44  The Lady He, whose personal name is not recorded, was a woman of Wan city in 
Nanyang. She was brought into the imperial harem through the open selection, 
which took place in the eighth month of each year: Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 63. A 
woman of striking appearance, she attracted the emperor's attention and was 
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During the reign of Emperor Ling, the eunuchs of the palace had 
dominated the government. In 168, when the young emperor first came to 
the capital, they had been under threat from the regent Dou family, but 
they overthrew their enemies in a coup d'état. Since then the eunuch 
group had maintained their influence and prosperity through patronage of 
their supporters and proscription of their obvious opponents, and had 
                                                                                                                   
fortunate enough to bear him a son which survived infancy. She was promoted to 
be Honoured Lady, and in 180 she was made Empress. Her biography is in HHS 
10B:449-50. 
  The father of the Lady He had died before this time, but in 181 he was 
posthumously honoured with appointment as General of Chariots and Cavalry and 
enfeoffment as Marquis of Wuyang. In 183 the mother of the Lady He was granted 
enfeoffment as Lady of Wuyang. 
  He Jin was actually an elder half-brother of the Empress: he was the son of her 
father by another woman, possibly a concubine but perhaps an earlier wife. He was 
brought to the capital when his sister became Honoured Lady, was given various 
senior appointments, including a period as Administrator of Yingchuan 
commandery, and was named General-in-Chief at the time of the Yellow Turban 
emergency in 184. His biography is in HHS 69/59:2246-53. 
  The Lady He had another half-brother, whose personal name was Miao. He was 
the son of her mother, who had evidently been married before. At some stage, 
either after the remarriage of his mother or more probably after the rise to fortune 
of his sister, Miao changed his surname to He, and he is generally described as He 
Miao, "younger brother" of He Jin, though the two men were not blood relations 
and Miao was evidently the elder: HHS 104/14:3299 with jijie commentary at 6a 
quoting the Qing scholars Hong Liangji and Qian Daxin; also HHS 103/13:3275 
and HHSJJ 69/59:6a. In 187 He Miao successfully put down a rebellion in Henan 
commandery, quite close to the capital, and was rewarded with appointment as 
General of Chariots and Cavalry, the office formerly held by his step-father, and 
enfeoffment as a marquis: HHS 69/59:2246. 
  Though He Jin and He Miao appear to have been reasonably competent in 
carrying out their official responsibilities, they owed their advancement solely to 
their sister's position as empress, and the posts of General-in-Chief and General of 
Chariots and Cavalry had long been used as perquisites for the family of imperial 
relatives by marriage rather than as substantive military commands. It is claimed, 
moreover, that the Lady He's father or members of his family had practised the 
trade of butchers. This had not disqualified the Lady from entering the imperial 
harem and achieving the highest position there, and indeed the very lack of 
distinguished background and social influence made the Lady He an excellent 
candidate in the eyes of the eunuchs, who held major control over the government 
and had no wish to import a powerful rival faction. When the He family did obtain 
responsibility for the regency, however, there is no question that their ancestry, 
background and social status put them at a disadvantage in dealing with the 
gentlemen who held high offices in the bureaucracy of the central government. 
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relied successfully on the favour and trust of the emperor. It was under 
their auspices that the Lady He had become Empress, and even though 
their imperial patron was gone, they expected continuing support from 
the new Empress-Dowager and her brothers.[109] 
As effective head of government, however, He Jin was under 
additional, contradictory pressures. The He were not one of the great 
families of the empire, and He Jin felt that he needed the support of 
powerful gentry and official clans to maintain his authority. In particular, 
members of the Yuan family of Runan, which had occupied the highest 
civil offices in the empire for four generations, were among He Jin's chief 
supporters, and Yuan Shao and Yuan Shu, nephews of the Grand Tutor 
Yuan Wei, held command among the guards and troops about the 
capital.45 These two younger men now reflected the long-held resentment 
held by gentry officials for the palace favourites, and they demanded 
reform of the government and destruction of the eunuchs as price of their 
support. 
The position of the eunuchs was very insecure. In 168 they had been 
able to destroy the General-in-Chief Dou Wu by claiming the authority of 
the emperor to raise troops against him. He Jin, of course, was also aware 
of that precedent, but the death of Jian Shi had removed the link between 
the eunuchs of the palace and any military forces outside. To intimidate 
the eunuchs and bolster his own position, He Jin called Dong Zhuo to 
bring his army into camp near the capital. The Empress He and He Miao 
spoke for the eunuchs, Yuan Shao and Yuan Shu spoke against them, He 
Jin could not make up his mind, and the eunuchs became desperate. 
On 22 September 189, a group of eunuchs waylaid He Jin and killed 
him as he came from the palace. They tried to brand him as a rebel and 
bring his soldiers under their own control, and they named their own 
supporters to critical posts controlling [110] the capital. But their plan 
was hopeless and it failed. Yuan Shao and his associates took command 
of the guard regiments, and then they burnt the gates, stormed the palace 
and massacred every eunuch that they found. 
One group managed to escape, taking the young Emperor and Liu 
Xie with them. They were chased and killed, and the boys were brought 
                                               
45  Biographies of Yuan Shao are in HHS 74A/64A:2373-2403, and in SGZ 6:188-201; 
biographies of Yuan Shu are in HHS 75/65:2438-44, and in SGZ 6:207-10. The 
biographies of earlier generations of the Yuan family are in HHS 45/35:1517-24; 
Yuan Wei is mentioned at 1523. 
  On the relationship between Yuan Shao and Yuan Shu, see note 69 below. 
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back, but as the party returned to Luoyang they met with Dong Zhuo and 
his army, and the young Emperor went back to the capital under that care. 
Before this time, the plots and coups and rebellions had been kept 
inside the capital, but the balance of political power which had been 
maintained under Emperor Ling was now destroyed. On the evening of 
24 September, when the palace was stormed and the eunuchs were killed, 
flames from burning buildings lit up the sky. Seeing them from his 
encampment, Dong Zhuo realised there was trouble and led his army 
forward to the city. As he gave the order, the rule of Han was ended. 
Established in Luoyang, Dong Zhuo had no difficulty gaining 
control. The two imperial princes were in his hands, the eunuchs had 
been killed, He Jin was dead and He Miao had also been assassinated in 
the disorders of the coup. The troops which had formerly been under their 
command turned to Dong Zhuo, and the Dowager He had no practical 
support. Similarly, despite their influence, the Yuan family and other 
leaders of the civil administration could not rely on any force at the 
capital strong enough to contend with Dong Zhuo and his frontier 
veterans, and they could do nothing at that time but accept his authority. 
Dong Zhuo did not hold his power for very long, but the way he had 
gained it and the way that he used it meant the end of [111] legitimate 
government in the empire.46 He had no good right to be at the capital, he 
held his power solely because he was the man in command of the army, 
and only another army could remove him. More than that, within a few 
weeks of his coming to Luoyang, he removed Liu Bian from the throne 
and set Liu Xie in his place. Some months later Liu Bian and his mother 
were dead. There was minimal argument about the rival claims of the two 
children: Dong Zhuo was simply removing one emperor and setting his 
own nominee upon the throne. He did this through his military strength, 
and control of the empire was now held by force. The child Liu Xie, 
known to history as Emperor Xian, last of the Han, reigned for more than 
thirty years, but he never held authority of his own. 
Within a very short time, however, Dong Zhuo was faced with armed 
opposition from "loyal rebels" outside the capital. Yuan Shao, Yuan Shu 
and a number of other leaders fled from Luoyang to the east and south, 
and they joined with local and provincial administrators to raise armies 
for an attack. By the beginning of 190 the allies had collected their 
troops, and the whole force, known as the soldiers "east of the 
                                               
46  Biographies of Dong Zhuo are in HHS 72/62:2319-31 and SGZ 6:171-79. 
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mountains," set up their camps in an arc from the northeast to the south 
of Luoyang. Yuan Shao, leader of the alliance, was north of the Yellow 
River in Henei commandery; another group, based upon Chenliu, 
occupied the southern bank of the river due east of the capital;47 and a 
third army was commanded by Yuan Shu, with headquarters at Luyang in 
Nanyang, present-day Lushan in Henan. The men who joined them in the 
attack on Dong Zhuo included administrators who had been appointed 
during the reign of Emperor Ling, some who had [112] been sent out by 
Dong Zhuo but now turned against him, and other leaders such as the 
future warlord Cao Cao, who had fled the capital like Yuan Shao and 
Yuan Shu, then raised troops from family followers and local 
conscription.48
 
Down in Changsha, Sun Jian also collected an army and came to join 
the alliance. On his way, however, he took the opportunity to kill two 
imperial officials, Wang Rui the Inspector of Jing province and Zhang Zi 
the Administrator of Nanyang. 
According to Wu lu, quoted in Pei Songzhi's commentary to the 
biography of Sun Jian, Wang Rui had accompanied Sun Jian on the 
campaign against the rebels in Lingling and Guiyang two or three years 
earlier, and on that occasion he made some slighting remark about Sun 
Jian's military appointment. 
It was quite appropriate, and indeed formally necessary, that Wang 
Rui should have been with Sun Jian in the operations against the rebels 
outside Changsha. On the other hand, the function of an inspector in this 
situation was primarily to supervise the military action and prevent any 
individual commander from establishing a local military dominance. The 
real credit for the campaign had gone to Sun Jian, and this, together with 
his remarkable promotion to Administrator and his subsequent 
enfeoffment as a marquis, caused jealousy and tension. Wang Rui, a man 
of good family, presumably made some unguarded remark that a 
commandery would be better in the hands of trained and experienced 
                                               
47  The Yellow River in this area flowed a little north of its present line. 
48  The biography of Cao Cao, founder of the state of Wei, is in SGZ 1:1-55. DeC, 
Imperial Warlord, offers an account of his life. 
  We may observe that the political hostility between Dong Zhuo and the Yuan 
clan became a personal vendetta when Dong Zhuo slaughtered the former Grand 
Tutor Yuan Wei, senior member of the family, and all his relatives who had 
remained at Luoyang: HHS 45/35:1523. 
SUN JIAN 
 
 
89 
officials, while fighting men [113] should act only as assistants.49 
Whatever the insult, Sun Jian remembered it. 
The headquarters of the Inspector of Jing province were at Hanshou 
in Wuling commandery, northeast of present-day Changde in Hunan. 
From Changsha, Sun Jian passed to the west of the Dongting Lake and 
his route led past Wang Rui. The story told in Wu lu says that Wang Rui 
had also raised soldiers to join the alliance against Dong Zhuo, but that 
he had an old quarrel with Cao Yin, the Administrator of Wuling, and let 
it be known that he planned to use his troops to kill Cao Yin before he led 
them north. Cao Yin, as Administrator, had his capital at Linyuan, which 
is now west of Changde and was quite close to Hanshou. He was 
frightened of Wang Rui, and he thought to turn Sun Jian's arrival to his 
own advantage, so he forged an imperial order and sent it to him. 
Claiming to come from a special imperial commissioner, the document 
accused Wang Rui of various crimes and instructed Sun Jian to execute 
him. Sun Jian accepted the order, brought his army forward to Hanshou, 
and gained entrance to the city by pretending his men had come [114] 
only to seek supplies. When he explained the real purpose of his visit, 
Wang Rui committed suicide. 
From Sun Jian's point of view, this was all very satisfactory, and he 
was probably not greatly concerned that the dispatch he had received 
might be false. He could always claim he believed it to be genuine, and 
for his own purposes the opportunity to eliminate Wang Rui was 
extremely useful. Not only did he satisfy a private grudge, but he also 
gained control of Wang Rui's soldiers and added them to his own army. If 
Wang Rui could threaten the Administrator, he held the majority of the 
troops in Wuling, and he may have had levies from other parts of the 
province. Sun Jian had his own men from Changsha, with additional 
                                               
49  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1096 and 1097-98 PC note 2 quoting Wu lu; deC, Biography, 38-39. 
  PC also quotes the Wangshi pu, a family record of the Wang clan, which says 
that Wang Rui was a great-uncle of Wang Xiang, who served the Wei and then the 
succeeding Jin dynasty in the mid-third century. The biography of Wang Xiang is 
in JS 33:987-90, and the beginning of the biography is translated by Fang, 
Chronicle II, 254. 
  The Wang family came from Langye, and had held official rank for some 
generations under Han. Wang Xiang's grandfather, the brother of Wang Rui, was at 
one time Inspector of Qing province. 
  So Wang Rui came from an established background, with some distinction in 
the empire, and certainly with substantial landed property. All the more reason, 
then, for him to speak scornfully of a newcomer such as Sun Jian. 
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detatchments from Lingling and Guiyang. Now he combined Wang Rui's 
troops with his own, and he could collect more men as he marched. His 
biography suggests, probably with exaggeration, that by the time he came 
to Nanyang his army was numbered in the tens of thousands. 
At some stage during this northern journey, Sun Jian was also joined 
by his nephew Sun Ben and a small contingent from his home country. 
Sun Jian's elder twin brother, Sun Qiang, had died a few years earlier, 
leaving two sons Sun Ben and Sun Fu. The elder, Sun Ben, can have been 
no older than his late teens, but he had held local office in Wu 
commandery. When the crisis over Dong Zhuo broke out and the leaders 
of the empire began to raise troops, Sun Ben travelled to join his uncle 
and to serve under him.50 
We have noted earlier that when Sun Jian was raising troops to join 
the campaign led by Zhu Jun against the Yellow Turbans, a part of his 
force was composed of personal and family followers led by his younger 
brother Sun Jing. The clan was neither large nor powerful, but even a 
small unit could serve as the [115] personal guard of a commander, and 
now that Sun Jian commanded a substantial army he had all the more 
reason to look for a nucleus of retainers whom he could trust among the 
amorphous mass of his regular troops. Sun Jian and other commanders of 
this period are known to have maintained groups of Companions, and in 
the uncertainty of the time such personal followers, family connections 
and associates were extremely important.51 
With his great army from the south, Sun Jian came forward to Wan 
city, capital of Nanyang commandery, where he met with the 
Administrator Zhang Zi who had been appointed by Dong Zhuo. 
According to Xiandi chunqiu and the biography of Sun Jian in 
Sanguo zhi, Sun Jian had sent a message ahead asking Zhang Zi for 
supplies. When Sun Jian came up, the two officials exchanged gifts and 
Sun Jian paid his respects to Zhang Zi; on the following day Zhang Zi 
returned the visit. While Zhang Zi was thus in Sun Jian's camp, Sun Jian's 
Registrar, his senior clerical officer, came in and reported that nothing 
had been done to provide for the visiting army. Zhang Zi was frightened 
and tried to escape, but Sun Jian arrested him, and after a brief 
                                               
50  SGZ 51/Wu 6:1209, the biography of Sun Ben. On Sun Qiang, see note 6 above. 
The biography of Sun Fu is in SGZ 51/Wu 6:1211-12. 
51  On Sun Jing, see note 31 above. Zu Mao, hero of the battle near Liang described 
below, is referred to as a Companion in SGZ 46/Wu 1:1096. 
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investigation he was found guilty of treason and was executed according 
to military law. 
A version given by Wu li differs in some details: there it is said that 
Zhang Zi was unwilling to visit Sun Jian, but Sun Jian pretended to be 
seriously ill, and offered to turn his troops over to Zhang Zi's command. 
When Zhang Zi came to his tent to take up [116] the offer, Sun Jian 
leaped from his bed, swore at his visitor, and cut off his head on the 
spot.52 
However the affair was managed, Zhang Zi was killed. Though he 
had been a nominee of Dong Zhuo, a number of such men had been 
prepared to change sides and join the rebels.53 Zhang Zi, however, 
appears to have held reservations about the eastern alliance east, and was 
reluctant to give his full support.54 Since Yuan Shu's forces were based in 
the north of Nanyang, any obstruction there would have cut Sun Jian off 
from his sources of supply in the south, and would have separated his 
men from their homeland. [117] It would in any case have been 
dangerous if the ruler of such an important commandery had been 
uncertain of his commitment to the cause. The troops of Nanyang, 
moreover, provided a useful addition to his army and, as in the case of 
                                               
52  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1096 and 1097-98 PC note 3; deC, Biography, 39-41. See also note 
54 below. 
53  For example, Han Fu the Governor of Ji province and Liu Dai, Inspector of Yan 
province, had both been appointed to those offices by Dong Zhuo, but turned 
against him when Yuan Shao began his rebellion: HHS 72/62:2326 and HHS 
74A/64A:2375). 
  It may be recalled that the supervision of provinces in Later Han had 
traditionally been entrusted to an inspector, but an edict of 188 provided for some 
appointments to be made as governor, chosen from men of higher rank and 
experience than inspectors. In the hierarchy of the civil service governors would 
regularly outrank the administrators of their subordinate commanderies, so 
provinces became the major units of the empire and a provincial administration 
was headed by an inspector or by a governor according to circumstances. 
  Han Fu had first been named as Inspector of Ji province (HHS 72/62) but by 
the time of Yuan Shao's plans for rebellion he had taken the title of Governor (HHS 
74A/64A). 
54  In this regard, we must note that Sun Jian was acting well outside his rights as 
Administrator when he left Changsha to join the attack against Dong Zhuo. As 
below, he took a new appointment from Yuan Shu, but this was hardly a regular 
commission. Zhang Zi's reaction to Sun Jian's request for assistance, therefore, was 
a touchstone of his acceptance of and support for the cause of the "loyal rebels," 
and both Sanguo zhi and Wu li refer to such a reluctance of Zhang Zi's part. 
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Wang Rui, Sun Jian had reason to look for some excuse to eliminate a 
potential rival. 
Having settled the administration at Wan, Sun Jian went forward to 
Luyang and joined Yuan Shu. He had already been given provisional 
appointment as a General of the Household,55 and he was now 
recommended as Acting General Who Smashes the Caitiffs and Inspector 
of Yu province. 
The qualifying terms "provisional" and "acting" to the posts which 
Sun Jian received from Yuan Shu reflect the idea that the appointments 
were still subject to imperial confirmation, and the expressions 
"memorialised" or "recommended" indicate that Yuan Shu was reporting 
his actions to the throne. In fact, of course, any recommendation from 
Yuan Shu to the boy Emperor Xian would be quite ineffective: Yuan Shu 
was the declared enemy of Dong Zhuo, and Dong Zhuo had full control 
over the actions and published decisions of the young ruler. However, the 
Yuan and their allies had said that they were acting in the emperor's name 
to save him from the oppression of the rebel usurper, [118] so they 
followed the formalities of recording and announcing their 
recommendations of officers, and they could claim to believe that the 
emperor would confirm their actions as soon as he was freed from the 
clutches of Dong Zhuo. When these loyal rebels began their campaign, 
some had taken titles for themselves, and the situation soon got out of 
hand, but few of the contending warlords at the end of Han failed to pay 
that lip-service to the authority of the emperor.56 
                                               
55  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1097 PC note 3 quoting Xiandi chunqiu. The term rendered here as 
"provisional" is jia, on which see note 12 above. 
  Generals of the Household were usually court appointees in charge of a corps 
of guards cadets on probation for commissioned office: Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 
24 and 27, deC, Northern Frontier, 46-47, and 48 above. Officers with this title, 
however, had served on active campaigns at the beginning of Later Han 
(Bielenstein, RHD II, 204 and note 5), against non-Chinese people on the northern 
frontier (e.g. deC, Northern Frontier, 108, 130 and 340), and most recently during 
the campaign against the Yellow Turbans: for example, Zhu Jun (HHS 71/61:2309) 
and Dong Zhuo (HHS 72/62:2320). 
56  The character rendered as "memorialised" or "recommended" is 表 biao. 
  Since this whole nomination system was quite non-legal, and since the 
emperor's approval could seldom be obtained for any appointment and could 
generally be disregarded if it was, there was nothing to prevent more than one man 
being nominated for the same position by rival warlords. Yuan Shao would later 
name one of his own officers as Inspector of Yu province, and send him to attack 
Sun Jian. 
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The appointments Sun Jian now held gave both military and civil 
authority, and established him as the chief lieutenant of Yuan Shu. As 
Inspector of Yu province, he had authority in six commanderies, 
including Yingchuan and Runan, and this wealthy region was the 
homeland of the Yuan family. Certainly the rank of an inspector was 
lower, and the power was less well-defined, than that of an administrator, 
but the office gave him the right to raise troops from the whole province, 
while his new title as a general gave him command in the field second 
only to that of Yuan Shu. 
By his destruction of Wang Rui and Zhang Zi, Sun Jian had left 
vacancies for the positions of Inspector of Jing province and 
Administrator of Nanyang, and he also relinquished his former post in 
Changsha. As he accepted the authority of Yuan Shu, moreover, Yuan Shu 
was able to take over Nanyang. 
As news of Wang Rui's fall reached the capital, however, Dong Zhuo 
appointed a new inspector in his place. Liu Biao, a member of the 
imperial clan, had been involved in the factions opposed to the eunuchs 
in the early years of the reign of Emperor Ling, and spent some twenty 
years in exile from the capital. He had been recalled to Luoyang, 
however, during the short hegemony of the He family, and was now sent 
to restore order in Jing province.57 
Though Yuan Shu blocked the main road to the south and the 
breakdown of government after the passage of Sun Jian had led to 
banditry and clan fighting, Liu Biao managed to make his way to Jing 
province unaccompanied and he established his headquarters at Yicheng 
in Nan commandery, south of Xiangyang on the Han River in present-day 
Hubei. Dong Zhuo's government may have hoped that Liu Biao's past 
history, as a gentlemen who had been proscribed by the eunuchs and as 
one of He Jin's supporters, would make it possible for him to arrange 
some form of co-existence with Yuan Shu and the rebels. This did, at 
                                                                                                                   
  At this time, however, it is unlikely that the nomination of Sun Jian by Yuan 
Shu was made in despite of any existing Inspector. A certain Kong Zhou had been 
Inspector of Yu province, and had joined Yuan Shao's rebellion (HHS 
74A/64A:2375), but no mention of him is made after that time and it is probable 
that he had left his post or died by the time Sun Jian was appointed. It is unlikely 
that Yuan Shu would needlessly antagonise one of his associates at this stage by 
proposing his own man for a place which was already occupied. 
57  Biographies of Liu Biao are in HHS 74B/64B:2419-24 and SGZ 6:210-13. He is 
discussed by Chittick, "Life and Legacy." 
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first, prove to be the case: Yuan Shu accepted Liu Biao's occupation of 
the greater part of Jing province, and Liu Biao recommended Yuan Shu 
as Administrator of Nanyang; but Liu Biao took no part on either side in 
the fighting between Dong Zhuo and his enemies. 
Sun Jian does not appear to have been involved to any significant 
degree in Yuan Shu's disposal of the spoils he had won on his way to the 
north. In some respects, it is a little surprising [120] that he was 
transferred away from Jing province, where he had established some 
authority, to become Inspector of Yu province, with which he had small 
previous connection. The effective result of these arrangements, 
moreover, was that Yuan Shu received secure command only of Nanyang, 
while the rest of Jing province was transferred to Liu Biao, who was 
Dong Zhuo's nominee and remained, at best, neutral. 
One imagines Sun Jian was under some pressure to acquiesce in 
these arrangements, and it must be recognised that his position was not a 
strong one. Men like Liu Biao, Yuan Shu and other commanders of the 
rebellion came from the most distinguished families of the empire, and 
Sun Jian, no matter what temporary authority he might have gained from 
his manoeuvres in Jing province, had no comparable personal status. 
Once he came to the north, he had to take a position as effective client 
and supporter of someone like Yuan Shu. If the prestige of the great 
families had been turned against him he would have been destroyed very 
easily, and he could strive only for their acceptance and tolerance, never 
for equality with them. 
Under Yuan Shu's command, therefore, Sun Jian took charge of the 
main attack against Dong Zhuo's position at Luoyang. He first 
established his headquarters in Luyang with Yuan Shu, and there made 
arrangements for lines of supply. He then marched north against Liang 
county in Henan commandery, now west of Linru in Henan. As the 
modern name implies, the city of Liang lay on the upper reaches of the 
Ru River, and an advance north or west along the valley would bring Sun 
Jian's army to the crest of a ridge of the Xiong'er Shan. From there he 
could descend on Luoyang from the south. Guangcheng, one of the 
passes which defended the capital, was established west of [121] Liang, 
but a fortified post would not long delay so strong a force as Sun Jian 
commanded.58 
                                               
58  Guangcheng was one of the eight passes re-fortified at the time of the Yellow 
Turban rebellion in 184: note 28 above. The pass controlled east-west traffic along 
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 Recognising the threat, Dong Zhuo sent an army under the command 
of his officers Xu Rong and Li Meng, which met Sun Jian's forces near 
Liang. In a great battle, Sun Jian was defeated, and was forced to flee for 
his life. One of Sun Jian's bodyguard took the red cap that Sun Jian 
regularly wore as a mark of distinction, and so attracted the enemy 
pursuit. Sun Jian then broke the lines that were encircling him and made 
his escape. 
Some of his associates were less fortunate. According to the 
biography of Dong Zhuo in Hou Han shu, Li Min the Administrator of 
Yingchuan was captured by Xu Rong's army and was executed by being 
boiled alive, while other soldiers of the rebel forces were killed with hot 
oil. It is some slight relief to find it recorded that Zu Mao, Sun Jian's 
rescuer, managed to escape.59
 
 
Map 4: The Region of Luoyang 189-190 
The last days of this Chinese year were successful ones for Dong Zhuo. 
Wang Kuang, Administrator of Henei, had been sent by Yuan Shao to 
press an advance along the Yellow River towards Luoyang, and he 
                                                                                                                   
the upper reaches of the Ru River, and also guarded the southern approach from 
Nanyang towards Luoyang. 
59  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1096 and HHS 72/62:2328. 
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camped at the Meng Crossing, northeast of the capital. Dong Zhuo sent 
soldiers against him, and Wang Kuang's army was destroyed. So Dong 
Zhuo's defence had been successful on both fronts, and the attack by the 
main force east of the mountains had broken down. [122] Sun Jian in the 
south gained no further support or co-operation from the allied armies on 
the Yellow River. 
Dong Zhuo's battle with Wang Kuang, however, and his temporary 
concentration on the Yellow River front, provided Sun Jian with the 
diversion he needed after his defeat by Xu Rong, and gave him time to 
recover the ground he had lost. Xu Rong had probably achieved his 
success chiefly through the suddenness of his attack and an element of 
surprise, and he had destroyed only a part of Sun Jian's forces. Certainly, 
the pursuit was not pressed, and Sun Jian was able to regroup and re-
organise his men with surprisingly little difficulty. On the other side, Xu 
Rong may have over-estimated the effects of his victory and have 
assumed that Sun Jian would be incapable of further operations for some 
time to come; but for his own part, in collecting and controlling his 
scattered troops after a heavy defeat, Sun Jian's achievement was 
considerable. By late February or early March of 191, the first month of 
the new Chinese year, Sun Jian had moved forward to the village of 
Yangren, northwest of Liang, further up the valley of the Ru River from 
the scene of his defeat, and he had established a camp. Though the defeat 
of Wang Kuang had proved decisive on the eastern front, in the south, for 
Dong Zhuo, all was to be done again. 
According to Yingxiong ji, quoted in the Pei Songzhi commentary to 
Sun Jian's biography, five thousand more troops, foot-soldiers and 
horsemen, were sent south against Sun Jian. They were commanded by 
Dong Zhuo's officer Hu Zhen, and the famous fighting man Lü Bu was in 
command of the cavalry. They attacked Sun Jian's fortified camp at 
Yangren, but were completely routed. We are told that Lü Bu and other 
officers were contemptuous of Hu Zhen, and they joined to deceive their 
commander and their own men, wearing them out [123>124] and driving 
them into panic. Whatever the truth of the matter, Sun Jian remained at 
Yangren, and Dong Zhuo sent no more expeditions to attack him.60
 
                                               
60  On the fighting about Liang and Yangren, see SGZ 46/Wu 1:1096 and 1098 PC 
note 5 quoting Yingxiong ji; deC, Biography, 41-43 
  HHS 72/62:2328 followed by ZZTJ 52:1919; deC, Establish Peace, 65, has a 
different order of events, which I have followed here. As I remark in Biography, 
72-73 note 60, I suspect that the quotation from Yingxiong ji, describing the 
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Just at this time, however, as Sun Jian was preparing to move 
towards Luoyang, he was suddenly put into danger and difficulty through 
the suspicions of Yuan Shu. One of Yuan Shu's officers suggested that if 
Sun Jian succeeded in capturing Luoyang, he might turn against Yuan 
Shu, presumably in an echo of Dong Zhuo's own military usurpation. 
Yuan Shu seems to have been influenced by the argument, and he cut off 
supplies to Sun Jian's army. He may have intended only to demonstrate 
his power, or he may have sought to have Sun Jian break off the 
campaign altogether. Certainly, Sun Jian was extremely anxious: he rode 
more than fifty kilometres from Yangren to Luyang in a single night in 
order to explain himself to Yuan Shu. Drawing maps on the ground to 
show his dispositions and plans, he assured Yuan Shu that he thought 
only of attacking Dong Zhuo for the good of the state and the honour of 
the Yuan family. Yuan Shu was satisfied, the supplies were sent on as 
before, and Sun Jian went back to his army.61
 
One possible justification for Yuan Shu's anxiety may be found on an 
account of an embassy from Dong Zhuo about this time. Two of his 
senior officers came to Yangren to ask for peace and an alliance, and 
promised that if Sun Jian would recommend any of his relatives for posts 
as inspector or administrator Dong Zhuo would arrange the 
appointments. Sun Jian replied, however, 
Dong Zhuo has turned against heaven and denies all law. He has 
destroyed the imperial house and overturned its power. I shall not be 
able to rest until I have killed you and all your families, as a sign to 
the world. How can I make peace and alliance with you?62 
In fact, Sun Jian had little to gain by changing sides. He came from south 
of the Yangzi and his military reputation had largely been made there, 
while his troops and supplies were sent to him from Yu and Jing 
provinces by arrangement of Yuan Shu. Should he abandon Yuan Shu, 
though Dong Zhuo may have held him in some personal respect he would 
                                                                                                                   
disastrous operations of Hu Zhen, has been misplaced in the main text of SGZ, and 
should appear in chronological order after the reference to the defeat of Sun Jian at 
Liang: the story in fact relates to Sun Jian's subsequent success at Yangren. 
61  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1096-97 and 1098 PC note 6 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan; deC, 
Biography, 43-44. 
62  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1097; deC, Biography, 44-45. It is just after the record of this 
incident that SGZ 46/Wu 1:1098-99 PC note 8 inserts the passage from Shanyang 
gong zaiji describing the conversation between Dong Zhuo and Liu Ai about the 
former strategy of Sun Jian at the time of the campaign against the rebels of Liang 
province: above at 99). 
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have obtained no great position at the capital. He and his men would be 
cut off from their home territories, and his troops could well turn restive. 
And the course of the rebellion east of the mountains had shown that the 
titles of local government which Dong Zhuo could offer would be of little 
use to Sun Jian and his kinsmen without a strong army to back their 
claims. Suspicious and unreliable though Yuan Shu might be, Sun Jian 
would find him a more useful master than Dong Zhuo could prove. 
Despite his fine and ferocious words, however, it appears that Sun 
Jian respected the flag of truce, and the envoys of Dong Zhuo were 
allowed to return to Luoyang.63 We have seen that Dong [126] Zhuo did 
not treat prisoners leniently, and in this civil war there had been another 
mission of truce, containing men of very high rank, who had been 
massacred by Yuan Shao and Yuan Shu.64 So it is possible that Yuan Shu 
had suspicions of Sun Jian when he learnt that messengers had come to 
his camp from Dong Zhuo and had been allowed to return. Yuan Shu may 
well have felt he needed reassurance from Sun Jian about his loyalty to 
their common cause – but he was evidently satisfied with Sun Jian's 
response. 
With this misunderstanding out of the way, Sun Jian led his army 
forward from his advanced base at Yangren and crossed the Xiong'er 
Shan by the fortified pass of Dagu, some fifty kilometres south of 
Luoyang.65 
Dong Zhuo now came in person to face him, and the two armies 
fought amongst the imperial tombs of Later Han. The graves of the 
rulers, with temples and funeral-mounds, had been established outside the 
                                               
63  HHS 72/62:2328 and SGZ 46/Wu 1:1097 say that one of the leaders of the embassy 
was Dong Zhuo's officer Li Jue. After the assassination of Dong Zhuo at Chang'an 
in 192, Li Jue was one of the military commanders who seized power in his stead: 
e.g. HHS 72/62:2333-34, SGZ 6:180-81. 
64  HHS 74A/64A:2376, describes the killing of members of an embassy sent by Dong 
Zhuo to Yuan Shao and Yuan Shu in the summer of 190: it included two ministers 
and other high officials. Of the five leaders, only the scholar Han Rong, who had 
been named Minister Herald by Dong Zhuo, was spared because of his personal 
reputation. The parallel passage is in ZZTJ 59:1916; deC, Establish Peace, 53. 
65  The Dagu or Taigu Pass was another of the eight passes whose fortifications had 
been restored in 184. It was on the road to the south of Luoyang through the 
Xiong'er range, just east of the Yi River. A modern motor-road follows that route 
(cf. note 57 above). 
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capital.66 During [127] the time Dong Zhuo had occupied Luoyang, he 
had arranged to pillage their treasures, and now Sun Jian's line of 
advance turned the sacred places of the dynasty into a battlefield. Dong 
Zhuo's army had the worst of it, and he retired to the west, along the road 
towards Chang'an, and camped at Mianchi in Hongnong commandery. A 
second army, under the command of Lü Bu, waited for Sun Jian under the 
walls of the city, and there was one more battle before Lü Bu led the last 
of Dong Zhuo's troops from Luoyang, and Sun Jian held possession of 
the city. 
It was a glorious achievement, but an empty victory. Luoyang had 
been plundered and burnt and ruined, and Dong Zhuo had driven the 
emperor and his court to Chang'an almost a year earlier. Of the civilian 
population, those who had not been compelled to move to Chang'an had 
fled into the surrounding country. Jiangbiao zhuan says that 
The former capital was deserted, and for several hundred li there was 
no smoke or fire [from a dwelling that was still inhabited]. Sun Jian 
came forward to the city, and he was sad and wept.67 
From a military point of view, moreover, Sun Jian's position was 
extremely weak. Since the destruction of Wang Kuang's army on the 
Yellow River some months before, the men from the east of the 
mountains had attempted no further advance along that line. Sun Jian had 
captured Luoyang by his own efforts, but there was no allied force close 
enough to support his position or help him develop his advantage. He 
sent a detachment to harass his enemies' retreat, but Dong Zhuo and Lü 
Bu had withdrawn their armies into fortified positions along the Chang'an 
road, and they could choose any time to make a counter-attack against 
Sun Jian's isolated force. Despite his victory, he could not stay for 
long.[128] 
Before he left the capital, Sun Jian carried out the rites which loyalty 
to the Han dynasty required of him. He cleared debris from the imperial 
temples and repaired the damaged tombs, and he held a great sacrifice, 
killing a bull and a ram and a pig, to honour the ancestors of the imperial 
clan. More than this, it is said that one of the soldiers under his command 
                                               
66  The tombs of the emperors of Later Han were in two areas, northwest and 
southeast of Luoyang: Bielenstein, Lo-yang, 83-87. Sun Jian was approaching 
from the southeast, so fighting affected the funerary parks of the founding Emperor 
Guangwu and his successors Zhang, He and Huan. 
67  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1099 PC note 9 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
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found the Great Seal of State of the Han dynasty in a well of the imperial 
pottery works. 
According to Wu shu, quoted in the commentary of Pei Songzhi to 
the biography of Sun Jian in Sanguo zhi, the seal had been thrown away 
at the time of the massacre of the eunuchs in 189, and it had not been 
recovered. Then, when Sun Jian was in camp in the city, a multi-coloured 
light appeared above the well. Everyone was afraid, and no one dared 
draw water. Sun Jian had one of his men go down into the well, and he 
found the seal and brought it up. According to Shanyang gong zaiji, Sun 
Jian at first kept possession of the seal, but Yuan Shu compelled him to 
give it up, threatening to keep his wife under arrest unless he did so. 
The commentary to Sun Jian's biography contains several further 
accounts and discussions of this discovery. Stripped of the miraculous 
symbolism which must accompany the story of such a numinous object, 
the basic record is not incredible. It is quite possible that one of Sun 
Jian's men found the seal among the ruins of the capital, and he may have 
found it in the well of the imperial pottery. Such an important discovery 
would soon become known and Sun Jian, as commander of the army, 
would take it into his keeping, while Yuan Shu, Sun Jian's superior 
officer, would naturally expect to be given it as soon as possible. 
In the commentary to Sun Jian's biography, however, the historian Yu 
Xi and the commentator Pei Songzhi both appear to believe that Sun Jian 
managed to keep the seal, that it remained in the possession of his 
descendants, the emperors of Wu, and that it was [129] never handed 
back. There is no evidence to support this theory; on the contrary, we are 
told that when Yuan Shu died in 199 his seal was sent to the imperial 
court of Han. By that time, Yuan Shu had tried and failed to establish 
himself as emperor of a new dynasty, and there seems no reason to doubt 
that he made use of the Great Seal of State for that purpose. It seems 
clear that Sun Jian had possession of the seal for a very short time before 
he handed it, whether under threat or not, to Yuan Shu.68 
With this trophy of victory and heavenly favour, Sun Jian abandoned 
the desolate capital of Later Han and returned to Yuan Shu at Luyang. 
                                               
68  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1099 PC note 9 quoting Wu shu, Shanyang gong zaiji, Jiangbiao 
zhuan, Zhi lin and some remarks by Pei Songzhi himself; deC, Biography, 48-51. 
See also A note on the Great Seal of State below. 
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Civil war and the last campaigns (191-192): 
Sun Jian captured Luoyang about the third month of the Chinese year, but 
even as he was fighting there the alliance against Dong Zhuo was 
breaking up, and the erstwhile allies ended all pretence of co-operation. 
Yuan Shu, who regarded himself as the head of his family, was jealous of 
the prestige enjoyed by Yuan Shao as leader of the alliance, and he spread 
stories against him, saying that "Shao is not a true son of the Yuan clan" 
and "Shao is our family slave." When Yuan Shao heard of this he was 
predictably furious.69[130] 
For his part, Yuan Shao had been concerned that he had no territorial 
base, and no real authority other than the nominal leadership of an 
alliance which was already showing signs of disintegration. Early in 191 
he put pressure on Han Fu and persuaded him to yield his place as 
Governor of Ji province, and about the same time he sent an army against 
Yuan Shu's possessions. Naming a certain Zhou Yu of Kuaiji as rival 
Inspector of Yu province, Yuan Shao sent him to make a surprise attack 
on Sun Jian's territory while Sun Jian was still away. 
Three brothers from Kuaiji, Zhou Xin, Zhou Ang and Zhou Yu, all 
came into the service of Yuan Shao about this time. According to Kuaiji 
dianlu, a local history of that commandery, quoted in the Pei Songzhi 
                                               
69  HHS 74A/64A:2373 says that the father of Yuan Shao was Yuan Cheng, and HHS 
75/65:2438 says that the father of Yuan Shu was Yuan Feng, who had been 
Excellency over the Masses in the reign of Emperor Ling. The two men would 
therefore have been cousins, and SGZ 6:207 describes Yuan Shu as the younger 
cousin. HHS 45/35:1523, being part of the biographies of earlier members of the 
Yuan family, likewise refers to Yuan Shao as the son of Yuan Cheng, who died 
young, and to Yuan Shu as the son of Cheng's younger brother Feng. 
  Commentary to HHS 74A/64A:2373, however, quotes the Hou Han shu of 
Yuan Shansong, and SGZ 6:188 PC note 1 quotes the Wei shu of Wang Shen, both 
stating that Yuan Shao was the son of Yuan Feng by a concubine, and that he was 
then adopted by Yuan Cheng. Yuan Shao would thus have been the natural-born 
half-brother of Yuan Shu, and Yuan Shu's comments on his status in the family 
would have been based upon the difference in rank of their respective mothers. 
  On the other hand, SGZ 6:188-89 PC note 2 quotes Yingxiong ji, which tells 
how Yuan Cheng died when Yuan Shao was young, and Yuan Shao later carried out 
exceptional mourning in his honour. Following this, Pei Songzhi suggests the 
relationship between Yuan Cheng and Yuan Shao was more direct than mere 
adoption.  
  Despite that argument, however, I note Yuan Shu's criticism and accept that 
both men were sons of Yuan Feng: Shu by his chief wife and Shao by a concubine; 
Shao's formal seniority in the family was a consequence of his adoption into the 
lineage of Yuan Cheng. 
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commentary to Sun Jian's biography in Sanguo zhi, when Cao Cao was 
collecting troops in Chenliu commandery for the beginning of the 
rebellion against Dong Zhuo in 189, he sent to invite Zhou Yu; Zhou Yu 
collected two thousand men and went to join Cao Cao to the north.70 The 
brothers probably went to the wars [131] together, and they evidently 
came from a powerful family, for Cao Cao had heard of them and they 
were able to gather a large number of soldiers. Later, while the armies 
were grouped against Dong Zhuo they changed to serve Yuan Shao, and 
while Zhou Yu was fighting to confirm his duplicate appointment as 
Inspector of Yu province, his elder brother Ang was named Administrator 
of Jiujiang, in Yang province north of the Yangzi and west of present-day 
Nanjing. 
As he was advancing toward Luoyang, Sun Jian had sent a 
detachment to occupy the city of Yangcheng in Yingchuan, now southeast 
of Dengfeng in Henan, in the valley of the Ying River, and as he 
withdrew he maintained this outpost to watch for any action by Dong 
Zhuo from the west. However, though the city was in Yu province under 
Sun Jian's authority as Inspector, it was also within Yuan Shao's sphere of 
influence in Ji province and Henei commandery to the north of the 
Yellow River. It was at this point, therefore, that Zhou Yu launched his 
attack, and Yangcheng was taken by surprise. 
According to Wu lu, when Sun Jian heard of Zhou Yu's attack, he 
sighed and said, 
Together we raised loyal troops, intending to bring aid to the nation. 
The rebels and bandits are on the point of destruction, yet people can 
act like this. Whom can I work with?71[132] 
                                               
70  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1100 PC note 10; deC, Biography, 52. 
71  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1100 PC note 10; deC, Biography, 52. 
  There is complete disagreement between the sources about which of the Zhou 
brothers was sent to attack Sun Jian. HHS 75/65:2439 says it was Zhou Xin, and 
HHS 73/63:2359 agrees, but the parallel text to HHS 73/63, in SGZ 8:242, says that 
it was Zhou Ang, and this has been followed by ZZTJ 52:1926; deC, Establish 
Peace, 76. 
  Wu lu, however, says that it was Zhou Yu, and since this is followed by the very 
circumstantial account of the careers of the three brothers taken from Kuaiji dianlu 
(note 70 above), I accept that version. 
  Though the surname is the same, there appears to have been no close 
connection between the Zhou family of Kuaiji and the Zhou family of Lujiang. In 
particular, the Zhou Yu of Kuaiji here is not the same person as the Zhou Yu from 
Lujiang who became the friend of Sun Ce and the great general of Sun Quan. 
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In fact, these first moves in the struggle between the two Yuan marked 
the beginning of a new stage in the confusion of wars which brought the 
end of Later Han. As the alliance against Dong Zhuo broke up, lines were 
drawn for battle across the whole of the North China plain, and the 
warlords and their armies prepared for the fighting which should leave 
one man master of China. 
Yuan Shao, former leader of the alliance, had already taken over Ji 
province, and he also sent one of his lieutenants to occupy Qing province. 
Liu Yu and Gongsun Zan, as Governor and chief military commander, 
held You province in the north in an uneasy co-operation;72
 
Yuan Shu 
claimed supremacy in Nanyang and in Yu province; and Liu Biao in the 
south controlled the lower reaches of the Han River and had nominal 
command of Jing province south of the Yangzi. Further east, between the 
lower course of the Yellow River and the Huai, the local administrators 
had not yet been required to show their loyalties, but choice would soon 
be forced upon them. 
In the mean time, the great commanders had already taken sides, and 
when Sun Jian led his army against Zhou Yu, was accompanied by a 
thousand cavalry from You province, led by Gongsun Yue a cousin of 
Gongsun Zan. The manoeuvres by which this co-operation had come 
about are summarised in a passage of Zizhi tongjian, and [133] they are 
typical of the convoluted personal and political relationships of the 
time:73 
Liu He, son of Liu Yu, was Palace Attendant [to the young Emperor 
Xian]. Hoping to return [from Chang'an] to the east, the emperor sent 
Liu He to steal away from Dong Zhuo, travel in secret through the 
Wu Pass,74 go to Liu Yu, and order him to lead troops to come and 
receive him. 
Liu He came to Nanyang, but Yuan Shu hoped to gain something 
from Liu Yu, so he kept him there and would not allow him to go 
further. Promising Liu He that when reinforcements came they 
would all go to the west together, he had him write a letter to Liu Yu. 
Liu Yu received the letter and sent several thousand horsemen to 
join Liu He. Gongsun Zan realised that Yuan Shu had ideas of 
                                               
72  On the rivalry between Gongsun Zan and Liu Yu in You province, see deC, 
Northern Frontier, 400-403, and also below. 
73  ZZTJ 52:1925-27; deC, Establish Peace, 77-78, based upon HHS 73/63:2355-56, 
and SGZ 8:241-42. 
74  The Wu Pass was southeast of Chang'an on the road to Nanyang commandery. 
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rebellion, and he tried to prevent these soldiers from going, but Liu 
Yu refused to listen to him. 
Then Gongsun Zan became afraid that Yuan Shu would hear 
about this and be angry with him, so he sent his cousin Gongsun Yue 
to lead another thousand horsemen to Yuan Shu, and he secretly 
encouraged Yuan Shu to keep hold of Liu He and take over his 
troops. Because of this, Liu Yu and Gongsun Zan became enemies. 
So Gongsun Yue and his troopers accompanied Sun Jian to attack Zhou 
Yu at Yangcheng, but Gongsun Yue was killed in one of the first 
skirmishes of the campaign. Furious at the death of his young kinsman, 
Gongsun Zan blamed everything on Yuan Shao, and he led his army to 
attack the northern borders of Yuan Shao's territory.[134] 
Zhou Yu's first attack was successful, and it was some time before 
Sun Jian recovered the ground he had lost. After initial set-backs, 
however, including the death of Gongsun Yue, he regained control of the 
situation and defeated Zhou Yu in a series of engagements. Then Yuan 
Shu led an attack on Zhou Ang in Jiujiang commandery, and Zhou Yu 
took his army away to the southeast to go to his brother's help. Defeated 
again, he abandoned the field and returned to his home country in the 
southeast.75 
Yuan Shu had now engaged Yuan Shao's forces on two fronts with 
considerable success. He had not yet conquered Jiujiang, but Sun Jian 
had restored the position in Yingchuan, and Zhou Yu's army had been 
eliminated as a fighting force. For Yuan Shao, on the other hand, the 
situation was extremely difficult: besides the failure in the south, he was 
under threat from the north, for Gongsun Zan had rejected all Yuan 
Shao's protestations of goodwill and disregarded all Liu Yu's attempts to 
make peace. Instead, he brought an army to the borders of Yuan Shao's 
territory in the northern part of present-day Shandong, he encouraged the 
rulers of cities to rebel in his favour, and he named his own rival 
inspectors of Ji, Yan and Qing provinces. 
Faced with such a combination of enemies, Yuan Shao made alliance 
with Liu Biao the Inspector of Jing province. From Yuan Shao's point of 
view, a diversion on Yuan Shu's southern front would gain him valuable 
time. For Liu Biao, Yuan Shu already controlled the wealthy 
commandery of Nanyang, and there was always a possibility that he 
                                               
75  On the later experiences of the Zhou family of Kuaiji with the Sun and their 
associates, see Chapter Three at 154 and 159. 
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might wish to expand south. On the other hand, if Yuan Shu was 
defeated, Liu Biao might hope to take Nanyang. Since the time of his 
appointment, more than [135] twelve months earlier, Liu Biao had put 
down the banditry and the civil feuds which he had found when he 
arrived, and he had stationed troops under his officer Huang Zu at the 
border between his own territory and that of Yuan Shu near Xiangyang on 
the Han River. For his part, Yuan Shu looked to take advantage of his 
recent successes, and he sent Sun Jian to lead his army to the south. 
Liu Biao sent Huang Zu to move forward to a position between the 
county city of Deng and the town of Fan, both in Nanyang commandery 
and on the northern bank of the Han River, and he came forward from his 
headquarters at Yicheng to guard Xiangyang itself. Then Sun Jian came 
up. He completely defeated Huang Zu's formations and flung them back 
across the Han, then surrounded Xiangyang to prevent Huang Zu taking 
his troops into the city. Some remnants of Huang Zu's forces fled to 
refuge in the hills called Xian Shan, a ridge south of Xiangyang city. Sun 
Jian led a force of light-armed horsemen to search them out, and in that 
fighting in the wilderness Sun Jian was killed. 
Sun Jian's biography in Sanguo zhi, and Dian lue and Yingxiong ji 
quoted in commentary, have differing accounts of his death.76 Their 
descriptions of the general course of the operations can be reconciled, but 
Dian lue says that Huang Zu made a sortie by night, and that the battle 
near Fan and the fatal pursuit took place in darkness. The main text and 
Dian lue say that Sun Jian was shot by an arrow, but Yingxiong ji claims 
that he was hit on the head and killed by a rock thrown down from a 
height above. There is no way to tell precisely what happened, but the 
suggestion of a night engagement appears very possible, even if [136] the 
main battle had taken place in daylight: in confused fighting, seeking 
swiftly to follow up his initial success, Sun Jian might well have found it 
necessary to lead the pursuit, and in darkness amongst that broken terrain 
it would not have been difficult for him to become separated from his 
companions or struck down in their midst. 
It appears that his body fell into the hands of his enemies. Sanguo zhi 
tells us that Huan Jie, a man of Changsha, had been nominated as a Filial 
and Incorrupt candidate by Sun Jian when he was Administrator of the 
commandery about 189. When Sun Jian was killed, Huan Jie went to Liu 
                                               
76  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1100-01 and PC note 1; deC, Biography, 52-53. 
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Biao to ask for the body, and Liu Biao granted his request.77 It was 
returned to the family, and Sun Jian was buried at Qu'a in Danyang 
commandery.78 
Sun Jian's death ended the fighting between Liu Biao and Yuan Shu. 
Liu Biao kept hold of Xiangyang but made no move further north. Sun 
Ben, nephew of Sun Jian by his elder twin brother Sun Qiang, took 
command of the army and went back to Yuan Shu, and Yuan Shu went 
through the formality of a recommendation that Sun Ben should take the 
place of Sun Jian as Inspector of Yu province. 
Sun Ben, as we have seen, had joined Sun Jian at the time of his 
march north from Changsha against Dong Zhuo, little more than a year 
earlier, and at this time he was only twenty years old. His appointment as 
Inspector did not carry a general's command with it, as Sun Jian's had 
done, and although it was a courtesy by Yuan Shu it was not an important 
post. With the death of Sun Jian, there was no member of his family 
influential or trusted enough to take his place among Yuan Shu's senior 
officers. Sun [137] Jian had served Yuan Shu well, and in years to come 
his relatives could look for patronage and favour from Yuan Shu, and 
might expect to hold command under him as proven allies. For the time 
being, however, his death had put an end to the higher ambitions of his 
family. 
After so many years, and with such sources as we have, it is difficult 
to assess the qualities of a man like Sun Jian. The people of his own time 
and the historians who came after generally acknowledge him as a loyal 
subject of Han. But he was pre-eminently a fighting man, and even as he 
fought the power of Han collapsed, and he died in one of the private 
quarrels that ended the unified empire. 
Sun Jian rose to high position because the times of disturbance could 
use a man of his abilities. He was not uniformly successful in battle and 
he suffered some notable defeats, but it appears that one of his chief 
military virtues was his ability to discipline and control his troops. One 
anecdote in his biography, which tells how he was caught by the enemy 
outside the walls of Luyang and yet was able to order his soldiers and 
bring them back to safety, may illustrate this,79 but better proof is given 
                                               
77  The biography of Huan Jie is in SGZ 22:631-33. 
78  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1101. PC note 1 quoting Wu lu adds that the name of Sun Jian's tomb 
was Gaoling 高陵 "The High Mound." 
79SGZ 46/Wu 1:1096; deC, Biography, 41. 
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by his recovery after the defeat at the hands of Xu Rong near Liang. If 
Sun Jian was forced to flee for his life, it was no small achievement that 
he managed to regroup his forces and resume the advance. 
Indeed, the whole campaign to Luoyang was a remarkable 
achievement for one isolated army fighting its way through a series of 
battles and defence-works against a number of different enemy forces, 
with an uncertain supply chain and a suspicious chief commander in the 
rear. Success in such an enterprise required the ability to hold an army 
together, composed as it was of a mixture of regular soldiers, conscripts 
from different regions, and personal followers – any of [137] whom, for 
one reason or another, might prove unreliable and willing to desert. The 
methods of raising troops in civil war did not always produce good 
soldiers, and the men that were gathered needed a leader who could make 
them fight for him. 
This, it would seem, was Sun Jian's great quality: to gain the 
confidence and the control of the men he commanded. He was still only 
in his mid-thirties when he died, but his achievements had gained his clan 
some position in the empire, and the memory of his name was of 
advantage to his sons. 
A note on the Great Seal of State: 
The Great Seal of State, literally "Seal Which Transmits the State" (傳國
璽 chuan'guo xi) was the insignia of the emperor. A central item at the 
ceremony of succession,80 it was worn at the belt on state occasions. 
There were other seals, six at the time of Later Han, which were used for 
certifying various documents.81 
Predictably, several legends accrued to the history of the Great Seal 
of State, hereafter referred to as the "Seal." We are told, for instance, that 
it was carved for the First Emperor of Qin, using jade from Lantian, or, 
according to another source, the celebrated piece of jade which had been 
handed to the King of Chu by the mythical Bian He.82 The calligraphy 
                                               
80  See HHS 96/6:3143, the Treatise of Ceremonial, originally part of the Xu Han shu 
of Sima Biao; Mansvelt Beck, Treatises, 77. The putting on and taking off of the 
Seal were notable elements in ceremonies of accession, and notably in the 
deposition of Liu He, brief ruler of Former Han, in 74 BC. See, for example, Dubs, 
HFHD II, 203-205, and Loewe, Crisis and Conflict, 120. 
81  See the Du duan of Cai Yong as quoted in commentary to HHS 1A:33, and Dubs, 
HFHD I, 56 note 3. 
82  On Bian He, see SJ 83:2471. 
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was attributed to [139] the notorious Chancellor Li Si: not 
inappropriately, since Li Si was said to be the man responsible for the 
reform of the Chinese script in accordance with the unifying policies of 
Qin. 
At the fall of Qin, the last ruler of that state surrendered the Seal to 
the future Emperor Gao of Han, and it remained in the possession of the 
dynasty until it was seized by the usurper Wang Mang; at his overthrow; 
it again came to the possession of the restoring Emperor Guangwu. 
Thereafter it remained among the treasures of the house of Han until it 
was lost at Luoyang in the disorders of 189, found by Sun Jian in 191, 
and so transferred into the hands of Yuan Shu.83 
Yuan Shu proclaimed himself Emperor in 197, and he died in 199. 
We are then told that his officer Xu Qiu took the Seal which Yuan Shu 
had appropriated, brought it to Xu city, where Emperor Xian was residing 
under the control of Cao Cao, and handed it in.84 
The seal found by Sun Jian is described by the Wu shu of Wei Zhao 
as being some four inches square at the base,85 surmounted by a ring 
carved in the form of five interlaced dragons. There was a small piece 
broken off one corner, which is attributed to an occasion recorded in the 
biography of the Grand Empress-Dowager Wang of Emperor Yuan of 
Former Han, an aunt of [140] Wang Mang: about AD 6, when Wang 
Mang was planning to take the throne, he sent to require the Seal of her, 
and the Lady Wang, in disgust, threw the Seal on the ground.86 
The inscription on the base of the Seal is a matter of some confusion 
and uncertainty. According to the Wu shu of Wei Zhao, the inscription on 
the seal found by Sun Jian was "For he who has received the Mandate 
from Heaven, long life and eternal glory."87 Yu Xi, in his Zhi lin, gives the 
                                               
83  On this history see, for example, SJ 6:228 note 7, the Zhengyi commentary of 
Zhang Shoujie of Tang quoting Cui Hao 崔浩 of the fifth century (translated by 
Chavannes, MH II, 108-110 note 5), HHS 1A:33 commentary quoting the Du duan 
of Cai Yong of the second century and the Yuxi pu 玉璽誧 "Register of the Jade 
Seals" compiled by Xu Lingxin 徐令信 of Tang, and note 1 of Liu Zhao's 
commentary to Treatise of Carriages and Robes at HHS 120/30:3673. There is an 
account of the seals of Later Han in Dong Han huiyao 9:131-133. 
84  HHS 75/65:2442-43, SGZ 6:209-10, the biography of Xu Qiu in HHS 48/38:1620-
21 (where the commentary of Li Xian gives the sound of his personal name as a 
homonym of 仇), and SGZ 1:30 PC note 2 citing Xianxian xingzhuang. 
85  A Han cun 寸 "inch" was approximately 23 mm. 
86  HS 98:4032. 
87  受命于天; 旣壽永昌 Shou ming yu tian; ji shou yong chang. 
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alternative reading "great prosperity" for the last two characters.88 One 
may observe, however, that Wei Zhao died in 273 as a subject of Wu, 
when the Seal was in the hands of the enemy state of Jin, while in the 
time of Yu Xi, the first half of the fourth century under Eastern Jin, the 
Seal was again somewhere in the north: on this later history, see below. 
So neither of these scholars ever saw the object they were describing, nor 
did they have any practicable way to determine the correct inscription. 
Cui Hao, a scholar of the fifth century, noted that Han shu has another 
form of the inscription as "By the decree of majestic Heaven, long life 
and prosperity to the Sovereign Emperor;" there is, however, no such 
statement in the present text of Han shu.89 
After the Seal which Yuan Shu had held was returned to the court of 
Han it remained in the formal possession of Emperor Xian for the next 
twenty years, and was transferred to Cao Pi, son of Cao Cao, when he 
took the imperial title and received the abdication of Han on 11 
December 220.90 The Seal was again [140] transferred to Sima Yan, first 
Emperor of the Jin dynasty, at the time of the abdication of the Wei 
Emperor Cao Huan on 4 February 266.91 
The Great Seal of State of the [Western] Jin dynasty, which was 
evidently this seal, is said to have fallen into the hands of the Xiongnu 
leader Liu Cong when Luoyang was taken and sacked in 311, an event 
which marks the effective end of the Western Jin period.92 Thereafter the 
records become confused, complicated and uncertain. 
According to the Treatise on Regalia of Jin shu, which was given its 
present form in the seventh century, the Seal passed from the hands of 
Liu Cong, ruler of the Former Zhao or Northern Han state, to those of his 
successor Liu Yao.93 In 329, with the destruction of Liu Yao by the 
general Shi Le, the Seal was transferred to his state, known as Later 
Zhao, and when that government fell into disorder and ruin in 352, the 
Seal was returned to the court of [Eastern] Jin, now south of the Yangzi.94 
                                               
88  且康 qie kang. 
89  昊天之命;皇帝壽昌 Hao tian zhi ming; huangdi shou chang. On Cui Hao, see note 
83 above. 
90  SGZ 1:62; Fang, Chronicle I, 10-11 and 35-39; also Leban, "Managing Heaven's 
Mandate." 
91  SGZ 4:154 and JS 25:772. 
92  JS 102:2659. 
93  JS 25:772, also JS 6:151 and JS 103:2684. 
94  JS 107:2797, JS 79:2071 and JS 8:198. 
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In recording the recovery of the Seal, Jin shu states that the inscription 
read "Receiving Heaven's Mandate, long life and prosperity to the 
Imperial Sovereign."95 Xu Guang, a scholar of the fourth and fifth 
centuries, cited in commentary to the Treatise of Carriages and Robes of 
the Xu Han shu of Sima Biao, has this version, but he cannot necessarily 
be relied upon as authority for the inscription of the Seal of Later 
Han.96[142] 
The later history of the Great Seal of State, however, is of marginal 
relevance to the story of Sun Jian; and one must suspect that the true and 
original Seal may have disappeared somewhere along that line of 
transmission. 
The best collection of translations in a Western language on the 
matter of the Great Seal of State is the work of Daudin. Though his 
interpretations of some titles and proper names are unreliable, the general 
thrust of his information, translated from a variety of Chinese sources, is 
reasonably clear.97 
More recently, Rogers, in his translation of The Chronicle of Fu 
Chien, has discussed the history of the Seal in the fourth century, arguing 
that the Chinese accounts are based primarily on the requirements of 
hagiography and exemplary history. His own opinion is that: 
The present writer does not believe that even a shred of objective fact 
necessarily underlies any given notice of this seal.98 
Rogers criticises Daudin, with other Chinese, Japanese and Western 
scholars, for accepting the story of the Seal rather too readily. To be fair, 
however, Daudin, in the introductory remarks to his translation, remarks 
that:[142] 
                                               
95  JS 8:198: 受天之命;皇帝壽昌 Shou tian zhi ming, huangdi shou chang. 
96  Quoted in the commentary of Liu Zhao to HHS 120/30:3673. 
97  Daudin discusses the question in detail at 129-157. See also Chavannes, MH II, 
108-110 note 5. 
98  Expressed in note 279 on page 102, and discussed also at 54-55. 
  At 102 Rogers cites further the opinion of Kurihara Tomonobu, who suggests 
that the whole idea of the Seal was a device by Emperor Guangwu, founder of 
Later Han, to emphasise the legitimacy of his succession from Former Han. 
  This is very possible, and the account of Wang Mang's seizure of the Seal from 
the Grand Empress-Dowager, sitting as it does in a special passage of her 
biography, certainly has the flavour of later propaganda against the usurper. On the 
other hand, it is clear that the Later Han dynasty did possess a Great Seal of State, 
whether or not that seal had indeed been carved for the First Emperor and handed 
on through the line of the rulers of Former Han. 
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...cet objet précieux fut en effet égaré au cours des guerres, contrefait 
par des usurpateurs, détérioré ou détruit dans les incendies, de sorte 
que même avant la dynastie des T'ang, l'authenticité du sceau de Ts'in-
Che-Hoang était très contestable. 
There remains the question whether Sun Jian did find the sacred item, as 
he appears to have claimed, at Luoyang after his defeat of Dong Zhuo. 
I doubt one can draw any firm conclusion. The story of the discovery 
in the well of the pottery office is strange and suspicious; on the other 
hand, it is difficult to believe that Sun Jian had time or opportunity to 
arrange the carving of an acceptable forgery in the middle of a hard-
fought campaign or in the confusion of its aftermath. Unlike fragments of 
the True Cross, or the lance-head which pierced the side of Christ, a 
convincing copy of the Seal would require some craftsmanship. And if 
we postulate the argument that Sun Jian, or more plausibly Yuan Shu, 
prepared the item in advance and pretended to discover it at Luoyang, 
then the technicalities of the plot, and the risk of embarrassment if 
something went wrong – as it easily could – make the whole business 
excessively complex. It seems easier to accept that Sun Jian found the 
Seal, or was given it by someone who knew the hiding place. 
We may observe, moreover, that the story of Sun Jian's recovery of 
the Seal, followed by Yuan Shu's seizure of it, and its later restoration to 
the Han court dominated by Cao Cao, is of no particular propaganda 
value to any of the protagonists, except perhaps, for a short time, Yuan 
Shu, and he does not appear to have gained great credit from its 
possession. There was evidently some legend that Sun Jian retained 
possession of the Seal and handed it on to his descendants, the later rulers 
of Wu, but there is nothing in the historical record which implies that Sun 
Ce, Sun Quan or their successors ever claimed to have the treasure, [144] 
and the discussion on this point is not well-founded.99 At the other end of 
the story, there is no evidence that Emperor Xian, or his master Cao Cao, 
gained any added authority or credibility from the fact that the Seal was 
restored. Emperor Xian was generally accepted as the nominal ruler of 
China, and while Cao Cao certainly gained from his ostensible position 
as "protector" of the powerless sovereign, his position was hardly 
enhanced by his puppet's possession of the Seal. 
                                               
99  See Jiangbiao zhuan by Yu Pu and Zhi lin by Yu Xi in SGZ 46/Wu 1:1099 note 9; 
deC, Biography, 48-49. 
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So there was limited opportunity for propaganda advantage to any of 
the protagonists other than Yuan Shu, and it is doubtful that he was in a 
good position to manipulate Sun Jian, to Sun Jian's own embarrassment, 
so comprehensively.100 I am therefore inclined to accept the historical 
record of the event, at least insofar as the statement goes that Sun Jian, 
when he was at Luoyang, obtained the Great Seal of State of Later Han. 
Thereafter, the record of transmission to Yuan Shu and then to Cao Cao 
and his successors and to the rulers of Jin seems as good as can be 
expected under the circumstances. Later, at the fall of Luoyang in 311, 
the history becomes too confused, and the opportunities for distortion and 
propaganda are too tempting, for anyone now to tell the real from the 
false. 
Finally, we may note that Chapter 6 of Romance tells how Sun Jian 
attempted to hide the seal in the hope of keeping it for himself, and 
perjured himself to his commander-in-chief Yuan Shu, denying that he 
had it in his [145] possession. Such a dramatic scene, however, requires 
that Yuan Shu should have been physically present, with his army, at 
Luoyang; there is no evidence in the historical texts that Yuan Shu was 
anywhere near the capital at this time. 
                                               
100 It is just possible that Yuan Shu had a false Seal prepared some time later, at his 
leisure, and used Sun Jian's capture of Luoyang to provide it with a spurious 
provenance after Sun Jian was conveniently dead: this would follow the pattern 
postulated by Kurihara for Emperor Guangwu (note 97 above). The problem 
remains, however, that Yuan Shu gained no particular prestige from its possession, 
and by this point, as Rogers would observe, the entire discussion disappears in a 
blur of theory and fantasy. 

  
 
 
 
Map 5: Yang province in the time of Sun Ce 
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THE YOUNG GENTLEMAN : SUN CE 
 
Introductory summary 
His early life and his service with Yuan Shu (175-195) 
The south of the Yangzi and the break with Yuan Shu (195-197) 
The move west and the middle Yangzi (198-199) 
The last campaigns (200) 
Sun Ce and the legend of Gan Ji: a medley of texts 
 
Introductory summary: 
Sun Ce, eldest son of Sun Jian, was still a boy when his father died. At 
the age of eighteen, he took service under Sun Jian's former patron, Yuan 
Shu, and was given some minor commands. In 195, however, he obtained 
approval for an expedition to acquire territory south of the lower Yangzi, 
and in a brilliant series of campaigns, contending against formal officials 
and local chieftains, he conquered the commanderies of Danyang, Wu 
and Kuaiji. 
 By this time, Yuan Shu, from a comparatively weak position in the 
valley of the Huai, had ventured to proclaim himself emperor in rivalry to 
the Han dynasty. The usurpation, however, was rejected, other warlords 
turned against him and Sun Ce took the opportunity to declare his 
independence. 
 From his base on the lower Yangzi, Sun Ce extended his power 
westwards to the region of the present-day Poyang Lake. He had 
ambitions further upstream, towards the territory of Liu Biao in Jing 
province, but before he could consolidate his position he was assassinated 
[147] by retainers loyal to a local clan leader. He died at the age of 
twenty-five. 
 
His early life and his service with Yuan Shu (175-195): 
Sun Ce, eldest son of Sun Jian, was born in 175, almost certainly at 
Yandu, where Sun Jian held his first appointment as Assistant in the 
county.1 With his mother the Lady Wu, he followed his father from one 
                                               
*  In the first edition of Generals of the South, published in 1990, Chapter Three 
occupied pages 146 to 212. The original pagination is indicated with brackets []; 
indexing and cross-references refer to those pages. 
1 The biography of Sun Ce is in SGZ 46/Wu 1:1101-12. 
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government post to another, but in 184, when Sun Jian went to join Zhu 
Jun in the war against the Yellow Turbans, the family stayed at 
Shouchun, a county city which was the headquarters of the inspector of 
Yang province, now Shouxian in Anhui. At that time Sun Ce was no more 
than nine years old by Western reckoning, his brother Sun Quan had been 
born in 182, and a third brother Sun Yi was born in 184.2 
 It is possible that Sun Jian's family were with him at the capital 
during his brief appointment as Gentleman-Consultant in 186, and it is 
certain they joined him in Changsha when became Administrator in that 
commandery. In 190, when Sun Jian led his army from Changsha to the 
north against Dong Zhuo, he left Sun Ce with his mother and younger 
brothers, and the family went to stay at Shu county, the capital of Lujiang 
commandery in Yang province: the city lay west of present-day Lujiang 
in Anhui, about 150 kilometres south of Shouchun. 
 Sun Ce at this time was about fifteen years old, and though his 
biography says that he took the family to Shu, it seems more reasonable 
to suppose that the arrangements were made by Sun Jian [148] and the 
Lady Wu. Again, according to Sun Ce's biography, even while he was at 
Shouchun in 184 and 185, he had already made a name and gained 
friends among the leading men of the district; this too seems rather 
unlikely, or exceptionally precocious for a boy of nine. We are also told, 
however, that it was at this time he met Zhou Yu, who had been born in 
the same year, 175, and the two became friends. It was because of their 
friendship that Sun Ce and his family went to stay at Shu a few years 
later, and we are told that Zhou Yu paid his respects to Sun Ce's mother 
the Lady Wu, and shared everything with Sun Ce.3 
 The Zhou family of Lujiang was one of the great clans of the empire. 
A paternal great-uncle and an uncle of Zhou Yu had held the post of 
Grand Commandant, highest of the bureaucracy, and other members of 
the family for generations had been members of the imperial civil 
service. The seat of the family was at Shu, and they were obviously 
wealthy. When the Lady Wu and her children arrived there in 190, the 
Zhou gave them a large house to live in. Zhou Yu's biography does not 
refer to any earlier meeting with Sun Ce at Shouchun, but suggests rather 
                                                                                                                   
  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1109 says that Sun Ce was twenty-six sui at the time of his death 
in 200 AD; he would therefore have been born in 175. On Sun Jian's appointment 
as Assistant of Yandu county, see Chapter Two. 
2 On the children of Sun Jian, see Chapter Two at 85-86 and note 17. 
3 The biography of Zhou Yu is in SGZ 54/Wu 9:1259-64. 
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that the two young men first became acquainted in Shu. It ascribes the 
grant of the house to Zhou Yu, but although the chief connection between 
the two families certainly seems to have been the friendship between the 
two boys, then aged fifteen, it is again unlikely that Zhou Yu at that age 
had direct control over the family property. 
 From the point of view of the Zhou family, though the Sun were not 
of comparable or distinguished background, the courtesy and generosity 
need not be mistaken. By 190, Sun Jian was an Administrator and held 
command of a powerful army. He looked clearly to be a coming man, and 
in the times of growing disorder even such a clan as the Zhou could well 
afford to establish good relations with his wife and children.[149] 
 Towards the end of 191 Sun Jian was killed in battle near Xiangyang. 
His body was brought back for burial at Qu'a, a county in his home 
commandery of Wu, now Danyang in Jiangsu. Sun Ce and the family 
went to Qu'a to attend these ceremonies, and they stayed there for a short 
time before shifting again to Jiangdu county in Guangling, on the 
northern bank of the Yangzi south of present-day Yangzhou. 
 From the death of Sun Jian, Yuan Shu's fortunes declined. He was 
forced to abandon the attempt to expand his territory south into Liu 
Biao's territory in Jing province, and by the beginning of 193 he was 
compelled to shift his headquarters northeast from Nanyang to Fengqiu in 
Chenliu commandery, by the city of the same name in present-day 
Henan.4 
 In the first months of 193 Yuan Shu was attacked from the north by 
Cao Cao, now Governor of Yan province in alliance with Yuan Shao, and 
in a series of battles and defeats he was driven southeast into present-day 
Anhui. Yuan Shu still commanded a large army, strongest in the 
southeast, but this single campaign had lost Nanyang to him forever, 
removed almost all his influence in the region of the Yellow River, and 
compelled him to regroup his forces in the basin of the Huai, with 
headquarters at Shouchun.5[150] 
                                               
4 Fengqiu is north of the present course of the Yellow River, but the River ran further 
to the north in this region during the Han period, and the city was at that time south 
of that stream: Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, 44-45 and 46. 
5 On this campaign, see SGZ 1:10, SGZ 6:207-08 and HHS 75/65:2439. 
  SGZ 6 and HHS 75/65 both say that Yuan Shu killed the incumbent Inspector of 
Yang province, Chen Wen, and took control of the administration. Yingxiong ji, 
however, quoted in SGZ 6:208 PC note 2, says that Chen Wen had died of illness 
shortly before Yuan Shu arrived. 
SUN CE 
 
 
117 
 The sudden arrival of his father's old commander brought a great 
change to the situation of Sun Ce. According to his biography, the young 
man had become well known while he was still in Shu with the Zhou 
family, and "all the people between the Yangzi and the Huai looked up to 
him." At any rate, he had collected a following, including Lü Fan, a 
refugee from Runan commandery, who brought Sun Ce a hundred 
retainers of his own, and Sun He, who had served under Sun Jian and had 
at one time commanded his body-guard.6 Sun Ce's biography says that he 
first went to Yuan Shu in 194, but from Jiangbiao zhuan, quoted in 
commentary to the biography, and from related texts in the biographies of 
Wu Jing, Sun He and Lü Fan, it appears that Sun Ce was already in 
contact with Shouchun in 193.7 It is almost certainly this early period 
which is described in the Jiangbiao zhuan story of Sun Ce's visit to Yuan 
Shu: 
Sun Ce went straight to Shouchun to see Yuan Shu, and he wept and 
said, "At a former time, when my late father came from Changsha to 
attack Dong Zhuo, he met with you at Nanyang and he made alliance 
with you and became your friend. By ill fortune he died, and his 
loyal work could not be completed. 
 "Considering the favour that you gave my father in the past, I 
wish to offer you my services. Would your excellency give a test to 
the sincerity of my feelings?"8[151] 
                                                                                                                   
  Yingxiong ji adds that the inspectorate of Yang province under Yuan Shu was 
then entrusted to his officer Chen Yu: on Chen Yu's later career, see note 48 below. 
6 The biography of Lü Fan is in SGZ 56/Wu 11:1309-11. 
  The biography of Sun He is at the beginning of that of his nephew Sun Shao in 
SGZ 51/Wu 6:1214. According to the main text, his surname had at one time been 
Yu, but because of the affection in which he came to be held by Sun Ce, it was 
changed to Sun. According to Wu shu, quoted in SGZ 51/Wu 6:1214 PC note 1, 
Sun/Yu He was a distant cousin of Sun Jian on the male side, but had been adopted 
across into the Yu family, a female line, in order to maintain that lineage; he later 
returned to the Sun clan. 
7 SGZ 50/Wu 5:1195, SGZ 56/Wu 11:1309, SGZ 51/Wu 6:1214. 
8 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1103 PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
  The main text of Sun Ce's biography says that Sun Ce went first to join his 
uncle Wu Jing in Danyang and then to Yuan Shu in 194. It is claimed, moreover, 
that Tao Qian, the Governor of Xu province, hated Sun Ce, and this was an 
incentive for him to approach Yuan Shu: note 11 below. 
  Jiangbiao zhuan describes Sun Ce's journey to see Yuan Shu at Shouchun as 
jing dao 徑到, which I render as "went straight," but which could in this context 
imply that Sun Ce travelled off the obvious routes, in some secrecy. 
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It is said that Yuan Shu was impressed by Sun Ce's address and bearing, 
but he did not at first give him any substantial command. Sun Ce was just 
eighteen in Western terms, and Yuan Shu may well have considered him 
too young. Nevertheless, Sun Ce had established connection with 
Shouchun, and some of his father's old soldiers came to join him. Soon 
after this first approach to Yuan Shu, Sun Ce moved south across the 
Yangzi and joined his uncle, Wu Jing, who was Administrator of 
Danyang commandery. 
 With the death of Sun Jian in the winter of 191-192, the Sun group 
had lost a great part of its influence in Yuan Shu's camp. Sun Jian's 
nephew Sun Ben had formally taken over his troops, but it does not 
appear that he held any significant command, and though he received 
courtesy appointment as Inspector of Yu province, it seems that the 
greater part of Sun Jian's array had naturally been taken over by Yuan 
Shu and his senior officers, while Sun Ben returned to the south soon 
afterwards, accompanying Sun Jian's funeral. He does not appear to have 
rejoined Yuan Shu until that warlord arrived in Shouchun. 
There remained, however, groups of recruits and followers who had 
owed a personal allegiance to Sun Jian or his relatives, and who had 
formed the loyal core of his greater command. Men such [152] as Sun 
He, Cheng Pu, Huang Gai and Han Dang evidently continued to serve in 
identifiable units, but played no important role under Yuan Shu. Yuan Shu 
had his own followers and clients, and he made small attempt to attract 
Sun Jian's former lieutenants or to offer them opportunities for 
advancement in his service.9 It was Sun Ce's request that these men 
should be allocated to him in right of inheritance from his father, and 
Yuan Shu's neglect of them worked to his advantage: young as he was, 
Sun Ce represented a new rallying point for those who had sought a 
career under the banner of Sun Jian. 
                                               
9 Cheng Pu, Huang Gai and Han Dang have biographies in SGZ 55/Wu 10:1283-84, 
1284-85 and 1285-86. 
  Another kinsman, Sun Xiang, who was a second cousin of Sun Jian and had 
served under him, was also in Yuan Shu's service. He was promoted to be a 
general, and when Yuan Shu claimed the imperial title in 197 he named him 
Administrator of Runan. Sun Ce wrote at that time to invite him, but though Sun 
Ben and Wu Jing were able to join him south of the Yangzi, Sun Xiang was too far 
away – and may in any case have preferred to stay with Yuan Shu. He died at 
Shouchun, Yuan Shu's capital, presumably about 199, during the last days of the 
fallen state. See SGZ 51/Wu 6:1210. 
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 An exception, of course, was Wu Jing, younger brother of Sun Ce's 
mother the Lady Wu, who had been appointed to senior rank and held 
command of an army. Despite the fact that the Wu family were originally 
of higher quality than the Sun, however, for one reason or another it does 
not appear that Wu Jing was able to obtain the personal loyalty of Sun 
Jian's old associates and establish himself as their leader. To some extent, 
no doubt, this is due to the memory of the personal authority of Sun Jian, 
and also to the fact that Wu Jing was after all a junior relative by 
marriage. At any event, as Sun Ce developed his career, his uncle Wu 
Jing acted as a supporter and assistant, not as a rival. 
 After Sun Ce had advertised his connection with Yuan Shu by the 
visit to Shouchun in 193, Jiangdu became dangerous for the family. Yuan 
Shu, at Shouchun, held formal control of Yang province, but Guangling 
commandery, which contained Jiangdu, was in Xu. Tao Qian the 
Governor of Xu province had become anxious when Yuan Shu came to 
Shouchun, and he was not pleased to discover that the son of one of Yuan 
Shu's former lieutenants was settled in the south of his [153] territory 
with a band of followers.10 When Sun Ce went to see Yuan Shu, he left 
his mother and brothers in the care of Zhang Hong, a scholar of 
Guangling commandery, but after he had seen Yuan Shu he sent his 
companion Lü Fan to bring the family back to Qu'a. Tao Qian had Lü Fan 
arrested as a spy and intended to put him to torture, but some of Lü Fan's 
own men rescued him, and all the party came safely to the south of the 
Yangzi.11 
                                               
10 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1101:says that Tao Qian hated Sun Ce, but one must wonder why the 
family settled within his territory if the danger was obvious. 
  There are biographies of Tao Qian in SGZ 8:247-50 and HHS 73/63:2366-68. A 
man from Danyang commandery, he had served under Zhu Jun against the rebels 
in Liang province. When Dong Zhuo seized power in Luoyang in 189, Tao Qian 
was already in Xu province. He maintained relations with the government of Dong 
Zhuo and his successors at Luoyang and then at Chang'an. It is probable that Tao 
Qian met Sun Ce's father, Sun Jian, at the time of the campaign in the northwest, 
and they were certainly in opposing alliances at the time of the civil war against 
Dong Zhuo. Most probably, however, the threat from Tao Qian arose only after 
Sun Ce had confirmed a formal association with Yuan Shu. 
11 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1309: after this incident, Lü Fan was such a close friend of the Sun 
family that when he called upon them he would be given food and drink before the 
Lady Wu, Sun Ce's mother. 
  The biography of Zhang Hong is in SGZ 53/Wu 8:1243-47. He had been a 
student at the Imperial University in Luoyang, and had also studied privately. He 
was offered several appointments at the Han court, but always refused to serve. 
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 Tao Qian had fair reason for his apprehensions about Yuan Shu and 
the Sun family. Once settled at Shouchun, Yuan Shu had begun [154] to 
take over the neighbouring commanderies, and he sent Wu Jing and Sun 
Ben to Danyang, as Administrator and Commandant, where they drove 
out the established Administrator Zhou Xin.12 Yuan Shu had encouraged 
Sun Ce to join his relatives – very probably, of course, as a means of 
getting the importunate young man out of his way – and Sun Ce stayed in 
Danyang for some months, gradually increasing the number of his 
followers and gaining military experience in petty warfare against local 
enemies, bandits and barbarians. Jiangbiao zhuan says that he acquired a 
force of several hundred men, but then he was unexpectedly attacked and 
was almost killed in a skirmish with Zu Lang, one of the chieftains of the 
hills-people in the south of the commandery. After this set-back he 
collected his followers and went north again to see Yuan Shu at 
Shouchun.13 
 Sun Ce arrived back at Yuan Shu's headquarters in 194, and on this 
occasion Yuan Shu transferred about a thousand men from Sun Jian's 
former troops to Sun Ce's command, and kept him stationed at Shouchun. 
We are told that Sun Ce was admired by senior officials and high-ranking 
officers, and he was awarded the flowery title of Colonel Who Cherishes 
Righteousness. What he wanted and expected, however, on the grounds 
of his father's earlier services to Yuan Shu, was an independent command 
[155] and some territory of his own. This was a great deal more difficult 
                                                                                                                   
  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1102-03 PC note 1 quoting Wu li tells how Sun Ce went to call 
upon Zhang Hong when he was mourning the death of his mother. At first Zhang 
Hong was reluctant to discuss affairs of state at such a time, but then he warmed to 
the enthusiasms of his young visitor, and encouraged him to aim for a role in the 
southeast comparable to that of the hegemon lords Duke Huan of Qi and Duke 
Wen of Jin in the time of Zhou: he could support the house of Han and play a 
dominant role in the affairs of the empire. 
12 These three men have all appeared earlier. Wu Jing was the elder brother of Sun 
Jian's wife the Lady Wu; Sun Ben was Sun Jian's nephew, son of his elder twin 
Sun Qiang, and the cousin of Sun Ce. Zhou Xin was the eldest of the three Zhou 
brothers from Kuaiji, referred to in Chapter Two. 
  There is a short account of Zhou Xin in SGZ 51/Wu 6:1206 PC note 2 quoting 
Kuaiji dianlu and Xiandi chunqiu. Xiandi chunqiu has the story that he lost 
Danyang to Wu Jing and Sun Ben because of his soft heart: Wu Jing made a 
proclamation that any people who fought for Zhou Xin would be executed without 
mercy; and Zhou Xin, rather than cause the loss of innocent lives, disbanded his 
army and retired to his home country of Kuaiji. 
13 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1103 PC note 2 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
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to obtain, for Yuan Shu does not appear to have been particularly 
interested in Sun Ce and his ambitions. 
 At first, Yuan Shu is said to have promised that he would appoint 
Sun Ce as Administrator of Jiujiang commandery, which would certainly 
have been a valuable appointment, but then he changed his mind and 
gave the post to another of his clients. Some time later the Administrator 
of Lujiang, Lu Kang, refused to send Yuan Shu some supplies he asked 
for, and Yuan Shu prepared to attack him. For his part, we are told that 
Sun Ce held a grudge against Lu Kang, because he had previously gone 
to call upon Lu Kang, and Lu Kang had refused to see him but had sent 
one of his clerks to meet him instead. So Yuan Shu chose Sun Ce to make 
the attack, and promised him that if he took Lujiang he would be made 
the new Administrator. Sun Ce did conquer the commandery, and we are 
told that he captured Lu Kang, but then Yuan Shu forgot his promise and 
gave the post to Liu Xun, another of his officers. Sun Ce became 
increasingly disillusioned.14[156] 
                                               
14 The Lu family, like the Sun, came from Wu commandery, though they were of far 
more distinguished lineage. The biography of Lu Kang is in HHS 31/21:1112-14. 
See also Chapter Eight. 
  Years before, when Sun Jian was Administrator of Changsha about 188, he had 
gone across commandery and provincial boundaries in order to bring assistance to 
a nephew of Lu Kang, who was then magistrate of Yichun county besieged by 
bandits: Chapter Two, and, for the identity of the magistrate as a nephew of Lu 
Kang, SGZ 46/Wu 1:1096 PC quoting Wu lu. 
  In the light of this past favour by his father, Sun Ce might have expected to be 
received courteously by Lu Kang, and had perhaps hoped for employment. Lu 
Kang was evidently unwilling to recognise the debt. 
  There is some disagreement in the sources, however, for Lu Kang's biography 
in HHS 31/21:1114, says that he defended his city for two years, aided by devoted 
retainers and citizens. This may be a fiction designed to present the hero of the 
biography in the best light; but so too may be the account in the biography of Sun 
Ce, which says that Sun Ce captured Lu Kang. 
  If we combine the two, then Sun Ce may have occupied the greater part of the 
territory of Lujiang commandery on behalf of Yuan Shu; but Lu Kang held out in 
his isolated capital, the city of Shu. Certainly, if the siege lasted more than a year, 
Sun Ce cannot have been in command of the attackers when the city fell, for by 
that time he had long been in the south of the Yangzi. 
  It is thus possible Sun Ce had considerable, but not total, success in his attack 
on Lujiang, and that he did not actually capture Lu Kang. As the campaign was not 
complete, Yuan Shu did not give the reward. 
  We are also told that, when it became obvious that there was danger from 
attack by Yuan Shu, Lu Kang sent his family to seek safety in their home country 
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 In the meantime, however, the situation in the basin of the Huai and 
the region of the lower Yangzi had become increasingly confused. In 193, 
the same year Yuan Shu was driven into Yang province, Tao Qian in turn 
suffered a devastating attack from Cao Cao. During the summer Cao Cao 
had invited his father, the former Grand Commandant Cao Song, to come 
from Langye commandery to join him in Yan province. Langye was in 
Xu province, and Cao Song had evidently taken refuge there as the civil 
war began. As he came westwards, however, with a large and valuable 
baggage train, he was set upon, robbed and killed by some subordinate 
officers of Tao Qian's command. It does not appear that Tao Qian had any 
personal responsibility for the incident, and indeed he appears to have 
been trying to provide Cao Song with protection. In fury, however, Cao 
Cao turned his armies against Xu province. He drove Tao Qian to take 
refuge in the south [157] of present-day Shandong province, and he led a 
campaign of massacre in the north of present-day Jiangsu and Anhui.15 
 It is possible that Cao Cao sought to use the opportunity to conquer 
Xu province and add that territory to his own comparatively small 
holding in Yan. Some sources suggest, however, that on this one occasion 
the normally cynical and unscrupulous Cao Cao was genuinely upset, and 
certainly the campaign did not turn to his advantage.16 The brutal conduct 
of his troops made it impossible for him to effect a peaceful transfer of 
power in the conquered territories, and in 194, when he returned to the 
attack, his distraction permitted a group of dissidents to make a rising and 
seize the greater part of his base in Yan province. Cao Cao was compelled 
to turn his energies to dealing with Lü Bu, the former lieutenant of Dong 
                                                                                                                   
of Wu commandery. In later years, the son of Lu Kang, Lu Ji, became a noted 
scholar at the court of Sun Ce's brother and successor Sun Quan, and Lu Kang's 
great-nephew Lu Xun became one of the leading generals of Wu; the biography of 
Lu Ji is in SGZ 57/Wu 12:1328-29 and that of Lu Xun is in SGZ 58/Wu 13:1343-
61. Whatever happened to Lu Kang, therefore, Sun Ce does not appear to have 
behaved in such a way as to cause a deadly feud between the families. 
15 On this incident and the campaign which followed it, see HHS 73/63:2367, SGZ 
8:249 and PC note 1 quoting Wu shu, and SGZ 1:10. 
16 On Cao Cao's motives at this time, see Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao," 218-222 and 225-227. 
Many commentators, perhaps influenced by the traditional distrust of Cao Cao, 
have argued that his only intention was to take Tao Qian's territory, and filial piety 
was nothing but an excuse. Apart from Cao Cao's personal feelings, however, even 
at a political level the display of fury may have seemed appropriate and necessary: 
such ostentatious vendetta against Tao Qian gave public expression to the 
seriousness with which a gentleman of the time should regard any injury to his 
family. 
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Zhuo who was now seeking territory of his own.17 The unfortunate Tao 
Qian, however, could make no use of the respite. He died a few months 
later, without re-establishing any authority, and for the next several years 
[158] the govermnent of Xu province remained unsettled and the territory 
became a scene of petty warfare. 
 As these events proceeded to the north and east, a rival to Yuan Shu 
for the control of Yang province appeared south of the Yangzi. Liu Yao of 
Donglai, member of a distant branch of the imperial clan and son of a 
great official family of the Han dynasty, had held office in the imperial 
government but took refuge in the southeast from the disorders of civil 
war. In 194 an imperial letter, issued by the military regime at Chang'an 
which had replaced the murdered general Dong Zhuo, appointed him 
Inspector of Yang province.18 
 Shouchun, headquarters of the inspectorate, was occupied by Yuan 
Shu, and Liu Yao did not wish to engage him at once.19 He therefore 
moved south of the Yangzi and came to terms with Wu Jing, and Wu Jing 
set him up in Qu'a. From there he was able to rally support, and by the 
end of the year he felt strong enough to turn against Wu Jing, as an 
associate of Yuan Shu. He drove him from Qu'a and then occupied 
Danyang. 
 Wu Jing asked for help from Yuan Shu, and Yuan Shu sent an army 
to support him against Liu Yao. He gave military command to Wu Jing 
and named Zhou Shang of Lujiang, uncle of Sun Ce's friend Zhou Yu, as 
Administrator of Danyang. The two armies faced each other across the 
Yangzi at Hengjiang and Dangli, now southeast of Hexian in Anhui, for 
                                               
17 Biographies of Lü Bu are in SGZ 7:219-21, and HHS 75/65:2444-52. Lü Bu had 
been one of Dong Zhuo's chief military commanders (Chapter Two at 122) and he 
became one of his closest associates. In 192, however, he was persuaded to turn 
against his master, and he assassinated Dong Zhuo. He and his party, however, 
were not able to maintain their position in Chang'an against the opposition of Dong 
Zhuo's former officers, led by Li Jue. Lü Bu was compelled to flee to the east, and 
most of his colleagues were killed. See ZZTJ 60:1933-39; deC, Establish Peace, 
93-103. 
18 The biography of Liu Yao is in SGZ 49/Wu 4:1183-84. 
19 HHS 112/22:3486, the Treatise of Administrative Geography, says that the 
headquarters of the inspector of Yang province was set at Liyang in Jiujiang 
commandery; the commentary of Liu Zhao at note 1 to that text, however, quotes 
Han guan as saying that the office was at Shouchun. It would appear that the 
headquarters had been moved to Shouchun towards the end of Later Han, and we 
may note that Chen Wen, whose post as Inspector of Yang province was taken over 
by Yuan Shu, had evidently been based at Shouchun: note 5 above. 
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almost a year, but no [159] effective action took place. To all intents and 
purposes, Yuan Shu had lost control of the lands south of the Yangzi, and 
Liu Yao was gaining troops and becoming an increasing threat. A second 
imperial edict promoted Liu Yao to be Governor of Yang province, with 
the rank of a general. Then, in 195, Sun Ce asked leave to join his uncle 
Wu Jing and his cousin Sun Ben in the south. 
 According to Jiangbiao zhuan, Sun Ce spoke to Yuan Shu and said, 
"In the past, my family was well regarded among the people of the east. I 
wish to help my uncle attack Hengjiang. When Hengjiang is taken, I 
would go to my own district and call up soldiers, and I could get thirty 
thousand men to help you give aid to the house of Han."20 
 Since Liu Yao was successfully holding the southern bank of the 
Yangzi and appeared well established in Qu'a, and since Kuaiji 
commandery, further to the southeast, was firmly under the control of the 
Administrator Wang Lang, Yuan Shu can hardly have believed Sun Ce 
had any great chance of success. However, he gave him the title of 
Colonel Who Breaks the Enemy Lines, and allowed him to go. 
 Sun Ce was allotted only about a thousand foot-soldiers and some 
thirty or forty horsemen, but he had a few hundred personal followers 
who were prepared accompany him, and he had the usual authority to 
recruit or impress men as he marched. Liyang, the county city in Jiujiang 
which was the headquarters of Yuan Shu's forces in the south, is now 
Hexian in Anhui, some two hundred kilometres from Shouchun. Sun Ce 
left Shouchun with about fifteen hundred men, and he arrived at Liyang 
with five or six thousand. There he joined the other commanders, and 
they made plans to cross the Yangzi. 
 Sun Ce's biography indicates that he took charge of the operations 
against Liu Yao from the time that he arrived, and there is [160] no 
indication to the contrary in the parallel texts of the biographies of Wu 
Jing and Sun Ben. Yuan Shu had transferred Wu Jing from Administrator 
of Danyang to become General of the Gentlemen of the Household 
Controller of the Army, and as a former administrator it might have been 
expected that he would be the senior officer in charge.21 In the events 
                                               
20 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1103 PC note 2 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
21 General of the Household was normally the title of the commander of a unit of 
palace guards at the Han court. At various times, however, and particularly towards 
the end of the dynasty, the title could be held by the commander of troops in the 
field: note 54 to Chapter Two. In the Han system, the rank of a general of the 
household, Equivalent to Two Thousand shi, was formally the same as that of a 
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which followed, however, it was evidently Sun Ce who took the lead, and 
by the time the war against Liu Yao was over he had established authority 
over his relatives and comrades. In part this may have been due to the 
memory of his father Sun Jian, who had commanded both Wu Jing and 
Sun Ben, but in great measure it was due to Sun Ce's own military 
abilities. 
 
The south of the Yangzi and the break with Yuan Shu (195-197): 
The eastern bank of the Yangzi at Hengjiang and Dangli was guarded by 
soldiers of Liu Yao under his officers Fan Neng, Yu Mi and Zhang Ying, 
with a large store-camp at Niuzhu Mountain, now northwest of Dangtu in 
Anhui, and other forces in the counties behind them. Not far downstream 
to the north, moreover, two further armies were commanded by allies of 
Liu Yao: Xue Li, Chancellor of Pengcheng, was at Moling city, at 
present-[161>162]day Nanjing, and Zhai Rong, Chancellor of Xiapi, was 
camped a short distance south of him. The territories of both Pengcheng 
and Xiapi lay north of the Yangzi in Xu province, in the northern part of 
present-day Jiangsu. With the disorders which had followed the death of 
Tao Qian, however, the rulers of these territories no doubt felt threatened 
by their neighbour Yuan Shu to the west, and Liu Yao had evidently 
persuaded them to combine forces with him and form a united front 
against their enemy's main line of advance.22 
                                                                                                                   
colonel, the title now held by Sun Ce (HHS 114/24:3564 and HHS 115/25:3574-
76). There is no way to tell, however, what the attribute Controller of the Army 
indicated in the military system of Yuan Shu, or what positions Wu Jing and Sun 
Ce occupied in this somewhat ad hoc hierarchy of command. 
22 Among these men, Zhai Rong is of some particular interest. He has a special 
mention at the end of the biography of Tao Qian in HHS 73/63:2368, and a 
subordinate biography following that of Liu Yao in SGZ 49/Wu 4:1185-86. 
  A man of Danyang commandery, Zhai Rong was one of the early followers of 
Buddhism in China. Early in his career he was sent by Tao Qian to supervise the 
transport of tax grain from Guangling and Pengcheng commanderies, but he seized 
all of it for himself, and used the proceeds to build a temple to the Buddha and to 
hold lavish banquets in celebration of Buddhist festivals. Later, when Tao Qian 
was attacked by Cao Cao, Zhai Rong fled south with more than ten thousand 
followers to Guangling, where he was received by the Administrator Zhao Yu. 
Soon afterwards, however, he killed Zhao Yu at a banquet. As a result of these 
activities, and similar incidents in his subsequent career, Zhai Rong is little 
celebrated by the Buddhists of China: Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest I, 27-28. 
  Zhai Rong is described as Chancellor of Xiapi in Jiangbiao zhuan, quoted in 
SGZ 46/Wu 1:1103 PC note 3, though the title is not given in his biography in SGZ 
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 The immediate opposition, however, was the post guarded by Zhang 
Ying at Dangli. Despite the stalemate over the past several months, there 
were still very few boats prepared for a landing on the hostile bank, and 
there was now a delay while detachments were sent to look for some 
more. One has an impression, in fact, that Wu Jing had not shown any 
remarkable energy during his time in command, and with the arrival of 
Sun Ce [163] he was ready to allow the younger man to take the initiative 
and the responsibility. 
 Xu Kun, a cousin of Sun Ce, had served with Sun Jian and now 
joined Sun Ce for the campaign against Liu Yao. According to his 
biography in Sanguo zhi Xu Kun's mother, who was a younger sister of 
Sun Jian, was with the army at that time, and she said to Xu Kun, "I am 
afraid Liu Yao's people may bring a fleet of their own to attack us, and 
this would be dangerous. How can we afford to wait any longer? We 
should cut rushes and reeds to make rafts, and those will supplement the 
ships we have to ferry the army across." Xu Kun spoke of this to Sun Ce, 
Sun Ce followed his aunt's suggestion and Zhang Ying was defeated at 
Dangli.23 
 As soon as he had established his beachhead, Sun Ce attacked and 
stormed Liu Yao's great depot at Niuzhu, and he captured all the grain 
and military equipment that had been stored there. He then turned north 
against Zhai Rong and Xue Li. First he attacked Zhai Rong and drove 
him back to take refuge in his camp. Then he attacked Xue Li, and Xue 
Li fled away from Moling and took no further part in the campaign. 
Before he could follow up these quick successes, however, Liu Yao's 
other commanders, Fan Neng and Yu Mi, came with a counter-attack 
against the camp at Niuzhu. Sun Ce went back to protect this base, and he 
attacked Fan Neng and the others and defeated them. It is said that he 
captured "more than ten thousand" men and women. 
 He turned north once more to attack Zhai Rong, but was hit in the 
thigh by an arrow during the fighting outside the Zhai Rong's camp, and 
since he could no longer ride his horse he went back to Niuzhu in a 
carriage. 
 Zhai Rong learnt from a deserter that Sun Ce had been wounded, and 
he believed he was dead, so he sent a detachment [164] against Niuzhu. 
                                                                                                                   
49/Wu 4. He may have been awarded the position by Tao Qian or he may simply 
have arrogated the title for himself. 
23  The biography of Xu Kun is in SGZ 50/Wu 5, 1197; his daughter later became a 
concubine of Sun Quan. 
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Sun Ce, however, was still able to command his troops. He sent a few 
hundred men to face the enemy and prepared an ambush in the rear. 
Under his instructions, the first line of battle gave ground and pretended 
to run, but when the enemy charged in pursuit they were taken by 
surprise from the ambush, were heavily defeated, and they lost more than 
a thousand men. Then Sun Ce went forward again with his army to the 
walls of Zhai Rong's camp, and he had his attendants call out to the 
people inside, "Young Gentleman Sun, what do you say of him now!" 
 When Zhai Rong realised Sun Ce was still alive, he raised his walls 
higher, dug his moats deeper and made all possible preparations for 
defence. The terrain was difficult, and there was limited point in a direct 
attack, so Sun Ce left him there and made a flank march to the east. In a 
series of battles, he moved north towards Moling and then southeast 
against Qu'a. As he marched, Zhai Rong and then Liu Yao abandoned 
their positions and fled southwest up the Yangzi to Yuzhang 
commandery.24 Sun Ce entered Qu'a city and set his headquarters there. 
 Sun Ce had reached Qu'a by the twelfth month of the Chinese year, 
February of Western 196, and Yuan Shu, in acknowledgement of his 
success, sent him a commission as Acting General Who Destroys 
Criminals. At this point, Sun Ce paused to [165] consolidate his position 
and establish an administration. According to Jiangbiao zhuan, 
Sun Ce was still young, and though he had his rank and was now 
well known, all the soldiers and people called him "Young 
Gentleman Sun." When men heard that Young Gentleman Sun was 
coming, they quite lost spirit, and the local magistrates and other 
officials would abandon the cities and run away to hide in the hills 
and open country. Then he would arrive, and the men of his 
command respected order and did not dare rob or plunder: not even 
chickens or dogs or vegetables were stolen. So all the people were 
                                               
24 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1103-04 PC note 3 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan contains the most 
detailed account of these manoeuvres, and SGZ 49/Wu 4:1184-85 gives further 
information on the treacherous and murderous career of Zhai Rong. 
  Following the defeat of the allies at the hands of Sun Ce, Zhai Rong killed his 
former associate Xue Li, and then went to Yuzhang and killed the Administrator 
there. He sought to take the territory for himself and keep Liu Yao out, but after an 
initial setback Liu Yao rallied local forces, defeated Zhai Rong and drove him 
away. Zhai Rong fled into the hill country and was killed by the people there. 
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extremely pleased, and brought cattle and wine to welcome his 
troops.25 
Sun Ce's biography in Sanguo zhi adds a short description: 
As a man, Sun Ce had a handsome face and an easy, friendly manner. 
By nature he was generous and tolerant, very good at managing men. 
That is why all his soldiers and the people who came into contact 
with him were devoted to him, and would gladly give their lives in 
his service.26 
By his victories over Liu Yao and his allies, Sun Ce immediately gained 
great numbers of soldiers. After the second battle at Niuzhu, for example, 
we are told that he took over many men who had formerly served Fan 
Neng or Yu Mi, and it is clear that on several occasions the captured 
soldiers of a defeated army were able to change allegiance after the 
battle. Liu Yao's flight, moreover, left his troops without a leader, and 
numbers of them were scattered about the countryside waiting only for an 
opportunity to join the new government. From Qu'a, Sun Ce sent 
proclamations to all the counties now under his control, saying that,[166] 
No questions will be asked of any local followers of Liu Yao or Zhai 
Rong who come to surrender. For those prepared to join my army, 
one man who comes will be regarded as fulfilling [the government 
levy on] his household. Those who are unwilling to join up will not 
be forced to.27 
It is said that within a few weeks he gained twenty thousand foot-soldiers 
and over a thousand horsemen, and they came like clouds from every 
direction. 
 Though the increased recruitment must have been gratifying, it was 
no small matter to bring these men, many of them former enemies, under 
effective control, and Sun Ce was fortunate, and suitably grateful, that his 
old friend Lü Fan took the position of Chief Controller, responsible for 
discipline in the new army. We are told Lü Fan made his offer during a 
series of friendly chess games, and Sun Ce first argued that a man of his 
rank and position should not demean himself with administrative chores. 
Lü Fan replied, however, that good order in the army was a matter which 
concerned the success of their whole enterprise: "It's like men in the same 
boat: if one thing goes wrong, we all drown. So it is just as much interest 
                                               
25 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1104 PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
26 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1104. 
27 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1105 PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
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to me as it is to you!" Sun Ce laughed and agreed, and Lü Fan's work 
brought coherence and discipline to the enlarged array.28 
 Also at this time Sun Ce brought his mother and brothers to Qu'a. 
When Liu Yao drove Wu Jing across the Yangzi, Sun Ce's family had also 
moved to safety and stayed in the vicinity of [167] Liyang.29 They now 
returned, and Sun Ce appointed his younger brother Sun Quan, about 
fourteen years old by Western reckoning, to be magistrate of Yangxian, a 
neighbouring county in Wu commandery. Sun Quan appears to have been 
granted the title rather for status than for practical service, but Sun Ce 
evidently respected and admired him, took counsel with him on occasion, 
and spoke highly of him to his own followers.30 
 Though Sun Ce had supplanted Liu Yao in the government of the 
settled Chinese lands of Danyang commandery and the region about Qu'a 
in Wu commandery, many of the people of the hill country, and the 
groups and clans of the region, had taken the opportunity of the disorder 
to extend their power and re-establish private armies. In the hills south of 
Qu'a the local leader known as White Tiger Yan appears to have made 
himself the chief of a loose confederation. In the west, about Jing county 
in Danyang, now Jingxian in Anhui, Taishi Ci, an officer loyal to Liu 
Yao, was attempting to organise a rival administration for the 
                                               
28 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1309 PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
  The office of dudu 都督, a title rendered here as Chief Controller, was 
comparatively low and essentially administrative: an adjutant with police powers. 
The status and function of the office, however, could vary with circumstances and 
the same title appears elsewhere about this time held by head of division in an 
army on active service; in later years it indicated the command of a large military 
region: Chapter Eight at 466-467. 
29 Jiangbiao zhuan, as cited above, says that Sun Ce's mother and brothers had been 
at Fuling. This was another city in Jiujiang, a short distance north of Liyang. 
30 The biography of Sun Quan, SGZ 47/Wu 2:1115, says that Sun Quan was 
nominated for Filial and Incorrupt (xiaolian) and Abundant Talent (maocai) 
candidatures by his commandery of Wu and his province of Yang, and it would 
appear that these honours were paid him after he became magistrate of Yangxian. 
  On the regular system of recruitment into the imperial service, see Chapter 
Two. In these terms, the nominations of Sun Quan made no sense, for a 
commissioned post as county magistrate required not only nomination but also 
approval by the emperor, and for a xiaolian candidate there was supposed to be a 
period of probation. Obviously, in Sun Quan's case the recommendations were no 
more than tokens of courtesy, but he was occasionally addressed as "Candidate" 
(Xiaolian), so there was some lip-service to this remnant of the imperial 
recruitment procedures: e.g. SGZ 47/Wu 2:1115. 
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commandery, [168] and he made an alliance with the hills people nearby, 
on the northern ridges of the Huang Shan range.31 
 For the time being, Sun Ce ignored Taishi Ci. His main objective was 
to the south and east, in his family's home country of Wu commandery 
and Kuaiji. Xu Gong the Administrator of Wu did not prove difficult to 
deal with, for when he attempted to oppose Sun Ce he was betrayed by 
his Commandant Zhu Zhi. 
 As Commandant, Zhu Zhi was responsible for the military 
organisation of the commandery, and was theoretically under Xu Gong's 
orders, but he was an old associate of the Sun family, he had served under 
Sun Jian, and when he heard Sun Ce was coming he raised an army to 
attack Xu Gong. Xu Gong was defeated and took refuge with White Tiger 
Yan, and Zhu Zhi took over the office of Administrator.32 
 White Tiger Yan and the other opposition groups in Wu were not 
sufficiently important to distract Sun Ce from his main objective in the 
south, and in 196 he moved to the attack on Kuaiji. The Administrator 
Wang Lang had been in power for several years, and it could not be 
expected that he would prove so easy to deal with as Xu Gong in Wu. As 
Sun Ce advanced against him [169] Wang Lang came forward to defend 
his territory on the line of the Qiantang estuary at the head of Hangzhou 
Bay.33 
 Sun Ce had taken the opportunity of his march through Wu 
commandery to call up support from his connections in that region, and 
his uncle Sun Jing, youngest brother of Sun Jian, came to join him at 
Qiantang. Wang Lang's army was at the town of Guling, just over the 
water, and though Sun Ce tried several times to force a bridgehead, he 
had no success. Then, however, Sun Jing arranged to lead a detachment 
of the army a few kilometres south to a river crossing at Zhadu, returning 
north to take Wang Lang's forces in the rear. Sun Ce had the rest of his 
                                               
31 The biography of Taishi Ci is in SGZ 49/Wu 4:1186-90. 
  Taishi Ci was a man from Donglai, the same commandery as Liu Yao. He was a 
man of considerable intelligence and courage, and there are anecdotes which 
describe his swift thinking and his loyalty to his associates, rather in the style of 
the knight-errant tradition. He had not, however, been given high command by Liu 
Yao, and this enterprise in Danyang was undertaken primarily at his own initiative. 
32 The biography of Zhu Zhi is in SGZ 56/Wu 11:1303-05. He had served under Sun 
Jian in the early campaigns, he had been acting Commandant in Changsha, and he 
had taken part in the capture of Luoyang from Dong Zhuo. He had already been in 
some contact with Sun Ce and his family. 
33 The biography of Wang Lang is in SGZ 13:406-14. 
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men light the usual number of camp-fires so that the enemy would not 
realise any troops were missing, and he Sun Jing and his men off at night. 
Wang Lang was taken completely by surprise and the Sun forces were 
established across the river.34 
 At first, Wang Lang attempted to organise a retreat and regroup his 
men, and he sent his lieutenant Zhou Xin, former Administrator of 
Danyang, to hold the line against Sun Ce's attack.35 But Sun Ce defeated 
Zhou Xin and killed him, and Wang Lang abandoned the greater part of 
his territory. He went by ship south along the coast to Dongye, a county 
administered by Kuaiji commandery but situated at the mouth of the Min 
River in Fujian, five hundred kilometres from Hangzhou Bay.36 
 Sun Ce evidently considered that Wang Lang was sufficiently 
important to be worth pursuit, presumably because of the possibility that 
he might attempt a return once Sun Ce had gone back to Wu and 
Danyang. At the same time, the victory over Zhou Xin had been so 
complete that he had no immediate problems in the area of [170] 
Hangzhou Bay, and could leave a part of his army for basic mopping-up 
exercises. So he followed Wang Lang, took the city of Dongye, and 
received his enemy's surrender. 
 Shang Sheng, Chief of Houguan county, which was neighbour to 
Dongye, had supported Wang Lang when he came to the south, and 
although Wang Lang surrendered, Shang Sheng allied himself with some 
of the local people and continued to resist Sun Ce. When Sun Ce returned 
to the north he appointed a certain Han Yan as Commandant of the 
Southern Region of Kuaiji, and gave him soldiers to attack Shang Sheng. 
Han Yan, however, had no success, and he was soon replaced by He Qi, 
member of a powerful family in Kuaiji who had joined Sun Ce after his 
arrival in the commandery. Shang Sheng offered to surrender, but was 
killed by his own allies, and it was some time before He Qi could win 
over groups of the local people, and take advantage of disagreements 
among his enemies in order to attack and finally defeat them. For several 
years to come, He Qi remained in charge of operations for the Sun family 
in this region of the far southeast, and he steadily extended their influence 
and power.37 
                                               
34 SGZ 51/Wu 6:1205. 
35 On Zhou Xin, see also note 13 above. 
36 On Dongye, see note 87 to Chapter One. 
37 The biography of He Qi is in SGZ 60/Wu 15:1377-80. 
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 With Wang Lang defeated and Kuaiji secure, Sun Ce moved back 
north into Wu commandery to deal with White Tiger Yan and the other 
groups who opposed him. Many of the enemy leaders were killed, but 
White Tiger Yan and the former Administrator Xu Gong managed to 
escape and regroup their forces. 
 There are two stories of Sun Ce at this time of civil war in his native 
commandery. A certain Wang Sheng, who had at one time been 
Administrator of Hepu in the far south, fought against Sun Ce but was 
captured. He was going to be executed, but Sun Ce's mother the Lady Wu 
said, "Wang Sheng was courting me at the same time as your father. Now 
all his sons and [171] brothers are dead and this old man is alone. Why be 
afraid of him?" So Sun Ce let Wang Sheng live.38 
 Similarly, it is told how White Tiger Yan fled to take refuge with a 
certain Xu Zhao of Yuhang, now Yuhang in Zhejiang, and later Sun Ce 
admired Xu Zhao's loyalty to an old friend and did not attack him. 
Nevertheless, though White Tiger Yan had made his escape and would 
cause trouble in the future, Wu commandery was now firmly under 
control. 
 Sun Ce named himself Administrator of Kuaiji, and he restored his 
uncle Wu Jing to the title of Administrator of Danyang. Zhu Zhi the 
former Commandant became Administrator of Wu. Sun Ce's cousins, Sun 
Ben and his younger brother Sun Fu, were also named administrators, 
Sun Ben to Yuzhang commandery and Sun Fu to Luling, a new unit 
formed from the southern part of Yuzhang; no part of Yuzhang, nor the 
putative Luling, was yet in Sun Ce's hands. 
 At this stage, towards the end of 196, Wu Jing and Sun Ben went 
back to Yuan Shu to report. Yuan Shu was engaged in a campaign to take 
Xu province from Liu Bei, the successor to Tao Qian, and he named Wu 
Jing as his Administrator of Guangling, the commandery immediately 
north of the mouth of the Yangzi. Sun Ben was given command of troops 
at Shouchun, and a distant cousin of Sun Ce, Sun Xiang, was appointed 
Administrator of Runan. Zhou Shang and his son, Sun Ce's friend Zhou 
Yu, had joined Sun Ce in the first campaign against Liu Yao, but after 
Sun Ce was established in Qu'a he left them to look after Danyang while 
he moved against Wu and Kuaiji. Soon afterwards, Yuan Shu recalled 
Zhou Shang and Zhou Yu. He offered Zhou Yu a military command, but 
                                               
38 This story and the anecdote relating to Xu Zhao below both come from Wu lu, 
quoted in SGZ 46/Wu 1:1105 PC note 2. 
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Zhou Yu asked instead to be made magistrate of Juchao county in Lujiang 
commandery, northeast of present-day [172] Chaoxian, a short distance 
from the Yangzi.39 Zhou Yu may already have been suspicious of Yuan 
Shu's ambitions and was afraid that he would fail, and he wanted to be 
stationed close enough to be able to move south and rejoin Sun Ce 
without great difficulty.  
 For by 196 or 197 Yuan Shu had decided to proclaim himself 
emperor of a new dynasty. The histories claim that he had been thinking 
of the imperial title as early as 191, when it is said that Sun Jian found the 
Great Seal of Han in the ruins of Luoyang and handed it over to him.40 
Later, in 196, he broached the matter in council with his officers, and 
though he went no further with the plan at that time, Sun Ce heard of the 
proposal and wrote to protest. 
 Wu lu, quoted in the commentary to Sanguo zhi, preserves the text of 
the letter which Sun Ce had composed by his counsellor Zhang Hong and 
which he sent to Yuan Shu, saying in part, 
Last winter there was a rumour you had made a great plan [to claim 
the empire], and everyone was afraid. Then we found that tribute was 
being prepared [for the Han court], and we were all relieved. 
 I have just heard, however, that discussion has started again, and 
that some people wish to revive the earlier proposal... This makes me 
even more concerned, but it is surely no more than a foolish rumour. 
The letter continues, at length, to argue against Yuan Shu's plan of 
empire.41 Nevertheless, despite this and other protests from his [173] 
officers, Yuan Shu proclaimed himself Emperor of the Zhong dynasty in 
the summer of 197.42 Sun Ce at once disclaimed all allegiance to him. 
                                               
39 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1260. 
40 E.g. SGZ 46/Wu 1:1099 PC note 9 quoting Shanyang gong zaiji, and SGZ 6:208 
PC note 1 quoting Wu shu. 
41 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1105-06 PC note 4 quoting Wu lu. 
  At the end of this note, Pei Songzhi observes that the Dianlue of Yu Huan 
suggests that Zhang Zhao, another counsellor of the Sun clan, was the author of 
this letter; Pei Songzhi, however, observes that this document is written in very 
fine style, that Zhang Hong was considerably superior to Zhang Zhao as a literary 
composer, and the letter should therefore be attributed to Zhang Hong. 
42 SGZ 6:209 and 210 PC quoting Dian lue, and HHS 75/65:2442. 
  The character zhong 仲, which also appears as chong 沖, is explained by the 
commentators as the name of the imperial state established by Yuan Shu, 
comparable to the name Han for the dynasty of the Liu family, or the name Cheng, 
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 Yuan Shu appears to have had an inordinate idea of his own 
importance and a remarkable capacity for self-delusion. Admittedly, he 
controlled most of Yang province and was contending for Xu province, 
while Sun Ce, who was notionally under his orders, was acquiring more 
territory in the southeast. On paper, therefore, Yuan Shu dominated the 
Huai and the lower Yangzi; but this was still not a great part of the whole 
empire. 
 Besides his territorial possessions, Yuan Shu was very conscious that 
he came from a great official family, and he claimed seniority in the clan 
to his cousin or half-brother Yuan Shao.43 On the other [174] hand, as Sun 
Ce pointed out in his letter, the honours that the Yuan family had received 
from the Han dynasty should rather encourage him to support the young 
Emperor, not attempt to take his place. 
 Yuan Shu had also convinced himself by means of prophecies and 
word-play with the characters of his name that he was the man destined 
to succeed the Liu family in government of the empire;44 but Sun Ce and 
Zhang Hong, in rational Confucianist fashion, pointed out that 
                                                                                                                   
taken by the warlord Gongsun Shu in the region of present-day Sichuan at the 
beginning of Later Han (e.g. HHS 13/3:535). 
  It seems probable that the name chosen by Yuan Shu was Zhong, which has the 
meaning of "younger" and hence implied a courteous succession from Han: in 
similar fashion the later state of Shu-Han, founded by Liu Bei in the west, was 
sometimes described as Ji-Han. The character chong on the other hand, as for 
example in the phrase chongren 沖人, would indicate a young ruler, still in his 
minority. It would not have been flattering to Yuan Shu's pretensions, and may 
have been a deliberate corruption by his enemies. 
  The founder of Han, of course, took the name of his dynasty from the kingdom 
with which he had been enfeoffed after the fall of the empire of Qin, and Gongsun 
Shu evidently took his dynastic name from his capital, Chengdu. It does not 
appear, however, that Yuan Shu had any association with a place called Zhong or 
Chong. 
43 On the relationship of Yuan Shu to Yuan Shao, see note 68 to Chapter Two. 
  Yuan Shu's father, Yuan Feng, his grandfather and his great-great grandfather, 
together with other collateral relatives had all held position as one of the Three 
Excellencies, the highest formal positions in the imperial bureaucracy of Han: 
HHS 45/35:1517-23. 
44 Dian lue, quoted in SGZ 6:210 PC note 1 and HHS 75/65:2439 record that there 
was an apocryphal saying current at the time which said, "The one to replace Han 
will be 'road high' (塗高 tu gao)." Since the character of Yuan Shu's personal name, 
術 shu, can have the meaning of a road or street, and the characters of his style, 
Gong lu 塗路, can have the meaning of "public (and hence 'high') road," he 
believed this was a reference to himself. 
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Many people of this time follow prophecies and accept superstitions. 
They compare words and fit them to current events, and they use this to 
delude their masters and to deceive the people... You must examine these 
carefully and think hard about them. 
 In the event, Yuan Shu's proclamation as an emperor proved ill-timed 
and mistaken. By the premature move he broke the rules of the civil war 
and made himself outlaw in the eyes of all other military leaders of the 
time, and it was not for twenty years that another such claim was made. 
Yuan Shu already had powerful enemies, Cao [175] Cao and Yuan Shao, 
in the north, and his position in the southeast depended in last resort very 
much on his family prestige and personal influence. He offered a 
marriage connection to the warlord Lü Bu, his ally in Xu province, but 
Lü Bu was persuaded that it would be unwise to have dealings with a 
rebel emperor: he broke off relations with Yuan Shu and attacked him in 
Yang province. Faced with the need to defend his claims and his 
territories by fighting, Yuan Shu was quite unsuccessful, and by the end 
of 197, under attacks from Lü Bu and from Cao Cao, he had been driven 
south of the Huai. Thereafter he was under constant pressure, and the 
resources of his diminished territory dwindled as the result of bad 
harvests and his own extravagance. His power steadily declined. 
 Sun Ce had set guards to hold the crossings over the Yangzi against 
his former master, and he wrote to his relatives and friends holding office 
under Yuan Shu and invited them to join him. Wu Jing, Sun Ben and 
Zhou Yu all came to him, and Zhou Yu brought with him Lu Su, one of 
the great commanders of the Sun family in the years that followed.45 Sun 
                                                                                                                   
  In fact, it is probable the prophecy was based upon the rebellion of a certain Xu 
Feng, who rebelled in the county of Dangtu 當塗 in Jiujiang commandery about 
144-145, and who may have devised the saying to encourage his own cause. See 
HHS 6:276; HHS 112/22:3486; and Mansvelt Beck, Treatises, 186. 
  As the commentary to HHS points out, moreover, the character for the state of 
Wei, which was founded by Cao Cao and which did indeed take over from the 
empire of Han, could bear the meaning "high." See, for example, Goodman, Ts'ao 
P'i Transcendent, 102. 
  Note 11 to Chapter Two discusses another prophecy of this nature concerning 
the phrase xuchang. 
45 The biography of Lu Su is in SGZ 54/Wu 9:1267-73. 
  Jiangbiao zhuan, quoted in SGZ 51/Wu 6:1210 PC note 1, says that Sun Ben 
had some difficulty on getting away to join Sun Ce, and that Sun Ce's other cousin, 
Sun Xiang, was not able to come, because it was too far for him to travel from 
Runan to the south of the Yangzi. He died at Shouchun. The main text of SGZ 51 
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Ce had no difficulty in holding his territory against Yuan Shu, who was 
far too pre-occupied with Lü Bu and Cao Cao to be able to spare him any 
attention, and he was immediately recognised in his position and urged to 
join the alliance against the usurper.[176] 
 In 192 Dong Zhuo had been assassinated at Chang'an by his trusted 
lieutenant Lü Bu. Within a few weeks, however, Lü Bu was forced to flee 
the capital to the east, and he had sought to establish a position in Yan 
province and then in Xu. The young Emperor Xian of Han, however, 
remained at Chang'an as a pawn in the hands of some of Dong Zhuo's 
former officers, a group of generals headed by Li Jue, who had come to 
avenge Dong Zhuo and succeed to his power. Towards the end of 195 the 
emperor was at last able to take advantage of the rivalries and quarrels 
among these guardians to make his own escape to the east. There, 
however, he fell into the hands of Cao Cao, and from this time on Cao 
Cao was able to issue orders and conduct his policy in the name of the 
sovereign of Han. 
 In 197, therefore, an edict was sent to Sun Ce, recognising him as 
Administrator of Kuaiji, recalling the deeds of his father in the service of 
Han against Dong Zhuo, and commanding him to join Lü Bu and a 
newly-appointed acting Administrator of Wu commandery, Chen Yu, to 
attack Yuan Shu. According to Jiangbiao zhuan, this edict was conveyed 
to Sun Ce by a certain Wang Pu, and besides confirming him as an 
Administrator it granted him succession to the marquisate of Wucheng, 
formerly held by his father Sun Jian, and named him a Commandant of 
Cavalry. Sun Ce felt that the military appointment was not high enough, 
and he wanted to be given title as general. In order to appease him, Wang 
Pu gave him the brevet rank of General Who Glorifies Han.46 
                                                                                                                   
says that Sun Ben actually abandoned his wife and children in his escape across 
the Yangzi. However, since we are also told that Cao Cao married one of his sons 
to a daughter of Sun Ben, some of his family rejoined him later (SGZ 46/Wu 
1:1104). 
  Yuan Shu does not appear to have had the forethought or the nerve to seek to 
use hostages as a means of holding Sun Ce and his allies to their allegiance. 
46 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1107 PC note 5 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
  On the significance of the prefix jia, here rendered as "brevet," see note 13 to 
Chapter Two. 
  SGZ 46/Wu 1:1101 PC note 2 quoting the Wei shu of Wang Shen, says that Sun 
Ce ceded his rights in the marquisate of Wucheng to his youngest brother Sun 
Kuang. It was not, at that time, a matter of major importance. 
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 Wu lu contained the memorial of thanks sent by Sun Ce at the time of 
this visit from Wang Pu, which reads in part:[177] 
Your subject is uninformed and uncultivated, and does no more than 
guard the frontiers. Your majesty extends his great favour far and 
wide, not failing to consider even the most minor contribution. You 
have given me the honour of a noble rank, and you have also set me 
in charge of a famous commandery. I respect the honour and 
appreciate the generosity; they are more than I deserve. 
 In the second year of Xingping, in the twelfth month, on the 
twentieth day [6 February 196] at Qu'a in Wu commandery I 
received a recommendation from Yuan Shu appointing me as Acting 
General Who Destroys Criminals. Now I have received your imperial 
commission, and I realise the [earlier] appointment was false and 
made without true authority. Although I have at once renounced the 
title, I am still trembling and perturbed. 
 When I was aged seventeen, I lost my support [my father]. I first 
held command of soldiers when I was not yet old enough to take the 
cap of manhood, and although I am weak and timid and not able in 
war, I have given the utmost attention to my orders. 
 Yuan Shu, however, is wild and deluded, and his mideeds are 
great and serious. I trust to your spiritual authority, I receive your 
commands to carry out his punishment, and I shall send him in a 
prisoner. May that be some recompense for the favours which have 
been granted me."47[178] 
 There was, in all this, a delicate and complex game of diplomacy and 
strategy played by and against Sun Ce. As a result of his recent victories, 
he controlled Kuaiji and Wu commanderies and part of Danyang. He was 
probably not at all reluctant to part company with Yuan Shu, for he had 
certainly shown that he could manage on his own, and he wanted to 
confirm his position by establishing a direct relationship with the court. 
                                               
47 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1107 PC note 5 quoting Wu lu. 
  In commentary at the end of this passage, Pei Songzhi observes that Sun Ce has 
referred to his father dying when he himself was seventeen, and that the main text 
of Sun Ce's biography says that Sun Ce died at the age of twenty-six sui in the year 
200. If these figures are correct, Sun Jian must have died in the second year of the 
Chuping period. The Han ji of Zhang Fan and Wu li both say that he died in the 
second year, but SGZ 46/Wu 1:1100 has the death of Sun Jian in the third year of 
Chuping. See further in note 1 to Chapter Two. 
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Whether or not the emperor was a puppet in another's hands, official 
approval from the Han dynasty would enhance his local authority. 
 On the other hand, the mission of Wang Pu must have come as a 
disappointment. In exchange for recognition by the Han emperor, Sun Ce 
was given only confirmation of a commandery which he already held, 
with succession to a marquisate to which he was already entitled and for 
which he had little use. Rank as Commandant of Cavalry was surely 
insulting for one who had been operating as a general and, more 
importantly, it was very possibly intended to restrict Sun Ce's freedom of 
action in his own region, for he could have faced some formal difficulty 
in commanding military operations or raising troops outside the borders 
of Kuaiji. The semi-official title which he compelled Wang Pu to grant 
him had two important advantages: it restored his former rank and it gave 
open recognition to his acceptance as a loyal servant of Han. 
 Moreover, the appointment of Chen Yu as Administrator of Wu 
commandery, although it was described as a temporary arrangement, paid 
no attention to the fact that Sun Ce's close associate, Zhu Zhi, had been 
acting as Administrator since his expulsion of Xu Gong more than year 
earlier. If Wu commandery could be separated from Sun Ce's control, he 
would have lost more than half of his territorial base and would be 
decisively weakened. 
 This program could already be seen in operation. Chen Yu came no 
closer than Haixi county in Guangling commandery, near present-day 
Guan'nan in Jiangsu and well north [179] of the Huai. From there, instead 
of co-operating with Sun Ce, he sent secret messengers to make contact 
with White Tiger Yan and other potential rebels, to have them act as 
agents against Sun Ce. There seems in fact to have been a plan to wait 
until Sun Ce committed his army to an attack across the Yangzi against 
Yuan Shu, and then arrange a rising which would seize Wu commandery 
and cut his communications with Kuaiji. This would not merely have 
weakened Sun Ce, but destroyed him. 
 Sun Ce evidently realised that possibility, or found out about it 
through spies of his own. His response was simple and firm. He led a 
punitive expedition against White Tiger Yan, and at the same time he sent 
an army under the command of Lü Fan against Chen Yu, who no doubt 
felt he was safe from attack so far north of the Yangzi. The expedition 
may have gone by sea, for Haixi was on the coastline of that time, and 
Sun Ce, at the mouth of the Yangzi, had fair access to shipping, but in any 
case, after a journey of two hundred kilometres, Lü Fan and his forces 
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took Chen Yu completely by surprise. They captured four thousand of his 
officers and men, and their wives and children, and Chen Yu fled away to 
the north.48 
 Once Sun Ce had defeated Chen Yu, and had shown Cao Cao that he 
was not going to be taken over easily, he was prepared to continue 
relations with the north as though nothing had happened. In the following 
year he sent up a large tribute of local products from Kuaiji, and in 
recognition of his loyalty he was given substantive title as General Who 
Exterminates Rebels [180] and was awarded a new fief as Marquis of 
Wu, chief county of the commandery. The brief campaign against Chen 
Yu, and the political manoeuvres which surrounded it, had successfully 
confirmed Sun Ce in all his territories, now held with official approval 
from the house of Han. 
From 197 to 199 the alliance against Yuan Shu was maintained, 
and Sun Ce sent his cousin Sun Fu to cross the Yangzi and occupy the 
city of Liyang. However, though there may have been some preparations, 
no large attack was launched against Yuan Shu either from the south or 
from the north, and the usurper remained for some time, restricted but 
unmolested, in his diminished territory between the Yangzi and the Huai. 
 
The move west and the middle Yangzi (198-199): 
By the beginning of 198, Sun Ce was in recognised control of the 
commanderies of Wu and Kuaiji, together with the eastern half of 
Danyang commandery. The rest of Danyang commandery, however, 
south and west from Jing county, had never submitted to him. 
 After his defeat by Sun Ce in 196 Liu Yao had fled to Yuzhang, but 
Taishi Ci, one of his officers, returned to Danyang to set up a new 
government as Administrator in his service. Taishi Ci's headquarters at 
Jing lay close to the hills, he had gained the support of the non-Chinese 
people there, and from that base he could guard the valley of the Yangzi 
between the two mountain ridges of Dabie Shan and Huang Shan. Any 
move by Sun Ce southwest up the river towards Yuzhang and the middle 
                                               
48 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1107 PC note 5 quoting Shanyang gong zaiji, tells us that Chen Yu 
found refuge with Yuan Shao, and was appointed by him to a minor military post 
in Ji province. 
  Chen Yu had thus a varied career. He had first been an officer of Yuan Shu 
(SGZ 6:208 PC note 2 quoting Yingxiong ji), then an associate of Cao Cao against 
Yuan Shu and also against Sun Ce, and finally an officer of Yuan Shao. He is not 
heard of again. 
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Map 6: The lower Yangzi about 200 
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Yangzi required him first to deal with Taishi Ci. Of lesser importance, but 
more immediate concern, a group of local leaders and tribesmen, loosely 
under the authority of Zu Lang, were operating in the area of the Jiuhua 
Shan, close to the Yangzi near present-day Anqing in Anhui. [181>182] 
Zu Lang was one of the leaders Sun Ce had attacked, and suffered defeat 
from, when he gained his first military experience under his uncle Wu 
Jing in 193 and 194.49 Now, in 198, Yuan Shu is said to have sent agents 
across the Yangzi to contact these dissidents and encourage them to cause 
trouble for Sun Ce. 
 Following his defeat by Sun Ce in 196 Liu Yao had fled to Yuzhang, 
but Taishi Ci, one of his officers, returned to Danyang to set up a new 
government as Administrator in his service. Taishi Ci's headquarters at 
Jing lay close to the hills, he had gained the support of the non-Chinese 
people there, and from that base he could guard the valley of the Yangzi 
between the two mountain ridges of Dabie Shan and Huang Shan. Any 
move by Sun Ce southwest up the river towards Yuzhang and the middle 
Yangzi required him first to deal with Taishi Ci. Of lesser importance, but 
more immediate concern, a group of local leaders and tribesmen, loosely 
under the authority of Zu Lang, were operating in the area of the Jiuhua 
Shan, close to the Yangzi near present-day Anqing in Anhui. [181>182] 
Zu Lang was one of the leaders Sun Ce had attacked, and suffered defeat 
from, when he gained his first military experience under his uncle Wu 
Jing in 193 and 194.50 Now, in 198, Yuan Shu is said to have sent agents 
across the Yangzi to contact these dissidents and encourage them to cause 
trouble for Sun Ce. 
 Four years, however, had made a difference to the comparative 
power of the two sides. When Sun Ce heard of the disturbances, he led 
his army up the Yangzi, turned inland to attack Zu Lang, and defeated 
and captured him at Lingyang, near present-day Taiping in Anhui. At that 
point he had by-passed and isolated Taishi Ci in Jing county; he now 
turned back to attack him, and likewise defeated and captured him. He 
faced no further opposition in Danyang, and he controlled all the Yangzi 
River as far as the southern border of present-day Anhui province. 
 According to Jiangbiao zhuan, when Sun Ce captured Zu Lang, he 
said to him, 
                                               
49 See above at 154. 
50 See above at 154. 
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Once before you made an attack on me, and [you were close enough 
to] chop the saddle of my horse. But now I have raised an army and 
established my position, and I have no concern with old enmities. 
 For any man, no matter who it might be, the only thing that 
concerns me is whether he can prove himself to be of service. You 
have nothing to fear from me. 
Then Zu Lang made the kowtow, and Sun Ce broke his bonds and 
appointed him to his personal staff.51 
 Sun Ce had also had dealings with Taishi Ci in 193 or 194, when 
Taishi Ci was in the service of Liu Yao, based at Qu'a. As he was on a 
scouting patrol with one [183] other soldier, they met by chance with Sun 
Ce and a small group of followers at a place called Shenting, evidently 
west of Qu'a. Taishi Ci immediately attacked, he fought briefly with Sun 
Ce in single combat. Honours were even, but then more men came up 
from either side and they were compelled to break off the duel. 
 Now, when Sun Ce captured Taishi Ci, he immediately released him 
from his bonds and took him by the hand, saying, "Do you remember that 
time at Shenting? What would you have done if you had taken me then?" 
 "I cannot imagine," replied Taishi Ci. 
 Sun Ce gave a great laugh, and said, "Everything I am doing now, I 
shall share with you." 
 When the army returned east from Danyang, Zu Lang and Taishi Ci 
rode together in the lead, and everyone noticed the honour and trust that 
was shown them.52 
 There is clear contrast between Sun Ce's generous treatment of Zu 
Lang and Taishi Ci in Danyang in 198, and his firm repression of 
opposition when he was in Wu commandery in 196. There, with the 
known exceptions of Wang Sheng, whom he pardoned from pity, and 
White Tiger Yan, who was able to escape, the local leaders who opposed 
Sun Ce were killed. It is likely that Sun Ce felt a lenient policy in 
Danyang could help to settle the various Chinese and tribal groups who 
had given their support to Zu Lang and Taishi Ci, and would keep them 
quiet even when his army had left the hills. His pardon and his offer of 
friendship were genuine, however, and Taishi Ci, in particular, became 
one of his most able officers. More probably, Sun Ce felt he could trust 
these two, and he did not feel the same about his fellow-countrymen. 
                                               
51 SGZ 51/Wu 6:1212 PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
52 Ibid and SGZ 49/Wu 4:1188. 
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 There is no firm pattern by which one may assess the chances of a 
man who changes sides in time of civil war, but as a rule of [184] thumb 
we may consider a distinction between "professional soldiers" and "men 
of family." Men such as Zu Lang and Taishi Ci, and Sun Ce himself, 
although they might come from the gentry and possess family 
connections and influence, held command primarily through their 
personal authority and ability. On the other hand, when Sun Ce entered 
Wu commandery, his chief opposition came from the leaders of clans and 
family groups, together with their armed retainers. The Sun were a family 
of Wu commandery, and many people came to join Sun Ce when he 
arrived in the southeast.53 Those who were not prepared to do so, but 
insisted on fighting him, may have disapproved of Sun Ce, or may have 
had some quarrel with his party, or may simply have wished to maintain 
their independent positions of local power. In any event, Sun Ce could 
not trust these people to remain subservient to his authority, and he would 
not be very willing to incorporate discrete local groups or personal bands 
of retainers as identifiable units into his army: they could too easily 
become the focus for discontent and mutiny. The best thing to do was to 
eliminate the leaders, and hope that the common people and soldiers 
would accept his own authority in their place. 
 From this analysis, it may be suggested that the leader of a local clan, 
commanding his forces by reason of family relationships, had little 
chance when he opposed a competent military commander such as Sun 
Ce, and he would have to display a real promise of loyalty and some 
notable personal capacity if he was even to survive the meeting. The men 
Sun Ce were prepared to accept were those who could lead by their own 
authority, and who were willing to commit themselves fully to his cause. 
When the great armies fought the civil war [185] in China, a man had to 
be more than the local leader of retainers, he needed to be a fighting man 
as well. Family position might give him a start, but the stakes and the 
requirements were higher than those of simple feuds and local bullying. 
 At this time, just after Sun Ce had conquered all of Danyang, he 
learnt that Liu Yao had died in Yuzhang commandery. Hua Xin, who had 
been Liu Yao's Administrator of Yuzhang, was the senior official 
available and was urged to take command of all Liu Yao's forces, 
                                               
53 Besides Sun Ce's family and relatives, and his father's old comrade Zhu Zhi, we 
may also notice Dong Xi of Kuaiji (SGZ 55/Wu 10:1290), He Qi of Kuaiji (SGZ 
60/Wu 15:1377 and 170 above), and Quan Rou from Qiantang county in Wu 
commandery (SGZ 60/Wu 15:1381). 
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presumably with the title of Governor or Inspector of Yang province. Hua 
Xin, however, was a modest fellow, and he refused to accept supreme 
command. Though he kept control of Yuzhang, the other parts of Liu 
Yao's former territory were left to their own devices.54 
 When Sun Ce heard of this, he called Taishi Ci and asked him to go 
to the west, to reconnoitre and see what chance he might have of 
persuading his former companions to join Sun Ce. 
 According to Jiangbiao zhuan, Sun Ce explained his situation to 
Taishi Ci, saying: 
In the past, Governor Liu resented the fact that I attacked Lujiang 
commandery for Yuan Shu. 
 But my late father had commanded several thousand soldiers, 
and they were all under Yuan Gonglu's [Yuan Shu's] control. I always 
wanted to make myself independent, but I had to join Yuan Gonglu if 
I was ever to get those men back from him. 
 The way things were, when he ordered me to attack Lujiang, 
what else could I do? It was only later, when he failed to follow the 
proper conduct of a minister, and when he forgot himself so far as to 
forge that wicked plan to usurp the imperial title, then I protested but 
he paid no attention, [and] I was compelled to leave [186] him... 
Now Liu Yao is dead, and I regret that I was never able to explain 
everything to him while he was still alive.55 
 Taishi Ci went off with a small party and came back several weeks 
later. He reported to Sun Ce: 
Hua Ziyu is a good man, but he has no skill in planning and no ideas 
of his own. He holds his position, but nothing more. 
 In Luling, Tong Zhi of Danyang has seized the territory for 
himself, and he pretends that he has an imperial commission as 
Administrator. 
                                               
54 The biography of Hua Xin is in SGZ 13:401-06. His style was Ziyu 子魚, and he is 
referred to in that fashion in the report of Taishi Ci below. 
55 SGZ 49/Wu 4:1189 PC note 2 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
  The main text records some uncertainty among Sun Ce's associates as to 
whether Taishi Ci, so recently captured, would stay loyal to his new master: many 
believed he would take the opportunity to escape. Sun Ce, however, had full 
confidence in his new lieutenant, and indeed Taishi Ci returned with news in 
exactly the time he had promised. As Sun Ce remarked, if Taishi Ci deserted, 
where would he go and who would trust him? 
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 In Poyang, the leaders of the local people have set up their own 
clan groups and have gathered men to defend the territory. They 
refuse to accept the officials sent by Hua Ziyu, saying, "We have 
already established a separate commandery. We are waiting for the 
Han to send a proper Administrator, and then we shall accept him." 
 And not only does Hua Ziyu fail to control Luling and Poyang, 
but five or six thousand families in Haihun, along the cliff country by 
Shangliao, have lately banded together by clans. They are prepared 
to send in tax cloth to the commandery, but none will respond to an 
official summons. 
 To all this, Hua Ziyu does no more than look on.[187] 
Sun Ce, we are told, clapped his hands and laughed aloud. And it was 
then that he decided he could take the territory of Yuzhang.56 
 By the following year, 199, Sun Ce had made his preparations and 
was ready to move up the course of the Yangzi towards the west. By this 
time, however, beside the remaining soldiers of Liu Yao, now 
commanded by Hua Xin or Tong Zhi, and the independent groups at 
Poyang and Haihun, his main objective was the army of Huang Zu. 
 Huang Zu was the man who had led the force that killed Sun Jian 
near Xiangyang in 191, and now, still in the service of Liu Biao, he 
commanded an army and a fleet which controlled the course of the 
middle Yangzi from headquarters near present-day Wuhan, at the junction 
of the Han River with the Yangzi. Following the death of Liu Yao, Huang 
                                               
56 SGZ 49/Wu 4:1190 PC note 3 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
  The capital of Yuzhang commandery under Later Han was at Nanchang, now 
close to the city of the same name, capital of present-day Jiangxi province. 
Yuzhang commandery under Han occupied essentially the same territory as 
present-day Jiangxi, being the drainage area of the modern Poyang Lake. The 
Pengli Lake of Han times, however, was not so large as the Poyang Lake is now, 
for much of the southern expanse of the present-day lake region was marsh and 
river land in Han times: Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, 51-52, and Chapter One at 51. 
  The various regions of Yuzhang commandery, referred to in Taishi Ci's report, 
may be identified as follows: 
Luling was a county near present-day Ji'an. We have noticed earlier that it was already 
being regarded as a separate region, and it would appear that the new 
"commandery" proclaimed by Tong Zhi may have included perhaps five or six 
counties in the south of present-day Jiangxi, on the upper reaches of the Gan River; 
Poyang was the name of a county near present-day Jingdezhen, east of the Pengli Lake; 
Haihun county was near present-day Yongxiu, west of the Pengli Lake; SJZ 29:17b, 
remarks that the Liao River, which flows into the Pengli/Poyang Lake, was called 
Shangliao in the area where it joins the Xiu River close to Haihun. 
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Zu had naturally taken advantage of the power [188] vacuum in the 
region of Yuzhang, and he extended his patrols eastwards down the 
Yangzi until his sphere of influence reached the territory of Sun Ce in 
Danyang commandery. As he moved towards the west, therefore, Sun Ce 
had to deal not only with merely local forces, but also with a significant 
and experienced rival operating from a strong base in Jing province. At 
the same time he gained the added incentive of revenge for his father's 
death. 
 Even as the army was setting out, however, Sun Ce learnt of changes 
to his north. That year, Yuan Shu had died at Shouchun. Many of his 
soldiers scattered to serve other masters, but a great number of his troops 
and the members of his court went to join Yuan Shu's Administrator of 
Lujiang, Liu Xun.57 When Sun Ce heard this, he was anxious about the 
danger from such a combined force on his flank, and he made plans to 
deal with the situation before he went further up-river. 
 Liu Xun was short of food for his new followers, and he sent 
messengers to Hua Xin in Yuzhang to ask for supplies. Hua Xin had 
nothing to spare, but he asked the leaders of Haihun and Shangliao for 
rice. They gave very little, and after more than a month of travelling Liu 
Xun's messengers had gained nothing. Then Liu Xun planned to attack 
Haihun and take the supplies by force.58 
 At this stage, Sun Ce was writing encouraging letters of friendship, 
couched in most humble fashion and accompanied by presents. He 
remarked upon the wealth of Shangliao, and claimed [189] that Liu Xun 
would have no difficulty in taking the place. For his own part, he would 
bring troops to act as support from the outside, but he sought no share in 
the proceeds. Despite warnings from his advisers, Liu Xun believed all 
this.59 He should perhaps have recalled that he held his position in 
Lujiang only because Yuan Shu had reneged on his promise to Sun Ce, 
appointing Liu Xun after Sun Ce had actually conquered the territory 
                                               
57 According to SGZ 46/Wu 1:1104, a number of Yuan Shu's people had planned to 
take refuge with Sun Ce, but Liu Xun waylaid and captured them. Jiangbiao 
zhuan, however, quoted in commentary to this passage, at 1108 note 6, makes no 
reference to this intention, and Sima Guang, in ZZTJ 63:2019-20, also disregards 
the story. For Yuan Shu's former followers, Liu Xun was a more logical choice for 
refuge than Sun Ce, who was a declared enemy of Yuan Shu. 
58 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1108 PC note 6 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
59 SGZ 14:443-44, being the biography of Liu Ye, who was at that time an adviser to 
Liu Xun. 
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back in 194.60 At any rate, Liu Xun accepted Sun Ce's offers of alliance 
and led his army out of his commandery. 
 As soon as he realised that his plan had worked, Sun Ce divided his 
forces: a detachment under Sun Ben and Sun Fu was sent to Pengze 
county in Yuzhang, by the lake junction with the Yangzi, to cut Liu Xun 
off from his base; and Sun Ce, with Zhou Yu, led the main army to seize 
Huan city, capital of Lujiang commandery, now Qianshan in Anhui. They 
captured Liu Xun's family and personal attendants, and also the wife and 
children of Yuan Shu and the former artisans and musicians and 
attendants of his imperial court. Sun Ce brought the bulk of the people 
back to his own territory across the Yangzi, and he left one of his officers, 
a certain Li Shu, with title as Administrator of Lujiang, in command of a 
garrison at Huan city. He then returned to join his cousins at Pengze. 
 In the mean time, Liu Xun had attempted to take Haihun by surprise, 
but the people were forewarned and he gained no success. When he learnt 
of Sun Ce's attack on his capital, he sought to return, but he was cut off 
by the army at Pengze and driven west up the Yangzi. He halted to 
prepare defensive positions near Xisai [190] Mountain, east of present-
day Daye in Hubei,61 and from there he asked Liu Biao and Huang Zu for 
help. 
 Huang Zu's eldest son, Huang She, brought a fleet and five thousand 
men to the support of Liu Xun, but Sun Ce defeated the allies and drove 
them back to the mouth of the Han. He captured two thousand of Liu 
Xun's soldiers and more than a thousand ships, and Liu Xun abandoned 
the struggle and fled north to Cao Cao with a handful of his remaining 
followers. Huang She went back to join his father, and Sun Ce followed 
his successes by an advance and an attack on Huang Zu's headquarters at 
Shaxian in Jiangxia, now southwest of Wuhan in Hubei. 
 In a memorial to the court, Sun Ce described the action that 
followed:62 
When I attacked Huang Zu, I came to Shaxian county, where he was 
camped, on the eighth day of the twelfth month [of Jian'an 4: 11 
                                               
60 See 155 above. 
61 The name Xisai 西塞 "Western Frontier" evidently refers to the position of this 
high ground on the southern bank of the Yangzi, at the western border of Yang 
province against Jing province. 
62 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1108 PC note 6 quoting Wu lu. The account of the campaign is 
included in the extract from Jiangbiao zhuan quoted earlier in the same note. 
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January 200]. Liu Biao had sent officers to help Huang Zu, and they 
joined their forces against me. 
 At dawn on the eleventh I sent forward detachments..., all 
advancing at the same time. I rode on a horse to order the battle 
lines, and I beat a fast drum to prepare our men for the fight. 
 The officers and soldiers were roused to the effort, and their 
spirits were raised a thousand times. Their hearts were keen and their 
minds were determined; each vied with the other to carry out my 
orders. 
 We crossed the rings of moats so fast it seemed we were flying. 
Fire spread with a favourable wind and the soldiers [191] charged 
through the smoke. Bows and crossbows shot together and the 
arrows poured down like rain. 
 As the sun rose to the early morning, Huang Zu was broken and 
destroyed. Cut down by sharp swords or burnt by the raging flames, 
no enemy was left alive before us, and only Huang Zu fled away. 
 We captured his wife and his sons and daughters, seven people. 
We cut off more than twenty thousand heads, and another ten 
thousand fled to the river and were drowned. We captured more than 
six thousand boats and a treasure piled up like mountains... 
 Truly all this is due to the far-reaching influence of the spiritual 
military authority of your sage-like government, that I have been 
able to put forth my feeble efforts and punish the wrongdoers. 
Sun Ce must have enjoyed sending that letter. Not only was he reporting 
victory in a fine dramatic style, but he was also warning the imperial 
court and its guardian Cao Cao, his nominal ally, that his power and 
ambition could extend further than the confines of Yang province in the 
southeast. He now sought to number Liu Biao among the enemies of 
Han, and so claimed the right to attack Jing province and the lands of the 
middle Yangzi.63 As Cao Cao is said [192] to have remarked at the time, 
"That wolf-cub! It will be difficult to deal with him"64 
                                               
63 In the second paragraph of the translation of the memorial above, I omit the list of 
names and titles held by the commanders of the detachments of Sun Ce's army. 
They are given as:  
Zhou Yu, Designated (領 ling) Administrator of Jiangxia and Acting (行 xing) General of 
the Household Who Establishes Majesty; 
Lü Fan, Designated Administrator of Guiyang and Acting General of the Household 
Who Subdues the Caitiffs; 
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The last campaigns (200): 
The victory over Huang Zu in the last month of the Chinese year, while it 
may not have been quite so complete as Sun Ce described it, certainly 
removed Huang Zu's ability to intervene in any part of the Yangzi 
downstream from Jing province. Driven onto the defensive by his losses, 
Huang Zu collected some of his scattered troops and received further 
reinforcements from Liu Biao in order to face the next attack. 
 Sun Ce, for his part, withdrew to the Pengli Lake region and 
prepared to invade Yuzhang and Luling. Since he had no wish to receive 
the same treatment he had given Liu Xun, he could not afford to extend 
his communications too far towards the west until he was sure that the 
territory to the south was secure.  
 Early in the Chinese new year Sun Ce was in camp at Jiaoqiu, a few 
kilometres from the city of Nanchang, capital of Yuzhang commandery. 
According to Jiangbiao zhuan, Sun Ce held considerable respect for the 
virtues of Hua Xin, and he sent Yu Fan, a former follower of Wang Lang 
the Administrator of Kuaiji, [193] to persuade Hua Xin that he should 
surrender without a fight. Yu Fan, with truth, pointed out the strength of 
Sun Ce's army and the weakness of Hua Xin's own position, and so Hua 
Xin came out and surrendered Yuzhang to Sun Ce.65 
 Once Hua Xin had surrendered, Sun Ce had nothing more to fear 
from that region. Tong Zhi, self-styled Administrator of Luling, still held 
out, but Sun Ce left Sun Fu and Zhou Yu at Nanchang to wait for an 
opportunity to attack him. Within a few months, they learnt that Tong Zhi 
had been taken ill, and they took advantage of this to go forward and 
                                                                                                                   
Cheng Pu, Designated Commandant of Lingling and Acting General of the Household 
Who Eliminates Criminals; 
Sun Quan, Acting Colonel Who Serves the Great Work; 
Han Dang, Acting Colonel Who is First to Scale [the Enemy Ramparts]; 
Huang Gai, Acting Colonel of the Firm Attack. 
 Apart from the flowery military titles, a feature of this list is the manner in which 
Sun Ce has identified three of his officers as future administrators of 
commanderies in Jing province: the term ling, which has the basic meaning of "in 
command of," seems best understood here as indicating that the appointment is 
made, but has yet to be taken up. Zhou Yu, in particular, bears a direct challenge 
against Huang Zu, who was Liu Biao's own Administrator of Jiangxia. 
64 SGZ 6/Wu 1:1109 PC note 7 quoting Wu li. 
65 The biography of Yu Fan is in SGZ 57/Wu 12:1317-26; the account of his 
negotiations with Hua Xin appears at 1318 PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
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occupy his territory.66 There was a brief period of skirmishing against a 
nephew of Liu Biao, Liu Pan, who attempted to maintain a guerrilla war 
in the hill country between the two provinces, but Taishi Ci put down this 
disturbance,67 and the region thereafter remained quiet, with the initiative 
firmly in the hands of the Sun group. 
 Historians and commentators have compared the dealings of Wang 
Lang and Hua Xin with Sun Ce. Both were famous scholars, both lost 
their territories to Sun Ce, and they both later went north and became 
high officials of the state of Wei under the Cao family. Wang Lang, as we 
have seen, did attempt to fight Sun Ce, but Hua Xin gave up without a 
struggle, and the fourth-century scholar Sun Sheng has scathing 
comments on his conduct:[194] 
He failed to maintain his honour as a loyal minister. He surrendered 
to the persuasions of a turncoat Confucianist [Yu Fan], and he allied 
himself with a greedy, brutal bully [Sun Ce].68 
Pei Songzhi, on the other hand, is more understanding, and perhaps more 
realistic: 
Both men met with turbulent times, and had to deal with fierce, 
sharp, military threats. Neither was able to cope... Lord Wang stood 
and fought, while Hua turned from his duty and asked to surrender. 
 The fact is, however, that when Sun Ce first appeared on the 
scene he had no great name and not many men under his command, 
so Wang could raise troops against him..... Later on, Sun Ce's power 
and authority had grown great, and his strength could not be 
matched..... 
 If the situation had been reversed, then Hua would have fought 
and Wang would have surrendered.69 
                                               
66 SGZ 51/Wu 6:1210 PC note 2 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
  It will be recalled that Sun Ce had named Sun Fu as Administrator of Luling as 
early as 196. 
67 SGZ 49/Wu 4:1190. Taishi Ci remained in control of this region until his death in 
206. 
68 Sun Sheng's comments are given in SGZ 13:403 PC note 5; they are also quoted in 
ZZTJ 63:2022; deC, Establish Peace, 265. 
  Whether or not it is fair to describe Yu Fan as a turncoat, he was recognised as 
a distinguished scholar, and he was used on several occasions as a persuasive 
envoy. His biography is in SGZ 57/Wu 12:1317-26. 
69 Pei Songzhi presents his remarks on this topic in commentary to the biography of 
Yu Fan, SGZ 57/Wu 12:1319 PC. 
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Certainly, by 200, Sun Ce commanded the most powerful army in south 
China, and one of the strongest in the empire. 
 In an earlier passage, discussing the different fates of opponents of 
Sun Ce during his campaigns in his home territory of Wu commandery 
and in the neighbouring Danyang, I sought to contrast the "professional 
fighting men" such as Taishi Ci with the local gentry leaders: professional 
soldiers could be recruited into the victor's army, while local leaders, 
particularly if they had shown a personal or family hostility, could not 
expect such good treatment.[195] 
 We may note here, in the examples of Wang Lang and Hua Xin, a 
third category: men of more than local distinction, often of significant 
family and scholarly status, who nevertheless failed to cope with the 
pressures of civil war. On the one hand, they were of limited use to a 
practical warlord, and they frequently tended to despise such upstarts. At 
the same time, they were too important to be killed out of hand, and there 
was some prestige to be gained from keeping them among the chief's 
entourage. They were little value in war, but they served some purpose in 
the rituals which needed to be found even for a warrior's state. 
 Sun Ce, of course, had his own scholars at court, men such as Zhang 
Hong, who was a personal friend, and he had limited interest in such past 
and potential enemies as Wang Lang or Hua Xin.70 Soon after the capture 
of Kuaiji in 195, Wang Lang had been allowed to return north, where he 
joined Cao Cao; and Hua Xin likewise stayed with the Sun family for 
only a short time before he, too, was permitted to make his excuses and 
                                               
70 Sun Ce did take Liu Yao's three sons under his protection. The eldest, Liu Ji, who 
was fourteen at the time of his father's death, later held high rank and favour at the 
court of Sun Quan, and his brothers Liu Shuo and Liu Shang both held official 
posts. See SGZ 49/Wu 4:1186. 
  In similar fashion, the children of Yuan Shu fell into Sun Ce's hands after his 
defeat of Liu Xun in Lujiang. Yuan Shu's son, Yuan Yao, held court rank in Wu, 
and his daughter was married to Sun Quan's son Sun Fen. Yuan Shu's daughter was 
taken into Sun Quan's harem, and was at one time considered as his possible 
formal wife; she was passed over, however, because she had borne him no 
children: SGZ 6:210, and SGZ 50/Wu 5:1200 PC note 1 quoting Wu lu. 
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leave.71 The important thing was not to kill such men out of hand, but to 
hand them on, if necessary, decently to someone else.72[196] 
 At this time in the north, the two great rivals Cao Cao and Yuan Shao 
had finally come to grips. Cao Cao, holding the emperor in his custody at 
Xu city and borrowing the imperial authority to justify his actions, had 
steadily increased his power. Yuan Shao, who still commanded broad 
lands and a powerful army, felt that Cao Cao was [197] becoming a threat 
and resolved to destroy him. From the spring to the winter of 200, the 
                                               
71 In 220, when Cao Pi succeeded Cao Cao as King of Wei, Hua Xin and Wang Lang 
held two of the three highest offices at the royal court. See, for example, ZZTJ 
69:2177; Fang, Chronicle I, 3 and 22, following SGZ 2:58. 
72 Some men in this category proved too insolent or too irritating to be tolerated 
indefinitely. One example is Kong Rong, a celebrated scholar and descendant of 
Confucius, who showed limited competence in the emergencies of the civil war 
and was eventually compelled to seek protection at Cao Cao's court. He continued, 
however, to intrigue against Cao Cao and in favour of some restoration of the 
power of Han, and he relied upon his reputation to sneer at Cao Cao. In 208 Cao 
Cao had him executed. Biographies of Kong Rong are in SGZ 12:370-73 PC note 
1, quoting from a variety of sources, and in HHS 70/60:2261-80. See also ZZTJ 
64:2081; deC, Establish Peace, 374-374 and sub voce. 
  There was also the case of Ni Heng, who was celebrated as a scholar and as a 
debater, but who was also proud and arrogant (The character of his surname, 禰, is 
commonly transcribed as Mi, but the old version Ni seems preferable). He was 
recommended by Kong Rong to Cao Cao, but behaved with gross discourtesy. Cao 
Cao would have liked to punish him, but he felt people would consider him 
intolerant and would criticise him. So he sent Ni Heng on to Liu Biao, who at first 
approved of him and got on well with him. Ni Heng, however, continually abused 
Liu Biao's attendants, and eventually someone reported to Liu Biao that Ni Heng 
had said he was a fine gentleman, but he lacked the ability to make up his mind. 
Liu Biao was angry, and he in turn sent Ni Heng on to his lieutenant Huang Zu. 
Huang Zu was less tolerant than Cao Cao or Liu Biao; there came the day that Ni 
Heng made some clever remark in public against Huang Zu, and Huang Zu killed 
him. 
  There is a biography of Ni Heng in HHS 80B/70B:2652-58, and other 
biographies are quoted in SGZ 10:311-12 PC note 2. His career is described in 
ZZTJ 62:1993; deC, Establish Peace, 210. The commentary of Hu Sanxing to that 
passage remarks that Cao Cao behaved quite well in sending Ni Heng to Liu Biao, 
for Liu Biao was a cultivated man; but Liu Biao was wrong to send Ni Heng to 
such a rough bully as Huang Zu. 
  The insult at Cao Cao's court, where Ni Heng showed disrespect by attending 
naked and beating a drum, is described with gusto in Romance chapter 23, and is 
the subject of a well-known drama, Ji gu ma Cao, "Beating a Drum and Abusing 
Cao Cao;" or Qun chen yan, "Banquet with a Multitude of Ministers" (Arlington 
and Acton, Chinese Plays, 38-52). 
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two warlords were engaged in a long-drawn campaign about the city of 
Guandu, just south of the Yellow River and north of Zhongmou in 
present-day Henan. By the end of the year, Cao Cao had won a complete 
victory and Yuan Shao's power was in decline, but for many months Cao 
Cao had little time to take thought for the south.73 
 To keep the peace with Sun Ce, Cao Cao had arranged a marriage 
alliance, which was set up soon after Sun Ce had captured Yuzhang. The 
daughter of one of Cao Cao's younger brothers or cousins was given in 
marriage to Sun Ce's youngest brother Sun Kuang, and Cao Cao's own 
son, Cao Zhang, married a daughter of Sun Ce's cousin Sun Ben.74 Cao 
Cao made a point of showing courtesy and respect to Sun Ce and his 
brothers, and he had his nominee Inspector of Yang province, Yan Xiang, 
present Sun Quan as a candidate of "Abundant Talent."75 The relationship 
between the two disparate parties was an uneasy one, and not necessarily 
either stable or friendly, but it was not at this stage critical, and both had 
more immediate preoccupations. 
 In fact, in the summer of 200, Sun Ce rode to his last campaign. 
When he was in the west to fight Huang Zu and take over Lujiang and 
Yuzhang, the remnant troops of his old enemy White Tiger Yan had made 
another rebellion in Wu commandery, encouraged [198] by Chen Deng, 
Administrator of Guangling appointed by Cao Cao; he was a cousin of 
Chen Yu, the earlier nominal Administrator of Wu commandery who had 
been driven away by Sun Ce in 197.76 
                                               
73 The campaign about Guandu is described in ZZTJ 63:2015-35; deC, Establish 
Peace, 252-290. It is discussed by deC, Imperial Warlord, 135-152. 
74 The biography of Cao Zhang is in SGZ 19:555-56. He was the second son of Cao 
Cao by his formal wife the Lady Bian. 
75 This recommendation as candidate of Abundant Talent is evidently the one referred 
to in Sun Quan's biography; note 30 above. Since the recruitment system of Han 
had quite broken down, the nomination was meaningless in practical terms. 
76 Unlike Chen Yu (about whom see note 49 above), Chen Deng was a loyal and 
recognised supporter of Cao Cao. He and his father Chen Gui played important 
roles in the destruction of Lü Bu, Cao Cao's rival in Xu province (SGZ 7:224). 
There is a supplementary biography of Chen Deng in SGZ 7:229-30, and the 
commentary of Pei Songzhi adds a long passage from a Xianxian xingzhuan, 
describing Chen Deng's later achievements in holding Guangling commandery 
against attacks from the south led by Sun Ce's successor Sun Quan. 
  On the relationship of Chen Deng with Chen Yu (they were first cousins once 
removed, Chen Yu being in the senior generation), see SGZ 46/Wu 1:1111 PC note 
2 quoting Jiuzhou chunqiu. 
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 Whether Cao Cao was directly involved or not, Chen Deng was 
evidently playing the same game as his cousin three years earlier, and the 
threat of disturbance in Wu commandery was a most effective means of 
keeping Sun Ce's attention safely in the southeast. 
 Among the rebels there was also the former Administrator Xu Gong, 
the man who had been driven from office in 196. Shortly before that 
time, when Sun Ce had defeated Liu Yao south of the Yangzi but before 
he had moved against Wu commandery, we are told that Xu Gong had 
written to the court to urge that Sun Ce be summoned to some 
appointment in the capital and kept there under control. Then Sun Ce 
took the commandery and Xu Gong fled to the local leader Xu Zhao, and 
it seems he was able to keep away from Sun Ce until this time. In one of 
the early engagements of the new campaign, however, Sun Ce captured 
Xu Gong, taxed him with that letter to the court, and had him executed by 
strangling. 
 After this first success, Sun Ce brought his army to camp at Dantu, 
southeast of present-day Zhenjiang in Jiangsu. There, by the southern 
shore of the mouth of the Yangzi, he planned [199] to wait a few days for 
supplies, and in the mean time he went hunting. However, though Xu 
Gong had been killed and his followers scattered, a few of them had 
taken refuge in the country nearby. Sun Ce loved to hunt deer, the horse 
that he rode was a good one, and none of his guards or attendants could 
keep up with the chase. For a little while, he was alone, and he came 
upon three of Xu Gong's former retainers. They seized their bows and 
shot at him, and one of the arrows struck him on the jaw. Then Sun Ce's 
attendants came up and the three men were killed, but Sun Ce was 
brought back to his camp with a serious wound. 
 There are several anecdotes surrounding the death of Sun Ce, but the 
story told by Wu li is natural and rather touching: 
When Sun Ce was wounded, the doctors said that he could be cured, 
but that he should take care of himself and keep quiet for at least 
three months. Then Sun Ce got hold a mirror and saw his own 
reflection, and he said to his attendants, "With a face like this, how 
shall I achieve anything again, and how shall I set up my power?" 
 He was very upset, he beat upon his armrest, and all his wounds 
broke open again. That night, he died.77 
                                               
77 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1112 PC note 3 quoting Wu li. 
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The date of his death was 5 May 200, and he was twenty-six years old by 
Chinese reckoning, twenty-five in Western terms.78[200]  
 
Sun Ce and the legend of Gan Ji: a medley of texts: 
There is also, however, another cycle of stories about the death of Sun 
Ce, loosely centred around the powers of the magician Gan Ji (or Yu Ji),79 
and these require some analysis. The crucial account is based upon the 
Soushen ji "Record of Enquiry about the Spirits" by Gan Bao of the early 
fourth century. In this work, the account of Sun Ce's death goes as 
follows: 
After Sun Ce had killed Gan Ji, whenever he sat alone he would 
think he saw Gan Ji by his side. This had a considerable effect upon 
him, he was very upset, and quite lost his usual good spirits. 
 Later [after the attack upon him by the retainers of Xu Gong, 
when] his wound was almost healed, he took a mirror to see his 
reflection. He saw Gan Ji's image in the mirror, but when he turned 
his head to look behind him there was no-one there. And this 
happened another two or three times. Then he struck the mirror, and 
cried out loud, and all his wounds broke open again, and so he died.80 
So who was this man Gan Ji, and how was it that he was so closely 
connected with Sun Ce? 
 Apart from the stories collected in the Pei Songzhi commentary to 
Sun Ce's biography in Sanguo zhi, Gan Ji is referred to most significantly 
as the discoverer or transmitter of the celebrated Taiping jing, "The 
Classic of Great Peace." The locus classicus for this attribution is the 
biography of the private scholar Xiang Kai [201] in Hou Han shu, which 
preserves the text of two memorials submitted to Emperor Huan of Han 
in the summer of 166. At the end of his first memorial, Xiang Kai, who 
was protesting against the emperor's policies and government, includes 
the statement: 
                                               
78 The date of Sun Ce's death is given by the Zhi lin of Yu Xi, quoted in SGZ 46/Wu 
1:1110 PC, as the fourth day of the fourth month (identified by ZZTJ 63:2029 as 
the bingwu 丙午 day; deC, Establish Peace, 279). His age at death is given by the 
main text of SGZ 46/Wu 1:1109. 
79 The surname of this Taoist teacher appears written both as Gan 干 and as Yu 于. I 
have accepted the arguments of Fukui [1958], 63, who made a detailed survey of 
the evidence and adopted the reading Gan. He is followed by Mansvelt Beck, 
"Date of the Taiping jing," 149 note 1. 
80 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1112 PC note 3 quoting Soushen ji. 
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Some time ago, I presented the throne with the sacred writings of 
Gan Ji, which had been passed to me by Gong Chong of Langye, but 
they did not accord with the emperor's opinions.81 
In the second memorial, he noted again: 
That sacred book presented by Gong Chong bases its teaching on 
respect for Heaven and Earth and an obedience to the Five Powers, 
and it deals with the techniques required to bring prosperity to the 
state and to help maintain a plentiful succession. The writing is easy 
to understand and fully accords with the [Confucian] classics. Yet 
Emperor Shun failed to put its precepts into practice, and therefore 
his successors did not flourish.82 
In the text of the biography, we are given some further explanation of 
Xiang Kai's references: 
Before this, in the time of Emperor Shun [125-145], Gong Chong of 
Langye had come to the palace and presented a sacred book in 170 
chapters which his master, Gan Ji, had obtained by the waters of the 
Quyang Spring. It was all written on pale green silk, with vermilion 
borders, dark green headings, and vermilion titles. It was called 
Taiping qingling shu, "The Book of Great Peace and Pure Guidance." 
The text dealt mainly with the schools of Yin and Yang and of the 
Five Powers, and it included a number of sayings of magicians and 
shamans. 
 The officials reported that the work Gong Chong had presented 
was unorthodox and false, outside the canon of the [202] classics; it 
was, however, received and retained [in the imperial library]. Later, 
Zhang Jue used some of its teachings.83 
More disconcerting, however, is the story recorded in the Shenxian zhuan 
"Biographies of Spirits and Immortals" compiled by Ge Hong of the 
fourth century, which tells us that the text of Taiping jing was acquired by 
Gan Ji and Gong Chong in the time of Emperor Yuan of Former Han, 
who reigned from 49 to 33 B.C.84 This would provide the work with a 
                                               
81 HHS 30B/20B:1080, translated in deC, Portents of Protest, 27; cf Petersen, "Early 
Traditions," 133-151. The memorials of Xiang Kai are also discussed in deC, 
"Politics and Philosophy," 65-67. 
82 HHS 30B/20B:1084: deC, Portents of Protest, 28. 
83 HHS 30B/20B:1084: deC, Portents of Protest, 31-32. 
84 Shenxian zhuan 10, quoted by the Qing scholar Hui Dong in HHSJJ 30B/20B:18b. 
This text is translated and discussed by Mansvelt Beck, "Date of the Taiping jing," 
160. 
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useful antiquity, but it also implies that Gan Ji was rather more than 250 
years old at the time he met with Sun Ce. 
 The origins and early history of Taiping jing and the school 
associated with it have been discussed elsewhere,85 and it does not seem 
appropriate to go very much deeper into the matter here. What we can 
say, however, is that there was a tradition that the man Gan Ji was 
involved with an early stage of the history of Taiping jing, that he was 
originally from Langye, being the commandery on the coast south of the 
Shandong peninsula, and that it appears he travelled further south and 
was operating in the territory of Sun Ce at the end of the second century 
AD. If the account in the biography of Xiang Kai in Hou Han shu is 
correct – and leaving aside the claims of Shenxian zhuan – he was by 
then quite old. 
 Pei Songzhi presents two versions of Sun Ce's quarrel with Gan Ji. 
The first, taken from Jiangbiao zhuan,86 says that: 
At this time there was a Taoist scholar Gan Ji of Langye, who had 
first lived in the east and moved later to Wu and Kuaiji [in the 
southeast]. He [203] built spirit-houses, burnt incense and read Taoist 
books, and he could put charms upon water in order to cure 
sickness.87 Many of the people of the region followed him. 
                                               
85 For example, Seidel, "Image of the Perfect Ruler," Kaltenmark, "Ideology of the 
Tai-p'ing ching," Mansvelt Beck, "Date of the Taiping jing," Kandel, Origin and 
Transmission, and Petersen, "Early Traditions." 
86 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1110 PC note 1; Petersen, "Early Traditions," 155-156. 
87 The placing of charms upon water to make medicine was a technique common at 
this time. It was used by Zhang Jue, founder of the Yellow Turbans (HHS 
71/61:2299), and we are told that the Rice Sect in the west, under Zhang Xiu and 
later under Zhang Lu, generally followed the methods of Zhang Jue, though we are 
not specifically told that they used charmed water: see Chapter Six. 
  Both the Yellow Turbans of Zhang Jue and the Rice Sect of the west believed 
that sickness was the mark of sin, and that those who became ill were suffering 
because of some wrongdoing: see the Dian lue of Yu Huan, quoted in SGZ 8:264 
PC note 1, and in commentary to HHS 75/65:2436. 
  We are also told, however, that the Rice Sect under Zhang Xiu had a system of 
setting up "houses of purity" (靜/淨室 jingshe), a custom which Zhang Jue did not 
have (note 11 to Chapter Six). People who became ill were sent to these "houses of 
purity" to contemplate their sins. 
  The name of the "spirit-houses" (精室 jingshe) of Gan Ji is very close to that of 
the "houses of purity" in the west, and it is likely that the difference is no more 
than a variant form of the character. It seems probable, therefore, that Gan Ji was 
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 There came a time Sun Ce was on the gate-tower of the capital 
city of the commandery [presumably the city of Wu], with all his 
officers and retainers assembled below. Then Gan Ji came by, 
splendidly dressed and carrying a small box patterned with lacquer, 
which he said [contained] the bell of an immortal.88[204] 
 Two-thirds of those present left the assembly to welcome him, 
and though the masters of ceremonies attempted to stop them, they 
had no effect. So Sun Ce had Gan Ji arrested. 
 All the people who served Gan Ji sent their wives and daughters 
to Sun Ce's mother, to ask her to intercede for him. The Lady Wu 
said to Sun Ce, "Master Gan has helped our army gain success, and 
his medicine protects our troops. You cannot kill him." 
 "The fellow is a trickster," replied Sun Ce, "and he deceives our 
people. Even at a distance he made my officers neglect the proper 
courtesies between ruler and follower: they turned away from me 
and went to greet him. I must get rid of him." 
 Then all the officers prepared a petition, offering their apologies 
and begging that Gan Ji be pardoned. Sun Ce replied, "A short time 
ago, Zhang Jin of Nanyang became Inspector of Jiao province. He 
set aside the precepts of the wise men of the past and he rejected the 
law codes of the house of Han. He wore a red cloth about his head, 
he had drums and flutes played, he burnt incense and he read the 
false books of the Taoists. He claimed that his would help his 
administration, but in the end he was killed by the local barbarians. 
                                                                                                                   
using the same system as that of Zhang Lu and his associates, and that he also 
followed the theory relating sickness to sin. 
  It should be observed, however, that the expression jingshe or some variant of 
it was well established in other terminology than that of Later Han Taoism. The 
phrase appears, for example, in the pre-Qin text Guanzi, where it refers to the 
emotions held within the breast; and also in Hou Han shu, where it refers to the 
physical building of a school for Confucian scholars: see, for example, the 
biography of Liu Shu in HHS 67/57:2190, and that of Bao Xian in HHS 
79B/69B:2570. 
88 The text here has the character hua 鏵 (following the pronunciation given by Lu Bi 
in SGZJJ 46/Wu 1:32b). Lu Bi explains the character as meaning qiao 鍫 "spade." 
He observes also that the Palace edition of SGZ suggests two variants: lian 鎌 
"sickle" or suo 鏁/鎻"lock, fetter, chain." Mansvelt Beck, in a paper presented to 
the Conference on State and Ideology in Early Imperial China, University of 
Leiden, September 1975, suggests (at 16) reading duo 鐸 "a bell" for hua; this 
makes better sense than the other readings, and I follow it. 
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This sort of thing is utterly useless, yet you people fail to recognise 
the fact. That fellow Gan Ji is already numbered among the dead; 
don't waste any more paper or ink upon him." 
 Then Sun Ce made haste to cut off Gan Ji's head and had it hung 
up in the market place. All the people who had served him, [205] 
however, still refused to believe that Gan Ji was really dead. They 
said he had done no more than leave his body, and they continued to 
offer sacrifices to him in the hope of good fortune. 
The second story quoted by Pei Songzhi comes from Soushen ji, and is 
preliminary to the tale of the mirror haunting which we have already 
considered. According to this account, Sun Ce was preparing to make a 
surprise attack upon Cao Cao's capital at Xu, taking advantage of Cao 
Cao's preoccupation with his defence against Yuan Shao, and intending to 
seize the person of Emperor Xian. By this means, Sun Ce hoped to play 
the same role as Cao Cao had hitherto: with the emperor under his 
"protection" he could seek to command the empire, and could label 
anyone who opposed him as a rebel. Soushen ji, however, tells us that 
there was a drought at this time, and Sun Ce's transport barges were 
stranded and could not get through. Sun Ce sought to encourage his men 
to work on the problem, but became furious when he found that many of 
them were more concerned to gather about Gan Ji, who had accompanied 
the army, than to attend to his own plan of campaign. He had Gan Ji 
arrested, tied him down exposed on the ground, and swore that he would 
be let go only if he persuaded Heaven to send down rain. 
 And indeed, suddenly clouds gathered and it began to rain, and the 
rivers and streams were full to overflowing. 
 Unfortunately, however, Sun Ce's officers and men showed their 
delight too well: sure that Gan Ji would now be pardoned, they gathered 
to offer him congratulations. Sun Ce was embarrassed and offended by 
this challenge to his authority and discipline, and he had Gan Ji killed. 
Sad and miserable, the officers and soldiers took Gan Ji's body and 
laid it away. That night a sudden mist arose and covered the corpse. 
Next day, they went to look, but could no longer find it.89[206] 
As Pei Songzhi remarks, it is impossible to reconcile the details of these 
two stories. Pei Songzhi also cites a comment by the scholar Yu Xi of the 
Jin dynasty, writing in a work entitled Zhi lin, "The Forest of Records," 
who refers to the connection of Gan Ji with the discovery and 
                                               
89 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1110-11 PC note 1 quoting Soushen ji. 
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presentation of the Taiping jing manuscript in the time of Emperor Shun, 
and who argues that a man of such seniority as Gan Ji should have been 
treated only with respect by Sun Ce. Yu Xi raises some other points, in 
particular that Zhang Jin, the Inspector of Jiao province said to have been 
criticised by Sun Ce, was not appointed to that position until after Sun Ce 
was dead. Pei Songzhi agrees, observing that Zhang Jin was still in Jiao 
province in 201, so on that point, at least, the account of the death of Gan 
Ji in Soushen ji is mistaken.90 
 If one can find any common ground between the stories, it is the 
sense of insulted dignity Sun Ce displayed, and which gave him the 
motive to eliminate Gan Ji as a rival to his authority. There is another 
tale, curiously similar, which offers the same message. Wu lu, again 
quoted by Pei Songzhi,91 tells how Sun Ce went to call [207] upon the 
scholar Gao Dai, a man who came originally from Wu commandery but 
who lived as a hermit in Yuyao county in Kuaiji, and who was celebrated 
for his knowledge of Zuo zhuan. Sun Ce took an interest in that work, 
and was anxious to discuss it with him. Some unkind person, however, 
advised Gao Dai that Sun Ce was young and arrogant and hated to be 
contradicted: Gao Dai's best policy, therefore, was to agree with 
everything he said. Then Sun Ce was told that Gao Dai despised 
amateurs, so he had no real interest in the discussion: he would pretend to 
accept what Sun Ce said and would make no attempt at debate; Sun Ce's 
opinions were simply not worth arguing with. 
                                               
90 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1110 PC note 1 quoting Zhi lin. As evidence, Yu Xi quotes a letter 
written by the contemporary Xiahou Dun 夏侯惇 (biography in SGZ 9:267-68; here 
called by his style Yuanrang 元讓) to a certain Shi Weize 石威則 (Weize was 
probably the man's style, but nothing more is known of him). In that letter Xiahou 
Dun refers to Zhang Jin holding office in Lingling and Guiyang commanderies 
after the defeat of Yuan Shao at Guandu; which event took place in the winter of 
200, while Sun Ce had died in the fourth month. Yu Xi argues, very reasonably, 
that Sun Ce could not have made any comment about the unfortunate policies and 
inevitable death of Zhang Jin in Jiao province. 
  Pei Songzhi gives his own endorsement of Yu Xi's remarks, adding that Jiao-
Guang erzhou chunqiu, a work presented to the court of Jin by the local official 
Wang Fan in 287, referred to Zhang Jin as Governor of Jiao province in 201. The 
career of Zhang Jin is discussed in Chapter Five at 348 and note 94. There seems 
no doubt that the reference to him in the story of the quarrel of Sun Ce with Gan Ji 
is an anachronism. 
91 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1109 PC note 1 quoting Wu lu. 
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 The conversation went just as badly as that: Sun Ce was furious with 
what he perceived to be Gao Dai's contempt for him and he had Gao Dai 
arrested. Gao Dai was regarded with great respect, both as a scholar and 
as man of honour, and great numbers of people came and sat outside Sun 
Ce's headquarters to beg mercy for him. Still more infuriated by this 
public display of opposition, Sun Ce had Gao Dai executed. 
 From the evidence we have, Sun Ce was an orthodox, not 
particularly superstitious, Confucianist, and he certainly had scholarly 
friends whom he respected. The approach to Gao Dai obviously went 
very wrong, and one might wonder who it was that played the role of 
Iago so effectively. Once again, however, we are shown another 
characteristic: Sun Ce was intensely sensitive about his authority and 
dignity, and he was jealous of others who appeared to have a following, 
even if based upon other grounds, which might rival his own. If we can 
accept the stories, Gan Ji and Gao Dai were both victims of this trait, but 
one should be careful of accepting any of these tales as they stand.92[208] 
 One further issue must be considered, and that is the question of Sun 
Ce's abortive attack against Cao Cao. Soushen ji has this as the occasion 
for the death of Gan Ji, and the main text of Sanguo zhi also says that Sun 
                                               
92 There is another story on this theme, describing an exceptionally successful 
intervention against Sun Ce's hot-headed indignation. 
  SGZ 50/Wu 5:1196 PC note 1 quoting Kuaiji dianlu, tells how Wei Teng of 
Kuaiji, who was Officer of Merit in the commandery responsible for appointments 
and recommendations for office, had opposed Sun Ce on some matter, and Sun Ce 
was angry and intended to kill him. 
  Other appeals had proven fruitless, but then Sun Ce's mother, the Lady Wu, 
stood by the side of a deep well, and said to him, "You are building a position at 
the south of the Yangzi, and the work is not yet done. This is the very time you 
should treat your worthy men well and be courteous to your officers, passing over 
their faults and thinking only of their good work. Officer Wei was simply doing his 
duty. If you kill him today, everyone will turn from you tomorrow. Rather than see 
such disaster come upon us, I would jump into this well." 
  Sun Ce was alarmed and most impressed, and he immediately let Wei Teng go 
free. (See also ZZTJ 63:2022; deC, Establish Peace, 266.) 
  Considering that the situation with regard to Gan Ji was very likely more 
dangerous than that involving Wei Teng, one might wonder why Sun Ce paid 
attention to his mother on that occasion and not on the later one: perhaps he had 
become a little older and more opinionated; or perhaps the whole cycle of stories is 
a medley of variants around a general theme, with only marginal relationship to 
ascertainable fact. 
  Romance chapter 29 has made an imaginative reconstruction of the whole 
incident concerning the killing of Gan Ji and the death of Sun Ce. 
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Ce was planning a northern expedition, but died before he could set out. 
The commentary of Pei Songzhi quotes from Jiuzhou chunqiu "Spring 
and Autumn Annals of the Nine Provinces" ascribed to the historian Sima 
Biao of the third century, and Pei Songzhi, in a note of his own, refers in 
addition to the Fuzi book of Fu Xuan of the third century.93 These latter 
two works, however, suggest that Sun Ce was making his plans while 
Cao Cao was engaged not against Yuan Shao at Guandu but against the 
Wuhuan in the region of Liucheng, towards present-day Manchuria. That 
campaign, however, took place in 207, long [209] after Sun Ce's death.94 
Though Pei Songzhi observes the error, and duly discounts the authority 
of these sources, he is yet prepared to accept the idea that Sun Ce might 
have had some coup in his mind just before he died. 
 The commentary, however, also quotes the third century scholar Sun 
Sheng, who points out a number of errors in the sources, but argues, more 
practically, that Sun Ce was in no good position to embark upon any such 
ambitious program as the kidnap of the emperor of Han. He had authority 
in six commanderies, but there were still Huang Zu and Liu Biao on his 
western flank, there were independent groups which had not yet been 
brought to full submission, and we are told specifically that the 
Administrator of Guangling, Chen Deng, was in the process of forging a 
new local coalition against him. It was hardly a good occasion to march 
the bulk of his forces away to the north on an expedition which might 
well turn into a wild goose chase. 
 Pei Songzhi, while agreeing with many of Sun Sheng's comments, 
suggests that Sun Ce could have hoped to deal promptly with Chen Deng 
and then march swiftly towards Xu city. He goes on to say, 
If Sun Ce had gained [the person of the emperor], great power was 
within his grasp, and any place between the Huai and Si rivers could 
have been taken for his capital. Why should he limit his ambitions to 
the lands south of the Yangzi? He could have swung the whole 
balance of the empire to the region of the southeast! 
This, however, is an argument difficult to accept, and once it is rejected 
in this form, then one may see why it is in fact most improbable that Sun 
Ce had any serious intention of attacking Xu and seizing the 
emperor.[210] 
                                               
93 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1109. The commentary of Pei Songzhi, and the works which he 
quotes are in SGZ 46/Wu 1:1111-12 PC note 2. 
94 On this campaign, see Chapter Four and deC, Northern Frontier, 407-413. 
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 The point is that Sun Ce had no higher status in the empire than that 
of a petty warlord who controlled part of a province. Men of accepted 
family, such as Cao Cao, Yuan Shao and Liu Biao, could hope to make 
use of the emperor as a means of giving authority to their policies, for 
they were of sufficient rank to make the relation a conceivable one. In 
earlier years, Dong Zhuo's control of the court had not prevented "loyal 
rebels" from rising against him, and his successors at Chang'an never 
received general acceptance. Even more notably, when Sun Ce's late 
master Yuan Shu assumed the imperial title, the contrast between his 
status in the empire and his extraordinary claim brought disaster very 
quickly. 
 So even if Sun Ce had obtained the person of Emperor Xian and 
brought him back to the south, it is in the highest degree unlikely that he 
would have held any sway over his rivals by means of his hostage. Far 
more probably, he would have brought an alliance against himself of the 
victor of the struggle between Cao Cao and Yuan Shao, combined with 
Liu Biao, and aided by fifth-column rebels in his own territory. He would 
have been immediately charged with lese-majesty, profaning the sacred 
person of the sovereign, and he would have been treated as an outlaw. Far 
from enhancing his position, possession of the emperor would have 
brought Sun Ce into immediate fierce conflict with every notable 
commander in the land. 
 If Sun Ce had been planning such a coup, it is fortunate for the 
fortunes of his house that he died before he could attempt to put it into 
effect. More probably, despite the tales and the comments which surround 
that putative project, Sun Ce made the same calculations and never 
contemplated anything so grandiose. He may have been considering 
some minor expedition to the north, primarily to deal with Chen Deng 
and to seek once again to persuade Cao Cao not to interfere, directly or 
through agents, with his territory south of the Yangzi. At the time of his 
death, however, Sun Ce had comfortable [211] control of a coherent 
though limited territory. This in itself was a remarkable achievement in 
the chaos of civil war, and it seems fair to credit him with the sense to 
appreciate the dangers of sudden, inappropriate ambition.95 
                                               
95 It must be noted, however, that the biography of Cao Cao, at SGZ 1:20, says that 
Sun Ce had such an intention, interrupted only by his death, while the biography of 
Cao Cao's adviser Guo Jia, in SGZ 14:433, has a further story. 
  According to this latter text, Cao Cao's other officers were worried about the 
possibility of a surprise attack by Sun Ce, but Guo Jia said, "Sun Ce is not a 
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 It is remarkable how the death of Sun Ce attracted such a variety of 
anecdotes, with references and allusions to subjects as diverse as Cao 
Cao and Taiping jing, but we can make no proper judgement of which 
tales may be accepted, and to what degree. Discounting all the 
embellishments, however, we are left with a man who was wounded 
[212] to the point of death, and Sanguo zhi has an account of his spoken 
testament, as witnessed by his senior advisers: 
Sun Ce's wound was very bad, and he called in Zhang Zhao and 
others and said, "Now China Proper is in confusion. With the 
resources of Wu and Yue, and the security of the Yangzi, we have 
enough to [keep aloof and] look on while others are fighting. Do you 
all try your best to aid my younger brother." 
 Then he called Sun Quan, fastened the seal and ribbon to his 
belt, and said to him, "To raise the forces east of the Yangzi, to 
decide the opportunities between two battle lines, and to fight for 
supremacy in the empire: for that, you are not my equal. To raise the 
worthy and grant office to able men, so that each gives all his effort 
to hold the lands of the east: in that I am not equal to you." 
 That night, Sun Ce died.96 
                                                                                                                   
serious person, and he does not make proper plans... I can foresee surely that he 
will be killed by some common fellow." And so indeed it turned out. 
  The commentary which follows, however, quotes from the book Fuzi, which 
has Guo Jia giving similar advice about a comparable threat from Liu Bei, who 
was acting in support of Yuan Shao and who was threatening Cao Cao on another 
front. As Pei Songzhi remarks, Cao Cao's biography in SGZ 1:18 implies that Cao 
Cao thought for himself that he had time to deal with Liu Bei before Yuan Shao 
could make a move, and Guo Jia is recorded only as expressing agreement on the 
question, not as initiating the plan. Pei Songzhi goes on to comment on the 
remarkable and perhaps excessive accuracy of Guo Jia's prediction, not only that 
Sun Ce would be assassinated, but that it would happen before he could plan a 
move against the north. 
  This all seems too clairvoyant to be credible, and the anecdote concerning Sun 
Ce may better be regarded as a formulaic story to enhance Guo Jia's reputation for 
percipience, rather than as a source of historical fact. 
  It is by no means impossible, of course, that there was concern in Cao Cao's 
camp lest Sun Ce should attack: in the short term it could have been embarrassing 
and highly dangerous for Cao Cao's position at the critical moment when he was 
dealing with Yuan Shao. But possibility, concern and even threat cannot be taken 
as firm evidence that Sun Ce was really intending such a dramatic move. 
96 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1109. 
  
 
 
 
Map 7: Jing province at the time of the Red Cliffs campaign
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Introductory summary: 
Sun Quan, second son of Sun Jian and younger brother of Sun Ce, 
succeeded to his brother's position in 200, at the age of eighteen. Despite 
his youth, he was the senior male of the Sun family, and he was 
recognised and accepted by the commanders who had followed Sun Ce. 
 Following a period of consolidation, the Sun group renewed the 
attack up the Yangzi towards Jing province, and at the beginning of 208 
their army defeated and destroyed Liu Biao's general Huang Zu in battle 
at the mouth of the Han River by present-day Wuhan. 
 During this period, however, the warlord Cao Cao had established 
dominance in the north. He defeated his chief rival Yuan Shao at the 
battle of Guandu in 200, and in the following years he destroyed the Yuan 
clan and took control of the whole North China plain. In 208 he turned 
south against Jing province and the position of Liu Biao in the valley of 
the Han. About this time Liu Biao died, and Cao Cao received the 
surrender of his son and successor Liu Zong.[214] 
 Liu Biao's elder son Liu Qi, however, aided by the exiled warlord 
Liu Bei, sought to oppose this takeover. Defeated by Cao Cao, they came 
south to the Yangzi and sought the aid of the Sun group. Sun Quan sent 
an army to the west, commanded by Zhou Yu, and the allied forces faced 
the fleet and army of Cao Cao at the Red Cliffs, upstream from present-
day Wuhan. After a short period of manoeuvring, an attack by fireships 
destroyed Cao Cao's fleet and compelled him to withdraw. 
                                               
*  In the first edition of Generals of the South, published in 1990, Chapter Four 
occupied pages 213 to 286. The original pagination is indicated with brackets []; 
indexing and cross-references refer to those pages. 
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The succession to Sun Ce: 
When Sun Ce died in the summer of the year 200, Sun Quan, born in 
182, was some eighteen years old by Western reckoning.1 For the past 
two or three years, he had been treated with courtesy and respect by his 
elder brother, associates and allies, and the formal records indicate that he 
had been prepared to take over power and that the transfer took place 
without great difficulty. 
 To some degree, this must have been true, and it reflects well upon 
the coherence of Sun Ce's party and the loyalty of his followers that his 
sudden death was not succeeded by a total collapse of order and the 
outbreak of mutinies, separatist rebellion and succession struggles. Other 
warlord states of that time were quite unable to cope with such a critical 
event as the death of the major leader. 
 It was, moreover, quite fortunate for Sun Quan personally that his 
brother died at the time he did. Sun Ce had been married only the year 
before, to a girl of the Qiao family of Lujiang, after his capture [215] of 
that commandery in 199.2 There was a son, Sun Shao, born of the 
marriage, but he was certainly no more than a few months old when his 
father died, and he may have been a posthumous child.3 There was no 
possibility that a small provincial state, literally fighting for its survival, 
could survive fifteen or more years of a minority rule; the successor to 
Sun Ce's power had to be a grown man. 
 Sun Shao, therefore, was not a serious rival to Sun Quan. Sun Yi, 
however, might have been. Third son of Sun Jian, also born of the Lady 
Wu, Sun Yi was the younger full brother of Sun Ce and Sun Quan.4 We 
are told in his biography in Sanguo zhi that he was energetic and out-
                                               
1 The biography of Sun Quan, "Ruler of Wu" 吳主 is in SGZ 47/Wu 2. At 1149 we 
are told that Sun Quan was seventy-one sui at the time of his death in 252, so he 
was born in 182, seven years after his elder brother Sun Ce. In 182, Sun Quan's 
father Sun Jian held the post of Assistant at Xiapi county: Chapter Two at 85-87 
and note 1 to Chapter Three. 
2 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1260. There were two daughters of the Qiao family, both celebrated 
for their beauty. Sun Ce had taken the elder for his wife, Zhou Yu the younger: 
below at 226. 
3 On Sun Shao, see SGZ 46/Wu 1:1112. 
  The commentary of Lu Bi notes (at JJ 36a-b) that Sun Ce evidently also left 
three daughters: one was married to Gu Shao (SGZ 52/Wu 7:1229); one to Zhu Ji 
(SGZ 56/Wu 11:1305); one Lu Xun (SGZ 58/Wu 13,1343). They must have been 
the offspring of concubines or more casual acquaintances. 
4 The biography of Sun Yi is in SGZ 51/Wu 6:1212. 
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going, more like Sun Ce than the somewhat reserved and perhaps more 
thoughtful Sun Quan. Dian lue, moreover, quoted in the Pei Songzhi 
commentary to that biography, says that when Sun Ce was on the point of 
death his counsellor Zhang Zhao and other advisers urged him to appoint 
Sun Yi, not Sun Quan, as his successor. Sun Ce, however, rejected this 
advice, and handed the seals and ribbons of his authority to Sun Quan. 
 Sun Yi would have been seventeen sui at that time, about sixteen 
years old by Western reckoning.5 In theory, at least, he had attained 
manhood, and he could have been acceptable as leader of [216] the forces 
of the Sun family. On the other hand, there is no question that such an 
appointment would have produced critical tensions between Sun Yi and 
Sun Quan, and would almost certainly have caused division. Most 
importantly, at that time it was Sun Quan who had been groomed for 
authority after Sun Ce, and Sun Yi had only just reached the age when he 
might have been able to gather support. 
 It is, in fact, difficult to believe that Zhang Zhao and his colleagues 
actually made such a suggestion. The consequences of a last-minute 
change would have been so obvious that no competent politician could 
have supported it,6 and if any such story, revealing the lack of confidence, 
had been current in the Sun camp, one must imagine that Sun Quan 
would have taken his revenge and demonstrated his authority. Instead, 
though it does not seem that Sun Quan had the same affection for Zhang 
Zhao as Sun Ce had shown, he appears always to have treated him with 
                                               
5 According to the biography, Sun Yi was twenty sui in 203: he was therefore born 
in 184. 
6 There are, in fact, two cases about this time when a younger brother was given the 
preference in succession to a warlord state: Yuan Shao handed power to his 
youngest son Yuan Shang in 202; and Liu Biao gave the succession to his younger 
son Liu Zong: 245 and 246 below. On the other hand, though Yuan Shao and Liu 
Biao had arranged the succession as they wished, they did so against the general 
advice of their senior counsellors, and the results, particularly in the case of the 
Yuan family, were most unfortunate. 
  Perhaps the best answer to such a proposal was that given by Jia Xu, adviser at 
the court of Wei at a time that Cao Cao considered the abilities of his third son Cao 
Zhi superior to those of his eldest son Cao Pi. Cao Cao asked him about the choice 
of succession, but Jia Xu at first made no reply. Cao Cao pressed him further, and 
then Jia Xu said, "I kept silent because I was thinking." Cao Cao asked him what 
he had been thinking about. Jia Xu replied, "I was thinking about Yuan Benchu 本
初 [Yuan Shao] and Liu Jingsheng 景升 [Liu Biao], and their sons." Cao Cao 
laughed, and took the point: SGZ 10:331; deC, Establish Peace, 513. 
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respect, and in the early years of his rule he entrusted Zhang Zhao with 
the most responsible positions of government.[217] 
 So it appears more probable that the story recorded in Dian lue 
reflects a piece of hostile propaganda, designed by outsiders to 
undermine Sun Quan's authority and his trust in his ministers. On the 
other hand, there may have been an element of truth in the possibilities 
for the future: had Sun Ce lived some years longer, he might have 
favoured Sun Yi and raised him to rival or even supplant Sun Quan. At 
the time he did die, however, Sun Quan was the only real candidate to 
succeed him. No other brother was old enough, and though there were 
several cousins of military age and experience, since the position of the 
Sun group in the south had been established by Sun Ce his personal 
authority could hardly have been claimed by a more distant 
relative.7[218] 
                                               
7 According to Wu shu, quoted in SGZ 57/Wu 12:1319 PC note 1, there was a short-
lived possibility that Sun Hao, a cousin of Sun Ce and Sun Quan, might claim the 
succession. [His personal name may also be also transcribed as Gao.] 
  Sun Hao was the elder son of Sun Jing, the youngest brother of Sun Jian who 
had accompanied him on his early campaigns, but then returned to the family 
home at Fuchun. When Sun Ce attacked Wang Lang in Kuaiji in 196, Sun Jing 
came to assist him with a force of household troops, but he went back to care for 
the family graves and other private property at Fuchun. He died there soon after 
Sun Quan's accession to power: SGZ 51/Wu 6:1205. 
  According to Wu shu, Sun Hao at that time held appointment as General of the 
Household Who Settles Firmness, and was camped at Wucheng (the site of the 
marquisate which had earlier been awarded to Sun Jian), some fifty kilometres 
north of present-day Hangzhou. Though he came from a junior lineage, he is said 
to have been older than Sun Ce (being his elder cousin 從兄 congxiong), and was 
thus certainly older than Sun Quan. 
  At this time, apparently, he thought of making an attempt to take over the 
government of Kuaiji commandery, and with the troops under his command, from 
a base close to that territory, it may not have seemed an impossible coup. Yu Fan, 
however, old associate of Sun Ce, was magistrate of Fuchun county. He was sent 
as messenger to Sun Hao, warning that the local government offices in all the 
counties would remain loyal to Sun Quan and resist any move against him. The 
threat was effective, and Sun Hao abandoned his plan. 
  Though his brothers held office under Sun Quan, and his sons played a role in 
the later history of the state, Sun Hao does not appear to have a further official 
career. Unlike other members of the clan, he has no individual biography in SGZ 
51/Wu 6. 
  This eclipse of Sun Hao appears to confirm, by negative example, that Sun 
Quan's brother Sun Yi never came forward as a serious rival to power. Had he done 
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 Given that Sun Quan was the recognised and logical heir to his elder 
brother, he was again fortunate in the support that he received from the 
core of senior officials who had served Sun Ce. Among them, the most 
important civilians were Zhang Zhao, Lü Fan and, a little later, Zhang 
Hong. The chief military men at headquarters were Cheng Pu and the 
famous Zhou Yu. 
 Zhang Zhao, then in his middle forties, was a man from Pengcheng 
in Xu province, the region about present-day Xuzhou in north-western 
Jiangsu. A distinguished Confucian scholar, with particular knowledge of 
the Zuo zhuan, he was regarded with respect in the empire at large. Even 
as a young man he was recommended for office in the imperial civil 
service on several occasions, but he refused to accept.8 
 In 193, when Cao Cao attacked Tao Qian in Xu province, great 
numbers of people fled south from the fighting, and it was probably at 
this time that Zhang Zhao moved to Yang province. In 195, when Sun Ce 
was beginning his campaigns south of the Yangzi, he met Zhang Zhao 
and appointed him as Chief Clerk, the officer in change of administration 
under a general.9 Zhang Zhao was at that time about forty years old. He 
was also given title as a Colonel, and later General of the Household 
Who [219] Supports the Army, though the appointments did not 
necessarily imply command of troops in the field. He was primarily a 
civilian administrator.10 
 According to Zhang Zhao's biography in Sanguo zhi, he was 
appointed by Sun Ce almost as regent for Sun Quan,11 and he certainly 
                                                                                                                   
so, it is unlikely that he would have been granted the important position of 
Administrator of Danyang: see above and below. 
8 The biography of Zhang Zhao is in SGZ 52/Wu 7:1219-23. 
  We are told that he was equally celebrated as a scholar with Wang Lang, the 
Administrator of Kuaiji defeated by Sun Ce in 196 (Chapter Two at 169-170), and 
with Zhao Yu, the Administrator of Guangling killed by Zhai Rong about 195 (note 
22 to Chapter Three), and he was friends with both of them. 
9 On this position under the Later Han system, see HHS114/24:3564 and 
Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 121-124. 
10 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1221 PC note 2 quoting Wu shu, records that Zhang Zhao did 
command forces in the field in the time of Sun Quan, attacking rebels in Yuzhang 
commandery and taking part in the campaign against Hefei in 208: SGZ 47/Wu 
2:1118.  also the comments of Lu Bi in SGZJJ 7:17a, and SGZJJ 22:19a. 
11 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1221 PC note 1 quoting Wu li, says Sun Ce told Zhang Zhao that, 
should Sun Quan fail to govern well he should consider himself entitled to take 
over from him, or simply return to his home at Pengcheng. 
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acted as head of the administration in the first days after Sun Ce's death. 
In an anecdote with appropriate moral flavour, we are told that Sun Quan 
was so distracted by grief for the death of his brother that he failed to 
attend to affairs; it was Zhang Zhao who called him to his proper 
responsibilities, arguing that his true duty to Sun Ce was to carry on the 
great work, not to sit in useless mourning. Then Zhang Zhao arranged for 
Sun Quan to hold a review of troops and show himself to the people as 
their new ruler. Zhang Zhao continued to act as Chief Clerk in Sun 
Quan's military government. 
 Lü Fan was a man from Runan commandery who had met Sun Ce 
when they were both at Shouchun with Yuan Shu. He joined Sun Ce with 
a hundred men of his own, and he went to Jiangdu in Xu province to 
bring back Sun Ce's mother the Lady Wu, and other members of the 
family.12 He accompanied Sun Ce to the conquest [220] of Danyang and 
Wu commanderies, and he held administrative and command positions in 
various newly-occupied counties. He commanded the expedition which 
drove away Cao Cao's agent Chen Yu,13 and he took part in the attacks to 
the west, against Zu Lang, Taishi Ci, Huang Zu and the settlements in 
Poyang. 
 Lü Fan, then, was one of Sun Ce's oldest associates. A handsome 
man of good family, he had a taste for extravagance and a flair for fine 
clothing and adornment. Apart from military operations, however, he had 
considerable ability in practical administration: most notably, when Sun 
Ce first came to the territory south of the Yangzi, Lü Fan had insisted on 
taking the low-ranking post of Chief Controller (here signifying the 
position of an adjutant), in order to set up a proper internal administration 
and discipline for the army.14 He was also responsible for the finances of 
the enterprise, and he maintained strict control over the young Sun Quan, 
then Prefect of Yangxian. Sun Quan once or twice attempted to extract 
extra funds for his own purposes, but Lü Fan kept a careful account. One 
of Sun Quan's assistants, Zhou Gu, was always prepared to juggle the 
                                                                                                                   
  It is difficult to believe, however, that Sun Ce was quite so pessimistic of his 
brother's abilities. Moreover, the tale has a suspicious similarity to the saying 
ascribed to Liu Bei, speaking on his deathbed to his great minister Zhuge Liang, 
perhaps with more justification for doubts, about his son Liu Shan: SGZ 35/Shu 
5:918. 
12  Chapter Three at 152-153. 
13  Chapter Three at 179. 
14  Chapter Three at 166. 
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books and Sun Quan was suitably grateful at the time; later, however, 
when he came to power, it was Lü Fan that he trusted, and Zhou Gu 
gained no advancement. 
 The other major civilian officer in the new regime was Zhang Hong, 
who had come to Sun Quan's service by a somewhat roundabout route. 
Zhang Hong was also an old acquaintance of Sun Ce: it was Zhang Hong 
to whom Sun Ce had entrusted his mother and brothers for safekeeping in 
Jiangdu at the time he first went to join Yuan Shu in 193. Later, he was 
with Sun Ce in the early campaigns south of the Yangzi, and he acted as 
the direct colleague of Zhang Zhao: according to Wu shu, they were 
jointly in charge of [221] administration, one of them being always at 
base and the other in the field with Sun Ce.15 
 In 199, however, Sun Ce sent Zhang Hong as his envoy to the 
imperial court at Xu under the control of Cao Cao. Zhang Hong was also 
a respected scholar. He had studied at the Imperial University in 
Luoyang, and he was widely read in the Confucian classics.16 He wrote 
poetry, rhapsodies and essay compositions, and was admired for his fine 
calligraphy. As a result, he was well received at court, became a close 
friend of the distinguished scholar Kong Rong, and was appointed by 
Cao Cao as Attendant Imperial Clerk, an office of the censorate. 
According to Wu shu, it was as a result of Zhang Hong's praise that Cao 
Cao gave Sun Ce recognition as an allied general and enfeoffment as 
Marquis of Wu.17 
 The position of Zhang Hong at the court in Xu was a delicate one. 
Formally speaking, he was a subject of the house of Han, and as a loyal 
officer of the imperial government he could serve the provincial 
commander Sun Ce or could take a post at the capital. In practical terms, 
however, any position which he took at Xu was held under the aegis of 
Cao Cao; while at the same time he still recognised a loyalty to Sun Ce, 
on whose behalf he had come to the capital in the first place. So there 
was always the possibility of divided loyalties and personal compromise, 
                                               
15 On the earlier association between Zhang Hong and Sun Ce, see Chapter Three at 
153. 
16 Zhang Hong had first gone to Luoyang and studied the Classic of History and the 
Classic of Changes according to Jing Fang's interpretation, a somewhat mystical 
school of criticism which dated from the first century BC and was popular at this 
time. He then went to a private academy and studied the Han version of the Classic 
of Poetry, the Li ji, and the Spring and Autumn Annals with the Zuo Chronicle. 
17 SGZ 53/Wu 8:1244 PC note 1 quoting Wu shu. 
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and one of the problems for a man in Zhang Hong's position was that he 
might end suspected and distrusted by both parties he sought to 
serve.[222] 
 We are told that Cao Cao intended to appoint Zhang Hong as 
Administrator of Jiujiang: by this means he would be arranging for him 
to return to the south, governing a territory in the immediate vicinity of 
that controlled by Sun Ce, but holding the commission to do so from Cao 
Cao. Zhang Hong, however, recognised the trap, and excused himself, 
very firmly, on the grounds of ill health. 
 A few months later, however, Sun Ce was dead and Sun Quan had 
succeeded him. According to Sanguo zhi, Cao Cao had it in mind to make 
an attack on the Sun group and take advantage of the uncertainty which 
accompanied the transfer of power. In fact, since Cao Cao was at that 
time committed to the campaign against Yuan Shao, which was not 
resolved until the decisive engagement at Guandu in the winter at the end 
of 200, it is most unlikely he was in position to plan a major campaign to 
the southeast at that time: in many respects, this is the other side of the 
false coin whose other side tells of Sun Ce's plan to attack Xu and seize 
the emperor.18 It is said that Zhang Hong dissuaded Cao Cao from the 
plan, on the grounds that it would be ungentlemanly and impolitic to 
appear to take advantage of another's period of mourning, but his 
arguments may not have been needed.19 
 It was very likely with Zhang Hong's encouragement, however, that 
Cao Cao did instead confirm with Sun Quan the alliance he had formerly 
established with Sun Ce. By authority of the Han government, Sun Quan 
was appointed General Who Exterminates the Caitiffs and Administrator 
of Kuaiji: apart from the slight [223] change of title of the generalship, 
these were the same two positions as Sun Ce had held. Moreover, Zhang 
Hong was released from his position at Xu and was sent to become 
Commandant of the Eastern Division of Kuaiji. 
 Formally speaking, this appointment made Zhang Hong the direct 
subordinate of Sun Quan in the local government of the commandery, but 
                                               
18 Chapter Three at 205 and 208-211. 
19 SGZ 53/Wu 8:1244. 
  It is possible that Cao Cao contemplated an attack early in 201, after his victory 
at Guandu, but this too is unlikely: he would hardly have wished to commit 
himself so quickly to the opposite direction, and Sun Quan by that time had been 
in his new position for eight or nine months, long enough to confirm a reasonable 
authority. 
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since Sun Quan's actual headquarters were close to the southern bank of 
the Yangzi, there must at first have been an element of uncertainty about 
his status and his proper duties. There were evidently some advisers in 
the new government of Sun Quan who were suspicious of Zhang Hong 
on account of his service with the court at Xu, for although he had been 
absent for only eighteen months, his former association had been 
primarily with Sun Ce, and he need hold no particular loyalty to Sun 
Quan. We are told that Cao Cao expected him to keep an eye on Sun 
Quan, and also that the Lady Wu, Sun Quan's mother, hoped he that 
would exercise some supervision from her perspective. With this 
background, the initial relations between Sun Quan and Zhang Hong 
cannot have been easy. 
 When he arrived, Zhang Hong was suitably cautious. He worked 
closely with his old colleague Zhang Zhao, but restricted himself chiefly 
to drafting official documents and policy proposals, and he did not seek 
an active part in the administration. He also took the time to prepare a 
special history and eulogy of the achievements of Sun Jian and Sun Ce, 
which he presented to Sun Quan.20 Sun Quan was touched by this mark of 
scholarly piety, and he accepted the loyalty of Zhang Hong to the Sun 
family, but one imagines that he still felt unhappy about the tutelage. 
 In 202, two years after his accession, when Sun Quan was twenty, 
the Lady Wu his mother died, and he freed himself from [224] Zhang 
Hong's immediate services.21 Zhang Hong was ordered to travel to his 
                                               
20 It is my suggestion that this pair of biographies provided the basic material for the 
accounts of Sun Jian and Sun Ce which are now preserved in the main text of SGZ 
46/Wu 1: Chapter Nine at 548-549. 
21 The biography of the Lady Wu, SGZ 50/Wu 5:1196 says that she died in 202. SGZ 
47/Wu 2:1116 agrees, and I have followed their statements. The Zhi lin of Yu Xi, 
however, quoted in PC note 2 to the former passage, argues that there was a hiatus 
in the tax returns from Kuaiji commandery in the years 207 and 208, and attributes 
this to the mourning for the death of the Lady Wu. The argument appears to be 
accepted by ZZTJ 54:2074; deC, Establish Peace, 362. 
  The position of Zhang Hong, as former officer at the court controlled by Cao 
Cao, may have been put in further doubt at this time by pressure from Cao Cao 
against the independence of Sun Quan. 
  According to Jiangbiao zhuan, quoted in SGZ 54/Wu 9:1260-61 PC note 1, in 
202 Cao Cao sought to confirm the subordinate position of Sun Quan by 
requesting he send hostages to court. The ministers in council were uncertain and 
could not decide, but Zhou Yu went with Sun Quan to the Lady Wu, and argued 
that he should maintain the option of independence, and that it would be foolish for 
him at this time to commit himself so thoroughly to Cao Cao's domination. The 
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local command, south of Hangzhou Bay about present-day Ningbo, and 
he remained there for the next several years. In 207, when Sun Quan was 
preparing a campaign of expansion [225] westwards up the Yangzi, 
Zhang Hong was recalled to his old duties, as under Sun Ce, in charge of 
the base while the main army was on active service. In 209, he succeeded 
Zhang Zhao as Chief Clerk to Sun Quan, and from that time, until his 
death in 212, at the age of sixty, he continued as a leading counsellor. 
 Zhang Hong was a respected figure at Sun Quan's court, and his 
talents were too considerable to be disregarded. On the other hand, Sun 
Quan's dispatch of him to Kuaiji was very probably intended as a 
demonstration of his personal authority, and Zhang Hong's return to the 
central government in 207 was arranged only when there was need for his 
services and when it was clear that he would now be regarded as Sun 
Quan's own appointee. Jiangbiao zhuan notes that Sun Quan would 
address all his officers by their intimate personal names, or "style," save 
only Zhang Zhao, whom he always called "Lord Zhang," and Zhang 
Hong, whom he called Dongbu, "Eastern Division," in reference to his 
official post in Kuaiji. Certainly this was a mark of distinction and 
perhaps, as Jiangbiao zhuan suggests, of courtesy; but it may also have 
served as a reminder that Zhang Hong's rightful position was in that 
distant frontier region.22 
                                                                                                                   
Lady Wu agreed, and said to Sun Quan, "Gongjin's advice is right [Gongjin 公瑾 
was the style of Zhou Yu]. Gongjin and Bofu 伯符 [Sun Ce] were the same age in 
years, though Gongjin was older by a month. I look upon Gongjin as a son; you 
should serve him as an elder brother." So they sent no hostages. 
  This story is confused, however, by reference to the request that Sun Quan 
should send a son as hostage: Sun Quan's eldest known son, Sun Deng, was born 
only in 209, and Sun Quan, then age twenty, was hardly old enough to have a son 
suitable for sending to the north. On the other hand, since the Lady Wu died in 
202, or possibly in 207, and Zhou Yu died in 210, it is difficult to tell when a 
debate on this topic could have taken place. 
  All in all, it is difficult to judge whether Cao Cao did ask Sun Quan for 
hostages in 202, and if he did, what hostages he asked for. It was not an 
unreasonable proposal, but Sun Quan suffered no immediate threat for his failure 
to agree. About this time Cao Cao occasionally contemplated a full attempt to 
bring the south under his control, but for the next several years the opportunities 
which were opened up by his victory at Guandu and the subsequent death of Yuan 
Shao kept him thoroughly engaged in the north. 
22 SGZ 53/Wu 8:1244 PC note 2 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. The term "style" here 
renders the character 字, being the intimate personal name; the characters for the 
special terms of address for Zhang Zhao are 張公, and for Zhang Hong 東部. 
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 Among the military men in the new government, the majority had 
come to prominence in the time of Sun Ce, though a few, such as Cheng 
Pu, Huang Gai and Han Dang, had served under Sun Jian ten or even 
twenty years earlier, and Zhou Tai, who originally joined Sun Ce from 
Jiujiang commandery, later transferred to Sun Quan's personal service.23 
For those who had served directly under Sun Ce, the transfer of power to 
Sun Quan was accepted as inevitable and necessary. According to the 
biography of the general Dong Xi in [226] Sanguo zhi, the Lady Wu 
asked various advisers their opinion of Sun Quan's expectations, and 
Dong Xi replied: 
The lands east of the Yangzi have the security of mountains and 
rivers, and His Excellency [Sun Ce the General] Who Exterminates 
the Rebels has granted grace and favour to the people. 
 [Sun Quan the General] Who Exterminates the Caitiffs succeeds 
to this foundation, and all obey his orders. If Zhang Zhao attends to 
civil affairs, and we others act as the claws and teeth, then the land 
and the people will aid and support us. There is nothing to worry 
about.24 
And to confirm such words as these, Cheng Pu, doyen of the 
commanders loyal to the Sun family, led an army through three 
commanderies (presumably Danyang, Wu and Kuaiji) in a show of 
strength and solidarity for the new administration, and he investigated 
and punished any officers whose loyalty was open to question. Cheng Pu, 
who came originally from Youbeiping commandery, in the north of the 
empire east of present-day Beijing, had served with Sun Jian since the 
time of the Yellow Turban rebellion in 184 and had joined Sun Ce at the 
very beginning of his career, before he began his conquest of the territory 
south of the Yangzi. He was highly respected, and his support was 
valuable. 
 In romance, however, and perhaps also in reality, the leading figure 
of the time was the celebrated Zhou Yu, boyhood friend of Sun Ce and 
later his most trusted associate. 
 Despite their long acquaintance and close affection, for most of the 
past five years Zhou Yu and Sun Ce had not been often in one another's 
company. Zhou Yu joined Sun Ce at the time he crossed the Yangzi in 
                                               
23 On Cheng Pu, Huang Gai and Han Dang, see note 9 to Chapter Three. The 
biography of Zhou Tai is in SGZ 56/Wu 10:1287-88. 
24 From the biography of Dong Xi, SGZ 55/Wu 10:1290-91 at 1291. 
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195, but after the defeat of Liu Yao, when Sun Ce turned against Wu and 
Kuaiji at the beginning of 196 he left Zhou Yu in charge of Danyang, and 
some time [227] after that Zhou Yu was called back to Yuan Shu at 
Shouchun. In 198, he left Yuan Shu and returned to join Sun Ce, but his 
first appointments were again in Danyang, on the bank of the Yangzi 
facing the territory still held by Yuan Shu in Jiujiang and Lujiang 
commanderies. 
 In 199, when Sun Ce was planning his attack up the Yangzi towards 
Jing province, he called for Zhou Yu, gave him the ambitious title of 
Administrator of Jiangxia, the commandery he intended to conquer, and 
also appointed him Protector of the Army at the Centre. The title 
Protector of the Army had been used in the Qin and Han dynasties, 
though with somewhat varying significance; on occasion it designated an 
officer responsible for military discipline.25 For Zhou Yu, it seems to have 
marked him as chief of staff, responsible for military administration in 
parallel with the Chief Clerk Zhang Zhao, who was in charge of civil 
affairs. Zhou Yu also commanded troops in the field, for he is mentioned 
as one of the divisional commanders against Huang Zu in 199, but it 
seems clear that Sun Ce regarded him as his right-hand man and gave 
him priority over his other commanders. 
 So he accompanied Sun Ce to the attack on Lujiang commandery 
and the capture of Huan city, and it was on that occasion Sun Ce took to 
wife the elder daughter of the Qiao family. Zhou Yu, for his part, married 
the younger daughter, and so was now related, at least indirectly, to Sun 
Ce. It is said that Sun Ce joked with Zhou Yu, "The two Qiao girls may 
be exiles, but now they have us for their husbands, they have all they 
need to make them happy." 
 Early in 200, after the defeat of Huang Zu and the take-over of 
Yuzhang commandery, Sun Ce left Zhou Yu at Baqiu, a city on the Gan 
River southwest of Nanchang and the Poyang marshes: from [228] that 
base he could provide a military reserve for control of the new and 
expected conquests in that region. 
 A few weeks later, however, Sun Ce was dead. While his colleagues 
Sun Fu and Sun Ben held the region of Yuzhang, Zhou Yu brought his 
troops back to Wu commandery. He attended Sun Ce's funeral ceremony, 
and then remained at headquarters, taking his former title as Protector of 
                                               
25 See, for example, deC, "Inspection and Surveillance," 62 note 46. 
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the Army at the Centre and sharing with Zhang Zhao in the 
administration of the new government. 
 There was, of course, one other potential rival to Sun Quan's 
authority, and that was Zhou Yu. He had been the trusted associate of Sun 
Ce, he was far more experienced in military and political affairs than Sun 
Quan, and he was now related by marriage to the Sun family. Moreover 
the Zhou, as we have seen, were one of the leading gentry families of the 
region, and the prestige of such a lineage would be far greater than that of 
the Sun. 
 It does not appear, however, that Zhou Yu made any attempt to take 
advantage of the situation, and there were factors which operated against 
him. Despite his close friendship with Sun Ce and his important position, 
he had not been regularly involved with matters at headquarters over the 
previous few years: he had spent time with Yuan Shu and he had held a 
number of separate commands. It is unlikely that he had been able to 
build up any substantial core of support among the leaders of the Sun 
party, and the prestige and even the past connections of his family could 
not necessarily have been usefully deployed in a power struggle against 
Sun Quan within his own central command. 
 So Zhou Yu, though his future achievements were to rank him as one 
of the finest military commanders of his time, with a reputation which 
would overshadow those of Sun Ce and of Sun Quan, remains in history 
and legend as the young, brilliant hero, not as an independent ruler. And 
Sun Quan, despite the potential threats to his [229] succession of his 
brother's power, was able to lay the foundations of an imperial state in the 
south. 
 
The establishment of Sun Quan: 
At the time of Sun Ce's death, his headquarters were at Dantu, a county 
city in Wu commandery, on the southern bank of the Yangzi just across 
the border from Danyang commandery.26 Dantu, and Qu'a which lay 
some 25 kilometres to the south, were the central and strategic points of 
                                               
26 For some years from this time, Dantu was also known as Jingcheng 京城 "Capital 
City," probably in recognition of its central position in Sun Quan's administration. 
See, for example, the commentary of Lu Bi to SGZJJ 51/Wu 6:13a, quoting also 
the commentary of Hu Sanxing to ZZTJ 64:2058, and to ZZTJ 66:2101-02; Hu 
Sanxing interprets the character jing, however, as referring to the position of the 
settlement on top of a ridge of hills close to the Yangzi. 
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Sun territory at this time:27 to the west, they gave access to Danyang 
commandery and the main stream of the Yangzi; to the southeast they 
were an appropriate starting point for operations into Wu commandery 
and then further south, beyond Hangzhou Bay, to Kuaiji. It was these 
three territories, Danyang, Wu and Kuaiji, which were the heart of Sun 
Quan's power. 
 In formal terms, Sun Quan's control over this territory was secure. 
He was Administrator of Kuaiji, appointed in succession to his brother by 
the imperial court under Cao Cao. The government there was maintained 
by his Assistant, Gu Yong, an experienced official who was a native of 
Wu commandery,28 and he was aided by the Commandant of the Western 
[230] Division, Jiang Qin, an old associate of Sun Ce.29 For some years, 
at least, the commandery was also under supervision from Zhang Hong. 
Further south, in the region of the Min River, upstream from present-day 
Fuzhou, the loyal and energetic He Qi was carving out a region of 
pacified territory among the Yue people, and extending Chinese culture at 
the point of the sword. 
 In Wu commandery, the Administrator was still Zhu Zhi, and there 
was no significant threat to his authority. The former Administrator, Xu 
Gong, had been killed by Sun Ce, and although we are told that Sun Ce 
was planning a further campaign against White Tiger Yan at the time of 
his death, and that campaign presumably did not take place, there is no 
further reference to White Tiger Yan after this time. It appears that the 
opposition to the Sun family in this region was on the point of collapse in 
any case, and required no further notable military action. 
 On the other hand, we are told specifically, and not surprisingly, that 
there was a good deal of country which had not yet been brought under 
full control, and throughout the region there were numbers of refugees, 
"who came or wandered away wherever they thought they could find 
good government and peace, and had no sense of loyalty to any particular 
ruler."30 These people needed to be settled, by ordinary good 
                                               
27 Qu'a was the site of the tomb Gaoling of Sun Jian (Chapter Two at 136). Sun Ce 
was apparently also buried there (see the commentary of Zhao Yiqing quoted in 
SGZJJ 46/Wu 1:36a), and when the Lady Wu died she was buried with her 
husband Sun Jian in Gaoling (SGZ 50/Wu 5:1196). 
28 The biography of Gu Yong is in SGZ 52/Wu 7:1225-28. 
29 The biography of Jiang Qin is in SGZ 55/Wu 10:1286-87. 
30 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1116. 
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administration in the accessible regions, and by firm military policy in 
the borders and hill country. 
 Danyang commandery, with its capital at Wanling, near present-day 
Xuancheng in Anhui, continued under the command of the Administrator 
Wu Jing, Sun Quan's uncle. When Wu Jing died in 203, he was succeeded 
by Sun Quan's younger brother Sun Yi, now about nineteen years 
old.[231] 
 Further afield, and notably north of the Yangzi, the acceptance of 
Sun Quan was less secure, and one matter had to be handled quickly. 
 In 199, when Sun Ce seized Lujiang commandery from Liu Xun, he 
appointed his officer Li Shu as Administrator, commanding a garrison at 
Huan city. From that position, Li Shu had defended his territory with 
success, killing the Inspector of Yang province appointed by Cao Cao, 
Yan Xiang.31 When Sun Quan took over, however, Li Shu became 
uncertain, and he attempted to change sides and join up with Cao Cao. 
Refusing to acknowledge Sun Quan's authority, he took in fugitives and 
rebels against him. 
 Sun Quan, however, contrived to isolate Li Shu. Taking advantage of 
Cao Cao's preoccupations in the north, and his official endorsement of 
Sun Quan's local authority, he wrote to Cao Cao to accuse Li Shu of the 
"wanton criminal act" of killing Yan Xiang, and asserted that he sought 
only to bring Li Shu to justice. Whether convinced by the propaganda of 
Sun Quan's arguments or, more probably, unable to make any move to 
stop him, Cao Cao abandoned Li Shu to his fate. Huan city was stormed 
by the Sun army, Li Shu was beheaded, Sun Quan regained control of his 
territory and his troops, and Sun He became Administrator.32 
 Cao Cao had evidently missed an opportunity, but his next move was 
an admirable one. He appointed Liu Fu, a man from Pei state, as his new 
Inspector of Yang province.33 The position was not an easy one: Liu Fu's 
predecessor had just been killed by Li Shu, only the commandery of 
Jiujiang was held with any confidence, and there were numerous bandit 
or refugee groups in all the area between the Yangzi and the Huai.[232] 
 Liu Fu, however, set his new administration at the city of Hefei, and 
within a few months he had gained the support and allegiance of the 
disaffected brigands and the refugees. In following years, he established 
                                               
31 SGZ 10:312 PC note 3 quoting Sanfu juelu. 
32 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1116 PC note 2 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. On Sun He, see note 6 to 
Chapter Three. 
33 The biography of Liu Fu is in SGZ 15:463-65. 
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farming colonies to settle the people, and he repaired dykes and dams to 
restore and improve the irrigation system and the agriculture that 
depended upon it. In many respects, the appointment of Liu Fu was Cao 
Cao's greatest success in the struggle against the Sun family. 
 For the time being, however, the disaffection of Li Shu had been 
solved and the territory of Sun Quan was confirmed. The next major 
problem occurred a few years later, probably in 204, with a mutiny in 
Danyang commandery. 
 After the death of Wu Jing in 203, his successor the young Sun Yi 
had sought to establish a lenient and reconciliatory government. In 
particular, he called into his service two men named Gui Lan and Dai 
Yuan, proteges of a certain Sheng Xian of Kuaiji. Sheng Xian had at one 
time been Administrator of Wu commandery, and after Sun Ce's conquest 
of that region he maintained some resistance and disaffection. He was 
eventually taken and executed by Sun Quan, while Gui Lan and Dai 
Yuan, who had at one time been recommended for office by Sheng Xian, 
took refuge in the hills. Sun Yi, however, invited them to join him, and he 
appointed Gui Lan to a military post and Dai Yuan as his civil Assistant 
in the commandery.34 
 The reconciliation was hardly perfect, however, for Sun Yi was 
assassinated, when drunk at a banquet, by a certain Bian Hong who [233] 
was associated with Gui Lan and Dai Yuan, and Gui Lan and Dai Yuan 
took over the administration. Sun He, recently Administrator of Lujiang 
but now appointed to command an army stationed at headquarters, was 
sent to investigate and restore order, but Gui Lan and Dai Yuan trapped 
him and killed him too. Then they sent north to Liu Fu, inviting him to 
come and take possession of the territory on behalf of Cao Cao. 
 At this point, however, it appears Gui Lan was distracted: not only 
did he take over the commandery government, he also took Sun Yi's 
concubines and serving maids, and then sought to compel the Lady Xu, 
                                               
34 The details of this story appear not in the biography of Sun Yi, but in that of Sun 
Shao, nephew of Sun He, in SGZ 51/Wu 6:1214-16 and PC note 1 quoting Kuaiji 
dianlu. 
  The position of Gui Lan is described as Grand Chief Controller (da dudu 大都
督). The title "Chief Controller" appears with increasing frequency at this time; it 
was not part of the regular structure of Han, and it appears to have indicated 
officers with differing functions. In the present instance, Gui Lan's post was 
probably equivalent to the Commandant in the commandery. Cf. Chapter Three. 
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widow of Sun Yi, to marry him. The young woman can have been hardly 
more than twenty, but she behaved with remarkable competence:35 
.....she said, "I beg to wait until the end of the month, then I shall 
arrange sacrifice and put off my mourning clothes." 
 Since it was almost the end of the month, Gui Lan agreed. Then 
the Lady Xu secretly sent someone she trusted to speak to Sun Yi's 
close retainers and former officers Sun Gao, Fu Ying and others, 
saying to them, "Gui Lan has already seized the concubines, and now 
I am also under pressure from him. The only reason I pretend to 
agree is that I want to set his mind at rest and so escape the fate he 
intends for me. I have made a plan, and I ask you gentlemen to help 
me in this time of distress." 
 .....When the last day of the month arrived, the sacrifice was 
arranged. The Lady Xu wept out all her grief; but then she finished 
and put off her mourning clothes and bathed herself, with scented 
herbs, and she moved to another apartment and contentedly hung up 
the curtains for the women's quarters; and she talked and laughed 
and made good cheer. Everyone was sick [234] and sorrowful, 
amazed she could act in such a way. Gui Lan spied upon her in 
secret, and could have no doubts. 
 The Lady Xu called Sun Gao and Fu Ying, had them put on 
maid-servants' clothing, and hid them behind the door. Then she sent 
someone to call Gui Lan, to tell him that she had ended her mourning 
and recovered her spirits, and she held herself ready for his orders. 
 Gui Lan came to her very cheerfully, and the Lady Xu went to 
the door to receive him. She bowed just once, then she called, "You 
two, now!" Sun Gao and Fu Ying came out together, and they killed 
Gui Lan, while the others of their party outside killed Dai Yuan. 
 Then the Lady Xu put on her mourning clothes again and 
brought the heads of Gui Lan and Dai Yuan as offerings at Sun Yi's 
grave. 
During this time, Sun Quan had been with the main army in Yuzhang 
commandery. He returned to Danyang in time to restore order after the 
Lady Xu's coup, rewarding the loyal plotters and punishing the adherents 
of Gui Lan and Dai Yuan. He appointed his cousin Sun Yu, son of Sun 
                                               
35 This story is told in Wu li, quoted by SGZ 51/Wu 6:1215 PC note 2. It also appears 
in ZZTJ 64:2058-59; deC, Establish Peace, 335-336. 
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Jing the younger brother of Sun Jian, as Administrator.36 Then he 
marched north to Dantu, pretending to make a surprise attack on the 
encampment formerly commanded by Sun He. Sun He's nephew, Sun 
Shao, seventeen years old, had taken command of his father's forces, and 
he was ready and alert. Sun Quan was suitably impressed, and confirmed 
Sun Shao in the inheritance, with rank as colonel, with the power to 
appoint his own subordinates and with access to supplies from the two 
counties of Dantu and Qu'a. 
 Sun Shao was certainly young for such responsibility, but so of 
course was Sun Quan, and he and his new government would be anxious 
to confirm their patronage for competent young men with a [235] record 
of family loyalty. In similar fashion, Sun Quan also initiated a program of 
reviewing his troops and assessing his military commanders, even at the 
lower levels. In the biography of Lü Meng, who later became one of the 
finest generals of the state of Wu but who at that time was only a Senior 
Major, we are told how:37 
When Sun Quan took over the government, he made a survey of all 
his junior officers, with the intention of combining those troops 
which had small numbers of men or inadequate supplies. 
 In secret, Lü Meng bought equipment on credit, he prepared red 
uniforms for his men and had them bind their legs with cord. Then 
he chose the day and drew up his lines in fine fashion, and the 
soldiers practised their exercises. 
 Sun Quan saw this and was very pleased, and he added to the 
troops under Lü Meng's command. 
One can readily imagine the ragtag appearance of some of the groups 
which had come to join the army under one petty leader or another, so re-
organisation and proper training of his heterogeneous force must have 
been a high priority for the new commander; the more so as those whom 
he confirmed or promoted in office would now give their allegiance to 
himself. 
 Again, Sun Quan had a policy of granting personal audiences to his 
officers. He is said to have done this on the advice of his Officer of Merit 
Luo Tong, who was formally in charge of selections and 
recommendations for appointments,38 but he was no doubt quite capable 
                                               
36 The biography of Sun Yu is in SGZ 51/Wu 6:1206. 
37 The biography of Lü Meng is in SGZ 54/Wu 9:1273-81. This anecdote appears at 
1273. 
38 The biography of Luo Tong is in SGZ 57/Wu 12:1334-36. 
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of thinking up the idea on his own. In any case, particularly on feast days 
and at other ceremonies, he would hold private interviews, asking various 
of his followers how they were getting on, what sort of lodging they had, 
and whether they had any [236] particular matters they wished to bring 
before him. All this was good, useful and important public relations. 
 At a higher level, Sun Quan also made a deliberate attempt to attract 
senior and respected men to his court, not only to strengthen his 
administration but also to establish a group of his own in contrast to those 
men whose services he had inherited from Sun Ce. In this, he appears to 
have been remarkably successful: among the scholars and gentlemen who 
came to him at this early time, and who stayed to give good service for 
years into the future, there were Zhuge Jin, elder brother of the later 
celebrated Zhuge Liang, who came from Langye; Bu Zhi of Xiapi; Yan 
Jun of Pengcheng; while his future commander-in-chief Lu Su was 
recommended to him by Zhou Yu.39 
 
The war against Huang Zu: 
Within two or three years of Sun Quan's accession, a good part of the 
process of consolidation was evidently complete, at least in the territories 
of Kuaiji, Wu and Danyang. The frontiers against the hills people were 
controlled and indeed expanding while, apart from the misfortunes of Sun 
Yi, the government of the commanderies was secured. Sun Quan was 
now in a position to turn his attention to his brother's earlier plans 
towards the south and west. 
 The territory of Yuzhang commandery, the region of the Pengli Lake 
and the Poyang Marsh, had been nominally controlled by the Sun group 
since 199, but it was on the fringes of their sphere of [237] influence and 
they had not yet established full authority. Further to the west, the years 
since the death of Sun Ce had seen no major changes in Jing province: 
Liu Biao maintained his position in the north, with a loose control of the 
basin of the Xiang River south of the Yangzi, while his general Huang 
Zu, old enemy of the Sun, guarded Jiangxia commandery and the region 
of the lower Han, with some threat down the Yangzi towards Yuzhang. 
                                               
39 The biography of Zhuge Jin is in SGZ 52/Wu 7:1231-35; that of Bu Zhi is in SGZ 
52/Wu 7:1236-40; that of Yan Jun in SGZ 53/Wu 8:1247-48; and that of Lu Su in 
SGZ 53/Wu 9:1267-72. 
  Zhuge Jin, Bu Zhi and Yan Jun were all noted scholars, and friends, who came 
separately to take refuge from the troubles of northern China in the lands south of 
the Yangzi. On Lu Su's earlier experiences, see Chapter Five at 303-305. 
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For any substantial development of his state, Sun Quan had to eliminate 
Huang Zu, and to this strategic interest there was added the motive of 
revenge for the death of Sun Jian outside Xiangyang ten years before.40 
 In 203, therefore, Sun Quan sent his army against Huang Zu's 
positions on the Yangzi above the Pengli Lake. He did not achieve a 
decisive victory, and he may not have sought one at this stage, but he 
crippled Huang Zu's fleet and the action prevented Huang Zu from 
intervening downstream for some time to come.  
 For the next year or so, Sun Quan's main concern was the region of 
Poyang, and indeed the whole territory of present-day Jiangxi province. 
Separate detachments of his army under Cheng Pu, Taishi Ci and others 
were sent about the marshlands and into the hill country along the river 
valleys to the south and west. Sun Quan maintained his headquarters at 
Jiaoqiu, near present-day Nanchang, though his administrative capital, 
and a reserve army under Sun He (succeeded by Sun Shao) remained at 
Dantu. 
 By 206, the Poyang region was felt to be secure, and Sun Quan's 
forces, under the command of Zhou Yu with assistance from the 
Administrator of Danyang Sun Yu, expanded their attacks to the west into 
Jing province. The first sortie was against the people of Mo and Bao, two 
settlements in the lake and marsh region near [238] present-day Jiayu in 
Hubei.41 The territory was formally in Jiangxia commandery, whose 
Administrator was Huang Zu, but it was separated from his headquarters 
at Xiakou, present-day Wuhan,42 by a morass of rivers and lakes. Zhou Yu 
                                               
40 On the death of Sun Jian, see Chapter Two at 135-136; on the earlier campaigns of 
Sun Ce against Huang Zu, see Chapter Three at 187-188 and 190-192. 
41 On the siting of the "camps" of Mo and Bao, see the commentary of Lu Bi to 
SGZJJ 51/Wu 6:2b. On the nature of the people, whom I suggest may have been 
refugees from the north of the Yangzi, see below. 
42 The capital of Jiangxia commandery in Later Han had been at Xiling, northeast of 
present-day Wuhan (HHS 112/22:3482). The biography of Gan Ning, however, at 
SGZ 55/Wu 10:1292 PC note 3 quoting Wu shu, notes that Huang Zu had his 
headquarters at Xiakou 夏口, and this fits with the description of the final attack 
given below. 
  Xiakou was not a county under Later Han, and the place evidently gained its 
importance only at this time. The site lay at the junction of the Han River with the 
Yangzi, and took its name from that fact. It is now in the metropolis of Wuhan, 
probably north of the junction of the two rivers, at the site of present-day Hankou. 
  The Xia River joined the Han from the west just before the junction of that 
main stream with the Yangzi; as a result, the last reaches of the Han/Mian were 
also known as Xia, while the name of the commandery itself was a combination of 
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could attack due [239] west, and the sortie would embarrass Huang Zu's 
defences and compel him to a counter-attack. 
 We are told that Zhou Yu killed the leaders of the Mo and Bao 
groups, and brought back more than ten thousand of the people to his 
camp by the Pengli Lake. Such a large number of immigrants appears 
somewhat unlikely, but it is very possible that Zhou Yu was able to make 
a forced recruitment and many of the men's families would have come 
with them. Despite the manner in which these new troops were 
compelled to join him, they had not had close connection to Huang Zu, 
and Zhou Yu was evidently prepared to use them alongside, and under the 
eye of, his regular soldiers. 
 Huang Zu sent a few thousand men against Zhou Yu, under the 
command of his officer Deng Long. Zhou Yu met the enemy at Zhaisang, 
near present-day Jiujiang on the Yangzi about the border of Jiangxi and 
Hubei provinces. He completely defeated them, captured Deng Long, and 
sent him as a prisoner to Sun Quan. 
 In the following year, Sun Quan came to take command of the 
offensive, though one may imagine that Zhou Yu remained in actual 
charge of the operations. On this occasion it appears that the attack was 
made directly against Huang Zu's positions along the Yangzi, but once 
more the main purpose was rather to capture people and bring them back 
than, at this stage, to destroy Huang Zu. Again, forced immigration was 
regarded as an advantage: the seizure of human resources from the enemy 
                                                                                                                   
江 jiang for the Yangzi and 夏 xia for the Han (SJZS 28:54b and 32:38b-44b, and 
HS 28A, 1567-68 note 1 quoting Ying Shao). See also note 45 below, and the 
commentary of Lu Bi to SGZJJ 1:70b. 
  The biography of Gan Ning, mentioned above, is in SGZ 55/Wu 10:1292-95. 
Gan Ning came from a family of Nanyang which had migrated to Ba commandery 
in present-day Sichuan. As a young man he was a leader of brigands, but he then 
took to scholarship and more civilised arts. He went to join Liu Biao, but received 
no advancement from him. He thought to join the Sun group, but was forced to 
stay several years with Huang Zu. 
  When Sun Quan attacked in 203, Gan Ning fought against him, and killed the 
colonel Ling Cao. Eventually, through the good offices of Huang Zu's lieutenant 
Su Fei, Gan Ning was appointed Chief of Zhu county, on the Yangzi nearest to the 
Sun positions in the east, and in 207 he was able to change sides. He encouraged 
Sun Quan to make a final attack on Huang Zu, whom he described as old and now 
dull-witted. 
  When Huang Zu was defeated, Gan Ning was given an independent military 
command, and he interceded successfully on behalf of his former patron Su Fei, 
whom Sun Quan had captured and intended to put to death. 
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fully outweighed any danger from disaffection among the captives. Either 
they lost their loyalty to their former master once he had failed to protect 
them, or else the question of their possible loyalty became irrelevant 
when they were held under the armed control of their conqueror. 
 In the spring of 208 Sun Quan launched the final offensive, this time 
against Huang Zu's headquarters at Xiakou. Zhou Yu commanded the 
vanguard, but it was a considerable [240] combined force which took part 
in the attack, and it represented a major commitment to gain a presence in 
the central Yangzi basin. The history records some incidents from the 
battle:43 
Huang Zu had arranged two ships, covered with raw ox-hide,44 
across the channel to narrow the entrance to Miankou,45 and he had 
two great coir ropes stretched between them with stones attached as 
anchors. Above this line of defence there were a thousand men with 
crossbows to give covering fire. The arrows poured down like rain, 
and the army could not get forward. 
 The Lieutenant-General Dong Xi and the Senior Major Ling 
Tong46 were together in the van. Each took charge of a forlorn hope 
of volunteers, all in double armour. They boarded a great barge, 
charged between the covered boats, and Dong Xi himself cut the 
ropes with his sword. The enemy craft were swept down-stream, and 
the main body of Sun Quan's forces were able to attack.[241] 
 The city was taken by storm, and Huang Zu was killed as he 
fled. 
                                               
43 The passage which follows is taken from the biography of Dong Xi, SGZ 55/Wu 
10:1291. See also ZZTJ 65:2078; deC, Establish Peace, 368-369. 
44 On the nature of these ships, see Some Notes on Ships and Naval Warfare at below.  
45 Miankou 沔口 is the same place as Xiakou (note 42 above), being the junction of 
the Han River with the Yangzi by present-day Wuhan. 
  Mian was another name for the Han River. The Mian was one of the chief 
sources of the Han, rising in the hill country of Wudu commandery in present-day 
southern Gansu. See SJZS 27:2b quoting Kong Anguo of the Former Han period 
and Ru Shun of the third century AD; SJZS 27 and 28 describe the whole course of 
the Han under the name of Mian. (The name of the Xia River, a tributary which 
joined the Mian/Han just before the junction with the Yangzi, was used only for the 
last reaches of the major stream.) See also the commentary of Lu Bi to SGZJJ 
1:70b, citing the commentary of Hu Sanxing to ZZTJ 65:2076. 
46 The biography of Ling Tong, in SGZ 55/Wu 10:1295-97 at 1296, has him at this 
time about eighteen years old. The father of Ling Tong, Ling Cao, had been killed 
by Gan Ning in 203 (note 42 above), when Ling Tong was fifteen sui. One 
imagines there was some tension in the Sun camp at this time. 
TO THE RED CLIFFS 
 
 
189 
This was a notable victory, and the destruction of Huang Zu marked the 
culmination of a program of revenge dating back to the death of Sun Jian 
in the fighting near Xiangyang in 191. Sun Quan did not maintain his 
position as far west as Xiakou, but he now dominated the course of the 
Yangzi for eight hundred kilometres, from the junction with the Han 
River east and north to the sea. 
 It is perhaps surprising that Liu Biao had not taken a more active role 
in support of his lieutenant, but there were other matters to concern him 
at the time, and Liu Biao was not a particularly energetic military 
commander. Moreover, though Jiangxia commandery was a part of Jing 
province, and the success of the Sun forces was a nuisance and a 
potential threat, it had no immediate effect upon the control of the rest of 
the province. From his headquarters at Xiangyang, Liu Biao's main line 
of communication with the south lay to the west of Jiangxia, through Nan 
commandery, across the Yangzi by the present-day Dongting Lake and up 
the valley of the Xiang River to Changsha and beyond. Jiangxia 
commandery was on his eastern frontier, and at that time the greater 
threat came from Cao Cao in the north. 
 Liu Biao had come to Jing province at the beginning of the civil war, 
and he established himself there while Yuan Shu and his general Sun Jian 
were preoccupied with the attack against Dong Zhuo in Luoyang. 
Thereafter, once Yuan Shu's attack in 191 was blunted by the death of 
Sun Jian, Liu Biao had been able to maintain himself without difficulty. 
He suffered, of course, growing harassment from Sun Ce and then Sun 
Quan against the region of Jiangxia, and there was a period, from 198 to 
200, when the Administrator of Changsha, Zhang Xian, maintained 
independence and also controlled Lingling and Guiyang. Zhang Xian, 
however, died, and his son Zhang Yi was taken over by Liu Biao. For the 
next [242>243] few years Liu Biao had no immediate rivals and his 
territory was generally peaceful. 
 That territory, however, was limited. Liu Biao does not appear to 
have had any position in Nanyang commandery to the north, and his 
control south of the Yangzi was erratic and occasional. He exercised real 
authority only over the valley of the Han and the line of the middle 
Yangzi, the general area of modern Hubei. 
 In histories of the time, and notably in passages of Sanguo zhi, Liu 
Biao is criticised and almost despised for his indolence, his lack of 
imagination, and even his vainglory. It is said that he usurped the regalia 
and the ceremonies of an emperor and that he sent no tribute to the court, 
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but at the same time he took no effective part in the civil war raging to 
the north, he sided with neither Yuan Shao nor Cao Cao in their great 
confrontation,47 and as a result he brought about the eventual destruction 
of his state. 
 In a sense, this is true; but many people found sanctuary under the 
protection of Liu Biao, and although much of the literature of the time 
describes Jing province as the land of lonely, perhaps useless and even 
alien exile, it was also a haven of peace and sanity in the madness of 
multiple warfare which had engulfed the civilised world of China. 
 The poet Wang Can, for example, a man of distinguished scholarly 
and official lineage from Shanyang commandery in north China, had 
been for a time at Changan during the disorders which followed the 
seizure of power by Dong Zhuo, but then fled south to seek protection 
with Liu Biao, who was an old friend of his family. In his "Poem of 
Seven Sorrows," he presents a desperate picture of [244] the miseries of 
the ancient capital district, but he also looks upon Jing province as alien 
and uncultured:48 
When wild disorder gripped the Western Capital, 
Tigers and wolves added to our despair. 
So I turned about and fled the Middle Kingdom, 
To far-off Jing, among the Man tribes there. 
Years later, at refuge in the city of Dangyang (present-day Dangyang in 
Hubei), he composed the "Rhapsody on Climbing the Tower," which 
described both the peacefulness of the country but also his own 
frustration in the south:49 
Flowers and fruit trees blanket the meadow, 
Two kinds of millet rich in the fields, 
Lovely as it is, however, this is not my land – 
How can I bear to stay here for long? 
.....The plain stretches far, and though I strain my eyes, 
                                               
47 SGZ 22:631 says that Huan Jie, a supporter of Cao Cao, encouraged Zhang Xian in 
his rebellion in the south so that Liu Biao would not be able to lend significant 
assistance to his ally Yuan Shao, Cao Cao's chief rival. 
48 The biography of Wang Can is in SGZ 21:597-99. These lines are taken from Qiai 
shi No.1; Frodsham, Anthology, 26-27. 
49 From Denglou fu, translated by Watson, Chinese Rhyme-Prose, 53-54. 
  The life and work of Wang Can has been studied in detail by Miao, Early 
Medieval Chinese Poetry, of which pages 65-79 provide a helpful discussion of the 
scholarship of Jing province in the time of Liu Biao. 
TO THE RED CLIFFS 
 
 
191 
They are blocked by the peaks of the mountains of Jing. 
The road winds back and forth, endless its turning; 
Rivers wide and deep that no-one can ford. 
I hate to be so cut off from my native land; 
Tears come in streams I am helpless to check. 
 In the autumn of 208, however, Liu Biao died, and the time of peace 
and isolation for Jing province was coming to an end. Wang Can and 
others found their fortune again in the north, and for Liu Biao's own 
family the end of independence came with some dignity and without 
great danger. Most other warlords did less well.50[245] 
 
Flight of a crossbow bolt:  
From the time he took possession of Emperor Xian in 196, the power of 
Cao Cao had grown almost without interruption. The struggle with Yuan 
Shao reached its critical stage in the campaign and battle of Guandu, and 
the result, at the end of the year 200, was a triumph for Cao Cao. 
Outnumbered and almost overwhelmed by the attack of his enemy, he 
held his ground south of the Yellow River, and then struck at Yuan Shao's 
lines of communication to the north. The great army of the Yuan 
disintegrated, and Cao Cao was confirmed in his control of the southern 
part of the plain. 
 Two years later, Yuan Shao died, leaving his power to his youngest 
son, Yuan Shang. Yuan Tan and Yuan Xi, his other two sons, were angry 
and disaffected, and the three quarrelled among themselves. With some 
pressure and encouragement from Cao Cao, Yuan Tan turned formally 
against his brothers, and asked the enemy's aid. By the end of 204, Yuan 
Shang and Yuan Xi had been driven from their territory, and Yuan Tan 
was under Cao Cao's renewed attack. In 205, Cao Cao was master of 
north China.51 
 To complete these political and military manoeuvres, Cao Cao 
moved against the non-Chinese Wuhuan people in the hill country of 
present-day northern Hebei and Liaoning. Tadun, leader of the tribal 
confederacy, had given refuge to Yuan Shang and Yuan Xi. Cao Cao, 
however, in a remarkable campaign, involving a long flanking march 
beyond the imperial frontiers, brought Tadun to battle and destroyed him 
                                               
50 For Wang Fuzhi's elegant defence of Liu Biao, see Du Tongjian lun 9:12b-13a. 
51 The history of the war between Cao Cao and Yuan Shao and his successors is told 
in ZZTJ 63-64:deC, Establish Peace, 251-338, and in deC, Imperial Warlord, 
Chapters Three and Five. 
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at White Wolf Mountain.52 Tadun was killed, Yuan [246] Shang and Yuan 
Xi fled to the warlord Gongsun Kang in present-day Manchuria; 
Gongsun Kang later became mistrustful of them and put them to death. 
 When Cao Cao returned from White Wolf Mountain, his power had 
no rival in north China, and his government controlled five of the thirteen 
provinces, the most populous and prosperous regions of the Han empire. 
West and northwest there were uncoordinated groups of Chinese 
brigands, local troops and non-Chinese tribes; in Yi province, present-day 
Sichuan, the Governor Liu Zhang held tenuous and limited control of his 
nominal territory;53 in Jiao province, isolated to the far south, various 
disparate groups acknowledged the loose hegemony of the leader Shi 
Xie;54 and in the east of You province, present-day southern Manchuria 
and northern Korea, Gongsun Kang was a formal ally of Cao Cao and 
happy to keep his distance.55 As Cao Cao turned his attention to the south, 
Liu Biao and, to a lesser degree, Sun Quan appeared as his only rivals of 
note. 
 At the time of his death, in the autumn of 208, Liu Biao was in his 
late sixties. He left two sons, Liu Qi and Liu Zong. Liu Qi was the elder, 
but Liu Zong had married a woman of the Cai clan, niece of the Lady Cai 
who had become Liu Biao's principal wife towards the end of his life. As 
a result, the Cai group formed a strong party in favour of Liu Zong, and 
Liu Qi was constantly criticised and lost the approval of his father. In an 
attempt to nullify [247] this pressure, and no doubt also to establish some 
independence, Liu Qi sought and was granted the position of 
Administrator of Jiangxia in succession to Huang Zu.56 
                                               
52 The campaign of Cao Cao against the Wuhuan, leading to the victory at White 
Wolf Mountain, is described by deC, Northern Frontier, 407-411, and Imperial 
Warlord, 230-240. 
53 The biography of Liu Zhang is in SGZ 31/Shu 1:868-70. Liu Zhang was the son of 
Liu Yan, a member of the imperial clan who had held ministerial rank and arranged 
to be appointed Governor of Yi province in 188; when he died in 194 Liu Zhang 
took over his position. The biography of Liu Yan is in SGZ 31/Shu 1:865-67, and 
HHS 75/65:2431-33. See also Chapter Six at 356 and 361-362. 
54 The biography of Shi Xie is in SGZ 49/Wu 4:1191-93. See also Chapter Five at 
341-344. 
55 On the Gongsun family in the northeast, see the two-part article by Gardiner on 
"The Kung-sun Warlords of Liao-tung." 
56 According to SGZ 35/Shu 5:914, Liu Qi made this move on the advice of Zhuge 
Liang, whom he had consulted about his problems. 
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 As it turned out, the move was not well timed, for within a few 
weeks Liu Biao had been taken ill and died. The Cai group were able to 
prevent Liu Qi from seeing his father on the deathbed, and they had small 
difficulty in arranging the succession of Liu Zong as Governor of Jing 
province. Liu Qi refused to accept the decision, and he was surely 
intending to make trouble, but at that time Cao Cao advanced from the 
north, and the quarrel was submerged by other events. 
 Xiangyang, headquarters of Liu Biao and now of Liu Zong, was on 
the northern frontier of their territory. Though Nanyang commandery, 
which was largely in present-day southern Henan, had been part of Jing 
province under Later Han, it does not appear to have been integrated to 
Liu Biao's administration, but remained disputed or neutral ground The 
effective border of Liu Biao's control lay just north of the Han River, 
about the line of the present provincial boundary between Henan and 
Hubei. 
 As Cao Cao led his army against him, Liu Zong was in a weak 
position. He had inherited his father's title rather through political 
manoeuvring than by formal establishment, he had an indignant elder 
brother planning rebellion behind him, and he had no time to take any 
action to confirm his personal authority. Moreover, the approach of Cao 
Cao encouraged numbers of senior advisers to urge Liu Zong's surrender: 
Cao Cao was incomparably the most powerful man in China, and here at 
last was the opportunity to restore unity to the empire and bring an end to 
warlord separatism. 
 For Liu Zong, the thought of military resistance was not enticing. He 
would certainly have had to abandon [248] Xiangyang in the face of Cao 
Cao's advance, and he would become a refugee even in his own territory. 
His own army would bear the brunt of the initial attack, and his personal 
safety was hardly assured once he joined a melee of resistance in the 
south. He would, moreover, be blamed by many of his own supporters, 
and by people outside, as the man who maintained the civil war and the 
miseries which accompanied it solely for his own petty ambition. With 
such an alternative, if Liu Zong could arrange surrender on reasonable 
terms he was wise to do so. And that is what he did. 
 As Cao Cao's army came to Xinye in Nanyang, sixty kilometres 
north of Xiangyang, Liu Zong went to meet him, bearing his seals and 
insignia of office, and surrendered. Cao Cao received him with courtesy, 
granted him nominal appointment as Inspector of Qing province, and 
enfeoffed him as a marquis. The senior advisers who had encouraged his 
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submission, fifteen in all, were also rewarded with fiefs, and numbers of 
scholars and officials at Liu Biao's former court were given senior posts 
in the imperial government. Kuai Yue, Administrator of Zhangling,57 
became Minister of the Household, and Liu Xian, who had been 
Attendant Officer in the provincial government, was appointed to the 
Secretariat. Han Song, a staff officer of Liu Biao, had been sent on 
embassy to Cao Cao and had argued, when he returned, that Liu Biao 
should acknowledge Cao Cao's suzerainty: he had been put in prison by 
Liu Biao, but was now released and named Minister Herald, and he was 
also encouraged to recommend other men for appointment. And the 
general Wen Ping, who had commanded one of Liu Biao's armies near 
Xiangyang, had initially refused to join in Liu Zong's [249] surrender but 
eventually came to make his peace with Cao Cao: he was appointed 
Administrator of Jiangxia and became one of Cao Cao's leading local 
commanders. 
 The majority of these former officers of Liu Biao came from 
Nanyang, and thus represented a local elite from the region of Jing 
province closest to central China.58 There were other gentlemen, 
generally from further north, who had come to live in Jing province but 
had largely kept aloof from the government at Xiangyang. Deng Xi of 
Nanyang had at one time been Headquarters Officer to Liu Biao, but had 
resigned in protest at Liu Biao's continued alliance with Yuan Shao some 
                                               
57 It appears that the commandery of Zhangling had been established by Liu Biao 
about the county city of that name in the south-eastern part of Nanyang 
commandery: the site of Zhangling city is now close to Zaoyang in Hubei. 
58 Kuai Yue, Han Song and Wen Ping were all men from Nanyang; Liu Xian came 
from Lingling commandery in the far south of Jing province. Of these, only Wen 
Ping has a separate biography, in SGZ 18:539-40; however SGZ 6:215-16 PC notes 
2, 3 and 5, attached to the account of Cao Cao's settlement of Jing province and of 
the appointments which he made at that time, includes biographies of Kuai Yue 
from the Fuzi, of Han Song from Xianxian xingzhuang, and of Liu Xian from 
Lingling xianxian zhuan. 
  Lu Bi also notes the Qing commentator Zhao Yiqing, who cites HHS 
69/59:2244-45, the biography of Dou Wu, regent and General-in-Chief who had 
been overthrown by the eunuchs in 169, at the beginning of the reign of Emperor 
Ling. Though most of Dou Wu's family was destroyed, his grandson Dou Fu was 
saved by loyal followers, and was taken to safety in Lingling commandery, where 
he was brought up under the surname of one of his protectors, Hu Teng. He later 
held appointment under Liu Biao and took back his original surname. After Liu 
Biao died, Dou Fu returned to the north with other members of his family and was 
given office under Cao Cao. 
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ten years earlier. He was now appointed Palace Attendant, a privileged 
courtier's position, by Cao Cao.59 Again, Sima Zhi formerly of Henei, He 
Xia formerly of Runan, Pei Qian formerly of Hedong, Han Ji formerly of 
Nanyang and Wang Can, the scholar and poet from Shanyang, all of 
whom had taken up residence in the southern part of the province, were 
[250] welcomed to Cao Cao's company and received positions at court or 
in local administration.60 
 In many respects, this was a smooth and generous take-over of a 
formerly hostile territory and government. Inevitably, however, there was 
some opposition to the almost humiliating speed of the surrender; there 
was a hard core of dissidents who, for one reason or another, were 
reluctant to accept Cao Cao's government; and there was a good deal of 
uncertainty and confusion among ordinary people faced with the rapid 
changes of political circumstance, from the regime of Liu Biao to that of 
Liu Zong and now to Cao Cao. At the centre of this opposition was the 
figure of Liu Bei.61 
 Liu Bei, at this time in his late forties, was a man from Zhuo 
commandery in the northeast of the empire, near present-day Beijing. He 
claimed to be a descendant of Emperor Jing of Former Han; a lineage 
which may have been correct, but which would be difficult to prove, and 
which he shared, in any event, with thousands of other people. Emperor 
Jing had reigned in the middle of the second century BC, he was an 
ancestor eighteen generations from the contemporary Emperor Xian, and 
Liu Bei was perhaps sixteenth or seventeenth cousin to Emperor Xian. 
Genealogically, this was rather a matter of mild curiosity than of practical 
interest, but Liu Bei made the most of it. 
 In more immediate terms, Liu Bei's grandfather had held office as a 
county magistrate, but Liu Bei's father had died when he was young, and 
he was compelled to work with his mother weaving straw mats and 
sandals. He acquired, however, a local reputation for strength [251] and 
character, he came to some prominence in the fighting against the Yellow 
Turbans in 184, and was then appointed to various posts at county level. 
                                               
59 The personal name of Deng Xi 鄧羲 also appears as Yi 義: SGZ 1:30; SGZ 6:211 
and 215; and HHS 74B/64B, 2424. 
60 The biography of Sima Zhi is in SGZ 12:386-89; those of He Xia and Pei Qian are 
in SGZ 23:655-57 and 671-73; that of Han Ji is in SGZ 24:677-78. 
  On Wang Can, see 243-244 above. 
61 The biography of Liu Bei is in SGZ 32/Shu 2; he is described there as "First 
Sovereign" (先主 Xianzhu). 
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 When civil war broke out in 189, Liu Bei joined and served under 
Gongsun Zan, an old acquaintance who became warlord in the north, and 
he made his career as a soldier of fortune. At one time or another he was 
in the service of, or allied to, Gongsun Zan, Tao Qian, Lü Bu, Cao Cao 
and Yuan Shao. His record is one of occasional victory, frequent defeat, 
and a concept of loyalty which was often disconcerting to his superiors 
and associates. Eventually, after a brief attempt to support Yuan Shao 
during the campaign about Guandu in 200, he was driven from the field 
and took refuge with Liu Biao. By 208, he had been some years from 
active service, and he held a garrison command at Fan city close to 
Xiangyang. 
 The arrival of Cao Cao brought no sense of security to Liu Bei. The 
last time he was at Cao Cao's court, he had been involved in a plot to kill 
him and restore power to the puppet Emperor Xian. It is most unlikely 
Cao Cao would have entrusted him with any responsibility, and far more 
probable that he would have waited only for the first respectable 
opportunity to eliminate him. On the other hand, Liu Bei had retained a 
personal following, he was known as a warrior hero, and despite his 
record of vacillation he maintained a reputation for honour and a sense of 
public duty. The fall of Liu Biao's regime in Jing province gave him new 
opportunity to seek a position of his own, and the approach of Cao Cao 
made it fairly clear that this chance could well be his last. 
 In Liu Bei's company at Fan city during the autumn of 208 there 
were his two lieutenants, Guan Yu and Zhang Fei, and his adviser Zhuge 
Liang. Guan Yu and Zhang Fei had both been with Liu Bei since the 
earliest days. Both men were noted for their fighting skills, their courage, 
and their arrogant self-confidence. Zhang Fei, who [252] had at one time 
been a butcher, was also known for his violent temper, which had on 
occasion brought trouble to himself and his party. Guan Yu, for his part, 
had acquired a reputation for personal honour superior even to that of Liu 
Bei; and based, perhaps, on better evidence.62 
 Liu Bei met Zhuge Liang only after his arrival in Jing province, and 
he took some time and trouble to attract him to his service. A man from 
from Langye, Zhuge Liang was the younger brother of Zhuge Jin, an 
officer in the service of Sun Quan. Their father died early, and Zhuge 
Liang accompanied his uncle Zhuge Xuan, who had been appointed 
                                               
62 The biographies of Guan Yu and Zhang Fei are in SGZ 36/Shu 6:939-42 and 943-
44. 
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Administrator of Yuzhang by Yuan Shu but was driven from that position 
in the late 190s. The family took refuge with Liu Biao, and Zhuge Liang 
came to the notice of Liu Bei. In 208 he was about twenty-seven years 
old.63 
 As Cao Cao's army drew closer to Liu Zong's territory, Liu Bei was 
left uncertain of Liu Zong's intentions. When at last he was informed of 
the decision to surrender, his options were very limited. There was some 
talk of his seizing power from Liu Zong and attempting to face Cao Cao 
on the spot. Such a move would have been most unlikely to be 
successful, and Liu Bei, in any case, preferred to advertise his loyalty to 
Liu Biao and his family. In this way, he could put himself at the head of 
any groups of people who were anxious to resist Cao Cao or were 
frightened by his approach, and he could then, perhaps in some 
combination with Liu Qi the dispossessed brother of Liu Zong, seek to 
maintain resistance further south. 
 So Liu Bei led his army away. Before he did so, however, he made a 
point of visiting the tomb of Liu Biao, to pay his respects [253] and 
demonstrate his loyalty to the memory of his former patron, and he called 
by Xiangyang, perhaps in a last attempt to dissuade Liu Zong from the 
surrender, but more probably to show himself as the claimant to 
leadership of the province's independence. The policy was not 
unsuccessful, and as Liu Bei moved down the valley of the Han, we are 
told that he was accompanied by a great mass of followers, fighting men 
and refugees. 
 It was inevitable there would be some exodus from the potential 
front line, and some people would seek their fortune apart from Cao Cao, 
but Liu Bei appears to have increased the mingled hope and anxiety of 
the people, and to have turned the situation into a confused and perhaps 
panic-stricken disorder. Militarily, he gained little of value, for the mass 
of civilians was a hindrance to any effective moving defence, and the 
baggage they brought with them seriously slowed his retreat. 
 Sending Guan Yu ahead, with a fleet on the Han River, Liu Bei 
continued directly southwards in an attempt to reach Jiangling on the 
Yangzi, near present-day Jiangling in southern Hubei. Capital of Nan 
commandery, Jiangling was an important military base and supply depot. 
Cao Cao, however, also realised the importance of Jiangling: he left his 
main force and baggage at Xiangyang and chased Liu Bei with five 
                                               
63 The biography of Zhuge Liang is in SGZ 35/Shu 5. 
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thousand horsemen. They caught up with the unwieldy column at the 
Chang Slope near Dangyang, now south of Jingmen in Hubei, and 
completely defeated Liu Bei's forces. Liu Bei was compelled to flee, 
abandoning those who had followed him and his own close family. Zhang 
Fei, with a small rearguard, held the line of a river long enough for him to 
make his escape, and Zhao Yun, an old friend and cavalry commander of 
Liu Bei, managed to rescue Liu Bei's concubine the Lady Gan and their 
infant son Liu Shan. As Liu Bei fled to the east with a few score [254] 
horsemen, Cao Cao captured the bulk of his followers and their 
baggage.64 
 Cao Cao did not follow up in immediate pursuit. The main objective 
of his drive to the south had been the base at Jiangling, and he went first 
to make sure of that. Liu Bei joined up with Guan Yu and the Han River 
fleet, and they continued their retreat to Xiakou, the junction of the Han 
with the Yangzi. Once there, they could do little more than wait. 
 In the uncertain weeks following the death of Liu Biao, Sun Quan 
and his officers had attempted to seize what advantage they could from 
the changing situation. As soon as the news of Liu Biao's death arrived, 
Sun Quan dispatched Lu Su as an envoy, officially to offer condolences 
to Liu Qi and Liu Zong, but also to observe the situation and make 
contact with Liu Bei. As Lu Su is said to have observed, there appeared at 
this stage to be two alternatives: if the government of Jing province 
remained stable, the best policy was to establish an alliance against Cao 
Cao; if, however, there was a succession quarrel, then there should be 
some advantage for Sun Quan - indeed, he might hope to detach the 
Yangzi region and the southern commanderies while the quarrelling 
factions were concerned with Xiangyang and the north. In either 
eventuality, it was important to establish some association with Liu Bei.65 
As Lu Su [255] was on his mission, Sun Quan brought his headquarters 
upstream to Zhaisang, on the Yangzi near the border of Jing province. 
                                               
64 The account of Liu Bei's retreat, his defeat at the Chang Slope, and the heroism of 
Zhang Fei and Zhao Yun, is told by Romance chapter 41, and by the traditional 
drama Changban po, "Battle at the Chang Slope" (Arlington and Acton, Famous 
Chinese Plays, 25-37, Peking Opera Texts, 1356, and Jingju jumu chutan, 84). 
  The biography of Zhao Yun is in SGZ 36/Shu 6:948-50; this incident is 
mentioned at 948 and also in the biography of the Lady Gan, SGZ 34/Shu 4:905. 
The biography of Liu Shan, "Later Sovereign" of Shu-Han, is in SGZ 33/Shu 3. 
65 Lu Su's comments on the situation at this early stage are recorded in his biography, 
SGZ 54/Wu 9:at 1169. 
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 Before Lu Su had reached Xiangyang, however, he learnt of Liu 
Zong's succession and of the arrival of Cao Cao. He travelled to intercept 
Liu Bei near Dangyang, and appears to have caught up with him 
immediately after the disaster at the Chang Slope. With Lu Su's 
encouragement, Liu Bei and the remainder of his party came further to 
the east, and he established a new headquarters at Fankou in E county, 
downstream on the Yangzi below Xiakou and present-day Wuhan. At this 
stage, Lu Su, accompanied by Zhuge Liang, went back to Sun Quan to 
report. 
 The record of the debate at the court of Sun Quan is considerably 
confused by two important factors: the presence of Zhuge Liang, who is 
celebrated as the great counsellor and is therefore given a notable and 
almost decisive role; and the fact that later writers knew how events 
worked out. As a result, although one would normally have quite a high 
level of confidence in matters recorded from discussion in open court, 
propaganda by one side and the other has tended to distort our 
view.66[256] 
                                               
66 On the Sun side, the main text of SGZ 54/Wu 9:1261-62, gives the dominant role 
in the debate to Zhou Yu, who is described as the one counsellor opposed to the 
general consensus for surrender. Jiangbiao zhuan, quoted in PC note 1 to that 
passage, adds the tale of Zhou Yu's night meeting with Sun Quan, when he 
calculated the men Cao Cao had and the number he would require to deal with 
them: see below. 
  Pei Songzhi, however, remarks that this account is inadequate, and biassed too 
heavily towards Zhou Yu. The biography of Lu Su makes it clear that the debate 
took place in two stages: Zhou Yu was initially absent in the Poyang region, 
returning to take part only after Lu Su had at least arranged that the decision 
should not be taken until he arrived: SGZ 54/Wu 9,1269-70. 
  Another record of the debate, with the leading role given to Zhuge Liang, and a 
reluctant Sun Quan persuaded by his eloquence, appears in the biography of Zhuge 
Liang, SGZ 5/Shu 5:915. The commentary of Pei Songzhi to the biography of Lu 
Su, SGZ 54/Wu 9:1269 PC note 1, points out the different emphasis between the 
two versions, and observes that even though Chen Shou was responsible for the 
main text of both sections of the history, he has preserved the contradiction 
between the two traditions. 
  Sima Guang presents a record of the debate in ZZTJ 65:2087-92; deC, 
Establish Peace, 386-395. I have tended here to follow that account. 
  Predictably, Romance chapters 43-44 provides Zhuge Liang with the leading 
role, and the drama Shezhan qunru, "Battle with the Tongue against a Multitude of 
Scholars," tells how he out-thought and out-argued the advisers of Sun Quan 
(Arlington and Acton, Famous Chinese Plays, 37, Peking Opera Texts, 2895, and 
Jingju jumu chutan, 85). 
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 Rhetoric aside, the situation and the nature of the debate are 
reasonably clear. Sun Quan was urged by Zhuge Liang to support Liu Bei 
in fighting against Cao Cao for Jing province. In this, he was supported 
by Lu Su, who still held comparatively junior rank, but was evidently 
well trusted and was the chief proponent of the "western" policy of 
intervention into Jing province. On the other hand, military commitment 
so far from home was opposed by more cautious counsellors such as 
Zhang Zhao. 
 At one point, in an early stage of the discussion, Zhuge Liang 
appears to have over-played his hand. Emphasising the claims of Liu Bei, 
with his descent from the imperial clan and his reputation as a military 
commander and a man of honour, he implied that Sun Quan was 
fortunate to have such an ally to look after things for him. Sun Quan, 
justifiably indignant, remarked that he was not prepared to collect the 
military resources of his state and put them under Liu Bei's command, 
particularly since Liu Bei had just been seriously defeated. Zhuge Liang 
reassured him that Liu Bei had been able to regather a considerable 
number of his men, and that he had been joined by Liu Qi with troops 
from Jiangxia. Moreover, added Zhuge Liang, 
Cao Cao's forces have come a long way, and they are now worn out 
and in distress. I have heard that when they were in pursuit of Liu of 
Yuzhou [Liu Bei]67 their light cavalry went more than [257] three 
hundred li in a day and a night. This is what is described by the 
proverb, 'The last carry of a bolt from a strong cross-bow is too weak 
to pierce silken cloth.'68 And The Art of War forbids this, saying it is 
sure to bring the greatest general to his downfall.69 
                                               
67 On two occasions during his career in the north, Liu Bei had acquired authority in 
Yu province: in 194 with title as Inspector in alliance with Tao Qian against Cao 
Cao; and in 196 with title as Governor in alliance with Cao Cao against Lü Bu. For 
this reason, he was often referred to as Liu of Yuzhou. 
68 HS 52:2402 has the expression: "the fading breath of a rushing wind cannot stir fur 
or feathers; the last flight of a bolt from a strong crossbow has not sufficient 
strength to pierce plain silk from Lu." The commentary of Yan Shigu to that 
passage notes that the people of Qufu 曲阜, in the ancient territory of the state of 
Lu 魯 in the Spring and Autumn period of the Zhou dynasty, were known for the 
weaving of a particularly fine silk. 
69 The parallel passage of Sunzi bingfa is translated by Griffith, Sun Tzu, 103, as 
"...marching at double time for a hundred li, the three commanders will be 
captured." Griffith evidently follows a text which reads san jiang 三將, no doubt in 
reference to the common phrase san jun 三軍: literally "the three armies" but in 
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Sun Quan was suitably impressed. 
 At this point, a letter arrived from Cao Cao, a splendid piece of 
writing: 
I have received the imperial command to attack all rebels. My 
standards point to the south, and Liu Zong has bound hands. I 
command a fleet with eight hundred thousand men, and I am coming 
to join you, to go hunting in Wu.70 
The effect was noticeable, and the arguments for surrender were 
strengthened by the fact that Cao Cao's fleet, the main force of warships 
on the Yangzi based at Jiangling and formerly controlled by Liu Biao, 
could nullify any advantage that the Sun forces might have expected from 
their experience in river fighting. On land, it [258] seemed unlikely that 
their numbers, even combined with Liu Bei's band of fugitives and the 
contingent from Liu Qi in Jiangxia, could match Cao Cao's main army 
now augmented by soldiers from Jing province. 
 Sun Quan had three options: he could surrender and make his peace 
with Cao Cao, almost certainly under terms which would remove forever 
his position as a semi-independent ruler; he could gather his forces about 
his own established territory and maintain a limited defence; or he could 
commit his troops to open warfare against Cao Cao in the west, aided by 
whatever support he might obtain from Liu Bei and Liu Qi in Jiangxia. 
 The incentive for the third, "forward," policy was the alliance with 
the remaining independent forces of Jing province, and the possibility of 
a major expansion of territory if Cao Cao was forced to retreat. The 
disadvantage was that he would be committing a sizable army onto the 
further edges of the region that he controlled, with no certainty his men 
could be extricated if things went wrong. 
 At this point Lu Su urged Sun Quan to consult Zhou Yu, who had 
been on a mission in the Poyang region but had now returned to 
headquarters. In open court, Zhou Yu argued that Cao Cao could not 
afford to leave his enemies in the far northwest for too long, that his army 
was inexperienced in fighting on water, and that the approaching winter 
would make it difficult for them to obtain fodder for their horses. It was 
                                                                                                                   
fact indicating "the royal/imperial army") rather than shang jiang 上將 or, as Zhuge 
Liang paraphrased it, 上將軍 shang jiangjun. 
70 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1118 PC note 3 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
  In traditional China, including the Han period, the annual hunt, held in the 
autumn or winter season, was an occasion for mobilisation and manoeuvre of 
troops. 
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very possible that the marsh country would bring sickness to his northern 
soldiers, who were unaccustomed and unacclimatised to it. "If you give 
me twenty or thirty thousand experienced men, I shall go forward to 
Xiakou and I guarantee to defeat him for you." 
 Sun Quan accepted the argument and declared his decision. Drawing 
his sword, he chopped the desk in front of him and said, "Should any of 
my officers dare to argue further that we should [259] surrender, he will 
be dealt with like this desk." And he dismissed the assembly. 
 That night, we are told, Zhou Yu went to see Sun Quan privately, and 
the conversation which followed, though it may not have been formally 
recorded, does present a reasonable picture of the strategic and political 
thinking in the Sun camp. 
Zhou Yu said, "When those other people saw Cao Cao's letter about 
eight hundred thousand soldiers and sailors, they all got frightened, 
and they offered you advice without thinking whether it was a matter 
of fact or whether he was only boasting. That was all quite pointless. 
 "Now check the real situation. The troops Cao Cao brought with 
him from central China were no more than a hundred and fifty or a 
hundred and sixty thousand, and they have been on hard active 
service for a considerable time. Then he got men from Liu Biao, 
seventy or eighty thousand at the most, and he cannot be certain of 
their loyalty. 
 "So he is using sick and weary men to control an army with 
possible disaffection. Even though he has great numbers, there is 
certainly nothing to be afraid of. If I have fifty thousand good 
soldiers I am sure that will be enough to deal with them. Don't worry 
about it." 
 Sun Quan clapped him on the back and replied, "Gongjin, you 
put things just the way I hoped. Those others are all worried about 
their wives and children, they thought of nothing but their own 
interests, and they made me very disappointed... 
 "It will be difficult to collect fifty thousand men right away, but I 
have already chosen thirty thousand, and their ships and supplies and 
equipment are all ready. You and Zijing [Lu Su]71 and Lord Cheng 
[Pu] go forward as the vanguard. I shall remain [260] in reserve and I 
shall continue to send you men and further supplies. 
                                               
71 Zijing 子敬 was the style of Lu Su. 
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 "If you can deal with him, then everything will be settled in our 
favour. If things turn out badly, come back here to me and I shall 
myself fight the deciding battle against him."72 
Sun Quan, therefore, looked upon the coming campaign as only the first 
stage in his manoeuvres and negotiations with Cao Cao. Should he lose 
that initial engagement, he still expected to have sufficient strength to 
fight at least once more, closer to his home ground; and should he decide 
not to fight, he would have sufficient resources to negotiate a surrender 
on good terms. The commitment to face Cao Cao in Jing province was 
certainly a gamble, but the odds were not unreasonable and penalties for 
a loss were neither overwhelming nor fatal. 
 Not all his followers could share Sun Quan's confidence, of course, 
and the choice was hardly an easy one. Once the decision was made, 
Zhang Zhao and his colleagues at court appear to have accepted it 
without further demur, and they presumably concentrated their energies 
on damage control in the event of Zhou Yu's defeat. Others, however, 
closer to the threat and isolated from the discussions at court, continued 
to have doubts, and it was probably at this time that there came the sad 
case of Sun Fu. 
 Sun Fu was the younger son of Sun Jian's twin brother Sun Qiang, 
brother to Sun Ben and first cousin to Sun Ce and Sun Quan. He had 
followed Sun Ce since the early days south of the Yangzi, and had taken 
part in the campaigns against Zu Lang and in the region of Poyang. There 
he had been appointed Administrator of Luling commandery, the new 
territory set up from Yuzhang commandery of Han, on the upper reaches 
of the Gan river in present-day Jiangxi. Later, he was also given title 
[261] as General Who Pacifies the South and Inspector of Jiao province, 
another sign of the Sun group's expansionist ambitions. 
 At this time, however, as Cao Cao came towards the south and east, 
Sun Fu was worried and we are told he sent messengers to Cao Cao, 
offering welcome. Nothing, of course, came of it at this time, but it was 
found out later, and then Sun Fu was imprisoned, his close advisers were 
killed, and his other clients and followers were scattered and distributed 
among members of the clan.73 
                                               
72 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1262 note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
73 Some further details of this affair are given in Dian lue, quoted in commentary to 
the biography of Sun Fu, SGZ 51/Wu 6:1212 PC note 2.  
  ZZTJ 63:2039; deC, Establish Peace, 295-296, dates the disaffection of Sun Fu 
to the beginning of Sun Quan's reign, just after the death of Sun Ce in 200. It 
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 It seems, moreover, that Sun Fu's brother, Sun Ben, was likewise in 
two minds about the policy of resistance. Sun Ben was Administrator of 
Yuzhang, the neighbouring territory to that of Sun Fu in Luling. He had a 
daughter who was married to one of Cao Cao's sons,74 and apart from this 
private interest he seems to [262] have been genuinely concerned with 
the threat from Cao Cao. Unlike his brother, he made no direct move to 
establish contact with the enemy, but the biography of Zhu Zhi notes that 
Sun Ben was known to have supported the sending of hostages to Cao 
Cao, and Zhu Zhi was sent to persuade him of the correctness of the 
court's policy; and to warn him against pressing the debate any further.75 
Sun Ben accepted the advice, and he did not suffer when his brother was 
disgraced.76 It is disconcerting to note, however, that the heads of two 
commanderies in the front line against the attack, close members of the 
Sun family, were doubtful about the success of the plan for resistance. 
The decision was not an easy one, and there were surely other officers 
like Zhu Zhi, sent to encourage the faint-hearted. 
                                                                                                                   
seems most likely, however, that Sun Fu would have been more concerned about 
Cao Cao in 208, when he was close by in Jing province and a serious debate was 
being carried on whether or not to surrender, rather than at a time when Cao Cao 
was primarily engaged in the north, and there was little likelihood of his making an 
effective intervention in the south. 
  The only reference to the timing in the early sources is the statement by Dian 
lue that the attempted communication with Cao Cao took place when Sun Quan 
was at Dongye 東冶, the county on the southeast coast near present-day Fuzhou. 
On the other hand, as the commentator Chen Jingyun, quoted by SGZJJ at 10a, 
remarks, there is no record that Sun Quan ever visited Dongye. The Qing 
commentator Zhao Yiqing suggests that the text at the end of the quoted passage, 
which says that Sun Fu was sent in exile to the east, should be amended to read 
Dongye instead of simply dong 東 "east" (JJ at 10a). So Dongye would indeed 
involved in the story, but as the place of Sun Fu's exile; the reference has been 
confused. 
74 Chapter Three at 197. Cao Zhang, son-on-law of Sun Ben, was a competent and 
respected military commander, but he was engaged at this time in the settlement of 
the north, and had no involvement with Jing province. 
75 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1304 PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
76 Sun Ben remained as Administrator of Yuzhang until his death a few years later, 
and he was succeeded in that position by his son Sun Lin. His biography in SGZ 
51/Wu 6:1210 says that at this time he had received an imperial edict, brought by 
the messenger Liu Yin, appointing him General Who Subdues the Caitiffs. Nothing 
more is known of Liu Yin, but if the reference to an edict (韶 zhao) is correct, then 
it must have been sent from the imperial capital under Cao Cao's control. In that 
case, Sun Ben was in a complicated and dangerous position. 
TO THE RED CLIFFS 
 
 
205 
 For the moment, however, this uncertainty was concealed. In the 
tenth Chinese month, late November or early December of 208, Zhou Yu 
and Cheng Pu led their men and ships up the Yangzi to join Liu Bei and 
Liu Qi.[263] 
 
Red Cliffs: 
Like the record of the debate at Sun Quan's court which preceded it, the 
history of the battle at the Red Cliffs is confused and almost 
overwhelmed by the accretions of romantic heroism which have 
developed around the conflict. So great is the mass of fiction, indeed, one 
might wonder whether any fighting took place at all.77 The bare bones of 
the contest, however, can be discerned, and in the description which 
follows I concentrate first upon the sequence of events in the real world. 
 Liu Bei had withdrawn his forces some fifty kilometres downstream 
from Xiakou to a new headquarters at Fankou, and he was joined there by 
Liu Qi with levies from Jiangxia commandery. In his discussion with Sun 
Quan, Zhuge Liang had claimed Liu Bei had ten thousand men, and Liu 
Qi another ten thousand. He was probably exaggerating, but they had 
likely accumulated a sizable force, though of what quality and morale it 
is difficult to say. In particular, Guan Yu had taken control of the 
warships formerly maintained by Liu Biao on the Han River; the second, 
presumably larger, fleet on the Yangzi had been based at Jiangling, and 
this was now in Cao Cao's hands. There was certainly no possibility that 
the combined forces of Liu Bei and Liu Qi were in any condition to resist 
Cao Cao's further advance, and when we [264>265] are told that Liu Bei 
at Fankou was watching anxiously for the arrival of Sun Quan's men, we 
may well believe it. 
 Officially, Sun Quan had appointed Zhou Yu only as a joint 
commander of the expeditionary force, with the veteran Cheng Pu as his 
associate of equal rank. For the initial phase of the operations, however, it 
                                               
77 Any historian dealing with the traditional Chinese account of a great and 
"decisive" battle must consider the example of the Battle of the Fei River so 
disconcertingly analysed by Rogers, "Myth," as a pseudo-event, invented initially 
to glorify the Xie family of Eastern Jin, and developed further as a warning to the 
rulers of Tang. Compare, however, Holzman's review of Rogers' Chronicle of Fu 
Chien in TP 57 (1971), 182-186. 
  I have sought to consider the account of the Red Cliffs in an appropriately 
critical light; and I come to the conclusion that some military activity did occur at 
that place at the time described. 
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seems clear that Zhou Yu was authorised to play the leading role, and in 
dealings with the allies he made sure to emphasise that point. 
 From the assembly point by Fankou, the combined force moved up 
the Yangzi, past the junction with the Han, and further south to a place 
called the Red Cliffs, now close to Jiayu in Hubei. At this point they met 
with the spearhead of Cao Cao's advance.78[266] 
 Following his victory over Liu Bei by Dangyang, Cao Cao had 
continued south to take over the arsenal and the fleet at Jiangling, capital 
of Nan commandery, and from there he moved east. In fact, the river 
                                               
78 There has been considerable debate on the site of the Red Cliffs. The commentary 
of Lu Bi, in SGZJJ 1:74a-75a, has a most helpful essay on the question, and in 
more recent times a number of articles have been published in China: for example, 
by Jiang Yongxin, Shi Ding, Wu Yingshou and Zhang Xiugui, Wu Yongzhang and 
She Zhimei, Yang Guanyi and Ding Fang, Yin Yungong, and Zhang Zhizhe. 
  My own conclusions on the course and sites of the campaign largely follow the 
arguments of Lu Bi and the map in Zhongguo shi gao ditu ji I, 47, supported by 
Zhongguo lishi ditu ji III, 29-30. In particular, I accept the identification of the site 
of the battle as being in the area of Wulin, which is mentioned in various places in 
the histories (e.g. SGZ 39/Shu 9:980 PC note 2 quoting Lingling xianxian zhuan 
and SGZ 54/Wu 9:1274), and I accept the modern site of Wulin, on the north-
western bank of the Yangzi, as being the same as the ancient place of that name 
(e.g. National Atlas IV, C7/C8, F5). 
  Not all ancient sites, of course, are in the same area as their modern counter-
parts. Huarong county of Han, for example, was close to present-day Jianjiang in 
Hubei, between the Yangzi and the Han; the modern city called Huarong is south 
of the Yangzi in Hunan: e.g. Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, 49-50, and Times Atlas 74, 
E2. Again, the place-name Wuchang now describes one of the three cities which 
compose the modern metropolis of Wuhan, at the junction of the Han with the 
Yangzi River in Hubei; during this period, however, Wuchang was another name 
for the county city of E, present-day Echeng, some distance down-stream. The 
name was changed from E to Wuchang in 220 (SGZ 47/Wu 2:1121), but there are 
anachronistic references to the city under the name Wuchang in accounts dealing 
with earlier years. 
  Among other traditions for different sites of the battle, we may note that the 
celebrated "First Rhapsody on the Red Cliffs" by Su Shi 蘇軾 (style Dongpo 東坡) 
of the eleventh century (translated by Graham in the Anthology edited by Birch at 
386), refers to Cao Cao "gazing towards Xiakou in the west, Wuchang in the east," 
which would mean he had reached a point on the Yangzi downstream of the 
junction with the Han. See also Chapter Nine at 579. 
  On the name and site of Wuchang in the third century, see above. There is, 
moreover, a local tradition in Wuhan that the battle was fought at the junction of 
the rivers, where the metropolis is now: for example, Fitzgerald, Why China?, 92-
93. 
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route along the course of the Yangzi led first southeast and then, passing 
the junction with the Xiang River at the present-day Dongting Lake, 
northeast, so the fleet was following two sides of a triangle. The northern 
bank of the Yangzi in this region was largely marsh-land, and though a 
number of Cao Cao's northern troops must have travelled with the fleet, if 
only to ensure the loyalty of the men who had so recently been in the 
service of Liu Biao, it is probable that a considerable part of his land 
forces took the direct road east from Jiangling, through the county city of 
Huarong, and the two arms of the attackers linked up near the Red Cliffs. 
 For Cao Cao, the obvious strategy was to force a crossing of the 
Yangzi. He would hardly have expected to fight his way steadily down 
the river against the combined opposition of Liu Bei, Liu Qi and Zhou 
Yu, but if he could defeat their forces and establish a bridgehead near 
present-day Jiayu, it was very possible the alliance against him would 
disintegrate under the shock of that defeat. To encourage the process, 
moreover, Cao Cao's forces at Jiayu could then either advance northeast 
against Liu Bei and Liu Qi's positions in Jiangxia, or move directly 
eastwards against [267] Zhaisang and the territory of Sun Quan. Faced 
with such conflicting threats, it was unlikely the allies could maintain 
their co-operation, and very probable that each would sue for separate 
terms. 
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Map 8: The Red Cliffs campaign 208 
 
Cao Cao, moreover, must also have been aware of the problems which he 
faced, as discussed with Sun Quan by Zhuge Liang, Lu Su and Zhou Yu. 
In this sense, time was of the essence. If he could follow up the impetus 
gained by the capitulation of Liu Zong, the defeat of Liu Bei at 
Dangyang, and the take-over of the Yangzi fleet of Jing province, then he 
had an excellent chance of ending the war with one sharp action. He 
could not, however, afford to tie himself down to an extended campaign 
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in a region so far from his centre of power in north China. Jing province 
was hardly secure, and there were plenty of enemies in central China and 
the west who would be ready and anxious to take advantage of any over-
long absence. Though the gamble of battle appeared worth while, Cao 
Cao surely embarked on this last stage of his campaign with reasonably 
limited objectives, and with clear ideas about his line of retreat and the 
posts he would need to hold if he was to consolidate what he had already 
gained so swiftly. 
 The story of the battle is quite brief. We are told that Cao Cao's army 
was in poor condition when his men arrived at the Red Cliffs: many of 
the northerners were exhausted by the long campaign to the south, and 
there was sickness in the tents. After an initial engagement, in which the 
Sun and Liu forces were successful, both sides drew back to 
encampments, Cao Cao near Wulin on the north-western bank, and the 
allies opposite him below the Red Cliffs. It is hard to tell how long the 
stalemate continued, but it seems likely that Cao Cao decided to wait a 
few days to collect his forces, and Zhou Yu did not feel strong enough to 
risk a formal offensive. 
 At this point Huang Gai, an officer of the Sun forces under Zhou Yu's 
command, put forward his plan for an attack. He sent a letter [268] by 
messenger to Cao Cao, asking to surrender; and there may well have been 
other, genuine desertions at this time. Huang Gai, however, prepared a 
special squadron of ten warships, filled them with dry reeds and faggots, 
and poured fatty oil over them. Then he covered them with red tent-cloths 
and set up banners and dragon-pennants, while at the stern of each of ship 
he tied a small skiff. He left the allied ranks and brought his vessels 
towards the northern bank. As they passed the middle point of the river, 
Huang Gai applied flame, and the commanders of his other vessels 
followed suit. They took to the small boats, and the unmanned fireships, 
driven by the following wind, burst against Cao Cao's fleets and camp.79 
 Fire, of course, is an excellent weapon, and fireships have often been 
used by the weaker naval force against a more powerful one. In the 
warfare of the south, at least, fire was used frequently when conditions 
allowed: we have noted the despatch from Sun Ce referring to an attack 
with fire and smoke against Huang Zu, and there will be other occasions 
                                               
79 The story of the fireships is told, not in the biography of Huang Gai (SGZ 55/Wu 
10:1284-85), but in that of Zhou Yu, SGZ 54/Wu 9:1262-63, where PC note 1 also 
contains an extract from Jiangbiao zhuan quoting the letter which Huang Gai is 
said to have written to Cao Cao. 
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when we may observe its use. It is possible that Cao Cao was less aware 
of the danger of his situation, though one would imagine that some of the 
men from Jing province must have warned him. More probably, there 
was a limit to what he could do, faced with the reality of wooden vessels, 
flammable huts and tents, and an unseasonable wind blowing against 
him.80 We are [269] told that the ships were moored stem to stern, and 
that the fire spread throughout the fleet and the army; possibly, however, 
some measures had been taken to isolate one unit from another and thus 
reduce the threat. 
 Wang Fuzhi has discussed the relative situations of Cao Cao and his 
chief opponent at the Red Cliffs, Zhou Yu. As he observes, in the 
triumphant campaign against Yuan Shao eight years earlier at Guandu, 
Cao Cao had been able to hold the defensive and wear the enemy army 
down, and he eventually broke Yuan Shao's forces by a successful attack 
on their supply route. At the Red Cliffs, however, the roles were reversed, 
and it was Cao Cao's forces which were oppressed by Zhou Yu's effective 
resistance. In the end, the attack by fireships may be looked upon simply 
as a catalyst for a military collapse which had become increasingly likely 
as time passed.81 
 Whatever the true extent of the fire, the initial shock was followed up 
very promptly by Zhou Yu, with a light-armed force, and the northern 
army was thrown into confusion. Cao Cao was compelled to order retreat. 
Again, casualties are incalculable. We have terrible stories of slaughter on 
the road to Huarong, with sick and wounded trampled under-foot by 
disorganised fugitives, and we are also told that Cao Cao was compelled 
to burn his own ships in order to prevent them falling into enemy hands. 
The stories may be true, but it is also possible that a considerable number 
of the men from Jing province, with their ships and weapons, were able 
to change sides. Abandoning his immediate plans for conquest, Cao Cao 
returned directly to the north. He left behind, however, a strong garrison 
at Jiangling, and another army further north at Xiangyang, former capital 
of Liu Biao.[270] 
                                               
80 In this region of the middle Yangzi, the prevailing wind during winter blows from 
the northwest, so Cao Cao could have expected it to be for most of the time in his 
favour. On the other hand, wind from the south or east, favouring Zhou Yu and his 
fireships, is not completely unusual or unexpected. (Personal communication from 
Professor Zhou Zhenhe of Fudan University, Shanghai, who was for several years 
stationed in the vicinity of Jiayu city in Hunan, close to the site of the battle.) 
81 Du Tongjian lun 9:21a-b. 
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 In retrospect, the engagement at the Red Cliffs may well be 
considered one of the decisive battles of Chinese history. It is 
questionable if fighting and slaughter took place on so great a scale as 
tradition has claimed, and Cao Cao may not have regarded the enterprise 
at that time as of major importance. Nevertheless, no comparable 
opportunity occurred in later years, and the campaign of the Red Cliffs 
proved in fact to be his last, lost, chance to bring Liu Bei and Sun Quan 
under his authority. Through various later developments, it was the 
continuing independence of these two men which rendered the full re-
unification of China impossible, and confirmed the long division of the 
Three Kingdoms and later centuries. 
 Naturally enough, then, the pleasure of the allies at their local 
triumph was only enhanced as the passage of time revealed the full 
significance of the incident. A whole cycle of stories grew up around the 
campaign, and many of them have been preserved in works of drama and 
in the Romance. The novel devotes eight chapters to the Red Cliffs, and a 
parallel collection of plays in the traditional repertoire describes various 
events, from the time that Zhuge Liang visited Sun Quan's court and 
persuaded him to support Liu Bei, through to the retreat of Cao Cao past 
Huarong, when he was trapped and then released by the heroic and 
chivalrous Guan Yu.82[271] 
 There is notable difference, however, between the historical record 
and the romantic tradition. From the history, it is clear that the major 
contribution to the allied force was that of the Sun group under Zhou Yu 
and Cheng Pu, that the critical action was the attack with fireships led by 
Huang Gai, and that sickness in Cao Cao's army played a considerable 
                                               
82 The story of the Red Cliffs occupies chapters 43-50 of the Romance, the very 
centre of the novel. Titles of the plays vary, and they are often associated under the 
general series known as Qunying hui, "Meeting of Many Heroes." Among the 
traditional ones are: Caochuan jie jian, "Borrowing Arrows with Straw Boats;" 
Jiang Gan tao shu, "Jiang Gan Steals a Letter;" Pang Tong xian lianhuan ji, "Pang 
Tong Proposes Chaining Ships Together;" Da Huang Gai, "Beating Huang Gai;" 
Jie dongfeng, "Obtaining an East Wind;" Huoshao zhanchuan, "Burning the 
Armada;" Huarong dao, "Incident on the Huarong Road." 
  See Arlington and Acton, Famous Chinese Plays, 201-210, Peking Opera 
Texts, 336, 2305, and Jingju jumu chutan, 86-87, which last notes that another 
modern composite work "Battle of the Red Cliffs," was prepared in 1958, at a time 
of increasing interest in the career and historical significance of Cao Cao. 
  Still more recently, here have been a number of television productions, and the 
two-part epic film Chi pi/Red Cliff of John Woo was screened in 2008 and 2009. 
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role in his failure.83 The account of the battle is found chiefly in the 
biography of Zhou Yu and the attached commentary of Pei Songzhi; there 
is only the briefest reference to the enterprise in the Wei section of 
Sanguo zhi, and little more in the history of Shu-Han.84 
 The romantic tradition, however, emphasises the story of Liu Bei and 
his adviser Zhuge Liang, and it was naturally difficult for literary men to 
accept the minor role that these heroes appear to have played at the Red 
Cliffs. As a result, of the plays in the [272] traditional drama cycle, only 
three are concerned primarily with the Sun group: two of those, 
appropriately enough, "Beating Huang Gai" and "Burning the Armada," 
deal with the attack of the fireships and the trickery required to persuade 
Cao Cao to believe in Huang Gai's false surrender; and one other, "Jiang 
Gan Steals a Letter," tells how Zhou Yu deceived a spy and so caused 
Cao Cao to execute two of his loyal and most experienced generals on the 
false belief that they were plotting treachery.85[273] 
                                               
83 The potential for damage from infectious disease in armies with primitive hygiene 
and without modern medicine cannot be neglected. For cases of "the sickness of 
the host" in Western history see, for example, Zinsser, Rats, Lice and History, 154-
165, which has many references to the destruction of armies through the ravages of 
such diseases as dysentery, scurvy, typhoid, smallpox, typhus and plague. The 
diseases themselves may have changed, but the vulnerability of large groups of 
men gathered together was a constant factor in pre-modern warfare, and remains a 
considerable concern in modern times. Just as military commanders failed to 
recognise the danger of infectious disease until it was too late, so later historians 
have often failed to appreciate its importance. 
84 In a letter to Sun Quan, preserved in Jiangbiao zhuan and quoted in SGZ 54/Wu 
9:1265 PC note 2, Cao Cao complained, "In the operations at the Red Cliffs, it was 
only because of sickness that I burnt my ships and retreated. It is out of all reason 
for Zhou Yu to take the credit for himself." 
  As Jiangbiao zhuan remarks, this may be no more than an attempt to discredit 
Zhou Yu as a boaster, but the very existence of the letter implies that Zhou Yu had 
acquired a reputation for the success at that time. In contrast, Shanyang gong zaiji, 
cited by SGZ 1:31 PC note 2, unusually for this early period, gives credit for the 
tactic of fire chiefly to Liu Bei. 
85 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1265 PC note 2 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan, does contain an account of 
how Cao Cao sent his agent Jiang Gan, a man from Jiujiang, the neighbouring 
commandery to that of Zhou Yu, known as the finest advocate of the region 
between the Yangzi and the Huai, to seek to persuade Zhou Yu to join him. 
  When his visitor arrived Zhou Yu received him hospitably, but before Jiang 
Gan could put any proposals Zhou Yu insisted on showing him through the camp, 
with all the men and stores available to him, and he held a feast to display his 
personal wealth and well-being. Then he spoke to Jiang Gan of his relationship 
with Sun Quan, like that of blood-brothers, with total mutual trust. 
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 "Tongue Battle with Many Scholars," however, emphasises Zhuge 
Liang's rhetorical triumph in persuading Sun Quan and his reluctant 
counsellors that they should support Liu Bei against Cao Cao; and 
"Incident on the Huarong Road" describes how Guan Yu caught Cao Cao 
at the time of his retreat, but spared him in remembrance of the favours 
Cao Cao had shown him in the past. Two other well-known plays, 
"Borrowing Arrows with Straw Boats" and "Obtaining an East Wind," 
both celebrate the achievements of Zhuge Liang, and appear to be almost 
completely fictitious, with no support from any near-contemporary 
historical record. 
 "Borrowing Arrows with Straw Boats" tells how Zhuge Liang was 
challenged by Zhou Yu to produce thousands of arrows at short notice. 
Rather than try to have them made, he sailed empty boats, laden with 
                                                                                                                   
  Jiang Gan made no attempt even to broach the subject of defection. He returned 
to Cao Cao and explained that the plan was hopeless: no persuasion could lead 
such a man astray. 
  Jiangbiao zhuan gives no specific date for this incident, though ZZTJ 65:2099; 
deC, Establish Peace, 407-408, sets it in 209, after the Red Cliffs campaign. It 
could, indeed, have taken place at any time after the accession of Sun Quan in 200. 
  Romance chapter 45 and the drama "Jiang Gan Steals a Letter," however, claim 
that Jiang Gan visited Zhou Yu at the time of the Red Cliffs, and Zhou Yu 
deliberately left a forged letter on his desk for Jiang Gan to steal. The letter 
purported to implicate Cai Mao and Zhang Yun, Liu Biao's former commanders 
now in the service of Cao Cao. Cao Cao executed them, and so lost valuable 
advice on the handling of his fleet. 
  Romance chapter 48 and the drama "Pang Tong Proposes Chaining Ships 
Together," continues the plot and tells how Cao Cao was persuaded by Pang Tong, 
agent of Zhuge Liang, to commit his ships into vulnerable array, chained one to 
another. 
  None of this, however, is mentioned by Sanguo zhi. Cai Mao and Zhang Yun 
are referred to as partisans of Liu Zong, son of Liu Biao, at the time of the 
succession dispute before the surrender to Cao Cao (see above at 247 and SGZ 
6:213); they are not noted for their skill in military or naval affairs. And the 
biography of Pang Tong has no mention even of his presence at the Red Cliffs 
(SGZ 37/Shu 7:953). 
  There are several similar occasions where Romance brings in historical 
characters and ascribes them an extra role in such major events as the Red Cliffs 
campaign, As one further example, I may cite the death of the worthy Liu Fu, who 
is said to have been killed there by Cao Cao in a fit of rage. Liu Fu did die about 
that time, but he was actually serving as Inspector of Yang province for Cao Cao, 
on the frontier between the Yangzi and the Huai. It is quite improbable he had any 
occasion to visit the army in Jing province at that time, still less be killed by Cao 
Cao: see below at 312. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
214 
straw, along the lines of Cao Cao's positions during the night, and had his 
men, under cover, call abuse and threats to the enemy. Cao Cao's troops 
responded with a rain of arrows, and Zhuge Liang was able to bring back 
more than a full supply, to the discomfiture and embarrassment of Zhou 
Yu.86 [274] "Obtaining an East Wind" gives Zhuge Liang credit for the 
wind essential to the plans of Huang Gai's fireship attack, for it was he 
who summoned the gale by his magical arts.87 
 All these stories are matched by the account of the campaign in 
Romance, and the whole tenor of the novel reflects a tradition which 
praises the role of Liu Bei, Zhuge Liang and their associates, while Zhou 
Yu and the other men of the Sun group are shown as their unhappy 
inferiors in spirit, imagination and skill. Zhou Yu, in particular, leader of 
the Sun forces, seeks to assert a dominance over Zhuge Liang, but is 
constantly foiled by the latter's wisdom and supernatural skill; he is 
reduced to the unattractive role of a talented man rendered frustrated and 
jealous by encountering a rival of matchless superiority.88[275] 
                                               
86 The parallel account appears in Romance chapter 46. Earlier versions of the story, 
notably Sanguo zhi pinghua, attribute the ruse of the straw boats to Zhou Yu, not to 
Zhuge Liang, and indeed, in general terms, earlier cycles of stories about the Red 
Cliffs campaign regularly give major credit to Zhou Yu. See Plaks, Four 
Masterpieces, 449 and 471. 
  There is, moreover, one near-parallel to the story about the arrows and the 
boats. SGZ 47/Wu 2:1119 PC note 1 quoting Wei lue, describes an incident during 
the attack by Cao Cao against Sun Quan's defensive post at Ruxu, on the northern 
bank of the Yangzi in present-day Anhui, in 213. 
  At that time, Sun Quan took ship on the river to observe the situation. Cao 
Cao's army sent out a hail of arrows and crossbow bolts. The missiles stuck in the 
side exposed to the enemy, and the increased weight threatened to make the vessel 
capsize. So Sun Quan turned his ship and presented the other side to enemy fire. 
Those arrows levelled the ship, and he was thus able to return safely to his camp. 
  It is likely that this incident (surely exaggerated) provided some later 
imagination with the story of Zhuge Liang's clever trick. It is, again, typical of the 
bias of romantic tradition that the concept, however distorted, was transferred from 
the credit of Sun Quan to that of Zhuge Liang. 
87 The drama "Obtaining an East Wind," and the parallel passage in Romance chapter 
49, say that Zhou Yu was embarrassed and in despair when he discovered that his 
planned attack with fire depended on a wind direction which never occurred at that 
time of year – that was why Zhuge Liang's magical arts were so necessary. See, 
however, note 80 above. 
88 On the fictional relationship between Zhou Yu and Zhuge Liang, and the distortion 
which this produces in the literary picture of Zhou Yu, see, for example, Hsia, The 
Classic Chinese Novel, 69-71, and Plaks, Four Masterpieces, 471. 
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 This matter is discussed further at other places, and there are 
frequent examples in Romance of the bias towards Liu Bei and Zhuge 
Liang, to some of which we shall be referring in future. The campaign of 
the Red Cliffs, however, is one of the more dramatic occasions that 
historical record is overlaid and distorted by the call of propaganda and 
the requirements of fiction, and the sources must therefore be read and 
interpreted with particular care. 
 The engagement at the Red Cliffs took place in the winter of the 
thirteenth year of Jian'an, probably about the end of Western 208. It was 
not necessarily a major tactical defeat for Cao Cao, but it did mark the 
failure of his hopes for a quick victory over the allies, and his armies 
would never reach so far to the south again. To that extent, the position of 
importance which it has acquired in legend and romance is not 
unjustified. In the immediate situation, however, Cao Cao was able to 
leave the region in reasonably good order, and his armies still controlled 
the northern part of Jing province from the line of the Yangzi by Jiangling 
and up the valley of the Han River. For the victorious allies, questions 
remained of how much they could profit from their success, and how they 
would divide those spoils. 
 
Some notes on ships and naval warfare: 
One difficulty in dealing with the military history of Wu, bound up so 
closely with naval warfare on the Yangzi and its tributaries, is that we 
know very little of the tactics employed in any of the battles and 
skirmishes, nor of the ships and weapons used in those engagements. It is 
one thing to discuss the strategy involved in the approach to such a battle 
as that at the Red Cliffs, but once the [276] romantic rhetoric is removed 
there is not much fact to fill out the story.89 
 We are told, for example, that there was a preliminary skirmish 
between Cao Cao's forces and those of the allies, and that Cao Cao's men 
had the worst of it - but there are no details of the nature of that fighting, 
nor any indication of the time that elapsed between the first engagement 
and the successful strike with fireships by Huang Gai. And though 
Sanguo zhi gives clear details of the arrangements for that attack, there is 
                                               
89 One of the best studies of Chinese inland naval warfare is the article by Dreyer on 
the Poyang campaign of 1363 between the warlord Chen Youliang and Zhu 
Yuanzhang, future founding emperor of the Ming dynasty. 
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confusion in the texts even as to the nature of the ships that Huang Gai 
used, and the number of them. 
 Firstly, Sanguo zhi says that the number of vessels in Huang Gai's 
squadron was "several tens," but the parallel passage in Zizhi tongjian, 
which may have followed a different edition of Sanguo zhi, omits one 
character, and so allocates Huang Gai only ten ships.90 Again, Sanguo zhi 
describes Huang Gai only as a "divisional commander" under Zhou Yu - 
a vague term which may indicate some informality in the command 
structure of the allies or, more probably, simple ignorance on the part of 
the historian.91 
 With regard to the ships themselves, they are described by the 
expression mengchong doujian, which served at that time as a general 
description for vessels of war: a little earlier in Sanguo zhi this term is 
used for the numbers of Cao Cao's fleet.92[277] 
 The phrase mengchong is discussed by the Tang scholar Li Quan in 
his Taibo yin jing, and that passage has become the locus classicus for 
description of ships at that time.93 We are there given a list of six different 
classes of warships, louchuan, "Towered Warship," the mengchong, 
rendered by Needham as "Covered Swooper," the zhanjian "Combat-
Junks," also known as doujian "Fighting Junks," the zouge "Flying 
Barques," the youting, "Patrol Boats" and the haihu "Sea-Hawks." The 
mengchong is said to have been protected by a covering of raw ox-hides 
for safety against fire and missiles, with loopholes in the sides for 
crossbows and pikes. It is emphasised, however, that the mengchong was 
a light and narrow craft, built for speed as much as for security, and in his 
                                               
90 Compare SGZ 54/Wu 9:1262-63, and ZZTJ 65:2093. 
91 The Chinese phrase is bujiang 部將.The biography of Huang Gai in SGZ 55/Wu 
10 notes that he had lately been Commandant of Danyang commandery, and after 
the Red Cliffs he was made a General of the Household, but we cannot judge what 
rank he held at the time nor how many ships he might have been expected to 
command. 
92 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1261: 蒙衝鬬艦. 
93 The Tong dian of the early ninth century, compiled by Du You, 160, 848c-849a, 
quotes from the Taibo yin jing 太白陰經 "Secret Classic of the Great White [Planet 
of War (=Western Venus)]," compiled in the middle of the eighth century. This 
passage is quoted in turn by the commentary of Hu Sanxing to ZZTJ 65:2089-90, 
parallel to SGZ 54/Wu 9:1261. The text, with additions from other sources, is 
discussed by Needham, Science and Civilisation IV:3, 424-425, and translated at 
685-686. 
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rendering of mengchong by the phrase "Covered Swooper," Needham 
explains the character chong as implying "rushing violent motion."94 
 Such a description of the mengchong, however, does not fit well with 
another account of ships of this type in action at the time: early in 208, a 
few months before the Red Cliffs, when Huang Zu had sought to defend 
the entrance to the Han River from the Yangzi by great ropes across the 
stream, he had mengchong ships moored to defend it. The mengchong 
were evidently acting as floating fortresses, not as light skirmishing 
vessels.95[278] 
 It appears that two things have happened to this terminology. Firstly, 
between the third century, when the fighting which we are discussing 
took place, and the eighth and ninth centuries, when the Tang scholars 
compiled their lists and descriptions, the role of the ships called 
mengchong changed, so they were indeed used as protected skirmishing 
craft, and had in fact become lighter. Second, as a consequence of this 
change in role, while the character meng was still understood as meaning 
"covered," the character chong was, as Needham has argued, interpreted 
to describe a dashing attack. I suggest, however, that in Han and Three 
Kingdoms times, the character chong held its other, perhaps more basic, 
meaning of "breaking the enemy line." While the mengchong of Tang did 
this purely by speed, the mengchong of Han was a powerful warship, 
possibly equipped with a ram, whose effect depended upon the weight of 
its approach, not its speed. I prefer, therefore, to render the term as 
"Armoured Breaker" rather than "Covered Swooper," and I suspect that 
its function was primarily to destroy the cohesion of enemy formations, 
allowing individual units to be isolated and surrounded, not to physically 
strike and sink another ship.96[279] 
                                               
94 Needham, Science and Civilisation IV:3, 686 note a. 
95 See 240 above, quoting SGZ 55/Wu 10:1291, where I render mengchong as "ships 
covered with raw ox-hide." 
  Needham, Science and Civilisation IV:3, 449 and 680, refers twice to this 
engagement, but takes no particular notice of the role of the mengchong. 
96 Needham, Science and Civilisation IV:3, 680, notes that the Shi ming of about 100 
AD describes the mengchong as long and narrow, dashing against the ships of the 
enemy, while the eighteenth century commentator Wang Niansun, discussing the 
list of names of types of ships in the third century work Guang ya (which 
unfortunately gives no description of the vessels named), explains that the 
character meng 蒙 should be understood as synonymous with mao 冒, which can 
refer to a covering but which here held the sense of "rushing and colliding." 
Needham goes on to argue that although meng may have originally referred to the 
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 As to the doujian, the Tang texts describe it as a large, open, ship, 
with two ranks of raised bulwarks, pierced with loop-holes. Confusingly, 
we are told that these fighting junks were designed for "combat," while 
the mengchong were not, which seems a strange thing to say about a 
warship. Needham suggests, however, that "this may have been an 
explanation intended for military readers used to close combat on terra 
firma,"97 and on this interpretation we may understand the mengchong as 
designed for ship-against-ship fighting, while doujian were for hand-to-
hand combat by boarding, or by anti-personnel missiles such as spears or 
cross-bows. 
 One may be reading too much into these scattered and often 
generalised references, but it seems reasonable to regard the essential 
division of responsibility among the major ships of these river fleets as 
being between those which served as fighting platforms for spearmen and 
archers to engage in close combat, and those covered with some form of 
protective material which could be used to break the enemy line of battle 
and perhaps to damage their ships and men with a ram or by projectiles. 
In that sense, the phrase mengchong doujian would then describe both the 
specialised functions of the capital ships at that time.[280] 
 We know, of course, that the term louchuan was used regularly for 
great warships of the Han dynasty. Ships of that description were used in 
Chinese attacks against the far south, and a General of Towered Ships 
took part in the conquests of Nan-Yue and Dong-Yue for Emperor Wu of 
Former Han.98 During Former Han, moreover, there was an Office for 
Towered Warships in Lujiang commandery, for the construction of 
louchuan and the training of sailors, and the arrangement was probably 
continued in some form during Later Han.99 The term, indeed, had been 
                                                                                                                   
ram function, by Tang times it had been interpreted as describing the defensive 
covering. 
  I believe that in this Needham is correct, but it is my argument that the term 
mengchong had gained this significance by the early third century. The question of 
ramming is discussed further below. 
  [See also Schafer, Vermilion Bird, 242, citing Tong dian 150, and noting that 
while the phrase mengtong 艨艟 referred to a warship, the two characters written 
with the "bird" radical 鳥 described the hornbill bird (Dicheros).] 
97 The Chinese says that the mengchong were 非戰之船, while doujian were 戰船. 
Needham's remarks appear in Science and Civilisation IV:3 at 687. 
98 See, for example, HS 6:186 and 189; Dubs, HFHD II, 80 and 82. 
99 Chapter One at 55. 
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used for centuries before Han,100 and although the Tang texts treat 
louchuan as a particular class of vessel, distinct from the mengchong and 
the doujian, it may well be better understood, at least for this period, as a 
general description of a warship with more than one deck. 
 Given the existence of river currents and the uncertainties of the 
winds, there is no question that these ships must have carried both sails 
and oars, and although many were built specifically for service in war, it 
is probable their design was based upon local river junks. Unlike the 
contemporary Mediterranean world, where the trading ship contrasted 
sharply with the specialised trireme and other warships, a Chinese 
fighting fleet of the early third century would have looked very much like 
an over-built and over-manned group of civilian vessels.101 And they 
would have been escorted, of course, by a mass of small craft, from light 
sailing ships [281] to canoes, anything which could be pressed into 
service and which might be useful in skirmishing. 
 There is, of course, one notable difference in the nature of river 
warfare as opposed to that which takes place at sea: the action is quite 
literally channelled into a limited area. The commander of a river fleet 
may normally expect to be informed of the position and the movements 
of his adversary, and the conduct of naval manoeuvres is inevitably 
linked closely to those of armies on land.102 
 In this situation, the requirements of a fleet are comparatively simple 
and straightforward, for it acts in many ways like a land army, and 
frequently as the extension of a landed force. Many ships are designed 
chiefly for the transport of troops, and though the men may fight on water 
                                               
100 See Needham's citations in Science and Civilisation IV:3, at 299 and 440. 
101 When Lü Meng moved west along the Yangzi to attack Guan Yu in 219, he had his 
troops hidden in barges and dressed the men who appeared on deck of the ships in 
civilian clothes, so they would look like merchants. The disguise appears to have 
been completely successful; which would indicate that warships were not 
obviously specialised vessels: Chapter Six at 400. 
102 One may compare the quite different situation of naval warfare as known in the 
West. There are two well-known examples: in 1588 the Spanish plan for invasion 
of England required a complicated, and eventually impossible, co-ordination 
between the sailing Armada and the forces of the Duke of Parma in the 
Netherlands; and in 1805 Napoleon's hopes for a similar invasion by his army 
camped at Boulogne were eventually frustrated by the outcome of Nelson's and 
Villeneuve's manoeuvres in the Atlantic, which included a hunt as far as the West 
Indies and which culminated in the battle of Trafalgar, close to the strait of 
Gibraltar and far distant from the ultimate object of the exercise. 
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they are quite as likely to disembark and engage on shore. As 
conservative officers observed when Lü Meng proposed to establish a 
bridgehead fortress at Ruxu, "We climb the bank to attack the enemy and 
we wade in the water to rejoin our ships. What is the use of such a 
fort?"103 And though the fortress indeed proved valuable, the principle 
was not negated. 
 This natural use of a river fleet primarily for the transport of an army 
was only enhanced in Han times by the fact that the weaponry of the time 
did not include any effective method of "ship-killing." Leaving aside the 
special case of fireships, one regular battle-ship could not normally 
expect to destroy another. Given the traditional [282] Chinese techniques 
of ship-building, which provide watertight compartments against sinking, 
but no keel which could form the basis for a ram, an attacker was at far 
more of a disadvantage against the defender than was the case in naval 
warfare on the Mediterranean.104 And before the advent of cannon, 
                                               
103 Chapter 5 at 319-320. 
104 The question of the history of ramming is long and complicated, for it is difficult to 
distinguish between ships designed to hole the enemy below the water-line, those 
which were constructed or reinforced to withstand a fore-and-aft shock, and those 
which simply ran into another from the side and acquired a largely accidental or 
opportunistic advantage. 
  Needham, Science and Civilisation IV:3, 678-680, discussing the matter, cites 
the Yue jueshu 越絕書 "Lost Records from the State of Yue," of which some part 
may be dated to the first century AD, where there is reference to tuwei 穾胃 
"Stomach-striker" ships, possibly armed with sharp protuberances to hole the 
enemy below the water-line, and the fragmentary third-century work Wanji lun 萬
機論 "Discussion of the Myriad Stratagems," by the admiral Jiang Ji of Wei, which 
tells how the oared ships of Wu and Yue in the Warring States period had "butted 
each other as if with horns" (相觸 xiang chu) – though it is unclear in this case 
whether their opponents were overturned or sank, and it is not certain that the term 
chu has the necessary meaning of ramming below the water line. In both cases, 
Needham is cautious about interpreting the terms as relating specifically to rams. 
He does suggest, however, at 680, that maotu 冒穾 ships used at the beginning of 
Later Han were capable of ramming; at 681 he observes the existence of a 
particular type of sampan in the region of Hangzhou which, unusually for a 
Chinese vessel, has a bifid stem and stern with a ram-like projection; and at 681 
note b he states that in the Song period there is evidence of deliberate use of the 
ram. 
  On the other hand, in his discussion of "The Po-yang Campaign" at 209, Dreyer 
observes that "It is also clear from the battle accounts that tactics did not depend 
upon the ram, so that the warships could do one another damage only by shooting 
arrows or other projectiles." Though this relates to events a thousand years after 
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mechanical [283] missile-launchers such as the catapult or trebuchet were 
so slow and clumsy that they were largely ineffective against rival 
ships.105 
 There was indeed the possibility of fire, but the success of an attack 
by fireships required a special combination of circumstances, notably a 
favourable wind, with an element of surprise or circumstances of 
restricted manoeuvre by the object of the attack. Such a tactic, therefore, 
was normally improvised on the spot, either with some light craft or 
unwanted ships constructed for the occasion or, as with Huang Gai, 
adapted for the purpose. Otherwise, apart from the use of arrows with 
inflammable material attached, which were not particularly difficult for 
defenders to control, the Chinese of the third century had no a regular and 
effective means to deliver an attack by fire. Most notably, there was at 
that time no Greek Fire.[284]106 
                                                                                                                   
the time we are discussing, it is noteworthy that Chinese ships of that time did not 
use the ram. By contrast, in the West, after the extraordinary Austrian success at 
the battle of Lissa in 1866, early versions of steam-powered ironclads up to the 
beginning of this century were deliberately designed with ramming capacity. 
105 They could, however, be used from ships or other floating platforms to attack a 
static fortification such as a city wall. In the warfare between Zhu Yuanzhang and 
Chen Youliang during the mid-fourteenth century, both sides captured cities by 
assault from ships: Dreyer, "The Po-yang Campaign," 204. 
106 In his admirable essay on the "The Gunpowder Epic" in Science and Civilisation 
V:7, Needham has sections on early incendiary warfare, with naphtha, Greek Fire 
and flame-throwers. 
  At 76-77, Needham observes that the Chinese of Han had access to petroleum 
(石油 shiyou) through natural oil seepages, and there is evidence that supplies of 
petroleum were part of a military arsenal late in the third century. It would appear, 
however, that it was no more than another inflammable substance, and it is not 
until the tenth century that the phrase menghuo you 猛火油 "fierce fire oil," appears 
to indicate the adoption of Greek Fire. 
  The ingredients of Greek Fire, which could be pumped and ignited against an 
enemy, are not known for certain. One theory is that it was a mixture of pitch and 
saltpetre, another that it was distilled petroleum, similar to modern volatile petrol. 
The technique, however, appears in the eastern Mediterranean no earlier than the 
latter part of the seventh century: Needham, Science and Civilisation V:7, 76-80. 
Similarly, the effective use of incendiary oils based upon naphtha was developed 
by the early Arab Muslim armies at about the same time, or perhaps a little later: 
Needham, Science and Civilisation V:7, 73-74. 
  Neither of these useful incendiaries, therefore, was available to the warriors of 
the Three Kingdoms, and the oil that Huang Gai used in his fireships at the Red 
Cliffs is described as gaoyou 膏油 "fatty oil," presumably prepared from animals or 
fish. 
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 For the most part, therefore, the greatest danger to a naval vessel of 
this time was not the enemy but the weather. The expanse of the Yangzi 
and the various lakes and tributaries was quite sufficient to offer 
problems of seamanship, and there was a natural tendency to overload 
fighting ships with defensive construction and upper-works, to a degree 
where many of them were so low in the water and so high above it that 
they were extremely difficult to handle. The biography of Dong Xi in 
Sanguo zhi tells how he was in command of a great five-decked ship 
when a storm arose suddenly in the night. The vessel was evidently top-
heavy and of limited seaworthiness, and as it was about to founder Dong 
Xi was urged to make his escape. He refused to leave his post of 
command, however, and went down with the ship.107 There is an account 
of Sun Quan under similar threat,108 and in 222, when Cao Pi first brought 
his army south against Sun Quan, a number of ships in a squadron 
commanded by Lü Fan were caught by a violent storm on the Yangzi and 
were wrecked or foundered with the loss of several thousand men.109[285] 
 In general terms, however, it seems clear that the men of the south 
were highly competent sailors, and their seamanship gave them 
consistent advantage over invaders from the north. We are told that on a 
number of occasions after 208 Cao Cao and his successors sought to train 
their men on lakes before they committed them to battle along the line of 
the Yangzi,110 but practice manoeuvres in limited and artificial conditions 
could not match the experience which the men of Wu gained in everyday 
dealing with the Yangzi and in regular patrols and small-scale expeditions 
against local trouble in the Poyang region and along the Han and the 
                                               
107 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1291, also Chapter Six at 383. The vessel is described as 五樓船 
wulou chuan: a phrase which might imply five separate fighting turrets but 
probably refers to five decks. Tang authorities regarded three decks as normal for a 
louchuan: Needham, Science and Civilisation IV:3, 442. 
108 See note 30 to Chapter Six. 
109 See Chapter Seven at 431, and SGZ 56/Wu 11:1311 and SGZ 47/Wu 2:1126; Fang, 
Chronicle I, 133. There was also the occasion in 232 that the fleet of Wu which 
had been visiting Gongsun Yuan in the northeast was wrecked in winter off the 
Shandong peninsula: e.g. Fang, Chronicle I, 376 and 393-394. That, however, was 
a matter of navigation at sea, with all its greater dangers. We know nothing of the 
ships involved except that they had been sent primarily to obtain horses, so there is 
no reason to believe they were specialised warships. 
110 In the spring and summer of 209, for example, the year after the Red Cliffs, Cao 
Cao arranged for naval exercises on the lakes near Qiao, in preparation for attack 
against Sun Quan's positions south of Hefei: SGZ 1:32, and Chapter Five at 316. 
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Xiang. For people of the south, rivers were essential routes for most long-
distance travel and transport of civilian goods, so mastery of navigation 
and the techniques of naval warfare were a natural part of the military 
and political power of the state. 
 From this point of view, the defeat at the Red Cliffs gains even more 
importance, for Cao Cao and his heirs never again controlled a fleet 
comparable to that which he had acquired in 208. In skill and experience, 
the forces which Cao Cao had taken over from Liu Biao had been equal 
to those of Sun Quan and his allies. Whether by reason of internal 
dissidence, poor management or the mischance of fate, as a result of the 
Red Cliffs campaign, and the allies' capture of Jiangling in the following 
year, that great fleet was lost. 
 It may well have seemed to Cao Cao, and to others at the time, that 
the matter was of minor importance, for ships could always be rebuilt and 
the northern part of Jing province was yet a substantial acquisition. In 
fact, however, the victory gave Sun Quan and Liu Bei control of the 
Yangzi, and in the defence of that line of the river the [286] southerners 
acquired a strategic initiative, and a dominance in skill, which they 
retained for generations to come. 
 One final point: the records of the great war-fleets which contested 
the Yangzi are evidence also of massive mercantile trade and industrial 
development in ship construction. The Han Office for Towered Warships 
in Lujiang, with its facilities for maintenance and construction, was 
surely matched at Jiangling and very probably by a base on the Han 
River, while there were certainly private shipyards at harbours along the 
waterways. The transformation of the Yangzi, however, from an internal 
transport route to a front line of naval warfare, required and received a far 
greater construction capacity than before, and every defence post of Sun 
Quan's territory must have had workshops to construct and service their 
ships. 
 At the same time, the importance of the Yangzi for civilian trade also 
expanded. The communications routes of Han had been based on roads 
and canals which led to the imperial capital at Luoyang, and the east-west 
course of the Yangzi was not a major contributor to that network. The 
development of Sun Quan's state, however, would greatly depend upon 
his ability to maintain links between the middle and the lower Yangzi, 
and the river itself was the only obvious route of access between the two 
regions. So the manufacture of warships was complemented by increased 
construction for trade and transport, and the waters of the Yangzi and its 
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tributaries saw an explosion of commercial development. As argued 
above, many ships of war, like those of medieval Europe, would have 
been civilian craft commandeered and converted for short-term service, 
and though official histories are predictably silent upon the question of 
mercantile trade, we know that the great invasion force sent against Jing 
province in 219 was disguised as a fleet of merchants. 111 When vessels 
sufficient to hold thirty thousand men could be presented as a normal 
commercial enterprise, there were surely great fleets upon the river.[287] 
                                               
111  Chapter Six at 400. 
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Introductory summary: 
After the defeat of Cao Cao at the Red Cliffs, the armies of Sun Quan 
attacked and captured Jiangling, thus gaining control of the middle 
Yangzi and the lower reaches of the Han. In the meantime, however, Liu 
Bei and his chief assistant Zhuge Liang had established control of the 
southern commanderies along the Xiang valley in present-day Hunan. 
With the death of Zhou Yu in 210:Sun Quan was compelled to recognise 
Liu Bei's control of the greater part of Jing province. 
 In Yang province to the east, Sun Quan was similarly restricted, for 
Cao Cao's local governor Liu Fu secured the valley of the Huai by means 
of agricultural colonies. Sun Quan could not develop a position north of 
the Yangzi, and the area between the two rivers became a no-man's land. 
 Within his own territory, however, Sun Quan extended his authority 
against the people of the hill country. In particular, the region of Huang 
Shan was brought under colonisation, while his officer He Qi advanced 
through the river valleys from the coast of present-day Fujian to the 
Poyang lakes and marshes.[288] 
 In the far south, Jiao province was largely in the control of the local 
leader Shi Xie, whose capital was Longbian near present-day Hanoi in 
Vietnam. In 210 Sun Quan sent Bu Zhi as Inspector, and he established 
an administration in the east about present-day Guangzhou. Shi Xie 
maintained his independence but gave formal recognition to Sun Quan's 
authority. 
 
                                               
*  In the first edition of Generals of the South, published in 1990, Chapter Five 
occupied pages 287 to 353. The original pagination is indicated with brackets []; 
indexing and cross-references refer to those pages. 
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The first settlement of Jing province (209-210): 
In the last weeks of the Chinese year, the beginning of Western 209, the 
armies of Sun Quan strove to follow up their success at the Red Cliffs. In 
the east, Sun Quan led an expedition north across the Yangzi against the 
city of Hefei. For this purpose, he was evidently able to commit the 
troops which he had gathered earlier to hold in reserve during the Red 
Cliffs campaign, and his attack was a serious attempt to break the line of 
the Huai and establish a presence in the north China plain. It was a two-
pronged offensive: as Sun Quan took the main force against Hefei city, he 
sent Zhang Zhao, his Chief Clerk, to lead a second column in an extended 
march against Dangtu, on the Huai River near Huainan in present-day 
Anhui, one hundred kilometres north of Hefei. They evidently hoped to 
isolate Hefei, cut the city off from supplies and relief and thus compel its 
surrender. The plan, however, failed completely. Zhang Zhao had no 
success at Dangtu, and Hefei withstood Sun Quan's siege and storm for 
more than a month. By the time reinforcements arrived from the north, 
Sun Quan had already retreated.1 
 The failure of this operation meant that any immediate expansion of 
Sun Quan's power into settled Chinese territory must take place in the 
west, in Jing province. There, however, despite the success at the [289] 
Red Cliffs, and the impetus this should have given the counter-attack 
against Cao Cao's positions, there were both military and political 
difficulties. 
 For Sun Quan, with his headquarters by the mouth of the Yangzi, the 
region of Jing province was still on the edge of concern. His authority 
stretched over a long and in many respects unwieldy group of territories, 
from the isolated region of present-day Fuzhou, on the coast far to the 
south, through Kuaiji and Wu commanderies, past Hangzhou Bay and the 
Tai Lake, then along the southern shore of the lower Yangzi to the 
Poyang district of present-day Jiangxi. This crescent of control was 
bordered on the north by the lands under Cao Cao's government through 
Liu Fu, and on the south by hill country with refugees and non-Chinese 
people. Both the opportunities to the south and the incipient threat from 
the north meant that only a limited force could be spared for any 
possibilities further up the Yangzi in present-day Hunan and Hubei. It 
                                               
1 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1118, and ZZTJ 66:2097-98; deC, Establish Peace, 404-405. On this 
campaign, see also below. 
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was not that the chances were not apparent or welcomed; it was simply 
that the resources available to Sun Quan and his generals were limited. 
 There was, moreover, the problem of Liu Bei, and to a lesser extent 
that of Liu Qi. Each had shared in the victory at the Red Cliffs, and each 
expected a portion of the spoils. Both men, one way or another, had 
established a position in Jing province, they had a reputation among the 
people there, and they could gather more support than the outsiders from 
down-river. Despite the leading role which Sun Quan's men had played in 
the success against Cao Cao, he could not neglect the claims of his allies. 
 Liu Qi, in fact, did not long present a problem. In 209, within a few 
months of the victory at the Red Cliffs, he died in Jiangxia, and that 
territory was formally taken over by Sun Quan through the appointment 
of Cheng Pu as Administrator.2[290] 
 Liu Bei, however, was considerably more difficult to handle. He was 
an experienced military commander, and though his army was almost 
certainly smaller than that of Zhou Yu, it was not negligible in size, it was 
personally loyal to Liu Bei, and it was based upon local recruitment. With 
the death of Liu Qi, who had been awarded the titular position of 
Inspector of Jing province by the allies, in semi-succession to his father, 
Liu Bei was able to ask for that appointment in his stead. In a farce of 
mutual recommendations, Sun Quan proposed Liu Bei as Governor of 
Jing province, and Liu Bei nominated Sun Quan as Governor of Xu 
province and Acting General of Chariots and Cavalry. Liu Bei's 
headquarters were at Youjiang kou, a settlement on the southern bank of 
the Yangzi downstream from Jiangling near the borders of Wuling and 
Nan commanderies. He renamed the place Gong'an.3 
 Already, in the immediate aftermath of the victory at the Red Cliffs, 
Liu Bei had been able to negotiate the preliminaries to such a favourable 
settlement. As the allied armies moved east to follow up their success, 
Liu Bei left Zhou Yu to attack Cao Ren, who commanded the forces Cao 
Cao had left behind in Jiangling, while he himself turned his attention to 
the south. Within a very short time he had received the surrenders of the 
administrators of Wuling, Changsha, Lingling and Guiyang who had 
                                               
2 SGZ 32/Shu 2:879 and HHS 74B/64B:2424, also SGZ 55/Wu 10:1284. 
3 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1118 and SGZ 32/Shu 2:879. The name Youjiang kou 油江口 some-
times appears as Youkou; the You was a tributary of the Yangzi. 
  The recommendations, of course, were being made formally to the court of Han 
under Cao Cao's control, and he would certainly not approve them. The same 
situation had prevailed in the time of Dong Zhuo: note 55 to Chapter Two. 
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recently been appointed by Cao Cao. Liu Bei then appointed Zhuge 
Liang to act as co-ordinator for the latter three commanderies, and Zhuge 
Liang set his administration at Linzheng city, near present-day Hengyang 
in Hunan, close to the junction of the Lei river with the Xiang. From 
there he had easy communications with Changsha commandery to [291] 
the north, Guiyang to the south, and Lingling to the southwest, and he 
provided supplies and men to Liu Bei in Wuling commandery. 
 Zhou Yu, on the other hand, was held for several months in the siege 
of Jiangling. We have been told that Cao Cao lost his fleet at the Red 
Cliffs, but it appears the Yangzi was still a significant obstacle to the 
attackers, and there is evidence that the division of command between 
Zhou Yu and Cheng Pu showed signs of strain and a lack of co-
ordination.4 Eventually, a detachment under Gan Ning was able to cross 
the Yangzi upstream of Jiangling and seize the city of Yiling, near 
present-day Yichang. Cao Ren sent a strong force against Gan Ning, but 
Zhou Yu left a minimal guard to maintain the siege of Jiangling and led 
the main body of the army to relieve him. They defeated Cao Ren's 
troops, captured numbers of horses, and returned in triumph. With a 
bridgehead thus established, Zhou Yu was able to bring the main body of 
his army across the river, and Cao Ren abandoned Jiangling and retreated 
to the north.5[292] 
                                               
4 Years later, in 219, when Sun Quan proposed to appoint his cousin Sun Jiao as 
joint commander with Lü Meng for the campaign against Guan Yu. Lü Meng 
argued against the proposal: 
  "If you believe [Sun Jiao] is the right man, you should give him the 
appointment. If you think that I am the right man, then use me. 
  "Once in the past, Zhou Yu and Cheng Pu were in command of the divisions of 
the left and the right and they attacked Jiangling together. The final decisions were 
taken by Zhou Yu, but Cheng Pu relied on his long experience and thus shared in 
the command. Though there was no specific disagreement, they almost wrecked 
the affairs of the state. This example must serve as a warning." 
  Sun Quan appreciated the point and put Lü Meng in sole command, with Sun 
Jiao in charge of the reserve. See Chapter Six at 397 and SGZ 51/Wu 6:1207-08. 
5 The biography of Cao Ren, cousin of Cao Cao, is in SGZ 9:274-76. 
  Cao Ren was a competent and experienced commander, and he had served Cao 
Cao since his early campaigns. His biography, in the description of the attack on 
Jiangling at 275, refers to his personal heroism in a skirmish against heavy odds. 
Despite the retreat, he was awarded an enfeoffment and continued as a trusted 
officer. Though Cao Cao had lost Jiangling, he was evidently reasonably content 
with the cost and delay to the enemy. 
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 Again, this was a defeat for Cao Cao's forces, and the line of his 
territory was now withdrawn some hundred and fifty kilometres to the 
region about Xiangyang. His enemies controlled all the lower valley of 
the Han, and of the territory which he had taken from Liu Zong he 
retained little more than Xiangyang and a northern part of Jiangxia 
commandery to the east. His defences on that line, however, were well 
established, he had little to fear from an attack for the next several years, 
and he could still threaten Sun Quan in the east across the Huai. For the 
time being, Cao Cao turned his attention to Chang'an and the northwest, 
and left the southerners to their own devices. The withdrawal from Jing 
province was a set-back, but other opportunities were now at hand. 
 The long-drawn fighting against Cao Ren, and the casualties incurred 
in that campaign, had taken toll of Zhou Yu's and Cheng Pu's forces, and 
quite removed the impetus from their success. There was no close pursuit 
of Cao Ren, and though Sun Quan's forces formally controlled Nan 
commandery, they were not in a strong position in Jing province. Liu Bei, 
on the other hand, having avoided the brunt of the fighting, was well 
established in the south,6 and in the winter of 209-210 he was confirmed 
in his possession of all territories south of Yangzi. For Sun Quan, Zhou 
Yu became Administrator of Nan commandery while Cheng Pu remained 
[293] Administrator of Jiangxia. Cheng Pu set his capital at Shaxian, on 
the Yangzi upstream and south of present-day Wuhan. He had to share his 
title, however, with the rival Administrator Wen Ping who had been 
appointed by Cao Cao, and who maintained his capital at Shiyang, now 
in the vicinity of Anlu in Hubei. 
 The territory of Sun Quan in Jing province, therefore, extended east 
and west along the Yangzi, including the marshlands either side of that 
river, and some part of the lower course of the Han. To the north was a 
long frontier with the forces of Cao Cao, and on the south expansion was 
blocked by the lands conceded to Liu Bei. Considering that Sun Quan 
                                               
6 Immediately after the Battle of the Red Cliffs, Liu Bei transferred a thousand of his 
own men under Zhang Fei to serve Zhou Yu in the direct attack on Jiangling; for 
his own part, with two thousand reinforcements from Zhou Yu he proposed to 
attack northwards up the Han River in an attempt to break Cao Ren's lines of 
communication: SGZ 54/Wu 9:1264 PC note 1 quoting Wu lu. 
  It does not appear, however, that anything came of this strategy. Gan Ning's 
flank attack on Yiling was the decisive break-through in the campaign, and Liu Bei 
quickly transferred his attention to the southern commanderies. There is no 
mention of operations against Cao Ren in the biographies of either Liu Bei or of 
Zhang Fei. 
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had defeated Huang Zu in Jiangxia before the death of Liu Biao, and that 
the brunt of the fighting at the Red Cliffs and afterwards had been borne 
by his troops, he had little to show for such success. On the other hand, of 
course, he had at least survived Cao Cao's attack. 
 The settlement with Liu Bei was largely enforced by circumstances. 
Liu Bei of course, fifty years old, was the more experienced man, and he 
had been able to use his local position to gain advantage. Zhou Yu, we are 
told, recommended that Sun Quan should attempt to give Liu Bei an 
important-sounding post in the east, and should grant comparable offices 
to Liu Bei's lieutenants Guan Yu and Zhang Fei: anything to keep them 
apart and away from their region of power in Jing province. Sun Quan, 
probably rightly, felt that Liu Bei would reject such a proposal and would 
only become more troublesome. For the time being the alliance seemed 
the best policy. 
 There was some recognition that Sun Quan was the leading partner. 
In 209 Liu Bei went east to pay his respects to Sun Quan at his capital in 
Danyang, and though Sun Quan escorted him part of the way on the 
journey back, he did not return the visit by [294] going to Gong'an.7 It 
was also at this time that Liu Bei was granted and took the younger sister 
of Sun Quan as his formal wife. The Lady Sun was probably little more 
than twenty years old, less than half Liu Bei's age, but she was evidently 
a woman of strong personality, she took general control of Liu Bei's 
household, and she exercised guardianship over his infant son and heir 
Liu Shan.8 [295>296] 
                                               
7 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1265 PC note 2 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan, refers to Sun Quan 
accompanying Liu Bei on a great "flying cloud" ship (飛雲 feiyun): the name came 
presumably from the size of its sails. 
8 The records of Liu Bei's marriages and offspring are inadequate. SGZ 34/Shu 4, 
containing the biographies of the wives and concubines of Liu Bei and Liu Shan, 
gives details of only two of Liu Bei's women, the Lady Gan and the Lady Wu. Of 
these, the Lady Wu was originally married to Liu Zhang, Governor of Yi province, 
and she became the formal wife of Liu Bei only after the death of Liu Zhang in 
219. 
  Though the Lady Gan was the mother of Liu Shan and was eventually 
honoured with posthumous title as an empress, she was not a principal wife but 
only the concubine of Liu Bei. A woman of Pei kingdom in Yu province, she 
evidently joined his household when he set his headquarters there in 194: ZZTJ 
61:1949; deC, Establish Peace, 128. 
  Liu Bei had at least one, and possibly two, full formal wives before he arrived 
in Jing province: 
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SGZ 32/Shu 2:873 says that in 196, when Liu Bei was in Xu province, his army was 
defeated by Lü Bu, who was allied to Yuan Shu, and his family was captured. 
Some time afterwards, he made an alliance with Lü Bu, and the women and 
children were returned to him. 
SGZ 32/Shu 2:874 says that in 198, when Lü Bu was again in alliance with Yuan Shu, 
his forces seized Liu Bei's capital, the county city of Pei, and Liu Bei was 
compelled to flee, leaving his family behind. A few months later, Cao Cao came to 
the assistance of Liu Bei, Lü Bu was captured and killed, and Liu Bei again had his 
family returned to him. 
SGZ 32/Shu 2:875 says that in 200, when he was still with Cao Cao, Liu Bei was 
involved in a conspiracy against him. The plot was discovered, and Liu Bei fled to 
Yuan Shao, again leaving his family behind. It is not recorded that they returned to 
him. 
 In none of these cases is there any statement of how many women and children 
were involved. 
  SGZ 38/Shu 8:969, the biography of Liu Bei's loyal supporter Mi Zhu, records 
that in 196, after Liu Bei had been defeated by Lü Bu and was in considerable 
distress, Mi Zhu not only gave him funds from his own resources but also 
presented his own sister to become principal wife, together with two thousand 
servants. 
  It is possible that the Lady Mi died of natural causes within the next few years, 
and it is also possible that there was at one time another official wife, for the 
biography of the Lady Gan in SGZ 34/Shu 4:905 says that Liu Bei was "several 
times in mourning for his principal wives and household." We may note that Mi 
Zhu, at least, was not upset at whatever fate his sister suffered, and he always 
remained loyal. 
  The Lady Gan was able to accompany Liu Bei to take refuge in Jing province 
with Liu Biao in 200, and in 207 she gave birth there to Liu Shan, who succeeded 
to the throne of Shu-Han after his father's death, and who is normally known as the 
Later Sovereign (後主 Houzhu). His biography/annals is in SGZ 33/Shu 3. 
  The Lady Gan died and was first buried in Nan commandery, presumably after 
Liu Bei had taken occupation of that territory under grant from Sun Quan 
following the death of Zhou Yu in 210 (see below). Her body was later taken to the 
west, and in 222, after Liu Bei had taken the imperial title the Lady Gan received 
posthumous honours as his empress. She was buried again in the mausoleum of 
Liu Bei at Chengdu: SGZ 34/Shu 4:905-06, including quotation of a memorial 
from the Chancellor Zhuge Liang. 
  Until the birth of Liu Shan, Liu Bei certainly had no male children of his own 
with him in Jing province. Indeed, he adopted a boy about ten years old, whose 
personal name was Feng, and who came from the Kou family of Luohou county in 
Changsha, related by marriage to the Liu clan of that commandery. SGZ 40/Shu 
10:991, being the biography of Liu/Kou Feng, says that Liu Bei had no heir or 
successor until this adoption (see also Fang, Chronicle I, 7-8). 
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 Liu Bei had gained extensive territories, but for the moment the 
initiative in Jing province still rested with Sun Quan and Zhou Yu. Nan 
commandery and Jiangxia controlled the middle course of the Yangzi, 
and although Liu Bei at Gong'an had a presence on the river, and the 
southern commanderies were broad and populous, it was not impossible 
that he might be held within the basin of the Xiang, in a region of 
prosperous, constrained exile. There was small chance for him of useful 
expansion southwards, across the Nan Ling into Jiao province,9 while 
Sun Quan could still hope for further developments and opportunities to 
the north. 
                                                                                                                   
  By the time of his death in 223, however, Liu Bei had sired two more sons, Liu 
Yong and Liu Li, by different concubines: SGZ 32/Shu 2:890, and their 
biographies in SGZ 34/Shu 4:907 and 908. 
  As to the Lady Sun, she is mentioned only in passing by SGZ 34/Shu 4:879. 
The biography of Fa Zheng, SGZ 37/Shu 7:960, however, tells us that she had the 
courage and energy of her brothers, and she was accompanied by more than a 
hundred female attendants, all capable of bearing arms; whenever Liu Bei visited 
her, he trembled for his life. SGZ 36/Shu 6:949 PC note 2 quoting Zhao Yun 
biezhuan, has a similar description. 
  The story of Liu Bei's visit to Sun Quan appears early in the dramatic tradition, 
notably in the play Huanghe lou "Tower of the Yellow Crane" by Zhu Kai of Yuan 
(Arlington and Acton, Chinese Plays, 230-251; Kuben Yuan-Ming zaju, 7A). The 
subject of his marriage to the Lady Sun is dealt with in Romance chapters 54-56 
and is the theme of several other plays with a variety of titles, some of which 
overlap: Longfeng chengxiang, "Happy Auguries of the Dragon and the Phoenix;" 
Longfeng pei, "Dragon and Phoenix Match;" Meiren ji, "Strategem of the Beauty;" 
Ganlu si, "At the Sweet Dew Temple;" Luhuatang, "Ambush at Luhuatang;" Hui 
Jingzhou, "Return to Jing Province." See Peking Opera Texts, 757, 2755, 2769, 
3379, and Jingju jumu chutan, 88-90. 
  The theme of Romance and of the drama cycle is that Zhou Yu plans to trap Liu 
Bei and prevent him from returning to Jing province. Liu Bei, however, is able to 
get away through the efforts of his officers and counsellors, and also because the 
Lady Sun herself supports Liu Bei against the treachery of Zhou Yu. On the other 
hand, Plaks, Four Masterworks, 423-424 and 438, notes the implied criticism 
which the novel offers on Liu Bei's interest in marriage to the Lady Sun, and also 
on how frequently Liu Bei is separated from or loses his family. Oscar Wilde, in 
"The Importance of Being Earnest," has the line: "To lose one parent, Mr 
Worthing, may be regarded as a misfortune; to lose both looks like carelessness." 
What, one might wonder, would Lady Bracknell have said of Liu Bei? 
9 By granting Sun Fu title as Inspector Sun Quan had earlier staked a claim to 
hegemony over Jiao province: Chapter Four at 260-261. Real authority in the 
region, however, was held by the local gentry leader Shi Xie, and it was some time 
before Sun Quan or anyone else was in a position to compete with him: 347ff 
below. 
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 One opportunity already appeared to present itself. In the Sichuan 
basin, beyond the Yangzi Gorges to the west, Liu Zhang, Governor [297] 
of Yi province, had succeeded his father Liu Yan in 194.10 His 
administration had been plagued, however, by a number of rebellions, 
from refugee groups that had come into the territory and from officers of 
his own command. In the northern part of Yi province, moreover, Zhang 
Lu the leader of the "Rice Sect" in Hanzhong commandery had 
established an independent theocratic state in the upper valley of the Han, 
and maintained a constant pressure against Liu Zhang.11
 
 Though the family of Liu Yan and Liu Zhang was part of the 
imperial clan, the relationship was not close: like Liu Bei, though on 
more solid grounds, they could claim descent from Emperor Jing of the 
Former Han dynasty, two and a half centuries earlier. Unlike Liu Bei, 
however, Liu Yan was a man of good gentry family, he had risen to be 
Minister of Ceremonies at the imperial court, and had obtained the 
governorship of Yi province in 188.12 
 Fifteen years after succeeding to his father's position, however, it was 
apparent that Liu Zhang was losing authority, and a number of his people 
were prepared to accept intervention from the east. Toward the end of 
209 Zhou Yu went to see Sun Quan and urged that he be given an army to 
take over Liu Zhang's government and that of Zhang Lu.[298] 
 It was an imaginative plan which would certainly have stretched the 
resources of Sun Quan's state, but the opportunity was a remarkable one. 
Though he would be moving upstream from his station at Nan 
commandery, it should not have been difficult for Zhou Yu to gain access 
to the Sichuan region, and if he was correct in his information about the 
weakness of Liu Zhang's political support, he could look with some 
confidence to a welcome from dissidents, many of whom had 
connections with Jing and other eastern provinces and might well be 
prepared to accept his leadership. For the time being, Zhou Yu argued, 
since the retreat of Cao Ren from Jiangling the enemy at Xiangyang was 
                                               
10 The biographies of Liu Yan and Liu Zhang are in SGZ 31/Shu 1:865-67 and 868-70 
respectively. There is also a biography of Liu Yan, followed by that of Liu Zhang, 
in HHS 75/65:2431-32. 
11 The biography of Zhang Lu is in SGZ 8:263-66. See also Chapter Six at 356-361. 
12 ZZTJ 59:1887-89; deC, Huan and Ling, 205-206. It is generally accepted that the 
appointments of governors at that time, chosen from men of ministerial rank, 
encouraged the formation of strong provincial units by subordinating 
commanderies to these regional organisations: Chapter One at 61. 
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generally on the defensive and would be reluctant to mount a major 
attack against the alliance of Sun Quan with Liu Bei; and Liu Bei was 
still occupied establishing his position in the south. 
 Whatever the chances of success, however, Zhou Yu and Sun Quan 
did not have opportunity to put them into practice. As Zhou Yu was 
returning to Jiangling to prepare for the expedition up the Yangzi, he fell 
ill and died. He was aged thirty-six. 
 In the ten years since the death of Sun Ce, Zhou Yu had played an 
increasingly important role as military commander, and he was 
recognised as the leading figure among Sun Quan's subordinates. Cheng 
Pu, an early follower of Sun Jian, had sometimes showed himself jealous 
and disapproving. Zhou Yu, however, treated him consistently with 
respect and tolerance and Cheng Pu became a close friend and admire. 
"To be with Zhou Gongjin," he said, "is like drinking cold wine unmixed 
with water: you become drunk before you realise it."13[298] 
 The death of Young Gentleman Zhou was a major blow to Sun 
Quan's position in Jing province. Victor at the Red Cliffs and dominant 
figure in the allied command, Zhou Yu had been able to maintain an 
authority which balanced that of Liu Bei. One might wonder, perhaps – 
as Liu Bei is said to have suggested to Sun Quan in private conversation 
– whether Zhou Yu would be prepared to serve indefinitely as the 
subordinate of another;14 and one may certainly suspect that if Zhou Yu 
had established himself in Yi province he might in future have dealt with 
Sun Quan as an equal rather than as a suzerain. But that was now in the 
realm of might-have-been, and when Sun Quan held full mourning for 
Zhou Yu he was right to do so. Zhou Yu had been a pillar of great 
strength to his state, and it would be very hard to find a replacement for 
him. 
 From his deathbed, Zhou Yu recommended Lu Su as his successor. 
One version of his last letter to Sun Quan reads: 
Lord Cao is in the north, and our borders are not at peace. Liu Bei is 
lodging here, and that is like feeding a tiger..... Lu Su is loyal and 
energetic, and in dealing with affairs he has no match; he can take 
my place. 
                                               
13 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1265 PC note 2 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. SGZ 54/Wu 9:1265, also 
tells us that Zhou Yu had an excellent ear for music and was very particular about 
it. Even at a banquet, after several cups of wine, he could always recognise a false 
note, and he would always point it out. 
14 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1265 PC note 2 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
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 When a man is dying, he speaks with total truth. If you can 
accept what I say, my death will not be useless.15 
Sun Quan followed this advice, though he did not immediately give Lu 
Su comparable rank. Lu Su was initially appointed Colonel Who 
Displays Firmness, with four thousand men from Zhou Yu's command, 
his base set at Jiangling, and revenue from four counties as his source of 
supply. Cheng Pu, however, took the vacant position as Administrator of 
Nan [300] commandery; so Lu Su had neither the military rank nor the 
administrative authority which had been held by Zhou Yu. 
 Soon afterwards, however, evidently on the advice of Lu Su, there 
was a major change in the arrangements of Jing province: Liu Bei was 
allowed to "borrow" Nan commandery; Cheng Pu returned to Jiangxia; 
and Lu Su was named Administrator of a new commandery, Hanchang, 
with headquarters at Lukou on the Yangzi in the north of Changsha. He 
was also promoted Lieutenant-General, with command of ten thousand 
men.16[301] 
                                               
15 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1271 PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. The main text of SGZ has 
a different version of the letter, though it is, as Pei Songzhi observes, couched in 
the same terms. 
16 The rank of Lieutenant-General (偏將軍 pian jiangjun) was not a recognised 
appointment under Han, but it appeared with increasing frequency during these 
years of civil war. As Administrator of Nan commandery, Zhou Yu had held that 
rank. 
  The biography of Zhou Yu, at SGZ 54/Wu 9:1264, says that Zhou Yu had been 
allocated the four counties of Hanchang, Xiajun, Liuyang and Zhouling to provide 
supplies. The commentary of Lu Bi to the biography of Lu Su at SGZJJ 54/Wu 
9:19a-b, suggests that the same four counties were allocated also to the support of 
Lu Su when he took over Zhou Yu's military position. It is likely that these 
comprised the territory of his new commandery of Hanchang. 
  Xiajun county was in the northern part of Changsha commandery under Later 
Han, and Zhouling was in the east of Nan commandery close to the Yangzi below 
present-day Yueyang: see the Treatise of Administrative Geography, HHS 
112/22:3485 and 3480, and Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, 49-50. 
  Hanchang county is not recorded in the Treatise of Administrative Geography, 
but commentary to SGZJJ 47/Wu 2:6b presents evidence to suggest it had been 
established near present-day Yueyang in the time of Emperors Huan or Ling, after 
the record of that census in the early 140s. Liuyang county appears to have been 
established about this time in the hill country to the southeast: SGZJJ 54/Wu 9:9b. 
See also Wu and Yang, Sanguo junxian biao fu kaozheng 8:2852-53. 
  SJZS 35:11a, cited in SGZJJ 47/Wu 2:6b-7a, identifies Lukou, Lu Su's 
headquarters, as a site downstream from the Red Cliffs/Wulin area, on the south-
eastern bank of the Yangzi. 
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 It is not possible to work out the precise timing of these changes, nor 
the details of the arguments presented at Sun Quan's council. The records 
are vague, and sometimes contradictory; again, as in the matter of the 
Red Cliffs, there are elements of rival propaganda, particularly on the 
question of the "borrowing" of territory by Liu Bei from Sun Quan. It 
seems fairly clear, however, that after the death of Zhou Yu Sun Quan 
allowed Liu Bei access to Nan commandery which he had not held 
before.17 By this grant, Sun [302] Quan gave up his direct control from all 
                                                                                                                   
  If these identifications and interpretations are correct, then the territory 
controlled by Lu Su at this time occupied the basin of the Yangzi for some 120 
kilometres from the junction with the Dongting Lake and the Xiang River down to 
northeast of present-day Jiayu, with territory taken from the three former Han 
commanderies of Nan, Changsha and Jiangxia. Lu Su thus occupied the border 
region between the two warlords. 
  Liu Bei had evidently agreed to the transfer of the extreme northern part of 
Changsha to the direct control of Sun Quan, but he soon received the important 
city of Jiangling in exchange. 
17 Jiangbiao zhuan, which seems to echo the opinions of supporters of Sun Quan, 
quoted in SGZ 32/Shu 2:879 PC note 3, says that Liu Bei was first established by 
Zhou Yu in the territory south of the Yangzi, and that he later (or "further:" the 
texts differ between 復 fu and 後 hou) "borrowed" (借jie) the various 
commanderies of Jing province from Sun Quan. 
  The biography of Lu Su, in SGZ 54/Wu 9:1270, says that when Liu Bei came to 
Sun Quan's capital he asked to be given command of Jing province. Lu Su was the 
only person who urged Sun Quan to agree, to maintain and confirm the alliance 
against Cao Cao. In context, this must refer to Liu Bei's visit to Sun Quan in 209 
(see above), for the item is followed by the account of the death of Zhou Yu and 
his recommendation of Lu Su as successor. 
  PC note 1 on 1271, related to this passage, quotes Han-Jin chunqiu, which tells 
how Sun Quan's officer Lü Fan urged Liu Bei should be detained in the east, but 
was argued down by Lu Su on the grounds that Sun Quan needed to show his grace 
and his sense of honour, and that Liu Bei was necessary to keep Jing province in 
order and defended against Cao Cao. 
  ZZTJ 65:2103-04; deC, Establish Peace, 414-417, dates the whole debate to the 
year 210, just before and immediately after the death of Zhou Yu. We are told, 
however, in the biography of Cheng Pu, SGZ 55/Wu 10:1284, that he initially 
succeeded Zhou Yu as Administrator of Nan commandery, and then, after Sun 
Quan had divided Jing province with Liu Bei, he returned to be Administrator of 
Jiangxia again. 
  From all this, it appears that the territory south of the Yangzi was initially 
allocated to Liu Bei in an ad hoc decision by Zhou Yu, military commander of the 
allied forces after the defeat of Cao Cao at the Red Cliffs. Liu Bei was sent to carry 
out mopping-up operations in that region while Zhou Yu himself moved up the 
Yangzi against Jiangling Sun Quan, however, confirmed that preliminary 
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of Jing province except for a portion of Jiangxia and the main stream of 
the Yangzi below the junction with the Dongting Lake and the Xiang 
river. And it was not merely a question of Nan commandery, for he was 
also giving Liu Bei access and opportunity for intervention into Yi 
province, the very project which Zhou Yu had proposed at the time of his 
death. 
 In later years, Sun Quan regarded this decision as one of his greatest 
errors, and he specifically blamed Lu Su. Praising him for the 
imagination with which he argued the plan for an empire, and also for the 
courage with which he proposed resistance to Cao Cao at the time of the 
Red Cliffs, Sun Quan went on to remark: 
Later, however, he urged me to cede territory to Xuande [Liu Bei].18 
Yet this single occasion of weakness is not sufficient to outweigh his 
two great actions. 
And Sun Quan suggested Lu Su was afraid of Liu Bei's general Guan Yu, 
and it was for this reason, when he felt he could not cope with the 
situation, he presented fine-sounding arguments to justify his policy of 
co-operation, and even subservience.19 
 Such a view of Lu Su has been generally accepted by both historical 
and literary tradition. In Romance, he is butt of jokes [303] and tricks 
played by the brilliant planner Zhuge Liang, and whereas Zhou Yu at 
least sought (albeit unsuccessfully) for the initiative, Lu Su can do little 
else but marvel at the skills and trickery of his rival. More recently, 
however, some historians have sought to present a more balanced 
judgement, and while one must recognise that the plans put forward by 
Lu Su were less striking than those of the splendid Zhou Yu, they were 
sensible and perhaps in some respects wiser.20 
                                                                                                                   
arrangement in 209 (or possibly in early 210), when Liu Bei visited his court; this 
formal allocation was opposed by Zhou Yu (and by Lü Fan) but was supported by 
Lu Su. Then, after the death of Zhou Yu in 210, another adjustment was made at 
the behest of Lu Su, allowing Liu Bei not only to hold the southern part of the 
province but also giving him access to Nan commandery. 
  There would be a good deal of later debate as to what territory had actually 
been "lent" (as opposed to being granted) to Liu Bei, and upon what real or 
understood conditions: see Chapter Six at 372. 
18 Xuande 玄徳 was the style of Liu Bei. 
19 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1281, recording Sun Quan's comments on Zhou Yu, Lu Su and Lü 
Meng, made in a discussion with his later commander Lu Xun. 
20 See, for example, the comments of Yuan Mei, quoted by Lu Bi in SGZJJ 54/Wu 
9:18a-b, and also the article by Feng Junshi [1982]. 
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 Lu Su at this time was in his late thirties, a little older than Zhou Yu. 
He came from a wealthy family of Dongcheng county in Xiapi 
commandery (which appears at this time to have been renamed Linhuai), 
in the region between the Huai and the Yangzi. There is no record in his 
biography that his family had held any official post, and he may have 
come from merchant background. We are told that he first made the 
acquaintance of Zhou Yu when the latter came by with his army and 
asked for supplies. Lu Su's house had two granaries, each filled with 
grain; he invited Zhou Yu to take his pick. Zhou Yu was impressed and 
they became friends. Though Yuan Shu named him magistrate in his 
home county, he left to join Zhou Yu and they went together to join Sun 
Ce.21 
 Lu Su appears to have made a considerable point of using his family 
wealth to gain a good local reputation. When he left Dongcheng, he had 
three hundred people with them, including sufficient men at arms to 
prevent the local provincial troops from harassing them or compelling 
them to return.22 He was, however, not entirely happy with his welcome 
at the Sun headquarters in Qu'a, [304] and after Sun Ce died he thought 
of returning to the north. We are told that Zhou Yu urged him to remain:23 
Once in the past, Ma Yuan said to [Liu Xiu, the future Emperor] 
Guangwu, "At a time like this, it is not only that a ruler should look 
for his servants; the servant must decide which ruler he can accept."24 
 Now our master [Sun Quan] is pleased about worthy men, and 
he gives honour to those of scholarship. He welcomes men of 
exceptional quality, and he chooses men of distinction. 
 I have heard, moreover, from occult learning of former times, 
that the one who shall succeed the house of Liu will surely rise in the 
southeast.25... This is the time for a hero to mount the dragon and soar 
with the phoenix - he will ride fast. 
                                               
21 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1267. 
22 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1267-68 PC note 1 quoting Wu shu. 
23 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1268. The passage translated below is a continuation of the same 
text. 
24 HHS 24/14:830, the biography of Ma Yuan, discussed by Bielenstein, RHD II, 165. 
25 There is no way to tell which prophecy Zhou Yu had in mind. A great number of 
prognostications were circulating at this time, most of them mutually 
contradictory, and they were available to any local leader, whether he believed in 
them, invented them for himself, or merely took advantage of their existence. We 
have observed the history of the apocryphal text concerning Xuchang/Xu Chang 
(note 11 to Chapter Two). We may also note here that when Liu Yan asked to 
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Then Zhou Yu urged Sun Quan to make a point of talking with Lu Su, 
and Sun Quan did so. Sun Quan, we are told, spoke of a plan to serve the 
Han dynasty like one of the hegemons of the ancient Zhou. Lu Su, 
however, said bluntly, 
As I see it, the house of Han cannot rise again, and Cao Cao will not 
be removed in a hurry. The best plan for you is just to hold [305] the 
east of the Yangzi, like one foot of a tripod cauldron,26 and watch the 
battles of the empire from a distance... 
 In the north, they have plenty of things to worry about. Take 
advantage of the fact that they are preoccupied, attack Huang Zu and 
force him away, then go on to attack Liu Biao, and follow up to hold 
the full length of the Yangzi. When you have achieved that, you can 
take title as emperor or king and you can plan to take over the whole 
of China. This was the method of Emperor Gao of Han.27 
Sun Quan disclaimed all such high ambition, but he was impressed by Lu 
Su. Zhang Zhao, his more conservative counsellor, disapproved of Lu 
Su's apparent lack of humility and caution, but Sun Quan showed him 
increasing respect and favour, and the wealth of the family was restored 
to what it had been in Lu Su's home country in the north. 
 It is difficult to tell how much of this is exaggeration, but it seems 
likely that Sun Quan recognised Lu Su as a favourite associate of Zhou 
Yu and a useful source of advice. By rewarding him and treating him 
well, moreover, Sun Quan gave an example to other local leaders north of 
the Yangzi, of the sort of reward they could expect if they came to join 
him. On a larger scale, there was a patron and client relationship between 
                                                                                                                   
become Governor of Yi province in 188, he was influenced at least in part by 
advice that "the territory of Yi province has the aura of the Son of Heaven:" SGZ 
31/Shu 1:865 and ZZTJ 59:1888; deC, Huan and Ling, 205 (and note the 
commentary of Hu Sanxing, quoting Yueling zhangzhu "Commentary to the 
Ordinances of the Months" by Cai Yong). 
26 This early use of the metaphor of a tripod cauldron seems so prescient that one 
must consider the possibility it represents a later interpolation: in years to come, 
the balance between the three states of Wei, Shu and Wu was regularly described in 
such terms. 
27 After the overthrow of the Qin empire at the end of the third century BC, the future 
Emperor Gao of Han was allocated the upper valley of the Han River as his fief. 
Within a very short time, he had broken out from this isolated region, taken over 
the small kingdoms of the former Qin heartland in the valley of the Wei, and then 
fought successfully against the hegemon king Xiang Yu for full control of the 
empire. See, for example, Dubs, HFHD I, 66-70 and ff. 
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the two men, and Lu Su could be seen as Sun Quan's personal 
follower.[306] 
 It is in this role that one may appreciate Lu Su's contribution to the 
strategy of the Red Cliffs campaign. His biography has no statement of 
the official rank and position that he held at that time, but he was sent off 
as Sun Quan's personal envoy, officially to Liu Biao but also to make 
contact with Liu Bei. He clearly possessed Sun Quan's confidence, and 
when he returned to take part in the debate over Cao Cao's ultimatum his 
opinion, as the man most recently on the spot, was significant. Sun Quan 
was prepared to attend to his advice, and when Zhou Yu confirmed his 
judgement, the decision to fight was settled. 
 Against this background, of trust from Sun Quan, of ambition for the 
future of his state, and of energy and imagination in the decision to 
oppose Cao Cao and fight for Jing province, it becomes more difficult to 
accept the judgement of Lu Su as a defeatist, the man who handed over 
the predominant position to Liu Bei and gave him the opportunity of 
expansion in the west. All the accounts we have of Lu Su's opinions and 
advice are based, of course, on records which could be invented or 
falsified in the light of later events, but it does appear that both Sun Quan 
and Zhou Yu thought highly of him, and Sun Quan's later criticism, as 
quoted above, can be taken as the judgement of hindsight. For proper 
assessment, one must consider the situation as it appeared at the time, 
when Sun Quan decided to allow Liu Bei access to Nan commandery. 
 From that point of view, we know already that Liu Bei was 
recognised as a difficult ally and an uncomfortable subordinate. We have 
been told Zhou Yu had sought to remove him from Jing province to the 
east, but Sun Quan had judged this impracticable. Now Zhou Yu was 
gone, and the situation was still more difficult, for there was no leader in 
Sun Quan's command who held comparable authority. His immediate 
colleague at the time of the Red Cliffs, Cheng Pu, despite loyal service, 
age and experience, was by no means up to Zhou Yu's weight, and Lu Su, 
by definition, as [307] the immediate and junior successor to Zhou Yu, 
had not established his position. 
 Liu Bei, moreover, was already interested in Yi province. Soon after 
the Red Cliffs campaign, Liu Zhang had made contact with him, and had 
even lent him a contingent of troops to help him in the south of Jing 
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province.28 As a result, when Zhou Yu put forward his proposal for the 
invasion of Yi province, Liu Bei protested that as representative of the 
imperial clan, he considered himself bound as an ally to Liu Zhang. The 
[308] argument was disingenuous, but it did indicate that Liu Bei was 
staking a claim to regard Yi province as part of his sphere of influence 
and concern. If Sun Quan and Zhou Yu wished to move to the west, they 
needed to devise some way to neutralise or compensate Liu Bei. 
 Two points were thus clear. First, there was no commander available 
to Sun Quan who was capable of an invasion of Yi province, and 
certainly none who was likely to attract sufficient support to bring such 
an enterprise to a successful conclusion. Second, with the loss of Zhou Yu 
the opportunity for Liu Bei had become apparent, and it was in the 
highest degree unlikely that Liu Bei would accept being ignored and by-
passed while Sun Quan sent an expeditionary force across his frontier to 
the north.29[309] 
                                               
28 SGZ 31/Shu 1:868, says that Liu Zhang had earlier been in contact with Cao Cao, 
and when Cao Cao received the surrender of Liu Zong and was advancing south 
through Jing province, he sent his aide Zhang Song to pay his respects. Cao Cao 
was preoccupied, however, and did not show Zhang Song proper courtesy. Then, 
when Cao Cao was defeated at the Red Cliffs, Zhang Song encouraged Liu Zhang 
to make contact with Liu Bei, and he continued to act as an advocate of that 
alliance. 
  Romance chapter 60 develops this story, and tells how Zhang Song made 
personal contact with Liu Bei, handing him a map of the territory of Yi province 
and the roads which led there, which enabled him to plan his later campaigns. The 
drama Xian Xichuan "Presenting the Map of Xichuan [the region of the Western 
Rivers]," also known as Zhang Song xian ditu "Zhang Song Presents the Map," has 
the same theme. See Peking Opera Texts, 2349, and Jingju jumu chutan, 92. 
  ZZTJ 65:2095; deC, Establish Peace, 399-400, has this incident, and Sima 
Guang quotes the fourth-century scholar Xi Zuochi), whose remarks are included 
in SGZ 31/Shu 1:ß869 PC note 2: "For just a moment, Cao Cao showed himself 
arrogant; and as a result the empire was divided into three..... The pity of it." 
  In fairness to Cao Cao, it should be pointed out that Zhang Song was the third 
messenger sent to him by Liu Zhang at this time. From the first embassy, Liu 
Zhang received appointment as a general; the second man, who took a contingent 
of three hundred men, was rewarded with appointment as Administrator of 
Guanghan; but when Zhang Song was sent Cao Cao was thoroughly engaged in the 
pursuit of Liu Bei, and he did not give him any reward. It was quite possibly a 
sense of disappointed expectation that proved to be the first motivation of Zhang 
Song. 
29 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1271-72. 
  SGZ 32/Shu 2:879-80 says that Sun Quan had suggested a combined attack 
against Liu Zhang by his own forces and those of Liu Bei. Liu Bei was at first 
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 So the possibilities in the west were very limited. By force of 
circumstances, partly a matter of geographical range, partly the loss of 
Zhou Yu, and importantly the local position of Liu Bei, Sun Quan had 
lost the initiative. It is likely that the short period during which Cheng Pu 
and Lu Su were based in Jiangling, as Administrator and garrison 
commander, had demonstrated to them the force of Liu Bei's ambitions in 
                                                                                                                   
inclined to agree, but then his adviser Yin Guan pointed out that if he committed 
himself to the west he could be cut off by the troops of Sun Quan and might well 
lose his possessions in southern Jing province; and it was not, of course, certain 
that he would be able to take over Yi province. On the other hand, as Yin Guan 
pointed out, if he refused to take part, Sun Quan could hardly commit his forces 
with an exposed flank across his flank. Liu Bei followed this advice. 
  PC note 3 to this passage, quoting Xiandi chunqiu, says that Sun Quan actually 
sent his cousin Sun Yu to lead an expeditionary force to the west. Liu Bei refused 
to let the army pass, and he and his commanders Guan Yu, Zhang Fei and Zhuge 
Liang occupied critical points along the river to block the advance. The story is 
followed by ZZTJ 66:2135-36; deC, Establish Peace, 483-485. 
  Sun Yu had earlier taken part in the operation with Zhou Yu against the camps 
at Mo and Bao (Chapter Four at 237-239). He was thus an old associate, and would 
have been a possible choice as commander of the campaign. His biography, 
however, at SGZ 51/Wu 6:1206, has no mention of this incident. 
  By definition, moreover, such a confrontation must be dated to the period after 
the death of Zhou Yu and the transfer of Nan commandery to Liu Bei's control; a 
time that the conciliatory counsel of Lu Su was already having influence. 
  So I doubt the matter ever went so far, and that Sun Yu was sent on such an 
expedition. It seems more likely that Sun Quan could appreciate the difficulties of 
such a venture and would not have attempted to play a hard line and force the 
issue. If, as Xiandi chunqiu tells us, he had been compelled to abandon the plan, 
Sun Quan would have lost considerable face; and even assuming Sun Yu had been 
permitted to pass, his army would have been extremely vulnerable to intervention 
from Liu Bei against its line of communications. 
  I therefore incline to regard the Xiandi chunqiu story as a fictional development 
of the real situation, correctly analysed by Yin Guan; and equally well understood 
by Sun Quan and his adviser Lu Su. 
  Romance chapter 57, developing this account still further, makes the futile 
attempt of Zhou Yu, aided by Sun Yu, to attack the west across the front of Liu Bei 
and Zhuge Liang, the immediate cause of Zhou Yu's frustration which brings about 
his death. As Winston Yang has remarked, this is the extreme expression of the 
negative attitude of the Romance for the man described by the history as generous, 
sensible and courageous: "The Use of the 'San-kuo chih,'" 290-297, and "Literary 
Transformation," 71-73. Plaks, Four Masterworks, 446, observes that the 
cleverness of Zhuge Liang in dealing with Zhou Yu is taken almost too far, so that 
admiration for and amusement at his wit is lessened by touches of cruelty, 
hypocrisy and cynicism. 
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that region. Quite possibly, Sun Quan had reason to fear that if he did not 
take Lu Su's advice and relinquish Jiangling voluntarily he could be 
forced out of that territory by military pressure from Liu Bei, aided by the 
constant threat from Cao Cao's forces in the north. The western extension 
of Sun Quan's territories to Jiangling had ceased to offer the basis for a 
further thrust up the stream of the Yangzi through the Gorges; it was now 
a vulnerable salient, exposed to potential enemies both north and 
south.[310] 
 On the other hand, by handing over the territory about Jiangling with 
good grace, and with theoretical right of resumption, Sun Quan gained a 
secure frontier in Jing province. There was no question of Liu Bei turning 
against the positions of Lu Su and Cheng Pu in Jiangxia: his immediate 
ambitions were clearly concerned with the west. At the same time, any 
attack from Cao Cao's forces in the north of Jing province would confirm 
the defensive alliance, and Sun Quan and Liu Bei were now in a stronger 
position than they had been in the time of confusion after the death of Liu 
Biao and before the Red Cliffs. 
 It may therefore be argued that, rather than seeking the chimera of 
western expansion and dominance over a resentful and dangerous Liu 
Bei, Sun Quan's best policy at that moment was to accept the situation as 
it was and concentrate upon real possibilities. These included the still 
open question of the frontier against Cao Cao in the north of Yang 
province; the consolidation and development of the settled region which 
he controlled immediately south of the Yangzi; and thirdly, more 
tentative, the matter of Jiao province, the distant territories of present-day 
Guangdong, Guangxi and Vietnam. All of these, in different fashions, 
were matters worthy and needful of attention. 
 If this was the advice of Lu Su, Sun Quan had reason to accept it. 
The victory at the Red Cliffs had secured his survival as an independent 
ruler for the time, though the death of Zhou Yu had perhaps, as 
counterbalance, robbed him of the dream of rapid expansion along the 
line of the Yangzi to the west. The period of consolidation which 
followed, however, did much to restore that loss, and it laid the 
foundations for a long-lasting state and a long-term division of 
China.[311] 
 
The defences of Yang province: 
We have noticed above, at intervals, the establishment of a frontier line 
between the territory of the Sun group along the Yangzi and the lands 
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controlled by Cao Cao in the valley of the Huai. When Yuan Shu died in 
199, Sun Ce took over many of his former followers and occupied the 
commandery of Lujiang.30 Later, after the death of Sun Ce, his 
Administrator Li Shu sought to join with Cao Cao but was destroyed by 
Sun Quan.31 
 Sun Quan, however, had not been able to extend his authority further 
to the north, and the dominant position north of the Yangzi was seized by 
Cao Cao's Inspector Liu Fu, who took up his position in 200. From 
headquarters at Hefei, Liu Fu was able to persuade the various rebel and 
vagrant groups south of the Huai to accept his authority, and we are told 
that tens of thousands of refugees returned to settle in their former 
territory. In true Confucian fashion, he established schools for them, but 
he also paid great attention to re-colonisation of abandoned farmland and 
he embarked on a major program of water control, with dams and canals, 
to provide irrigation for rice paddy.32 
 At the time of the rebellion in Danyang commandery in 204, we are 
told that one of the men killed by the mutineers was Sun He, who had 
been appointed Administrator of Lujiang after the overthrow of Li Shu. 
Sun He, however, was actually at that time in command of an army 
stationed at headquarters in Dantu,33 and there is no mention that anyone 
was sent to replace him as Administrator in Lujiang.[312] 
 It appears, therefore, that in the years immediately after Sun Quan's 
succession, following Cao Cao's appointment of the energetic Liu Fu, the 
territory of Lujiang had slipped from the southerners' control.34 At best, it 
                                               
30  Chapter Three at 188-189. 
31  Chapter Four at 231. 
32  Chapter Four at 231-232, and the biography of Liu Fu in SGZ 15:463. 
33  Chapter Four at 233. 
34 One may observe, for example, the various reports of the local leader of Lujiang, 
Lei Xu. SGZ 15:463 mentions him as the chief of one of a number of dissident 
groups, operating about the year 200 in the area between the Yangzi and the Huai, 
and then brought under the authority of Liu Fu. 
  A few years later, however, about 209 or 210, soon after the death of Liu Fu, 
Lei Xu was again in rebellion. Cao Cao sent his general Xiahou Yuan to attack 
him, and Lei Xu was thoroughly defeated: SGZ 9:270. Though he was driven from 
Lujiang, however, he still held a considerable number of people under his 
leadership, for SGZ 32/Shu 2:879 says that he came to join Liu Bei, then engaged 
in the settlement of his new territories in Jing province, and that he was 
accompanied by tens of thousand of people. 
  The numbers are surely exaggerated, but the evidence shows that Lujiang 
commandery had become a region of uncertain control, and it is likely that there 
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had become a no-man's land: extending to the north of the Yangzi, it was 
of less immediate concern than the core territory of Danyang, Wu and 
Kuaiji, and the main drive for expansion in the first years of Sun Quan's 
government lay westwards, up the stream of the Yangzi, first to the Pengli 
Lake and the Poyang marshes, then against Huang Zu in Jing province. 
For the purposes of these campaigns, so long as Lujiang was not held by 
a strong potential enemy, the Sun armies could afford to ignore the 
region. 
 Liu Fu died in 208, just about the time of the Red Cliffs campaign, 
and when Sun Quan took his army north across the Yangzi to attack 
Hefei, he might well have expected to force a bridgehead across the Huai. 
Cao Cao's main army had suffered a considerable defeat, with losses 
which would only be exaggerated in the reporting, while the death of Liu 
Fu had deprived the local defenders of their most effective and trusted 
leader.[313] 
 Sun Quan and Zhang Zhao, however, achieved no success, and the 
biography of Liu Fu records that his people defended themselves with 
energy and skill, holding back a host of the enemy even though the city 
walls were threatened with washaway from torrential rains and had to be 
repaired in makeshift fashion night after night. Every plan of attack by 
Sun Quan was countered, and eventually he was deceived by a false 
report that a major army had been sent to break the siege. At this, he 
burnt and abandoned his encampment, and withdrew to the south.35 
 The failure of this attack confirmed Cao Cao's frontier in the 
southeast and was a notable blow to Sun Quan's hopes of expansion 
towards the Huai. Furthermore, the achievement of Liu Fu was reflected 
not so much in the result of military activity, but in the long-term 
arrangements he had made for the government of the people and the 
defence of their territory. In eight years administration of this region, he 
established an economic and political base along the Huai which proved 
                                                                                                                   
was a good deal of emigration to more settled regions, either north to the Huai or 
south across the Yangzi into Jing and Yang provinces. 
35 The ruse is attributed to the junior official Jiang Ji, whose biography is in SGZ 
14:450. The general Zhang Xi had been sent to the relief of the defenders, but Cao 
Cao's main army was still in Jing province, there were many soldiers sick, and 
Zhang Xi had only about a thousand horsemen. Jiang Ji arranged for copies of a 
false letter from Zhang Xi to be sent into the city of Hefei, claiming that he was in 
fact approaching with more than forty thousand men. One copy got to the city to 
encourage the defenders, while two others fell into the hands of Sun Quan. Sun 
Quan believed the information and ordered a retreat. 
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secure against any raid or invasion from the south, and the frontier of Liu 
Fu is a demonstration of the effectiveness of the tuntian system under 
Cao Cao's government.36[314] 
 The term tuntian, which I render as "agricultural colony," had been 
recognised since the time of Former Han, and the technique had been 
used to control marginal or non-Chinese territory in the north and 
northwest. In particular, during the first century BC, the Han general 
Zhao Chongguo had recommended and carried out a program of 
agricultural colonies in the valley of the Huang Shui or Xining River in 
present-day Gansu and Qinghai.37 They were essentially self-supporting, 
both in food and in military defence, and this concept of the soldier-
farmer was an important element in the northern expansion and frontier 
defence of the Han empire. It was the achievement of Cao Cao and his 
advisers that they adapted the principle to the resettlement and control of 
the regions of central China devastated by civil war.38 
 The Han had levied a tax on each subject's landholding.39 It was not 
set at a high rate, but other exactions, such as poll tax, [315] civil corvée 
                                               
36 The tuntian system of Cao Cao is discussed by Tang Changru [1955], 37-43, 
Zhang Weihua [1956], He Ziquan [1958], 8-17, Zhao Youwen [1958] Wang 
Zhongluo [1961], 22-23 and 89-94, and Ochi Shigeaki [1963]. In English, there is 
a good account of the system in Crowell, "Land Policies and Systems," chapter IV, 
and more recent discussion in deC, Imperial Warlord, 89-92. 
37 See, for example, deC, Northern Frontier, 63-64, and Hsu, Han Agriculture, 139-
141 and 236-237. 
38 SGZ 1:14 and PC note 1 quoting Wei shu. The latter passage tells, by contrast, how 
at this time the soldiers of Yuan Shao in the north were reduced to scavenging for 
mulberries and jujubes, and those of Yuan Shu in the region of the Huai looked for 
oysters and clams. See also JS 26:782; Yang, "Economic History," 158. Two years 
earlier, according to SGZ 1:12, the price of a single hu of grain (about 20 litres) 
had reached more than half a million cash. 
  There are indications that the technique had been used at earlier stages of the 
civil war, but the achievement of Cao Cao's government was to develop and apply 
the program widely and effectively. 
39 On the land tax system of Han, see Cambridge Han," 596-598 [Nishijima, 
"Economic and Social History of Former Han"]. Formally speaking, the tax was 
based upon the annual crop. After early variations, it was settled for Former Han in 
155 BC as one thirtieth of the yield; and after the restoration of Later Han, that 
figure was confirmed: HHS 1B:50. In practice, however, for convenience of 
accounting, the tax was levied upon the expected yield of the land, not upon what 
was actually obtained or reported. As a result, land was surveyed for the 
government, and graded as high, medium or low quality. Each year there was then 
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and military conscription (or payment for substitutes), placed a heavy 
burden on the peasant farmer. By the end of the dynasty, moreover, the 
expansion of private landholdings had placed an influential gentry class 
between the imperial government and the tillers of the soil, and the rulers 
of Later Han had considerable difficulty in gaining access to their 
revenues. The opportunities for corruption and confusion, for false 
reporting and evasion, were only too great, particularly since the 
bureaucrats responsible for the collection of the revenues generally came 
from the land-owning families themselves.40[316] 
 The agricultural colonies established by Cao Cao, through 
concentration upon sharing the yield rather than taxing the land and 
equipment, removed the need for analysis and survey of the land and 
other materials, and by placing the peasants under direct control of the 
government the system eliminated, at least for the first years, the 
corrupting influences of private interest. 
                                                                                                                   
a levy based upon the notional yield: and this in effect represented a tax upon 
acreage. 
  Hsu, Han Agriculture, 72-75, estimates that the effective average level of 
taxation would have been about half a dou, or 5 sheng of grain to the mu, or 
approximately one litre to 0.045 hectare, a tenth of the English acre. Chen, 
however, "Economy, Society and State Power" at 139-140, argues that Hsu has 
underestimated the figure by half, and the rate was in fact close to one dou [10 
sheng] to the mu. Bielenstein, RHD IV, 148, basing his calculations on the 
expected yield of an average farm, finds an effective tax rate of approximately 
four-fifths of a dou, or 8 sheng, to the mu. 
  This rate of tax, however, applied only to the owner of the land. Though there 
is disagreement among modern scholars about the percentages involved, it is 
accepted that a substantial number of the farmers of Han time held their lands as 
tenants, and rentals were regularly as high as 50% or more. See, for example, on 
the Former Han period at the time of Emperor Wu, HS 24A, 1137; Swann, Food 
and Money, 182, and on the attempts at reform by Wang Mang, HS 99B:4111; 
Dubs, HFHD III, 286, and HS 24A, 1143; Swann, Food and Money, 208. On Later 
Han, see Hsu, Han Agriculture, 55-56 and 213-214, Ch'en, "Economy, Society and 
State Power," 133-136, and Bielenstein, RHD IV, 148. 
40 For example, Hsu, Han Agriculture, 53-56, Chen, "Economy, Society and State 
Power," 147-148, Bielenstein, RHD IV, 136-137 and 157-158. 
  At the beginning of Later Han in 39 AD, Emperor Guangwu attempted to carry 
out a full survey of cultivated land in the empire. Though there were severe 
punishments for false or inadequate reporting, it appears that the project was never 
successfully completed. See, for example, Hsu, Han Agriculture, 55 and 210-212, 
and Bielenstein, RHD IV, 136-137. 
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 Once the colonies arranged by Liu Fu to the north of the Yangzi had 
taken a firm hold, Sun Quan had no resources to deal with the problem. 
The tuntian system was built upon availability of land and of displaced 
people, but in the territory under Sun Quan's control there was, if 
anything, a shortage of people, and most of the land remained in the 
hands of its original owners: the wars of the Sun and their local rivals had 
not produced any such disruption as that experienced in central China. 
There were, of course, numbers of refugees from the north; some had 
joined the army and others had taken up farmland, but many travelled 
still further south, beyond the control of the Sun regime, and sought to 
establish settlements of their own. These, and the native peoples of the 
hill country to the south, provided a different problem and opportunity 
for Sun Quan. 
 In the meantime, the territory between the Yangzi and the Huai 
remained uncertain. In the spring of 209 Sun Quan abandoned his siege 
of Hefei, and a few months later Cao Cao himself came in a show of 
strength. He had brought his main army from Jing province back to Qiao, 
a city south of Xu,41 and at the beginning of 209 he held naval exercises 
there. In the autumn he led his army and a fleet down to the Huai river, 
then south to Hefei. At that point, however, he issued a proclamation, 
taking note of the many campaigns in which his men had been engaged, 
referring with regret to the losses his people had suffered through 
sickness and battle, and granting [317] relief and rewards to their 
dependants. He made some local appointments for Yang province, 
ordered an expansion of agricultural colonies at Quebei, the great lake 
south of Shouchun, then withdrew his troops to the north.42 
 It is possible that the decision to go no further against the south was 
forced upon Cao Cao by discontent within his army, though the texts 
contain no reference to any particular disturbance. More probably, the 
advance to the south was intended only as a warning for Sun Quan, and 
the withdrawal was a voluntary decision by Cao Cao. Certainly, over the 
past few years, those soldiers who formed the core of his army had taken 
part in an extraordinary series of campaigns. After the victory over Yuan 
Shao at Guandu in 200, Cao Cao had taken his army to the conquest of 
the former Yuan territories during 204 and 205, and northeast beyond the 
                                               
41 Qiao, near present-day Boxian, was the home county of Cao Cao: SGZ 1:1. 
42 The text of Cao Cao's proclamation is in SGZ 1:32. On pronunciation of the name 
of this lake – one would expect Shaobei – see note B to Chapter One at 56. 
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frontiers to destroy the Wuhuan alliance in 207. He had then returned, 
almost immediately, to the attack on Jing province which culminated at 
the Red Cliffs in 208. He and his men had been engaged in active service 
almost without interruption from one end of China to the other, and it 
seems quite reasonable that he should now have called a halt. 
 In the twelfth month, winter at the beginning of 210, the army was 
back in Qiao city, and for the next eighteen months Cao Cao was 
primarily concerned to consolidate his rule over the territories he 
controlled. In the autumn of 211 he went again on campaign, but this 
time to the northwest, where he defeated and annexed the territories of 
the various local warlords in the valley of the Wei. He then returned to 
Ye, former capital of Yuan Shao,43 and after another pause for 
administrative arrangements he turned [318] his attention once more to 
the southeast. In the winter of 212-213 his army came to the Yangzi. 
 Sun Quan must have been equally glad of the respite. Much of his 
attention had been taken up with the settlement of his position in Jing 
province, and that territory was now reasonably secure. The immediate 
threat was an advance by Cao Cao direct across the Huai, for this struck 
at the heart of Sun Quan's power and Liu Bei was unlikely to give 
significant support. 
 We are not told of any major reforms - certainly nothing comparable 
to the agricultural colonies of the north44 - and Sun Quan's strategy 
appears to have been largely concerned with the consolidation and 
expansion of the country he controlled south of the Yangzi. Two specific 
changes, however, were the transfer of his capital, and the establishment 
of the Ruxu fortress. 
 In 211 Sun Quan moved his headquarters upstream along the Yangzi 
from Dantu to Moling. In the following year, he fortified the hill called 
Shitou in the north of Moling county, and he changed the name of that 
                                               
43 Ye had been the capital of Wei commandery under Later Han; it was from this 
territory that Cao Cao later took the name of his state. The city was south of 
present-day Cixian in Hebei. 
44 The concept of agricultural colonies was adopted by Sun Quan's government about 
this time, and the junior official Lu Xun was made Commandant of Agricultural 
Colonies at Haichang, on the north of Hangzhou Bay: SGZ 58/Wu 13:1343, and 
below. There is, however, no evidence that the system was yet used in the lower 
Yangzi valley: e.g. JS 26:782-83; Yang, "Economic History," 159, and Chapter 
Eight at 475-476. 
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place to Jianye, "Establishing Achievement." This city of Sun Quan is 
now the centre of the modern metropolis of Nanjing. 
 An area of high ground above the Yangzi delta, where the main 
stream of the river widens into the estuary towards the sea, the site had 
held military significance for centuries in the past. According to tradition, 
the great King Goujian of Yue built a fortress here as a base from which 
to attack the rival state of Chu, north and west of the Yangzi. Later, the 
place was taken by Chu. In its early foundation, the city had been named 
Jinling "Hill of Metal," but [319] when Chu was overthrown by the first 
Emperor of Qin the name of the territory was changed to the humbler and 
more prosaic Moling, "Hill Where the Horses are Fed."45 
 During the Han period, Moling was the seat of a county 
administration, and it had served as a base for the army of Xie Li, in 
alliance with Liu Yao against the invasion of Sun Ce in 195.46 Once the 
Yangzi had again become a significant military barrier, this region at the 
bend of the river, looking north towards Xu province and west towards 
Hefei, was an excellent centre and strongpoint. The new capital was 
eighty kilometres west of the former headquarters at Dantu, with access 
to the eastern territories of Wu and Kuaiji, and Sun Quan gained a great 
deal in communications up-river to the west.47 
 At the same time as he fortified Jianye, Sun Quan also constructed a 
naval base and fortress some 120 kilometres upstream at the mouth of the 
Ruxu River. The Ruxu River flowed from the Chao Lake, south of Hefei, 
to join the Yangzi a short distance above [320] present-day Wuhu. Here, 
                                               
45 On the traditional early history of Nanjing, see for example, Nagel's Guide, 971, 
and Gaillard, Nankin, 17-48. 
  The name of the earlier city at this site, Jinling of Chu, is sometimes rendered 
as "Hill of Gold." I suspect, however, that the character 金 jin here referred to a 
harder metal, indicating the strength of the defence post (cf. Jincheng, county city 
in the commandery of that name under Han, and an outpost against the north-
western frontier: HS 28B:1611. So the name Moling, evidently given by the First 
Emperor of Qin, was a deliberate slight against the former defenders: their 
stronghold was now a meadow for his war-horses to graze. 
46 HHS 112/22:3486-87; on the campaign of Sun Ce against Liu Yao, see Chapter 
Three at 160-164. 
47 On the establishment and the name change of Jianye, see SGZ 47/Wu 2:1118. 
  We are told that Sun Quan's counsellor Zhang Hong, and his associate and rival 
Liu Bei, had both recommended the site to Sun Quan as suitable for his capital. 
The advice of Zhang Hong is recorded in Jiangbiao zhuan, and that of Liu Bei in 
Xiandi chunqiu, both quoted in SGZ 53/Wu 8:1246 note 2. 
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it seems, the mouth of the tributary river provided an open harbour on the 
north bank of the Yangzi, and Sun Quan built a wall to protect the 
mooring. 
 The fortress is said to have been planned on the advice of Lü Meng, 
and some of Sun Quan's other officers doubted it was necessary: "We 
climb the bank to attack the enemy and we wade in the water to rejoin 
our ships. What is the use of such a fort?" they asked. Lü Meng replied 
that no-one could be certain of success in every battle, and if swift retreat 
was necessary, then a land-based defence line would protect the men and 
the ships until they could be withdrawn in safety. The argument was 
convincing, and the fortifications were duly constructed.48 
 The Ruxu position, a hundred kilometres south of Hefei, was 
designed to serve also as Sun Quan's main bridgehead north of the 
Yangzi. From here, his fleet controlled the obvious crossing points, and 
the military presence within the encampment was a continuing threat to 
any sortie from Hefei or Cao Cao's other garrisons. In the winter 
campaign of 212-213, Sun Quan offered no forward resistance to Cao 
Cao's advance, but concentrated his fleet and his army at Ruxu, and there 
withstood the attack. After a month, as the spring rains were coming, Cao 
Cao was compelled to withdraw without success.49[321] 
 In following years, the defence complex of Ruxu, coupled with Sun 
Quan's undisputed naval command of the Yangzi, proved as effective a 
barrier to Cao Cao's forces as Hefei city was against Sun Quan's. The 
difficulty of attack for either side was enhanced by the short campaigning 
season available: the northern armies sought advantage in the dry season 
of winter, and the forces of Sun Quan, which relied upon amphibious 
operations, usually took the offensive in late spring and summer. As in 
the case of Cao Cao's attack on Ruxu in 212-213, if the defence could 
                                               
48 Wu lu, quoted in SGZ 54/Wu 9:1275 PC, indicates that Sun Quan was already 
considering the establishment of the fort when Lü Meng argued in favour of the 
program. 
49 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1118 and 1119 PC quoting Wu li. 
  Wu li says that Sun Quan wrote to Cao Cao, warning him that "The spring rains 
are coming, you should go back quickly;" and in another part of the letter, he 
added, "I shall have no rest until you are dead." Cao Cao was suitably impressed 
with the chivalry of his opponent. 
  SGZ 1:37, from Cao Cao's point of view, claims he destroyed all Sun Quan's 
"western camps:" i.e. his military positions north of the Yangzi, and captured his 
Chief Controller Gongsun Yang; he then, however, withdrew his army. 
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hold out until the beginning of the wet, the enemy was obliged to retreat 
and positions which had been lost could be regained. 
 The contested land itself, however, was exposed to plunder and 
devastation from both sides. In the campaign of 212-213, Sun Quan 
abandoned and Cao Cao destroyed all his camps and settlements north 
and west of the Yangzi except Ruxu. As Cao Cao retreated, he sought to 
bring the people of the border region back north to settle in the region of 
the Huai, leaving behind a wasteland where Sun Quan could hold no 
ground. The plan was not entirely successful: the people did abandon 
their land, but many of them, rather than agreeing to settle in Cao Cao's 
agricultural colonies, preferred to flee south into Sun Quan's control,50 
and they were encouraged by the "open-arms" program of Sun Yu, 
Administrator of Danyang.51[322]
 
 In the territory from Hefei southwards to the Yangzi, there remained 
in Cao Cao's hands only the city of Huan, capital of Lujiang 
commandery. The Administrator there, Zhu Guang, also attempted to 
establish rice fields with agricultural colonies, and he encouraged the 
people of Poyang to make a rising against Sun Quan. Sun Quan's adviser 
Lü Meng, who maintained his interest in this region, persuaded him that 
this salient was too dangerous to ignore, and in the summer of 214 Sun 
Quan led his army to the attack. 
 According to Wu shu, most of Sun Quan's officers advised him to 
prepare for a full siege, with causeways and ramps and machines to 
attack the walls. Lü Meng, however, again came forward and urged the 
attack should be made as quickly as possible: 
It will certainly be several days before the earthworks and siege 
engines are ready; and by that time the defenders will be prepared for 
us and there will be a relief force on its way. We cannot deal with 
that. 
                                               
50 SGZ 14:540, being the biography of Jiang Ji, who advised against the move. Cao 
Cao later conceded that Jiang Ji had been correct, and named him Administrator of 
Danyang: since that commandery was firmly in Sun Quan's hands, we cannot be 
sure that the appointment was intended as a compliment. 
51 SGZ 51/Wu 6:1206. Sun Yu was appointed General Who Displays Majesty and 
appointed Administrator of Danyang, a post which he had held before. He 
appointed Rao Zhu and Yan Lian as chiefs of Xiang'an and Juchao respectively, 
both being counties in the southeast of Lujiang, near the Yangzi, and set them to 
attract the people of that region to their government. SGZJJ 51/Wu 6:2b-3a, 
suggests that the people of both Jiujiang and Lujiang were appealed to in this 
campaign. See also note 53 below. 
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 We have come here, moreover, with the advantage of seasonal 
rain and flooding. If we delay, the water will drain away and our 
route home will become extremely difficult. This could present a 
dangerous situation. 
 Look at this city now, it cannot be very secure against us. If the 
army makes a fierce attack from all sides at once, we can take the 
place by storm. Here is the way to certain success. 
Sun Quan took his advice, Gan Ning was put in charge of the scaling 
party and Lü Meng followed him in support. The attack began at dawn, 
and by breakfast-time the city was taken. Zhang Liao, Cao Cao's 
commander at Hefei, had learnt of the attack, and he [323] was already 
on the way with a relief force when he heard that the city had fallen. He 
halted and went back.52 
 Lü Meng was now appointed Administrator of Lujiang, but he set his 
headquarters at the city of Xunyang, close to the Yangzi, and Huan city 
was maintained only as an isolated outpost.53 
 These years of manoeuvring and campaigns had now confirmed the 
broad outline of the frontier. Sun Quan's forces controlled the main 
stream of the Yangzi from the high ground of the Dabie Shan to the sea, 
with military bases at Xunyang, Ruxu and Jianye. Cao Cao's people had 
firm control of the valley of the Huai, with an outpost at Hefei. Between 
them, north and west of the Yangzi, lay a region of open ground, 
effectively occupied by neither side, but constantly vulnerable to raiding, 
invasion and counter-attack. 
 
The hills people south of the Yangzi: 
In the time of Later Han, the commanderies of Yuzhang, Danyang, Wu 
and Kuaiji had between them laid notional claim to the whole territory of 
present-day Jiangxi, Zhejiang and southern Anhui and Jiangsu. In 
practice, however, judged by the positioning of their subordinate 
counties, control on the ground was far more restricted. For the most part, 
                                               
52 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1276, and PC note 1 quoting Wu shu. 
53 Xunyang was a county city in the extreme south of Lujiang, close to the Yangzi 
and just north of present-day Jiujiang in Jiangxi. 
  SGZ 47/Wu 2:1118-19 remarks that after Cao Cao's attempted withdrawal of 
the people in this region, "south of Hefei he held only Huan city," and Sun Quan 
captured that place in the following year, 214. It appears that the counties of 
Xiang'an and Juchao were abolished soon after Sun Yu's successful program of 
attraction and resettlement for the people in that region (note 51 above). 
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county cities lay in the open country of the Yangzi valley and estuary, and 
the region of the Tai Lake and Hangzhou Bay. A few settlements, such as 
Fuchun the home of the [324] Sun family, were established in valleys 
further inland, but for the most part the hill country from present-day 
Anhui southwards was beyond the authority of imperial government.54 
 This territory, marginal to the interests of an empire based on the 
Yellow River and the northern plain, had been occupied during those 
centuries by two types of people: the non-Chinese original inhabitants; 
and small but increasing numbers of Chinese immigrants, who sought 
land and some freedom from government exactions beyond the effective 
frontiers of the empire. The historical sources refer, with varying 
precision, to these groups as shanmin 山民 "hills people," as shanyue 山
越 "southern barbarians of the hills" and sometimes, pejoratively, as 
shanzei 山賊 "hills bandits," but the difference is not always well 
maintained, and the distinction cannot be relied upon.55 
 In this region, beyond the effective frontiers of Han, there was a 
three-way contest. The Chinese immigrants from the north sought to 
establish themselves in the territory held and defended by the non-
Chinese inhabitants, and both groups were concerned to maintain their 
independence from the organised government of the empire. Their 
villages were thus established as small armed camps, frequently 
dominated by the members of a single clan, but conflict between the new 
settlers and those whom they came to dispossess was ameliorated to some 
degree by intermarriage [325] and exchange of customs. Unlike the 
contrast between farmer and herdsman along the northern frontier of the 
empire, the peoples of the south, Chinese and non-Chinese, had no 
patterns of economic difference to maintain their separate identities. 
Once the Chinese colonists had established a position in the wooded 
valleys of the hill country, their way of life, based primarily upon rice-
                                               
54 On the commanderies and counties of Yang province under Later Han, see HHS 
112/22:3485-92, HHSJJ 112/22:35a-54b, and Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, 51-52. 
55 On the nature of these people, and also on the term zong 宗 below, which I 
interpret as "clan," as for example in the phrase zongmin 宗民, see the article in 
Tang Changru [1955] on the foundation of the state of Wu and the clan groups and 
non-Chinese south of the Yangzi at the end of Han (pages 3-29), criticised and 
discussed by He Changqun [1956B]. 
  Other articles on this question, and on the expansion of the power of the Sun 
government in these territories, as discussed below, have been written by Fu Lo-
ch'eng [1951] and Gao Yawei [1953]. 
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paddy, with terraces on the hillsides and basic irrigation, was compatible 
with that of the non-Chinese, and these latter could also learn from and 
adapt to the techniques of the newcomers. 
 In the last years of the second century, as the empire fell into 
disorder and civil war spread across north China, numbers of people 
came to take refuge in the south. We have noted the manner in which 
masses of displaced people, with their families, household and farming 
equipment, wandered across central China and were eventually found 
settlement in the agricultural colonies established by Cao Cao; in similar 
fashion, a significant number were uprooted by the wars and troubles of 
Yuan Shu and Tao Qian in the region of the Huai and came south to the 
Yangzi. At this time, notably in the 190s, Sun Ce was concerned 
primarily with military survival and expansion, so his new regime had 
little time to spare for the settlement and establishment of these 
newcomers, and in the first years of Sun Quan's government the priorities 
remained much the same. 
 Some refugees from the north moved south beyond the frontiers to 
seek settlement among the non-Chinese people and the earlier colonists, 
and their numbers sent waves of tension and instability through the 
region. Others travelled less far, and their masses added a complication 
and an opportunity for the warring leaders in the south. At the same time, 
even in territories which had been under the nominal control of Han, 
there many local leaders, not members of the established gentry, who 
might seek to obtain independence and security on their own. The 
tendency for [326] these people to form military alliances based upon 
clans is reflected in the term zong 宗, often used to refer to them, and one 
may imagine that while some of the floating population of refugees 
maintained identifiable units of their own, many individuals found it best 
to commit themselves to some local leader: the armies of Sun Ce and Sun 
Quan, and those of their opponents, were swelled by this source of 
recruitment. 
 Between 196 and 198, for example, in the western part of Danyang 
commandery, opposition to Sun Ce was led by Taishi Ci, who had 
contacts and support from the Shanyue people, and by the local clan 
leader Zu Lang, who also sought an alliance with the Shanyue. Later, 
when Sun Ce moved west into the Poyang region, he had to deal with the 
clans-people of Poyang, Shangliao and Haihun, who were claiming to 
establish their own governments, independent of the formal commandery 
offices. Eventually, from those separatist movements, there were 
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established the three commanderies of Poyang, Luling and (reduced) 
Yuzhang.56 
 One may observe that there was a ready connection between the 
territory of Lujiang commandery, north of the Yangzi, and the Poyang 
region, south of the river and the Pengli Lake. Liu Xun in 199, persuaded 
by Sun Ce, had mistakenly regarded the Poyang area as a potential sphere 
of influence,57 and when Cao Cao's officer Zhu [327] Guang was 
attempting to establish a position as Administrator at Huan city in 
Lujiang, he encouraged the various groups at Poyang to cause trouble 
within Sun Quan's territory.58 In this region the river and water system 
provided a means of transport across the Pengli Lake, and the north-south 
route was of comparable importance to the east-west line along the main 
stream of the Yangzi. 
 Finally on this matter, we may note the camps at Mo and Bao, 
situated near Jiayu in present-day Hubei, in the territory of Jiangxia 
commandery in Jing province. These two settlements were attacked by 
Zhou Yu, Sun Yu and other commanders under Sun Quan in 207, and we 
are told that their leaders were slain and the rest of the people, ten 
thousand or more, were brought back to the neighbourhood of the Pengli 
Lake. The incident has been mentioned earlier and, regardless of the 
possible exaggeration of the numbers involved, it is clear that these 
people were considered an important resource for the Sun group in their 
war against Huang Zu.59 
 The references to the camps at Mo and Bao are too limited for any 
firm conclusions to be drawn, but it seems likely that the people were 
refugees from the north who had crossed the Yangzi to seek shelter in the 
marshlands in the east of the middle Yangzi basin. From the context of 
                                               
56 The establishment of Luling commandery was proclaimed by Sun Ce about 196, 
though he did not control the territory until some years later: Chapter Three at 171. 
The administrative unit, however, may already have obtained at least local 
recognition by that time. Poyang commandery was established by Sun Quan in 
210: SGZ 47/Wu 2:1118. 
  On the changes of commanderies and counties, see the table and discussion of 
Wu Zengjin and Yang Shoujing, and the parallel compilations of Xie Zhongying 
and Hong Liangji. Zhongguo lishi ditu ji III, 27-28, presents a map of Yang 
province during the Three Kingdoms; naturally enough, however, it does not show 
all the variations from one year to the next. 
57  Chapter Three at 188-189. 
58 See above at 322. 
59 See Chapter Four at 237-239. 
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the history, they were not closely attached to the regime of Huang Zu, 
Administrator of Jiangxia under Liu Biao, and were thus vulnerable to 
large-scale kidnapping by the forces of Sun Quan. In this respect, the 
settlement by the Pengli Lake may be seen as a local version of Cao 
Cao's system of agricultural colonies, established in the south without the 
formal administrative arrangements and care that was shown in the north. 
 All this activity, the attacks on Taishi Ci and Zu Lang, the 
involvement in the Poyang region and the seizure of the people from 
[328] Mo and Bao, had taken place within the general bounds of the 
established empire. Soon after the Red Cliffs campaign, however, and the 
first settlement of Jing province which followed it, the government of 
Sun Quan embarked upon a program of expansion against territory which 
had lain hitherto beyond the effective control of Han. 
A leading figure in this development was He Qi, a man of family 
from Shanyin, the capital of Kuaiji commandery. He Qi held junior, 
locally-appointed rank in the commandery, and gained reputation, when 
acting as temporary magistrate of Yan county, for his firm dealing with a 
certain Si Cong, head of a local clan with strong contacts and support 
among the Shanyue. When Si Cong broke the law, He Qi arrested him 
and killed him, then led his own officers and loyal citizens to defeat the 
Si clan and the Shanyue in a pitched battle. He later held office in Taimo 
county on the south-western frontier of Kuaiji, and again dealt effectively 
and firmly with the local people. 60 
 When Sun Ce took over Kuaiji in 196, He Qi joined him and was 
soon afterwards named Commandant of the Southern Division, the 
territory about Dongye where Sun Ce had pursued and captured the 
former Administrator Wang Lang. Though it was an isolated region of no 
great importance, it needed competent control. The responsibility was 
first given to Han Yan, magistrate in the neighbouring coastal county of 
Yongning, but Han Yan was defeated and He Qi was appointed in his 
stead.61 
 He Qi was able to defeat the local rebels and dissidents quite swiftly, 
and the next several years saw remarkable development. With dextrous 
use of intrigue, persuasion and military force, he induced the surrender of 
Chinese opponents and the alliance of non-[329>330] Chinese peoples, 
and he expanded the territory under his control from the mouth of the 
                                               
60 The biography of He Qi is in SGZ 60/Wu 15:1377-88. 
61 On Sun Ce's expedition to Dongye, see Chapter Three at 169-170. 
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Map 9: Expansion in the southeast 
 
Min River along the whole course of the stream through present-day 
central Fujian. By 203 he had established his headquarters as 
Commandant at the new city of Jian'an, near present-day Jian'ou, and by 
205, after one last campaign against the local people north of that 
position, he had control of some eight counties and, equally importantly, 
he had recruited an army of ten thousand men.62 As the culmination of his 
                                               
62 SGZ 60 Wu 15:1377-78. 
  Though the region about Jian'an was controlled by a Commandant, it was still 
part of Kuaiji commandery. A separate commandery of Jian'an was established in 
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advance up the Min River, in 205 He Qi attacked dissidents in the region 
of Shangrao county, and established the new county of Jianping to the 
south. Shangrao was near present-day Shangrao on the upper reaches of 
the Xin River in eastern Jiangxi, so He Qi had established a line of 
conquest and control from the sea near present-day Fuzhou inland to 
Yuzhang and Poyang. 
 In 208, probably at the end of the year after the Red Cliffs campaign, 
He Qi was called to the north, appointed General of the Household Who 
is Majestic and Firm, and sent to campaign against Yi and She counties in 
southern Danyang. 
 Yi and She, now close to the cities of the same name in southern 
Anhui, were on the upper reaches of the Xin'an Jiang, which flows into 
the Fuchun River in Zhejiang, south of the watershed of the Huang Shan. 
They were thus isolated from the main territory of Danyang commandery, 
and were largely under the control of clan and so-called bandit groups. 
The groups were rather defensive than aggressive, and it seems probable 
that numbers of the people were recent arrivals from the north. When He 
Qi arrived, four new districts had been occupied and brought under [331] 
control, and he recommended immediately that a new county, Shixin, be 
established east of She, on a lower reach of the Xin'an River. 
 From that base, He Qi attacked the hill camps of the enemy, each of 
them said to contain ten thousand households. With light-armed troops 
using iron darts as pitons, who climbed the cliffs and high walls which 
the defenders had relied upon, He Qi stormed the camps, killed the 
leaders, and brought the bulk of the people back to settlement.63 
Following this success he recommended the establishment of another 
                                                                                                                   
260, during the reign of Sun Quan's son and second successor Sun Xiu: SGZ 
48/Wu 3:1159. 
63 SGZ 60/Wu 15:1379 PC note 1 quoting the Baopuzi book of Ge Hong of the fourth 
century, tells a story of this campaign. The hills people obtained the services of a 
sorcerer expert in jin 禁 "preventive" magic, who cast a spell making the swords of 
He Qi's troops lose their cutting effect, while their arrows turned back against them 
in mid-flight. After some thought, however, He Qi remarked, "I have heard that a 
cutting edge of metal can be 'prevented' and the poison from a snake can be 
'prevented.' However, a thing which has no edge, and a snake which is not 
poisonous, cannot be affected by these spells. So the magic which is working 
against us will become useless if our weapons have no edges." 
  He therefore had his men cut down trees to make cudgels, and sent a storming 
party up the slopes with these weapons. The defensive magic was now quite 
ineffective, and the enemy were utterly defeated. 
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three counties, and the commandery of Xindu, with He Qi as 
Administrator, was established with its capital at Shixin. 
 This new arrangement marked a major development in the 
integration of the territory controlled by Sun Quan. Xindu lay on a direct 
line between Hangzhou Bay and the Poyang region, with good access in 
both directions. For normal purposes, the Yangzi provided a better 
transport route, but He Qi at Xindu was able to intervene swiftly and 
effectively against disturbance or rebellion to the east or west. In 211, he 
put down a clan group rising in Yuhang county west of present-day 
Hangzhou, and a new county, Linshui, was established in that region. 
Two years later, there was a rebellion [332] in Yuzhang commandery, and 
He Qi attacked the dissidents and pacified them. 
 In both cases, the references to rebellion and pacification conceal the 
reality of the situation, that this was government aggression. There may 
have been some provocation, but the first crime of these people was that 
they wanted to be left alone. In the case of the Yuzhang group, we are 
told specifically that He Qi, having executed the ringleaders, chose the 
best troops for his army and settled the weaker ones by households 
among the counties: they were, in other words, brought under close 
control of the local administration.64 
 Three years later again, in 216, a certain You Tu of Poyang, leader of 
a band of local people, was sent a seal and ribbon from Cao Cao's 
government and encouraged to raise a rebellion. He was able to cause 
trouble and gain support in his own territory and in the neighbouring part 
of Danyang commandery.65 He Qi and the commander Lu Xun attacked 
him, You Tu was killed, the rebels surrendered, and the government 
obtained eight thousand good soldiers. 
 In 215 He Qi accompanied Sun Quan to an abortive attack on Hefei, 
and apart from the short campaign against You Tu he remained thereafter 
on the Yangzi frontier. He played an important role in the defence of that 
region, but it was his achievements in the new lands to the south that 
proved critical for the development of the state, for the firm control 
which he established south of the Huang Shan range became the basis for 
future expansion.[333] 
                                               
64 SGZ 60/Wu 15:1379, where the phrase used is xianhu "counties and households." 
See also note 78 below. 
65 It seems likely that the rebellion of You Tu had been instigated by Cao Cao's 
Administrator of Lujiang, Zhu Guang: see above. 
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 Other commanders of the Sun group were similarly involved in the 
expansion of territory and the control of formerly independent peoples, 
though none at this time operated on such a broad scale as He Qi. Huang 
Gai, hero of the Red Cliffs victory, appears to have become a specialist in 
this military and administrative technique: according to his biography,66 
Where the Shanyue refused to submit, or counties were troubled by 
bandits, Huang Gai would be appointed as magistrate..... 
 Altogether he held office in nine counties, and wherever he went 
the places were pacified and settled. Later he was transferred to be 
Commandant of Danyang, where he held the powerful in check and 
gave help to the weak. The Shanyue admired him and turned to him. 
In similar fashion, Han Dang, Zhou Tai and Lü Meng were involved in 
control of Shanyue in the Poyang region;67 Zhu Huan was engaged in 
campaigns in both Poyang and Danyang;68 and Xu Sheng pressed south 
into the hills from Wuhu county in Danyang.69 Zhu Zhi, long-term 
Administrator of Wu commandery, stayed specifically at the frontier city 
of Guzhang for a year in order to supervise the settlement of people in 
that region,70 and about 211 Zhu Zhi's adopted son, Zhu Ran, who had 
become a personal friend of Sun Quan, was given control of a new 
commandery named Linchuan, probably on the borders of western 
Danyang and eastern Poyang, to deal with the hills people immediately 
south of the Yangzi.71 Again, between 226 and [334] 228, the temporary 
                                               
66 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1284-85; the biography of Huang Gai. 
67 e.g. SGZ 47/Wu 2:1116. 
68 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1312; the biography of Zhu Huan. 
69 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1298; the biography of Xu Sheng. 
70 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1305; the biography of Zhu Zhi. 
71 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1305; the biography of Zhu Ran. 
  Zhu Ran was a nephew, son of an elder sister, to Zhu Zhi. His father's surname 
was Shi 施. When the boy was thirteen, about the time Sun Ce first came to the 
south of Yangzi, Zhu Zhi had no children, and he asked Sun Ce to recognise Ran as 
his successor. Zhu Zhi, of course, was a valued ally of Sun Ce in Wu commandery, 
so Sun Ce showed Ran every courtesy, and Ran and Sun Quan received schooling 
together. 
  The main text of SGZ 56 says that Linchuan was divided off from Danyang 
commandery, and Zhu Ran was made Administrator. The commentary of Pei 
Songzhi, at 1306 PC note 1, adds that the commandery was soon afterwards 
abolished, and ihat it was not the same as the commandery called Linchuan in Pei 
Songzhi's own day, the early fifth century. A Linchuan commandery was 
established some years later, in 257, from the eastern part of Yuzhang 
commandery; this appears to have occupied the territory south of the present-day 
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commandery of Dong'an was established about Fuchun, and the 
Administrator Quan Zong attacked the Shanyue in that region.72 
 In the enterprise of conquest and recruitment among the people of 
the margins, however, the chief successor to He Qi appears to have been 
Lu Xun, his colleague in the attack on the renegade You Tu of Poyang in 
216. 
 Lu Xun was a man of distinguished family in Wu commandery. He 
was the great-nephew of Lu Kang, that Administrator of Lujiang who had 
been attacked by Sun Ce on the orders of Yuan Shu in 194. At the time of 
the attack, Lu Kang recognised the danger and sent his family back to 
their home estates. His territory of Lujiang was seized by Sun Ce, and he 
himself eventually fell into the hands of Yuan Shu, where he died soon 
afterwards of illness. Despite this history, Lu Kang's son Lu Ji and Lu 
Xun's younger brother Lu Mao both became respected officials of Sun 
Quan's court, and Lu Xun was one of Sun Quan's leading military 
commanders and later regent of the state of Wu.73 
                                                                                                                   
Poyang Lake, and it was maintained through the Jin dynasties and into the fifth 
century: e.g. SGZ 58/Wu 3:1153; JS 15:462; Zhongguo lishi ditu ji III, 27-28 and 
55-56; IV, 5-6 and 17-18. This must be the one referred to by Pei Songzhi. 
  It is not possible to determine which counties were allocated to the earlier 
commandery of Linchuan. It was presumably set up as an administrative device for 
keeping closer control of a troublesome region, and was abolished, possibly about 
230, when the need had passed. See SGZJJ 56/Wu 11:4b, and SGZJJ 60/Wu 
15:20a, citing Wu and Yang, at 2944, also Xie and Hong. 
72 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1133 and PC note 1, and 1134. 
73 The biography of Lu Xun is in SGZ 58/Wu 13:1343-54; that of Lu Ji is in SGZ 
57/Wu 12:1328-29, and the biography of Lu Xun's younger brother Lu Mao is in 
SGZ 57/Wu 12:1336-38. 
  The Lushi shisong, a clan record, quoted in SGZ 58/Wu 13:1343 PC note 1, 
says that Lu Xun's grandfather Yu had risen to the post of Colonel of the City 
Gates at Luoyang, and his father Jun was Commandant of Jiujiang before his early 
death. The main text says that Lu Xun was orphaned when he was young, and he 
then went to the household of his great-uncle Lu Kang, the Administrator of 
Lujiang who was later attacked and overthrown by Sun Ce on behalf of Yuan Shu: 
Chapter Three at 155. 
  The earliest recorded connection between the families is the incident about 188, 
when Sun Jian was Administrator of Changsha and went to the support of a 
nephew of Lu Kang who was magistrate of Yichun in Yuzhang: Chapter Two at 
105. Curiously, given the later importance of the family, there is no record of the 
personal name of this official, but it is possible that he was Lu Jun, the father of Lu 
Xun. 
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 When Sun Ce came to take over Wu commandery, it appears that the 
Lu family, very wisely, had made no move to either side. After Sun Ce's 
death, however, Lu Xun, then aged twenty-one and thus a little older than 
Sun Quan, came to court and was appointed to a series of staff and 
clerical positions. He was then sent out as Commandant of Agricultural 
Colonies at Haichang, acting also as magistrate of the county. Haichang 
appears to have been a new administrative unit in Wu commandery, and 
the arrangement of colonies in this region was evidently intended to 
provide a centre for new settlement; it was not the same aggressive 
development as that of Cao Cao and Liu Fu in the valley of the 
Huai.[336] 
 Haichang was on the northern shore of Hangzhou Bay,74 and Lu Xun 
obtained his first military experience in an expedition against the hills 
people on the southern borders of Kuaiji. With a force of levies under his 
own command he captured the bandit Pan Lin and settled his people; 
increased by the new recruits, and Lu Xun's followers were now more 
than two thousand. From this local appointment, Lu Xun was sent with 
He Qi against the rebels in Poyang in 216, and he was then appointed to a 
colonel's command, with quarters on the Yangzi near the capital Jianye. 
 At this time, Sun Quan gave his niece, a daughter of Sun Ce, as wife 
to Lu Xun. The young woman cannot have been the daughter of Sun Ce 
by his formal wife the Lady Qiao, but she was surely the child of a 
recognised and respectable concubine.75 She was a little less than twenty 
when she was married, and Lu Xun, recognised as the senior male 
representative of his clan, was about thirty-five. The arrangement was not 
grossly incongruous in terms of age, it confirmed the attachment of the 
Lu clan to the Sun, and it established their fortunes in the developing 
regional structure of political power. 
                                               
74 The Lushi zitang xiangzan, evidently a collection of inscriptions from the clan 
temple, quoted in SGZ 58/Wu 13:1343 note 1 bis, says that Haichang was later 
named Yanguan. Zhongguo lishi ditu ji III, 27-28 and 55-56, shows the county of 
Yanguan on the northern shore of Hangzhou Bay, close to present-day Hangzhou. 
75 At the time Sun Ce died, he had been married to the Lady Qiao for less than a year; 
it is probable that his son Sun Shao was the only child of that marriage. 
  Lu Bi, in SGZJJ 46/Wu 1:36a-b, notes that three daughters of Sun Ce are 
recorded as being given in marriage: to Lu Xun, to Gu Shao and to Zhu Ji: note 3 
to Chapter Four. 
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 From this new position, Lu Xun's first policy was to emphasise the 
importance of the program of expansion against the hills people. In a 
formal statement of opinion, he argued,76[337] 
At this time that all the brave men and heroes are fighting for power, 
and they look out over the empire like wolves that seek their prey. 
Without great numbers of men, it will be impossible to defeat your 
enemies and settle the disorders. 
 In these circumstances we should consider the rebels of the hill 
country, who have long been a nuisance to us. They rely upon the 
natural difficulty of the terrain, and until these heartlands of our 
country are at peace we can make no proper plans for action at a 
distance. We must force a settlement upon them, and take their men 
as soldiers. 
We are told that Sun Quan accepted the argument, and Lu Xun was 
appointed Chief Controller on the Right, directly under headquarters 
command, to establish such a program. In fact, of course, He Qi and 
others had already put such operations into practice for the last ten years 
and more, but it was intended that Lu Xun should revive the campaign 
and press it further. 
 About this time, another rebel, Fei Zhan, in Danyang commandery, 
received insignia from Cao Cao and made an alliance with the Shanyue. 
Lu Xun was put in sole charge of operations, he attacked Fei Zhan and 
destroyed his forces, then followed this success with a sweep though the 
border territories of Danyang, Wu and Kuaiji; able-bodied men were 
conscripted for the army and the rest of their people were brought into 
settlements. At the conclusion of the campaign, he came back to set his 
headquarters at Wuhu in Danyang, the same base as had been used earlier 
by Xu Sheng. 
 One can, in Yang province, distinguish different regions of 
expansion, with varying military and administrative techniques applied to 
each of them. In the east, along the coast, the officers of Sun Quan 
pressed steadily against the hills people on the edges of their territory in 
Kuaiji and Wu commanderies. Southeast, in the area of present-day 
Fujian, He Qi, and his associates Jiang Qin and Lü [338] Dai, advanced 
up the valleys of the Min River complex, and established county seats in 
                                               
76 SGZ 58/Wu 13:1343-44. 
WARLORD STATE 
 
 
265 
regions which had never been under Chinese control.77 South from Wuhu 
in Danyang, there was a useful route into the hills of the Huang Shan 
range along the line of the present road and railway, so Wuhu was a 
headquarters for operations against the Shanyue, used by Xu Sheng, Lu 
Xun and probably also by Zhu Ran. Further west, in the Poyang region, 
the marsh-lands and hill country provided a refuge for Chinese and non-
Chinese, but it was a refuge constantly under pressure of invasion, forced 
recruitment and settlement from the forces of Sun Quan. Finally, in the 
south of the established territories, the new commandery of Xindu 
represented a major advance and consolidation of controlled territory and 
people into regions which Chinese governments had not occupied 
effectively before. 
 This program of expansion by regular Chinese power, under the 
government of Sun Quan, against the Chinese and non-Chinese people 
beyond the frontiers continued for many years, but the rationale and the 
techniques were established at this time. Repeatedly, the achievements of 
the various campaigns are described in terms of able-bodied men 
conscripted as soldiers, and other people settled under control, while the 
phrase xianhu "county households" appears to have indicated a system of 
forced settlement comparable to that of the agricultural colonies 
organised by Cao Cao in the north.78[339] 
 Unlike Cao Cao's agricultural colonies, moreover, the methods of 
Sun Quan's government were not designed, even at face value, to provide 
secure land tenure for displaced wanderers and refugees. The policy was 
either to take over established settlements of the hills peoples, with 
appropriate levies of taxation, corvee labour and military service, or, one 
                                               
77 The biography of Jiang Qin is in SGZ 55/Wu 10:1286-87, and that of Lü Dai is in 
SGZ 60/Wu 15:1383-87. Both men were involved in campaigns in the valley of the 
Min River, after the transfer of He Qi to the region of the new commandery of 
Xindu, and Jiang Qin later served with He Qi in the Xindu campaigns. 
78 Thus, for example, we have seen how He Qi settled the people of Yuzhang in 213 
(note 64 above), and Lu Xun, after his campaign against Fei Zhan in Danyang, 
brought families back "to fill up household settlements" (補戶 bu hu): SGZ 58/Wu 
13:1344. 
  In these and similar contexts, references to counties (縣 xian) and house-holds 
(戶 hu) are best interpreted as the settlement of people in Chinese-style colonised 
farmland, under effective supervision by local administrative offices. Unlike the 
tuntian system of Cao Cao, of which there were evidently some experimental 
establishments in the territory of Sun Quan, it does not appear that settlements by 
xian and hu entailed any particular variation from the tradition of Han. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
266 
stage further, to bring the people of the hills by force into land where they 
could be held under administrative control. Agricultural colonies, such as 
that established under Lu Xun at Haichang, were marginal to the main 
program of expansion inland: it was not a matter of matching the people 
to the land, but rather the forcible seizure of people who had once been 
independent. 
 Ultimately, survival of the state would depend upon geographical 
isolation and advantage, and the numbers that could be mobilised for 
defence against the north. In 210, after the success of the Red Cliffs and 
the division of Jing province with Liu Bei, Sun Quan controlled the 
equivalent of one province of the old empire, and the population of his 
territory, in terms of the Later Han census figures compiled some seventy 
years earlier, was about four million. In comparison, the population of the 
provinces controlled by Cao Cao, from Luoyang east across the North 
China plain, could be estimated at seven times that figure.79 For long term 
[340] survival, it was essential to expand the base of population, and Sun 
Quan's government had early embarked upon that policy. Behind the 
defence line in the north, and the military and diplomatic manoeuvres in 
Jing province to the west, the expansion and administrative colonisation 
of the vulnerable lands and peoples to the south and east had high 
priority. Sun Quan and his officers were recruiting men in the south of 
their territory for action in defence of the north and development in the 
west; and the success of this enterprise would prove of major importance 
for the future of the new state and for the history of China as a whole. 
 
The far south: 
During the twenty years of civil war since the time Dong Zhuo seized 
power, Jiao province had remained isolated and largely unaffected. This 
region beyond the Nan Ling ranges, extending over present-day 
                                               
79 These figures are based upon records in the Treatise of Administrative Geography, 
HHS 109/19-113/23: the account of Yang province appears in HHS 112/22:3485-
92. The date of the list is given by HHS 109/19:3389 as equivalent to 140 AD for 
the capital commandery of Henan, and the figures, itemised by households and 
individuals for each commandery, relate generally to that time. 
  At the end of Han, it was sometimes claimed that the population of the whole 
empire had fallen to only a fraction of the former numbers. The greater part of this 
apparent loss, however, was a failure of registration, not actual mortality. War, 
famine and migration affected great numbers of people, but the twenty years of 
disturbances cannot b have made a critical, sudden difference to the general pattern 
of settlement and colonisation in China as a whole. 
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Guangdong and Guangxi and the north of Vietnam, had minimal interest 
to the contending warlords of central China. After Sun Jian took his army 
north from Changsha to join Yuan Shu in 190, except for the brief 
independence of the Administrator Zhang Xian about 200,80 there had 
been no [341] significant local leader in the basin of the Xiang River, the 
region of present-day Hunan; and though Liu Bei established himself 
there after 208, his attention was directed north and west, not south. 
There had been occasional attempts by one northern commander or 
another to create a presence in the further south, but the distance and the 
difficulties of the terrain across the mountains allowed the territory to 
establish a political entity of its own. 
 On this basis, early in the 190s, the local leader Shi Xie, based upon 
Jiaozhi commandery in the Red River delta, established authority over 
the whole of the region.81 
 According to the biography of Shi Xie, his family came originally 
from the state of Lu in north China, but migrated to the south in the time 
of Wang Mang, and took up residence in Guangxin, capital of Cangwu 
commandery, near present-day Wuzhou to the northwest of Guangzhou. 
Cangwu occupied an important position on the West River, the main 
inland communications of the province, and controlled the chief trading 
route to the north by way of the Ling Qu canal. The Shi family prospered 
there, and in the time of Emperor Huan, who reigned from 146 to 167, 
Shi Xie's father Shi Ci became Administrator of Rinan. Strictly speaking, 
the appointment was improper, for the head of a commandery under Han 
should not have held office in his native province,82 but the appointment 
may reflect both the local importance of the Shi clan and the comparative 
lack of official concern for these niceties on the fringes of the 
empire.[342] 
 Born in 137,83 as a young man Shi Xie travelled to the capital, 
Luoyang, where he studied the Confucian classics Spring and Autumn 
Annals and Zuo Chronicle. He was then recommended by his local 
commandery as Filial and Incorrupt, and was appointed to the Imperial 
Secretariat, an office requiring serious scholarly ability. He later resigned 
                                               
80 On Zhang Xian's rebellion against Liu Biao in the late 190s, see Chapter Four at 
241. 
81 The biography of Shi Xie is in SGZ 49/Wu 4:1191-94. His career is discussed in 
detail by Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 70-80, and Holmgren, Colonisation, 72-77. 
82 See Yen Keng-wang [1961], 348-350, and his more detailed article of 1950. 
83 SGZ 49/Wu 4:1193 says that Shi Xie died in 226 at the age of 90 sui. 
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and returned home, but after the death of his father he was again 
nominated, as Abundant Talent, by the provincial government. The higher 
grade of recommendation gave the right to immediate appointment, and 
Shi Xie became magistrate of Wu county in Nan commandery in Jing 
province, on the Yangzi by present-day Wushan in Sichuan, in the region 
of the Gorges. He was then transferred to become Administrator of 
Jiaozhi, again in his own province. 
 
 
 
Map 10: The far south in the time of Shi Xie 
 
Ding Gong, Inspector of Jiao province in the early 180s, was evidently 
impressed and influenced by the Shi family, for when he was appointed 
Excellency over the Masses in 188 he summoned Shi Xie's brother, Shi 
Yi, to join him at Luoyang. Ding Gong, however, left office soon 
afterwards, and though Shi Yi was well received he found it prudent to 
return home when the troubles broke out and Dong Zhuo came to power 
in 189. 
 As we have observed, there had been a number of rebellions in the 
south during the second century of Later Han, and there is a general 
record of disturbance during the reign of Emperor Ling, much of it 
caused by local resentment at the extortion and corruption of imperial 
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officials.84 In 181 [343] the Inspector Zhu Jun, later patron of Sun Jian, 
put down a rebellion in Jiaozhi, but there was further disturbance in 184. 
The Inspector Jia Cong restored order by his lenient government, and he 
made a point of appointing local men as county magistrates.85 
 It was probably under the influence of Jia Long's policy that Shi Xie 
received appointment to the important position of Administrator of 
Jiaozhi. His father had held equivalent position in Rinan, but that was on 
the edge of the empire, while Jiaozhi, on the Red River delta, dominated 
the western part of the province. Elsewhere, the region was in almost 
constant disturbance.86 
 The headquarters of the Inspector were in the east, at Panyu, capital 
of Nanhai commandery, present-day Guangzhou, but some time in the 
190s the Inspector Zhu Fu, probably a relative of Zhu Jun, was killed by 
local non-Chinese,87 and Shi Xie had opportunity to take control over the 
whole province. Keeping his position as Administrator of Jiaozhi, he 
went through [344] the formality of nominating Shi Yi as Administrator 
of Hepu, his next brother Shi Hui as Administrator of Jiuzhen, and the 
fourth brother, Shi Wu, Administrator of Nanhai. Of the three remaining 
commanderies in the province, Cangwu was the home country of the Shi 
family, and Rinan must have been influenced by former subordinates of 
                                               
84 See Chapter One at 39-40 and Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 64-70. 
  An important text on the history of the south at this time was compiled by Xue 
Zong. His family had taken refuge in the south from the civil war and he later held 
office under Lü Dai (Chapter Seven at 441-448). When Lü Dai left the south in 
231 Xue Zong, concerned at the need for effective government in the region, 
presented a long memorial to Sun Quan, summarising the recent history of the 
territory and pointing out the need for firm and honest administration. The text of 
the memorial is preserved in his biography, SGZ 53/Wu 8:1251-53. 
85 The biography of Jia Cong is in HHS 31/21, 1111-12. His achievement and his 
policies are discussed by Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 68-69. 
86 The memorial of Xue Zong, at SGZ 53/Wu 8:1252, tells how the Administrator of 
Rinan, a man from Nanhai, had one of his senior officers flogged to death and was 
driven away in consequence; and the Administrator of Jiuzhen was killed in a local 
mutiny brought on by a similar fit of ill temper. 
87 The memorial of Xue Zong, at SGZ 53/Wu 8:1252, says that Zhu Fu was a man 
from Kuaiji, the same commandery as Zhu Jun. Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 71, says 
that he was Zhu Jun's son, but I can find no such statement in the early Chinese 
sources. Taylor describes Zhu Fu as a patron of upper-class refugees escaping the 
depredations of the Yellow Turban rebels in the north, and presumably the other 
disturbances of the civil war. This may well be, but according to Xue Zong the 
basic cause of Zhu Fu's downfall was the exploitation of the people by the local 
officials he had appointed. 
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Shi Ci. Yulin commandery, in the hill country on the border between 
present-day Guangdong and Guangxi, does not appear to have caused any 
difficulty to the hegemony of Shi Xie. 
 For some years after the death of Zhu Fu, Shi Xie remained in 
undisputed control of the southern territory, and the region became, like 
Jing province to the north, a place of refuge for émigrés from the warfare 
of central China. Longbian, Shi Xie's capital, on the Red River delta near 
present-day Hanoi, was a major trading centre, Shi Xie was admired for 
his authority and his scholarship, and the splendour of his court was 
celebrated:88 
Shi Xie and his brothers all governed commanderies, and they were 
lords over a whole province. For ten thousand li around, they had no 
superiors in rank and authority.[345>346] 
 When they came out or went in, there was the sound of chiming 
stones, their equipage had majesty and ceremony, flutes were blown 
and drums were beaten, while the horsemen and carriages filled the 
roads. There were always dozens of foreigners burning incense by 
the hubs of the wheels.89 
                                               
88 On Longbian, capital of Jiaozhi commandery, and thus of Shi Xie's government, as 
a centre for overseas trade in Later Han, see Yü, Trade and Expansion, 178-179. 
  The passage rendered below comes from SGZ 49/Wu 4:1192 and is translated 
also by Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 73-74. The biography, at 1191-92, also cites a 
letter from the scholar Yuan Hui, writing to Xun Yu, head of the Imperial 
Secretariat, and praising not only the government but also the scholarship of Shi 
Xie. 
  Yuan Hui is described as a man from Chen state, in present-day Henan; there is 
no further account of him in the histories. Xun Yu was a member of a celebrated 
scholarly clan from the neighbouring Yingchuan commandery, who became a 
leading adviser of Cao Cao; his biography is in SGZ 10:307-19. He was head of 
the Secretriat in the Han government from the time the emperor came into Cao 
Cao's hands in 196 until his death in 212. 
89 The phrase huren 胡人, here rendered as "foreigners," commonly indicates "non-
Chinese peoples of the north." In this instance it may best be understood as a 
description of people from the direction of India, to whom the term hu was 
sometimes applied since the first contact with those people came along the trade-
routes of central Asia, roughly speaking from the north. See, for example, Lao Kan 
[1947] 90, and Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest I, 51, and II, 336-337 note 148, also I, 
290-292 and ff. 
  This passage has been discussed by many scholars, from different points of 
view with varying interpretations. Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest II, 336-337 note 
148, accepts the argument that these incense-burning foreigners may have been 
Buddhist monks from India or central Asia, enlisted for the occasion, though he 
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 Their wives and concubines rode in covered coaches, and their 
sons and junior relatives followed the soldiers on horseback.[347] 
 They had the greatest honour at that time, and they caused the 
barbarians to submit for very fear. The Commandant [Zhao] Tuo had 
been no greater.90 
Shi Xie, by the transcribed name of Sĩ Nhiếp, is still honoured in 
Vietnamese national history as King Si.91 
 For a considerable time, the leaders in the north had other things to 
occupy them. Liu Biao, Governor of Jing province, was naturally 
interested in the lands across his southern border, but the separatist 
activities of Zhang Xian had acted as buffer to protect the position of the 
Shi family further south, and Liu Biao was in any case concerned rather 
with the north than with the distant south. 
 In similar fashion, Sun Ce and his rivals in the lower Yangzi had no 
opportunity to consider action at such a distance. Sun Ce had sailed to the 
mouth of the Min River, and there had long been communication and 
trade along the coast,92 but there was no possibility of significant political 
                                                                                                                   
does not agree with the further proposal of Fukui, Research, 109-110, that the 
procession itself was Buddhist. Yü, Trade and Expansion, 178, interprets the text 
as meaning that "the streets of Tonkin were filled with barbarians:" this may have 
been the case, but it is not a precise translation; the context shows clearly that the 
foreigners were specifically associated with the panoply of a formal procession. 
  Yü Ying-shih, therefore, together with Lao Kan and also Tran Van Giap, 
"Bouddhisme en Annam," 216-220, uses this passage as evidence for sea trade 
with Southeast Asia and beyond. This seems the more probable route for the 
foreigners to come, though there is evidence that Shi Xie had contact, through 
present-day Yunnan, with the west and northwest of China proper: note 101 below. 
  Holmgren, Colonisation, 75-76, interprets the accompaniment of foreigners 
and their incense as evidence of the influence of Hindu and Buddhist practices 
upon the court of Shi Xie. As Zürcher remarks, there is nothing to show that this is 
specifically a Buddhist procession, but it does demonstrate the use of related rituals 
to enhance the splendour of Shi Xie's ceremonial, and it seems likely that there was 
a significant colony of resident or visiting foreigners to support and appreciate the 
performance. 
90 On Zhao Tuo, see Chapter One at 29-30. 
91 Schafer, Vermilion Bird, 99. 
92 On Sun Ce's voyage to Dongye and Houguan at the mouth of the Min River, and 
the subsequent operations of He Qi on his behalf, see Chapter Two at 169-170. 
  The Shenxian zhuan, "Chronicle of Spirits and Immortals," by Ge Hong of the 
late third and early fourth century AD, quoted in SGZ49/Wu 4:1192 PC note 1, 
tells how Shi Xie was cured of a mortal sickness by the adept Dong Feng from 
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contact or control by the sea route. Later, Sun Ce's cousin Sun Fu, 
operating in the valley of the Gan River south of Poyang, was given title 
as Inspector of Jiao province, but this was rather a general threat than a 
serious claim,93 and no move was made to follow it up. 
 The early death of Shi Wu, however, Shi Xie's youngest brother who 
had been made Administrator of Nanhai, appears to [348] have reduced 
the control of the family in that region, and provided an opportunity for 
outside forces to intervene. At any rate, some time after 200 the court of 
Han, under the control of Cao Cao, sent Zhang Jin to act as Inspector of 
Jiao province. 
 Zhang Jin does not appear to have come into conflict with Shi Xie, 
but he was concerned with the potential threat from Liu Biao and he 
sought to build up a local military force of his own. In this he was 
unsuccessful, and about 203 or 204 he was killed, either by non-Chinese 
people or by a mutiny among his own troops. We are told Zhang Jin had 
attempted to maintain his authority with Taoist rituals, and in the isolated 
circumstances on which he was operating, he would have needed very 
strong magic to survive.94 
 Soon after the death of Zhang Jin, Liu Biao took a hand in the affairs 
of the south, sending Lai Gong of Lingling commandery as Inspector, 
                                                                                                                   
Houguan. This serves at least as evidence of continuing contact, which we would 
expect, along the south-eastern coast of China at the time. 
93 See Chapters One at 52-53 and Four at 261. 
94 According to JS 15:464-65, Zhang Jin was first appointed as Inspector, but was 
then given the higher rank and title of Governor, presumably in an attempt to 
enhance his local authority. It seems this was the first time the territory had been 
given the formal status of a province: note 57 to Chapter One. 
  The record of Zhang Jin has been discussed in relationship to the quarrel of Sun 
Ce with the supporters of Gan Ji: Chapter Three at 204. The earliest reference to 
him is in SGZ 6:189 PC note 1 quoting the Xu Han shu of Sima Biao, where he is 
described as a client of Yuan Shao who sought to persuade He Jin to massacre the 
eunuchs in 189 (cf. Chapter Two at 109). SGZ 38/Shu 8:965, has a passing 
reference to one Zhang Ziyun in a letter written by Xu Jing to Cao Cao, and at 966 
note 3 the commentary of Pei Songzhi remarks that Ziyun was the style of Zhang 
Jin, who was a man from Nanyang, and whose story is told in more detail in the 
Wu section of SGZ. 
  Zhang Jin is mentioned in SGZ 49/Wu 4:1192, and again in the memorial of 
Xue Zong, SGZ 53/Wu 8:1252. See also Holmgren, Colonisation, 72-77, and 
Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, 71-72. 
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and Wu Ju of Changsha as Administrator of Cangwu.95 Cao Cao, 
however, made an alliance with Shi Xie, [349] recognising him as 
Administrator of Jiaozhi and also appointing him General of the 
Household Who Comforts the South, with authority over all seven 
commanderies. Shi Xie, in turn, made a point of sending tribute offerings 
from the province to the court at Xu city, and this show of loyalty was 
rewarded with promotion to the rank of general, and enfeoffment as a 
marquis. It does not appear, however, that Shi Xie in the west or Liu 
Biao's people in the east of the province took any action against one 
another at this time. 
 The quick succession of events in 208, from the death of Liu Biao to 
the conquest by Cao Cao and then his defeat at the Red Cliffs, brought a 
measure of confusion and change also to the south. Wu Ju raised troops 
to attack his former associate Lai Gong, and Lai Gong fled back to Jing 
province. Wu Ju then asked for support from Sun Quan, probably 
intending to use the alliance as a means to become independent. Sun 
Quan, however, sent Bu Zhi, lately the Administrator of Poyang 
commandery, to take the post of Inspector.96 
 Bu Zhi was a man of scholarly family from Xiapi commandery of 
Later Han, who had come south during the disorders in Xu province. He 
had lost all his property, but he then joined the staff of Sun Quan, and for 
the next several years, with the exception of a brief stint as magistrate of 
Haiyan in Wu commandery, he held secretarial and administrative 
positions at headquarters. In 210 he was appointed Administrator of 
Poyang, and after only a few months in that post he was transferred to be 
Inspector of Jiao province, with supplementary appointment as General 
of the [350] Household Who Establishes Firmness and command of a 
thousand archers. 
 There is little in his record up to that time to indicate that Bu Zhi was 
a man of action, and it appears in some respects a strange appointment. 
On the other hand, such a civilian official would be in a fair position to 
deal with the Shi clan, and when action was required Bu Zhi was 
certainly energetic and competent. Soon after his arrival, with suspicions, 
                                               
95 Apart from the death of Zhang Jin, there had also been a vacancy created for the 
position of Administrator of Cangwu due to the death of the incumbent Shi Huang. 
  Shi Huang, whose surname was not the same as that of Shi Xie and his 
relatives, is not referred to elsewhere. We may assume that he was tolerant of Shi 
Xie's overall authority, and was perhaps an ally and associate. 
96 The biography of Bu Zhi is in SGZ 52/Wu 7:1236-42. 
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however justified, that Wu Ju was undecided in his loyalty, he invited 
him to a conference, then arrested him and had him executed. 
 With this show of force, and subsequent victory in a skirmish against 
local forces at the Gaoyao narrows of the West River, Bu Zhi established 
his position in Nanhai and Cangwu,97 and he not only took over the 
troops lately commanded by Wu Ju, but also collected units which had 
earlier served Zhang Jin. For their part, Shi Xie and his brothers offered 
formal recognition to Bu Zhi as Inspector of the province as a whole, 
although it does not appear that Bu Zhi made any attempt to exert an 
oppressive authority. 
 The core of the Shi family power was in the Red River basin, about 
present-day Hanoi, with some interest in the region of the Leizhou 
peninsula and Hainan island. Though we have been told that the power 
and prosperity of Shi Xie rivalled that of Zhao Tuo in the past, and he had 
at one time sought to control Nanhai commandery through the 
appointment of his brother Shi Wu as Administrator, he was now content 
to leave that eastern region alone, and there is no sign that he sought to 
establish a real independence. On the contrary, about 217 Shi Xie sent his 
son Shi Xin as hostage to Sun Quan. Shi Xin was made Administrator of 
the new capital commandery of Wuchang in the [351] middle Yangzi,98 
while Shi Xie was given title as General of the Guards and renewed 
enfeoffment as a marquis, and his brother Shi Yi was also honoured. 
 It was at this time, moreover, that the local leader Yong Kai of 
Yizhou commandery in Yi province, about present-day Kunming in 
Yunnan, who had embarked on a rebellion against the new regime of Liu 
Bei at Chengdu, sent messengers to make contact with Shi Xie.99 Shi Xie 
passed the communication across to Bu Zhi, and for the next several 
years Yong Kai and his associates were maintained as agents of Sun Quan 
in the southern part of Yi province. 
 In all this, one is struck by the comparatively limited ambition and 
enterprise of Shi Xie. From his high point of power, controlling the whole 
of Jiao province, he had tolerated and allowed the incursion of alien 
inspectors and Administrators in the Nanhai-Cangwu region, and he had 
                                               
97 There is a more detailed account of Bu Zhi's entry into the province in SJZ 
37:1176-79, where the personal name of Wu Ju appears as Chen 臣. Gaoyao is 
some seventy-five kilometres west of present-day Guangzhou. 
98 On the establishment of Sun Quan's capital at Wuchang, see Chapter Seven at 413. 
99 On the take-over of Yi province by Liu Bei, see Chapter Six at 367-370; on the 
later history of Yong Kai, see Chapter Eight at 447. 
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accepted not only the distant recognition of Cao Cao but also the more 
immediate authority of Bu Zhi and the court of Sun Quan. One might 
imagine that he could have manipulated the overtures of Yong Kai in 
such a way as to confirm his own autonomy, and seek to establish a semi-
independent confederation of local groups across the whole of the south. 
None of this, however, took place, and he certainly made no effective 
effort to emulate the political achievement of Zhao Tuo and the state of 
Nan-Yue in the second century BC. 
 Some of the explanation may lie simply in the fact that Shi Xie was 
now an old man, in his late seventies and early eighties. He appears to 
have maintained an undisputed authority as head of the clan, while his 
very presence prevented energetic junior members from taking initiatives 
of their own. Furthermore, though his power [352] was dominant in the 
region, there were certainly non-Chinese and very likely Chinese groups 
that were potential sources of trouble, and the authority of the Shi group 
may have benefited from the threat of great and powerful friends in the 
north. Whichever of these reasons may have applied, Shi Xie either 
would not or could not establish a long-term base of independent 
authority; and other members of his family would later regret that failure. 
 For the time being, however, during ten years of Bu Zhi's 
appointment, the south was largely at peace and Shi Xie, under the guise 
of tribute, maintained a prosperous official trade with Sun Quan. Every 
year he would send an embassy, with a catalogue of gifts, many obtained 
by overseas trade: incense and fine cloth, pearls and great cowrie shells, 
ornamental glass,100 kingfisher feathers, tortoise-shell, ivory and 
rhinoceros horn, and fruits such as bananas, coconuts, longan "dragon-
eyes" and lichees. Shi Yi in Hepu also sent horses, presumably obtained 
by overland trade.101 Sun Quan [353] replied with protestations of 
                                               
100 On the phrase 流離 liuli as referring to ornamental coloured glass, see Yü, Trade 
and Expansion, 198, Schafer, Golden Peaches, 235-237, and Needham, Science 
and Civilisation IV:1, 104-105. Glass appears to have been one of the chief 
Chinese imports from the Roman empire: HHS 88/78:2919, refers to liuli as a 
product of Daqin, and Wei lue, in SGZ 30:861 PC, lists several different varieties. 
It arrived in the east both by land across central Asia and by the sea route to south 
China. 
101 Since we know that Shi Xie had contact with Yong Kai and his associates in the 
region of present-day Yunnan, it is likely these horses came from the west of 
China. In 112 the Later Han government established horse pastures in Yuexi, 
Yizhou and Jianwei commanderies, all in the region of present-day Sichuan and 
Yunnan: HHS 5:218, and deC, Northern Frontier, 486 note 62. 
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friendship, and gave generous gifts in return: the quality and quantity are 
not specified, but we may assume the exchange was sensibly balanced. 
 In economic terms, it was useful to Sun Quan to have access to the 
resources of the south as a means to supplement the produce of the 
comparatively limited territory which he held under his direct control. In 
his own region, Shi Xie had established and maintained an effective local 
administration, with successful trade on land and sea to the west and 
south, and security provided by the alliance with Sun Quan. The stability 
of this political balance, however, was predicated upon the authority of 
Sun Quan remaining unrivalled in the territory of the Yangzi, and that 
required there should be no strong alternative regime in Jing province. 
From every view, control of the middle Yangzi was critical to the 
ambitions, and even the survival, of the state of Sun Quan. 
                                                                                                                   
  There was, however, also at this time a trade in horses of the Yuezhi by the sea 
route from India to southeast Asia, and it is just possible that some animals, of the 
better stock, came by this round-about way. See Needham, Science and 
Civilisation IV:3, 449, citing the now fragmentary work Wushi waiguo zhuan 吳時
外國傳 of Kang Tai 康泰, written about 260 (note 38 to Chapter Eight). 
  On the other items from the south, as listed here, see also Yü, Trade and 
Expansion, 177-182, and especially Schafer, Vermilion Bird, 197 [incense], 220 
[kau silk or pinikon], 160-162 [pearls], 208 [cowrie shells], 238 [kingfisher 
feathers], 215 [tortoise-shell], 224-225 [ivory], 226-227 [rhinoceros horn], 186-
187 [bananas], 173-174 [coconuts], 188-190 [lichees and longans]. On incense, 
pearls and cowries, see also Schafer, Shore of Pearls, 41-43 and 50. 
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STRUGGLE FOR JING PROVINCE 211-219 
 
Introductory summary 
Liu Bei in the west (211-214) 
The second settlement of Jing province (215) 
The great betrayal (219) 
 
Introductory summary: 
After the victory at the Red Cliffs, Liu Bei obtained control of the 
southern commanderies of Jing province, with access to the Yangzi by 
Nan province. In 211 he was invited into Yi province, present-day 
Sichuan, to assist the local warlord Liu Zhang against the theocratic ruler 
Zhang Lu, who occupied Hanzhong commandery. Soon after his arrival, 
however, Liu Bei turned against Liu Zhang and took the territory for 
himself. 
 With Liu Bei thus established in the west, and his own forces 
unsuccessful in their attempts to expand north of the Yangzi, Sun Quan 
became increasingly dissatisfied with the arrangements in Jing province. 
His claim was rejected by Liu Bei, but in 215, after a brief campaign, a 
new treaty was drawn up which gave him some additional territory. The 
alliance was reconfirmed. 
 In 219, Liu Bei captured Hanzhong and proclaimed himself King, 
and in the latter part of the year his general in Jing province, Guan Yu 
attacked Cao Cao's positions on the Han River. Destroying an enemy 
army, he laid siege to Cao Ren in Fan city.[355] 
 While Guan Yu was thus engaged, however, Sun Quan and his 
general Lü Meng attacked his rear positions. Guan Yu was killed by Sun 
Quan's forces, and Sun Quan was able to take over all the territory of Jing 
province which he had formerly held for Liu Bei. 
 
Liu Bei in the west (211-214): 
The agreement concluded in 210 between Liu Bei and Sun Quan had 
given Liu Bei control of all the southern commanderies of Jing province 
in the basin of the Xiang River and its tributaries, together with the 
                                               
*  In the first edition of Generals of the South, published in 1990, Chapter Six 
occupied pages 354 to 407. The original pagination is indicated with brackets []; 
indexing and cross-references refer to those pages. 
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"loan" of Nan commandery controlling the course of the Yangzi upstream 
from the Dongting Lake. The territory held directly by Sun Quan covered 
the southern part of Jiangxia commandery, governed by Cheng Pu and 
facing Cao Cao's Administrator Wen Ping, and the reach of the Yangzi 
between the Dongting Lake and the junction with the Han, including the 
area of the Red Cliffs: this was held by Lu Su as Administrator of 
Hanchang.1 
For a time, there was no further discussion of this arrangement. Liu 
Bei was content with what he had and was looking for opportunity 
elsewhere, while Sun Quan was primarily concerned with control of Yang 
province and the territory north of the Yangzi towards the Huai. Cheng 
Pu died, and Lu Su was for a time transferred to the northern front, where 
he took part in the capture of Huan city in Lujiang in 214. In the 
following year, however, Sun Quan turned his attention once more to the 
west. 
 These few years had seen a remarkable development in Liu Bei's 
position. He and his advisers, notably Zhuge Liang, had successfully 
combined his personal prestige, political opportunity [356] and a ruthless 
hypocrisy to seize Yi province in present-day Sichuan and establish a 
new government of considerable military strength. 
 When Liu Zhang, the Governor of Yi province, succeeded to the 
position of his father Liu Yan in 194, we are told that he was chosen 
because he was gentle and amenable,2 and he was always considered a 
weak ruler. Nonetheless, though there had been rebellions and other 
disturbances during his government, and it was clear that he might be 
vulnerable to a strong rival, Liu Zhang had so far managed to hold his 
own. In 211, however, he issued an invitation to Liu Bei in Jing province 
that he should bring an army to assist him against the Taoist Zhang Lu. 
 Zhang Lu's family came originally from Pei, in the eastern part of the 
empire, but his grandfather Zhang Ling had migrated to the west, where 
he established a religious sect based upon Haoming Mountain west of 
                                               
1 Chapter Five at 292-293 and 300. 
2 See Chapters Four and Five, and SGZ 31/Shu 1:867. 
  Liu Zhang and his two elder brothers, Liu Fan and Liu Dan, had accompanied 
the imperial court under Dong Zhuo when it moved to Chang'an in 190. Liu Zhang 
was later able to join his father, but Liu Fan and Liu Dan were killed at the time of 
an attempted coup by the north-western warlord Ma Teng against Dong Zhuo's 
successors Li Jue and others in 194. It was soon after this Liu Yan died. 
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Chengdu.3 According to Zhang Lu's biography, Zhang Ling [357] taught 
the people from scriptures which he wrote himself, and he required an 
offering of rice from his followers: the group was known as the "Way of 
the Five Dou of Rice," or "Rice Sect."4 When Zhang Ling died, his son 
Zhang Heng followed him as leader of the sect, and when Zhang Heng 
died Zhang Lu succeeded him. 
 About the time of the Yellow Turban rebellion of Zhang Jue in the 
east of China in 184, there was a short-lived rising under a certain Zhang 
Xiu, described as a man from Ba commandery, who was evidently 
associated with the Rice Sect.5 The trouble, however, [358] was brought 
                                               
3 There is a biography of Zhang Lu in SGZ 8:263-66, and a parallel account of him 
in HHS 75/64:2435-37. The account of Zhang Ling, also known as Zhang Daoling, 
is given at the beginning of those texts. See also note 5 below. The history is 
considerably confused, not only through the normal lack of interest shown by 
traditional Chinese historians for such heterodox sects, but also through the 
hagiographic tradition which came to surround the founders of the modern Taoist 
church. It should be observed, moreover, that the teachings and practices of a sect 
could change very considerably in the course of evolution under different 
leadership at different times, and it is extremely difficult to judge what stage of 
development is described in any particular passage of a text. 
  Among the many detailed discussions of the sect of Zhang Lu and his 
predecessors, I would mention in particular those of Maspero, Eichhorn, Fukui, 
Miyakawa, Michaud, Seidel and (with caution) Levy. 
4 I have discussed this religious group briefly in note 87 to Chapter Three. I refer to 
it hereafter as the Rice Sect. The dou 斗 measure of capacity in Han times was a 
fraction under two litres. There is, however, some debate among modern scholars 
whether the reference to dou (which can also indicate the constellation of the Big 
Dipper, Ursa Major) was not more symbolic than practical. 
5 The Dian lue of Yu Huan, quoted in commentary to HHS 75/64:2436 and in SGZ 
8:264 PC note 1, has a comparatively detailed account of the organisation and 
beliefs of the Rice Sect, to which the leadership is attributed first to Zhang Xiu, 
and then to Zhang Lu. There is some variation between the texts, presumably due 
to corruption in transmission: the version preserved in SGZ PC is very much better. 
  HHS 8:349 notes that in the seventh month of 184 the religious leader Zhang 
Xiu of Ba commandery made a rising. Commentary to that passage quotes the 
[Lingdi] ji of Liu Ai, a contemporary, which describes Zhang Xiu as a leader of the 
Rice Sect, and this is supported by Dian lue. 
  In commentary at the end of the latter passage, however, Pei Songzhi argues 
that the personal name of Zhang Xiu has been miswritten for that of Zhang Heng. 
He evidently bases this upon the main text of SGZ 8:263, which describes how the 
son of Zhang Ling, Zhang Heng, carried on the teachings of his father, and was 
succeeded in this by his own son Zhang Lu: in this lineage, there appears no room 
for Zhang Xiu. The Kaoyi commentary of Sima Guang to ZZTJ 58:1872, 
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under control without great bloodshed, and Zhang Xiu was permitted to 
make his peace with the authorities. 
 A few years later in 188, another group who styled themselves as 
Yellow Turbans brought trouble to Yi province and killed the Inspector 
Que Jian. The Rice Sect, however, were not implicated in this 
disturbance.6 On the contrary, when Liu Yan became Governor [359] 
                                                                                                                   
moreover, notes that Zhang Lu later killed Zhang Xiu (see below), so it highly 
unlikely that Zhang Xiu should be identified with Zhang Heng. In the main text of 
ZZTJ 58, Sima Guang accepts the plain statement of HHS 8, and evidently 
discounts the statement of Liu Ai connecting Zhang Xiu with the Rice Sect. 
  It seems possible, as I suggest in my discussion of the text of ZZTJ 58 (deC, 
Huan and Ling II, 557-558), that Zhang Xiu had at some time taken an active 
position of leadership in the Rice Sect, parallel and in rivalry to the spiritual 
authority of Zhang Heng; and he was later killed by Zhang Lu, taking back his 
father's position. 
  Eichhorn, "Chang Jio und Chang Lu," 317-318, noting the passage in Dian lue 
which says that when Zhang Lu was in Hanzhong after he had killed Zhang Xiu he 
was obliged to maintain Zhang Xiu's teachings in order to keep the support of the 
people, has the imaginative proposal that Zhang Lu was not in fact particularly 
concerned with Taoist beliefs until that time, and that it was Zhang Xiu who had 
always been the effective leader of the Rice Sect. 
  There could be a good deal of truth in this, though Zhang Ling presumably was 
a Taoist teacher, and we are told that his mother was an adept. It is by no means 
impossible, however, that Zhang Xiu was the true founder and leader of the Rice 
Sect until the time Zhang Lu seized it from him and killed him, and that Zhang 
Ling and his son Zhang Heng had been teachers of a separate, less important 
group. References to the foundation and leadership of the Rice Sect by Zhang Ling 
and Zhang Heng would then be later interpolations, designed to give a legitimate 
tradition to the claims of Zhang Lu. In any event, Eichhorn is surely correct when 
he remarks that Zhang Ling and Zhang Heng owe their later fame and glory simply 
to the success of Zhang Lu; without him, they would have remained nameless 
nobodies. 
  There is evidence, notably in the Dunhuang text of the Laozi bianhua jing 
"Sutra of the Transformation of Laozi" (MS. Stein 2295), discussed by Seidel, 
"Image of the Perfect Ruler," 222-227, for the existence of a number of competing, 
potentially rebellious groups in the region of present-day Sichuan during the latter 
part of the second century AD. Zhang Lu, with his predecessors, associates and 
rivals, were thus a few amongst many. 
6 Though Maspero, Mélanges posthumes II, 152 note 4, also 44 and 152, and some 
other scholars have suggested a fairly close connection between the followers of 
Zhang Lu in the west and those of Zhang Jue's Yellow Turbans in the east, Zhang 
Lu and his group do not appear to have been involved with the activities of the 
local Yellow Turbans in 188. And even if the rising of Zhang Xiu in 184 did 
involve the Rice Sect, it is not described as Yellow Turban activity, it was not co-
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soon afterwards he gave frequent audience to Zhang Lu's mother, who 
was also an adept of the sect. About 190, moreover, he gave a joint 
military command to Zhang Lu and the former rebel Zhang Xiu7 that they 
should attack the Administrator of Hanzhong, who had been reluctant to 
accept Liu Yan's authority. The campaign was successful, but then Zhang 
Lu killed Zhang Xiu, took over their combined forces, and established his 
own theocratic government.8 
 In the religious history of China, Zhang Ling is recognised as the 
founder of the Taoist "papacy," the school of the Heavenly Masters of the 
present day, and Zhang Lu is one of the foremost patriarchs. His 
biography notes that he taught the people spiritual arts, describing 
himself as "Lord Teacher".9 His doctrines included [360] an association 
of illness with wrong-doing, requiring the sick to confess their sins,10 and 
                                                                                                                   
ordinated with Zhang Jue's activities, and it was apparently not regarded so 
seriously: Zhang Xiu was permitted to surrender rather than suffering execution. 
The Rice Sect and Zhang Lu were not necessarily rebellious, and in this respect 
they did not resemble the Yellow Turbans, neither those of Zhang Jue in the east of 
the empire nor the group closer home in Yi province itself. 
7 Fukui [1958], 4, suggests that Zhang Xiu the rebel of 184 and Zhang Xiu the 
officer of Liu Yan were two different men. Eichhorn, however, disagrees: "Chang 
Jio und Chang Lu," 317 note 81. 
8 It should be noted that this was Zhang Lu's first recorded act of insurrection. 
  During the time Zhang Lu was independent in Hanzhong 漢中 commandery, he 
gave the territory the name of Hanning 漢寧, but after his surrender to Cao Cao in 
215, the name was changed back to Hanzhong: SGZ 8:263 and SGZ 1:45. For 
convenience, I refer to the territory consistently as Hanzhong. 
9 The title "Lord Teacher" renders the phrase 師君 shijun. The accounts of Zhang Lu 
in HHS 75/64:2435 and SGZ 8:263 say that those who first came to him were 
called "spirit soldiers" (鬼卒 guizu) and were later named Libationers (祭酒 jijiu). 
The title Libationer was used in certain offices by the government of Han 
(Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 250 sub voce), but its use in Zhang Lu's organisation is 
probably related rather to their ideal ritual functions than to any deliberate 
patterning on imperial administration. 
  It has been argued that the use of the character gui in much of the terminology 
of the sect indicates some prejudice against the non-Chinese people of the region 
who came to join it. It is more probable, however, that the term gui may be 
understood rather in a general sense of supernatural forces than of disapproved 
"demons." At the same time, it seems likely that much of the basis of the creed was 
concerned with fear and propitiation of powerful and potentially hostile spiritual 
forces. See Eichhorn, "Chang Jio und Chang Lu," 322-324, with note 102. 
10 The doctrines of Zhang Lu are described by SGZ 8, and those of the earlier sect 
under Zhang Xiu by Dian lue, as cited in note 5 above. Since it was believed that 
wrong-doing would bring sickness, Zhang Lu's administration of the law was 
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in this and other matters there were similarities with the eastern schools 
of popular Taoist religion. From the evidence in the histories, these 
various sects may best be considered as local extensions and 
developments from a common base of ritual and belief, centred for the 
most part on the north China plain, but adapting their expression to 
different circumstances, customs and leadership.11[361] 
 For Liu Yan, Zhang Lu's declaration of independence was a modified 
misfortune. Hanzhong commandery controlled the upper reaches of the 
Han River in the south of present-day Shenxi, so Zhang Lu was blocking 
communications through the mountains to the Wei River valley. Liu Yan 
was thus able to excuse himself from any dealings with the imperial 
government, and behind the buffer of Zhang Lu's insubordination he 
established a personal authority in the rest of Yi province. 
 When Liu Zhang succeeded his father in 194, the relationship with 
the Rice Sect was yet undetermined, for Zhang Lu had taken no action 
against the provincial government and members of his family still 
attended court in Chengdu. Some time later, however, about 200, there 
was a formal break. Zhang Lu claimed Hanzhong as his own territory, 
and sought to expand his authority southwards into the upper tributaries 
                                                                                                                   
comparatively lenient. An offender was pardoned three times, and only then was 
formal punishment administered: it was presumably expected that the spirits 
should be given the opportunity to inflict their own justice first. 
  Dian lue adds that under the administration of Zhang Lu, after he had taken 
over from Zhang Xiu, those who had committed a small fault were required to 
pave a hundred paces of roadway. And there was also a custom of establishing 
"houses of charity" (義舍 yi she), way-stations by the roads, with rice and meat set 
out for travellers to help themselves to what they needed. 
  Besides this, we are told that Zhang Lu's doctrine accepted the cycle prescribed 
by Yue ling "The Ordinances of the Months," the ritual calendar popular among the 
scholars of Han: Yue ling was included in the anthology Lüshi chunqiu, 1-12; 
translated by Wilhelm, Frühlung und Herbst, 1-156, and was later incorporated as 
chapter 4 of Li ji; Couvreur, Mémoires I, 330-410:and see Bodde, Festivals, 16 and 
passim. Among the prohibitions of Zhang Lu, no slaughtering was permitted in 
spring or summer, and alcohol was forbidden. 
11 As discussed in note 87 to Chapter Three, Gan Ji of Langye, dealt with by Sun Ce 
in the lands of the lower Yangzi, treated illness by casting charms over water for 
people to drink, a technique associated with Zhang Jue. He also established "spirit 
houses," which probably performed the same function as the "houses of purity" 
established by Zhang Xiu. It may be suggested that Zhang Xiu and Zhang Lu, 
Zhang Jue and Gan Ji each made a slightly different selection from a common 
heritage. 
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of the Jialing Jiang, the northern part of Ba commandery of Han. Liu 
Zhang, for his part, executed Zhang Lu's mother and other members of 
the sect, and set an army in Lanzhong county to oppose him. 
 By 210, however, some fifteen years after his accession to power, the 
government of Liu Zhang in Yi province appeared weak, disunited and in 
imminent danger of collapse. His father Liu Yan, originally from Jiangxia 
in Jing province, had acquired contacts and associates as a minister at the 
imperial capital, and had established his government in the early 190s by 
the firm suppression of local leaders whose authority might rival his own. 
Later, when refugees came to Yi province from the capital district and 
from Nanyang, they were organised into a fighting force known as the 
Dongzhou troops – men from the eastern provinces – but the local 
government did little to assist them,[362] and they proved insubordinate, 
disruptive and a source of instability. In personal terms, several of the 
men who had assisted Liu Yan and supported the accession of Liu Zhang 
later turned against him. Zhao Wei, for example, took a leading role in 
securing the appointment of Liu Zhang as Governor in 194, but a few 
years afterwards, taking advantage of local resentments, he led a 
rebellion and laid siege to Chengdu city before he was eventually driven 
back, defeated and killed. Pang Xi, who had been a close friend of Liu 
Yan, also joined Zhao Wei's rebellion, but was able to make peace with 
Liu Zhang. He was then given command of the troops operating against 
Zhang Lu, where he achieved only limited success. 
 The histories describe Liu Zhang as an indecisive man, and the 
judgement may be fair. Certainly, he had not established a reliable base of 
support: he had no strong allies among the local leadership; he had 
alienated many of his father's former associates; and he had no authority 
over the refugees from the north and east, who might have given personal 
allegiance. In a sense, Liu Zhang held power in Yi province as much 
through local political inertia as through any sense of government, for 
there was no single figure in the region who might offer a serious 
challenge. 
 By 211, however, it appeared that the situation was going to change. 
In the autumn of that year, Cao Cao achieved a notable victory over the 
combined forces of the warlords of Liang province at the battle of 
Huayin, on the Wei River just west of the junction with the great bend of 
the Yellow River.12 From this success, Cao Cao's forces controlled the 
                                               
12 On this campaign, see deC, Northern Frontier, 163-165. 
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valley of the Wei as far as Chang'an, and he was able to move north 
against Anding commandery and south against Hanzhong. By the end of 
the year Cao Cao had received the surrender of Yang Qiu, warlord in 
Anding, he had begun the settlement of the region about Chang'an, and 
his general [363] Zhong Yao had been given orders to prepare for 
operations against Zhang Lu in Hanzhong. 
 For Liu Zhang in Yi province, this threat to his old enemy presented 
both opportunity and danger. On the one hand, if he could take advantage 
of Zhang Lu's preoccupation with the north he could recover a great deal 
of territory and strengthen his own authority. On the other hand, if Zhang 
Lu surrendered to Cao Cao, Liu Zhang would be brought face to face 
with the dominant military power in the empire, and he would be 
attempting to maintain his independence with only the rump of Yi 
province, without natural defences. Once Cao Cao's forces had crossed 
the barrier of the Qin Ling ranges, the mountain country between the Han 
River and the Sichuan basin would present far less of a problem, while 
the armies which Cao Cao could put into the field were much greater than 
those of Zhang Lu. It was unlikely Liu Zhang could survive such an 
assault. 
 Liu Zhang had few personal or administrative resources to deal with 
this developing crisis. The situation from that perspective was summed 
up for him by his adviser Zhang Song: 
The military commanders within this province, men such as Pang Xi 
and Li Yi, think only of their own achievements and their own 
position. They may well prove unreliable. 
 You must obtain assistance from [Liu Bei of] Yuzhou. If you do 
not, you will have enemies attacking you from outside and your own 
people turning against you within your borders: that is the road to 
certain defeat.13 
The argument presented to Liu Zhang was that he should use the prestige 
and military authority of Liu Bei to provide himself with a [364] base of 
loyal support. He was assured that Liu Bei would respect and serve him 
because they were both members of the imperial clan, so he would obtain 
an access of military strength sufficient to defeat Zhang Lu and a core of 
                                               
13 SGZ 31/Shu 1:868, and see also SGZ 32/Shu 2:881. On the term "Yuzhou" as a 
reference to Liu Bei, see note 67 to Chapter Four. 
  Zhang Song, it may be recalled, was the man sent to Cao Cao at the time of the 
Red Cliffs campaign in 208, who subsequently became a supporter of Liu Bei: note 
28 to Chapter Five. 
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personal support which would enable him to dominate the various 
factions in Yi province. 
 Such advice was valid, however, only on the assumption that Liu Bei 
would remain loyal and be content to take second position to Liu Zhang, 
and in this respect the argument was at least doubtful and at worst 
dishonest. Doubtful, because with the best will in the world it must have 
been hard to imagine that Liu Bei, who already controlled a significant 
territory of his own in Jing province, would be prepared to abandon that 
position of independence in order to assist a weak ruler such as Liu 
Zhang. Dishonest, because we have repeated statements in the histories 
that many of Liu Zhang's advisers were in close communication with Liu 
Bei, and were urging him to come and take over in Yi province. 
 In this debate, besides Zhang Song, the advisers supporting the 
alliance with Liu Bei included Fa Zheng and Meng Da, both originally 
from Youfufeng near Chang'an. Those who argued that Liu Zhang should 
attempt to solve his problems with his own resources appear to have been 
local men, such as Huang Quan of Baxi commandery and Wang Lei of 
Guanghan.14 These latter, however, were overruled, and the invitation was 
issued to Liu Bei.[365] 
                                               
14 The biography of Fa Zheng is in SGZ 37/Shu 7:957-62, and that of Huang Quan is 
in SGZ 43/Shu 13:1043-45. 
  Huang Quan was a man from Langzhong county, near the present-day city of 
the same name. Langzhong had been made the capital of a new commandery 
which was established by Liu Zhang in 194 and given the name Baxi in 201. 
  The administrative geography of the region of Ba commandery of Later Han 
became complicated at this time, and a summary explanation may be helpful. 
  Ba commandery of Later Han had occupied the valleys of the Jialing River and 
its eastern tributaries the Qu and the Ba, together with the basin of the Yangzi 
downstream from the region of present-day Chongqing. The capital was at 
Jiangzhou, close to the river junction by present-day Chongqing. 
 In 194, however, Liu Zhang divided that territory: 
1 the valley of the Jialing, with the Qu and the Ba became (truncated) Ba 
commandery, with capital at Langzhong; 
2 the valley of the Yangzi in the region of the Gorges became Guling commandery, 
with capital at Yufu, by present-day Fengjie; 
3 the basin of the Yangzi about Chongqing and the lower reaches of the Jialing River 
became Yongning commandery, with capital at Jiangzhou; 
4 the south-eastern segment of the commandery, in the hill country about the lower 
valley of the Wu River, was established as the Dependent State of Badong, with 
headquarters at Fuling near present-day Pengshui. 
 In 201, the names of the three commanderies were changed about: 
1 the truncated Ba commandery, as in 1 above, was renamed Baxi; 
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Map 11: Western China in the time of Liu Bei 
 
Liu Zhang gave orders for preparations to welcome Liu Bei, but the 
formalities of the reception were rivalled by the popularity which 
accompanied the newcomer's great reputation, and the history says that 
Liu Bei came into Yi province for the first time as if he was returning to 
                                                                                                                   
2 Guling commandery, as in 2 above, was renamed Badong; 
3 Yongning commandery, as in 3 above, was renamed Ba commandery. 
 So the city of Jiangzhou by present-day Chongqing was capital of the large Ba 
commandery of Later Han until 194, then became the capital of the small 
commandery of Yongning, and then in 201 became again the capital of (a reduced) 
Ba commandery. And the county of Langzhong, home territory of Huang Quan, 
was a regular county in the large Ba commandery of Later Han until 194, then 
became the capital of truncated Ba commandery, and then in 201 became the 
capital of Baxi commandery. 
  Later again, in the time of Liu Bei, the Dependent State of Badong was 
established as an independent commandery named Fuling. 
  On these and other variations, see in particular the tables of Wu Zengjin and 
Yang Shoujing, 2920-22, and 2927-28. 
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his native home.15 With an army of his own, supplemented by an escort 
sent from Liu Zhang and quantities of [366>367] supplies and presents 
provided also by his host, Liu Bei moved up the Yangzi to Jiangzhou near 
present-day Chongqing, then followed the Jialing and Fu rivers north to 
the city of Fu, by present-day Mianyang. Here Liu Zhang came to meet 
him, and in a scene like the Field of Cloth of Gold, with chariots and 
canopies brilliant as the sun, the two leaders held festival. 
 As Liu Bei passed by Jiangzhou, the Administrator of Ba 
commandery, Yan Yan, loyal to Liu Zhang, observed in despair, "This is 
like a man sitting alone on a little hill, and he calls on a tiger to protect 
him."16 And already during the meeting at Fu, Zhang Song, Fa Zheng and 
some of Liu Bei's own advisers were recommending that he take Liu 
Zhang captive immediately. Liu Bei replied that it was too early for such 
a step, that his reputation as a man of honour would suffer if he betrayed 
Liu Zhang so quickly, and he had not yet established a following among 
the people of the province. For the time being, he and Liu Zhang 
recommended one another with honourable titles. Liu Zhang allocated 
Liu Bei still more troops and quantities of supplies, then sent him north to 
Jiameng to take command of all operations against Zhang Lu. Liu Bei, 
for his part, gave generous donations and showed gracious behaviour, to 
win the hearts of the people to himself. 
 From such a record there appears no question that Liu Bei was 
merely waiting for the opportunity to take over Liu Zhang's position. On 
his side, Liu Zhang was presumably hopeful that the alliance with Liu 
Bei would give credit to his government against the disparate forces 
which he had attempted with limited success to control, and at the same 
time he might expect that the presents and patronage which he gave Liu 
Bei would be sufficient to keep his associate in second position. In his 
capital at Chengdu, Liu Zhang still controlled the treasury and taxation 
resources of the province and Liu Bei, isolated in the north from his base 
in Jing province, might be [368] reluctant to embark upon open 
insurrection. It is doubtful, however, that Liu Zhang appreciated the 
degree to which his own nominal supporters and counsellors were 
prepared to serve the interloper's cause. 
                                               
15 SGZ 31/Shu 1:868. The text has the expression 如歸 ru gui; Liu Bei had never been 
in the province before. 
16 SGZ 36/Shu 6:943 PC note 1 quoting Huayang guo zhi. 
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 Rather more than a year after Liu Bei had arrived in Yi province, his 
opportunity came. The pretext, curiously enough, was the attack mounted 
by Cao Cao against Sun Quan's positions on the lower Yangzi in the 
winter and early spring of 212-213. In that region, though Sun Quan was 
compelled to give ground, his defence line of the Yangzi, based primarily 
on the new fortress at Ruxu and his local naval supremacy, held firm 
against the invader, but there were no doubt anxious moments for Sun 
Quan and his ministers as Cao Cao's strategy developed. In any event, it 
is said that Sun Quan wrote to Liu Bei to ask for his assistance, and Liu 
Bei asked leave to join his old ally.17 
 The biography of Liu Bei says that Sun Quan specifically asked him 
for aid, but one must have doubts about that. The campaign was taking 
place a thousand kilometres away in a direct line, and far more by the 
natural route of the Yangzi. It is possible Sun Quan asked that Liu Bei's 
lieutenant Guan Yu, who had remained in Jing province, should make a 
sortie north up the valley of the Han in order to relieve the military 
pressure further east. Certainly, in his letter to Liu Zhang, Liu Bei 
emphasised that Guan Yu was in trouble in Jing province, and that it was 
his duty to go back and support him against Cao Cao and his armies. 
Zhang Lu, remarked Liu Bei, is firmly on the defensive and presents no 
immediate threat. 
 Predictably, Liu Zhang was reluctant to support this move. He had, 
after all, brought Liu Bei into his territory to attack and conquer Zhang 
Lu, and a year after operations had begun Liu Bei was still on the same 
line. Now he was proposing to take not only his own forces, but also the 
men he had been given by Liu Zhang, to embark on a different campaign 
quite outside Liu [369] Zhang's area of interest or control. So Liu Zhang 
basically rejected the proposal, allocated Liu Bei less than half of the 
troops that he asked for, and similarly reduced his supplies. 
 Now, however, Liu Bei could claim to hold a casus belli against Liu 
Zhang. In a fiery proclamation, emphasising his wider responsibilities to 
his old allies and his subordinates, and with telling phrases about the 
manner in which he and his men had laboured in the service of the 
ungrateful Liu Zhang, Liu Bei turned his men against Chengdu. The fact 
that Cao Cao's attacks had been limited and generally unsuccessful on 
both fronts along the Yangzi might seem to have proven Liu Zhang's 
point, that Liu Bei's presence there was unnecessary. Liu Bei, however, 
                                               
17 Chapter Five at 320, and SGZ 32/Shu 2:881. 
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was operating on the principle that because he had been given inadequate 
support for his expedition to the east, he was therefore entitled to turn 
west against his patron and employer. Logically, this was meaningless 
double-think; in practical terms, it was excellent propaganda, giving Liu 
Bei and his supporters all the justification they needed for the rebellion 
against Liu Zhang. 
 Once the decision was made, Liu Zhang's power was ended, though 
the result was due at least in part to his own lack of ruthlessness. He may 
not have been a decisive man, but he was also not a cruel one, and he 
rejected plans for isolating Liu Bei with a scorched earth policy along the 
approaches to Chengdu. Though a number of his generals deserted or 
were betrayed to Liu Bei, many people remained loyal. The city of Luo, 
capital of Guanghan commandery but close to Chengdu, maintained its 
defence for a year under the command of Liu Zhang's son Liu Xun, while 
Yan Yan in Jiangzhou, who controlled the essential communications 
between Liu Bei and his base in Jing province, held firm until he was 
overwhelmed by an attack from the forces of Zhuge Liang, Zhang Fei 
and Zhao Yun, advancing west along the Yangzi.18 Liu Zhang, however, 
failed to take the chances these isolated acts of loyalty might have offered 
him, and he was betrayed by too many deserters and false advisers. 
By the summer of 214, Liu Zhang was trapped in Chengdu, faced with a 
combined attack by Liu Bei, the reinforcements from the east, and also 
the army of Ma Chao, soldier of fortune from the north whom Liu Bei 
had enticed to join him.19 After a few weeks siege, rather than subject his 
people to further miseries of storm and sack, Liu Zhang came out from 
Chengdu and surrendered to Liu Bei. He was allowed to retain the title of 
a general and a great part of his treasure, but he was sent downstream and 
out of Yi province, to Gong'an on the middle Yangzi. In the meanwhile 
Liu Bei held a splendid feast at Chengdu, showered honours on his old 
                                               
18 We may observe that the dispatch of this force from Jing province must have left 
Guan Yu, Liu Bei's commander there, with limited troops to face any attack from 
Cao Cao – further evidence that Liu Bei was actually more concerned to seize Yi 
province from Liu Zhang than to support his ally Sun Quan in the east. 
19 The biography of Ma Chao is in SGZ 36/Shu 6:944-47. He was the son of Ma 
Teng, a man of mixed Chinese and Qiang parentage, who had been a leader of 
rebels in Liang province in the 180s. Ma Chao succeeded to his father's position, 
but was driven from the north after the battle of Huayin in 211: deC, Northern 
Frontier, 161-165. Ma Chao later became one of Liu Bei's chief commanders in 
Hanzhong. 
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and new supporters, and handed the official treasury over for pillage to 
his victorious soldiers. 
 
The second settlement of Jing province (215): 
It is difficult to believe that Sun Quan gained any sense of vicarious 
satisfaction from Liu Bei's takeover of Yi province. It was, after all, a 
territory for which he had had held ambitions [371] of his own, and once 
it was in Liu Bei's hands it was permanently barred to Sun Quan. Liu Bei, 
moreover, who had formerly been the junior partner in their alliance, now 
controlled the better part of two provinces, and he and his men were 
clearly energetic military operators. Though Sun Quan was decidedly 
more secure in his own territory than Liu Zhang had ever been in his, the 
demonstration of Liu Bei's adaptability was not designed to make any 
colleague or ally feel secure. And Liu Bei, thanks to the arrangements 
made after the death of Zhou Yu, held an excellent position in Jing 
province. In a pattern often followed by diplomats of nineteenth century 
Europe, Sun Quan sought "compensation" from his successful ally. 
 There were obvious signs of difficulty as early as 211, when Liu Bei 
first went to Jing province. The Lady Sun, sister to Sun Quan and chief 
wife to Liu Bei, returned at that time to her brother's court, and she 
attempted to take Liu Bei's son and heir, Liu Shan, with her. She was 
escorted by a flotilla of ships from Sun Quan, but Liu Bei's commanders 
Zhao Yun and Zhang Fei intercepted the convoy. We know nothing of the 
details of the negotiations, which must have been delicate and tense, but 
the result was that the boy Liu Shan stayed behind while the Lady Sun 
continued her journey. The marriage, and the alliance at that level, were 
effectively ended.20 
 Over the following years Sun Quan was pre-occupied with Yang 
province and his defences against Cao Cao on the lower Yangzi, while 
the greater part of Liu Bei's troops continued to be stationed in Jing 
province. By the latter part of 214, however, the situation between the 
Yangzi and the Huai was temporarily stable: Sun Quan had seized Huan 
city and the south of Lujiang commandery, and though Cao Cao made a 
brief military demonstration in the region of the Huai, he soon abandoned 
plans for a further attack and returned to Xu city. At the same time, to 
effect his conquest and settlement of Yi province, Liu Bei had called the 
                                               
20 SGZ 36/Shu 6:949 PC note 2 quoting Zhao Yun biezhuan. 
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greater part of his [372] army to the west, and Guan Yu held command of 
diminished forces in Jing province. 
 Early in 215, therefore, Sun Quan sent a formal note to Liu Bei, in 
the hands of his minister Zhuge Jin, elder brother of Zhuge Liang,21 
asking that the commanderies of Jing province should be handed over to 
him. The request was put in terms of the territory being "returned" to Sun 
Quan, though it would seem that Liu Bei had taken possession of the 
southern territories in his own right after the victory at the Red Cliffs, and 
Nan commandery was the only one which could be said to have been 
"loaned" by Sun Quan. Nan commandery, however, was a vital link in the 
communications between Jing province and Yi province through the 
Yangzi Gorges, and Jiangling, capital of the commandery, was the 
headquarters of Guan Yu. 
 Liu Bei had no intention of giving up any of his possessions, but his 
reply was prevarication: he was making plans for a campaign in the north 
to conquer Liang province, but as soon as he had control of that region he 
would hand over all his holdings in Jing province. Sun Quan was quite 
unimpressed, and remarked in disgust, "This is borrowing and not 
returning."22 He issued letters of appointment for officials in his service to 
take over Changsha, Lingling and Guiyang commanderies, and when 
Guan Yu, predictably, refused to allow these men entry, Sun Quan sent Lü 
Meng with twenty thousand men to press his claim.[373] 
 The strategy of the campaign was well-planned, and was executed 
with a neat sense of timing. Sun Quan's forces operated in two divisions: 
Lu Su remained at his headquarters, Lukou in Hanchang, to face and fix 
Guan Yu upstream at Gong'an; covered by this, Lü Meng was able to 
advance unimpeded to the south and deal with the three commanderies 
one by one. Liu Bei's administrators in Changsha and Guiyang 
surrendered to the overwhelming local force, but by the time Lü Meng 
reached Lingling, to the west of Guiyang and with some communication 
                                               
21 The biography of Zhuge Jin is in SGZ 52/Wu 7:1231-36. 
  Born in 174, he was seven years older than Zhuge Liang. The family came 
from Langye, but when their father died Zhuge Liang was still young. He 
accompanied his uncle, who was Administrator of Yuzhang during the mid-190s, 
and he later went to join Liu Biao: Chapter Four at 252. Zhuge Jin had evidently 
gone his own way before that, and became a member of Sun Quan's personal staff.  
22 On the transfer of territory to Liu Bei and Guan Yu in previous years, see Chapter 
Five at 300-303. 
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to the north, Liu Bei had come with reinforcements to Gong'an and Guan 
Yu was free to intervene. 
 
 
 
Map 12: Jing province in contention 210-220 
 
By this time Sun Quan had advanced to Lukou, and Lu Su moved south 
and west to intercept Guan Yu's relief force, facing him again at Yiyang 
in western Changsha. The two armies halted, and the leaders accused one 
another of false dealing, while urgent messages were sent south for Lü 
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Meng to return and join the confrontation before Lu Su and he were 
attacked and destroyed separately. 
 Lü Meng, however, played one last game of bluff. With orders for 
retreat already in his hands, he announced to his officers that he would 
storm the city of Quanling, capital of Lingling commandery, the very 
next day, and he had an envoy sent to the Administrator Hao Pu, 
describing the situation quite falsely: that Liu Bei was under attack in 
Hanzhong, far to the west, while Guan Yu was held in the north of Jing 
province by the advance of Sun Quan; there was thus no hope of relief. 
Hao Pu believed him and came out to surrender. Receiving him with 
courtesy, Lü Meng escorted him to the river bank to board the ship which 
would take him away to the north. Then, however, as a parting cut, he 
showed Hao Pu the orders he had received which gave the [374] true 
situation – and as Hao Pu read the document Lü Meng roared with 
laughter at his own success.23 
 The capture of Lingling was useful, though it did not prove to be a 
permanent accession at this time. Sun Quan was naturally worried about 
the consequences of a long campaign in Jing province, and he was 
primarily concerned to hold what he could of his new gains, not 
necessarily all of them. On the other hand, much to Sun Quan's 
advantage, Cao Cao at this time was moving south into the upper valley 
of the Han. Long expected and now a reality, that threat was enough to 
persuade Liu Bei that his best policy lay in a swift agreement so that he 
could turn his chief attention to the north of his newly-acquired territory 
in Yi province. 
 So the two erstwhile allies renegotiated their division of Jing 
province. Lingling was returned to Liu Bei and Guan Yu, but it was 
agreed that the Xiang River would now form the frontier between the 
two, and Sun Quan thus gained Guiyang and the major part of 
Changsha.24[376] 
                                               
23 The major account of this campaign is in the biography of Lü Meng, SGZ 54/Wu 
9:1276-77, which includes the account of his embassy to Hao Pu. 
  Hao Pu later entered Sun Quan's service and was appointed Minister of Justice. 
In 230, however, he was forced to commit suicide for his credulous support of the 
traitor Yin Fan. See SGZ 62/Wu 17:1418 with PC note 1 quoting Wu lu and Wu li; 
Fang, Chronicle I, 321-322, with 334 and 336. 
24 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1119-20 and SGZ 32/Shu 2:883 indicate that the three commanderies 
of Jiangxia, Changsha and Guiyang were now held by Sun Quan; SGZ 54/Wu 9 
states that the Xiang River was now the boundary. 
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 The settlement must have been considered incomplete and unstable. 
Each of the contenders had convinced themselves of the righteousness of 
their conflicting claims, and the Xiang River was primarily a 
communications route north and south rather than a barrier between east 
and west. For the moment, however, both Liu Bei and Sun Quan had 
more to concern them in the north, dealing with their common enemy 
Cao Cao on one front or the other from the upper Han to the lower Huai. 
 In the autumn of 215 Cao Cao launched his attack on Hanzhong, and 
after a brief campaign Zhang Lu surrendered in the winter. He was 
granted honours by Cao Cao, his church received official approval, and 
he ended his days as comfortable pensioner.25 
 Some of Cao Cao's advisers urged him to follow this success by 
moving into the main part of Yi province. They argued that Liu Bei had 
not yet established his regime and that the overthrow of Zhang Lu must 
have unnerved his supporters, so he would be vulnerable to a swift attack. 
In the region of Ba, moreover, south of Hanzhong, there were non-
Chinese people interested in their own independence and prepared to 
support Cao Cao if they could obtain [377] it with his support, and Zhang 
Lu had held considerable influence there.26 
                                                                                                                   
  Under Later Han, Changsha commandery extended considerably to the west of 
the Xiang River: Zhongguo lishi ditu ji II, 49-50. If all the commandery had been 
transferred to Sun Quan at this time, it would have made an awkward salient into 
Liu Bei's territory, and interrupted his communications with Lingling in the south. 
Zhongguo lishi ditu ji III, 29-30, shows a Hengyang commandery controlling the 
western part of earlier Changsha. The commandery of Hengyang was established 
by the state of Wu only in 257 (SGZ 48/Wu 3:1153), but it is possible the division 
had been made for a short time at this period. 
  The negotiations surrounding this settlement are dramatised in a play "With a 
Single Sword, Lord Guan Goes to the Feast" by the celebrated Yuan composer 
Guan Hanqing, a work of which variant editions survive. It gives a summary of the 
facts with strong favour to the achievements of Guan Yu and to the detriment of Lu 
Su and Sun Quan's other counsellors. See Liu Ching-chih [1980], chapter 3, Peking 
Opera Texts, 2409, and Jingju jumu chutan, 96, also Romance chapter 66. 
25 An account of the campaign appears in the biography of Zhang Lu, SGZ 8:264-65. 
Zhang Lu's younger brother Wei made a brief attempt at resistance, and Zhang Lu 
took temporary refuge in Ba commandery, south of Hanzhong, before his final 
surrender. 
  Seidel, "Image of the Perfect Ruler," 227 and note 35, notes that Zhang Lu 
appears to have acknowledged Cao Cao as the rightful master of the empire, and 
claimed the authority of the Taoist religion to do so. 
26 SGZ 1:45-46. 
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 South from Hanzhong, however, Cao Cao would have been 
advancing into isolated territory, across the grain of the mountain ridges, 
and the consequences of defeat, or even a lesser set-back, would have 
been far more serious for his army and even for his state than the 
misfortune at the Red Cliffs seven years earlier. So his moves in that 
direction were only tentative. A probing advance into Ba commandery by 
his commander Zhang He was defeated and driven back by Liu Bei's 
general Zhang Fei at Dangqu, near present-day Quxian,27 and Cao Cao 
thereafter sought only to confirm the frontier in the upper valley of the 
Han. Leaving his senior general Xiahou Yuan in command, he returned to 
the east. Liu Bei, for his part, remained at Chengdu to establish his 
government. 
 While Cao Cao and Liu Bei were thus occupied in the west, Sun 
Quan had sought to follow his moderate success in Jing province with a 
renewed attack north of the Yangzi toward the Huai. In the summer of 
215, soon after the second settlement with Liu Bei, he took personal 
command of a major assault on Hefei city. 
 The expedition, however, resulted only in a humiliating disaster. 
Zhang Liao and his colleagues, commanders of Cao Cao's local forces in 
Hefei, were outnumbered several times by the army from the south, but 
they put forth a sortie against Sun Quan's men before the siege had been 
properly joined, and they caused such disruption that the attackers were 
compelled to retreat within a matter of days. 
 The major source on the campaign is the biography of Zhang Liao in 
Sanguo zhi, which emphasises his personal prowess and his rout of the 
enemy: neither Sun Quan nor any of his followers [378] dared to stand 
against him.28 On the other side, however, even the records of the Wu 
section of Sanguo zhi support the tale of misfortune. The biography of Lü 
Meng, who accompanied the expedition, says that he and Ling Tong 
fought gallantly in the rear-guard protecting the retreat. And the 
biography of Sun Quan tells how he was cut off by the enemy at a river 
crossing close to Hefei, and was almost captured by Zhang Liao. The 
commentary quotes Xiandi chunqiu: 
                                               
27 SGZ 32/Shu 2:883 and SGZ 36/Shu 6:943. 
28 SGZ 17:518-19. There is an account of the campaign in ZZTJ 67:2141-42; deC, 
Establish Peace, 493-495. 
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Zhang Liao asked one of the men from Wu who had surrendered, 
"There was a commander there with a purple beard, long body and 
short legs, good with a horse and expert with a bow; who was that?" 
 The prisoner replied, "That was Sun of Kuaiji."  
 Zhang Liao and [his fellow general] Yu Jin met later, and they 
agreed that if they had only known who the man was they would 
have pressed the attack harder and caught him. All the army was 
unhappy to have missed the opportunity.29 
And Jiangbiao zhuan tells how: 
Sun Quan rode a swift horse to the bridge of the crossing, but the 
southern end had already been broken down, and there was a gap ten 
feet across. 
 Gu Li got behind the horse, and he had Sun Quan grasp hold of 
the saddle and loosen the reins, and then Gu Li used a whip to 
encourage the animal forward, and so it managed to jump across and 
Sun Quan was able to escape.30[379] 
Finally, He Qi came with three thousand men to give cover to Sun Quan 
and he was escorted back to headquarters on board ship. He gave a 
banquet to his officers, and He Qi spoke on their behalf,  
Your honour is a ruler of men, and you should always be most 
carefully guarded. In the action today, when you almost suffered 
                                               
29 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1120 PC note 2 quoting Xiandi chunqiu. 
30 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1120 PC note 2 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. This text goes on to say 
that Gu Li had originally been a junior servant in attendance on Sun Quan, but 
because of his honesty and courtesy he had been made Inspector of Companions, 
an officer of the bodyguard; on the Companions, a system which had evidently 
now been formalised, see Chapter Two at 114-115. In reward for his services on 
this occasion, Sun Quan enfeoffed Gu Li as marquis of a chief village. 
  Jiangbiao zhuan, quoted in SGZ 47/Wu 2:1133 PC note 2, tells of another, later 
time when Sun Quan was sailing on the Yangzi near Wuchang in his great ship 
Chang'an長安. A storm blew up, and though Sun Quan believed the ship could sail 
safely before the wind, Gu Li drew his sword and compelled the helmsman to steer 
for shelter at Fankou. Presumably somewhat put out by the fact that Gu Li had 
over-ridden his orders, Sun Quan twitted him, "A-li, are you so frightened of the 
water?" Gu Li, however, knelt down and said, "The great king is master of ten 
thousand chariots. You treat lightly the unfathomable deep, and you make sport of 
the furious waves. But your ship was built too high, and if you should meet with 
some unexpected misfortune, what would become of our nation? That is why I 
dared threaten death [to the helmsman]." Sun Quan admired him all the more, and 
from this time on, as a sign of respect, he never called Gu Li by his personal name, 
but would always address him by his surname. 
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misfortune, your servants were frightened and afraid as if Heaven 
and Earth might fall to ruin. We beg you take this as the warning for 
a lifetime. 
Sun Quan reassured him, "I am grateful and ashamed. I have now 
engraved caution upon my heart; it is not just a note on my girdle."31 
 Two particular items may be noted in accounts of this campaign. 
First, the biography of Gan Ning, which tells of his intervention to assist 
the escape of Sun Quan, mentions in passing that there was [380] 
sickness in the army, and this was a reason for the withdrawal. The story 
may be correct, and such a misfortune could have serious effect on the 
morale and capacity of a large army such as Sun Quan had gathered.32 
 Second, at the end of the biography of Sun Quan's officer Chen Wu, 
who died on this campaign, Jiangbiao zhuan tells us that Sun Quan 
attended his funeral in person to show him honour, and arranged for his 
favourite concubine to be buried in the tomb with him. This was a strange 
revival of a thoroughly unattractive custom, and the commentator Sun 
Sheng is predictably scathing: 
When Sun Quan had the living follow the dead like this, it is surely 
only appropriate that the prosperity of his dynasty should have been 
short-lived.33 
                                               
31 SGZ 60/Wu 14:1380 and PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. The reference to the 
girdle is evidently taken from Lunyu 15.5; Legge, CC I, 296, which tells how the 
disciple Zizhang noted down Confucius' teachings on the end of his sash. 
32 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1295. See also note 83 to Chapter Four. 
33 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1289 and PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan and the comments of 
Sun Sheng. 
  Earlier examples of burial alive, alleged to have been a custom of the "semi-
barbarous" state of Qin, are referred to in the celebrated "Yellow Birds" ode of Shi 
jing I.9.6; Legge CC IV, 198-200, in Mengzi I.1.4.6; Legge CC II, 133-134, and in 
Zuo zhuan, Wen 6; Legge, CC V, 244. Zuo zhuan Xuan 15; Legge, CC V, 328, also 
mentions the projected burial of a widow by a gentleman of the state of Jin, though 
this was not carried out. 
  SJ 6:265; Chavannes, MH II, 195, tells how the women of the harem of the 
First Emperor of Qin, as well as the workmen who had constructed his tomb, were 
killed at the time of his burial, and evidence of human sacrifice has indeed been 
found among the modern excavations at that site. During Former Han, however, 
the burial of human victims was banned: HS 53:2421; Wang, Han Civilization, 
208. 
  In more modern times, one particularly unattractive feature of the Ming and 
Qing periods was the self-immolation, often encouraged by social pressure and 
family interest, of "virtuous widows." See T'ien, Male Anxiety and Female 
Chastity. 
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 In general terms, the debacle at Hefei did nothing for the morale and 
position of Sun Quan's forces on this northern front, nor for his own 
reputation as a military commander. Though the propaganda of [381] 
Zhang Liao's biography claims that at one stage Sun Quan was too 
frightened to come down and fight, other records describe him as a 
competent, even courageous, warrior, with appropriate skills of 
horsemanship and archery. Unlike his elder brother, however, Sun Quan 
could claim no significant success as a general on active service. He was 
capable of commanding an army, and he had maintained a competent 
defence against Cao Cao's attacks in earlier years, but he had never been 
involved in a notable offensive. At the time of the Red Cliffs, Zhou Yu 
and Cheng Pu commanded the troops directly engaged against Cao Cao, 
and Sun Quan had charge of the army in reserve. For the attack on Huan 
city in 214, Lü Meng appears to have taken the leading role; and in the 
recent campaign against Guan Yu and Liu Bei in Jing province, the 
mobile force was commanded by Lü Meng, with Lu Su in support, and 
Sun Quan again as the reserve. 
 Sun Quan was brave, and on occasion even foolhardy. We are told 
that he took delight in hunting tigers, and on at least one occasion an 
animal got close enough to tear the saddle of his horse. Later, he was 
persuaded to have a special carriage made, with some protection and 
loopholes to shoot from inside, but it was still a dangerous sport and it is 
said that Sun Quan took delight in being attacked by several wild beasts 
at a time.34 
 His personal character and authority, therefore, were not in question, 
but it was a source of some weakness for a warlord state that its 
commander-in-chief had no great military reputation. Despite past 
setbacks, Liu Bei was recognised as a fine military commander, and no-
one could sensibly criticise Cao Cao on that score. Sun Quan, however, 
owed most of his success to his subordinates, and he continued to do so. 
He did not command a serious attacking force again, but he demonstrated 
the [382] administrative and political skills appropriate to the ruler of a 
state, and even if he was not a great tactician, he had a good grasp of 
strategy and excellent subordinates to carry out his plans in the presence 
of the enemy. 
                                               
34 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1120 and SGZ 52/Wu 7:1220, the biography of Sun Quan's cautious 
adviser Zhang Zhao. 
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 In 216, after the success over Zhang Lu in Hanzhong, Cao Cao 
returned to his city of Ye, and in the summer he was raised in fief to 
become King of Wei under the empire of Han.35 This in itself was a clear 
sign of the future, for in the four hundred years since the founding 
Emperor Gao of Han, it had been an agreed convention that no person 
outside the imperial house of Liu should be granted royal honours.36 Cao 
Cao had made himself Duke of Wei in 213, which was already an 
exceptional position,37 but this new enfeoffment was still more 
significant.[383] 
 In the winter of 216-217, little more than a year after Sun Quan's 
failure before Hefei, Cao Cao came south from Ye to the Huai and the 
Yangzi. By the eleventh month he was at Qiao, and in the spring, in the 
first month of 217 he brought his army forward to Juchao in Lujiang, 
close to the Yangzi by Huan city.  
 As at the time of the earlier attack by Cao Cao in 212-213, Sun Quan 
had placed his army entirely on the defensive, notably in the Ruxu 
fortress. Chastened, perhaps, by the experiences of 215, he appears to 
have taken limited direct interest in the operations, and gave tactical 
command to Lü Meng, in charge of the land forces, and Jiang Qin with 
the fleet. Cao Cao attacked Ruxu, but had no success in the immediate 
                                               
35 SGZ 1:47. The same text notes that in the spring of that year Cao Cao had 
personally engaged in the ceremony of ploughing the sacred field, hitherto an 
imperial prerogative: Bodde, Festivals, 223-228 and ff. 
36 E.g. SJ 9:401; Chavannes, MH II, 414, and HS 3:100; Dubs, HFHD I, 201. 
  There was one exception to this rule, made by the short-lived Gengshi 
Emperor, who enfeoffed chieftains of the Red Eyebrows and others of his 
supporters in AD 24: Bielenstein, RHD II, 52-54. This was, however, an unusual 
occasion, and the later fate of the Gengshi Emperor at the hands of his over-mighty 
subjects did not make those enfeoffments a helpful model or precedent. 
37 The position of duke under the Later Han dynasty had generally been reserved for 
the titular descendants of the ancient royal houses of Zhou and Shang/Yin: 
Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 108. 
  At the time of his enfeoffment as Duke of Wei, Cao Cao was also granted the 
Nine Distinctions: HHS 9:387. The last occasion that the Nine Distinctions had 
been awarded was in 5 AD, at the end of Former Han, when they were granted to 
Wang Mang, who took the imperial throne for himself for years later. For further 
discussion, see note 15 to Chapter Seven. 
  Three of Cao Cao's daughters were also taken into the Emperor's harem as 
Honoured Ladies, the second rank after that of Empress, and 215, after the 
Empress Fu and her family had been destroyed on a charge of treason, one of Cao 
Cao's daughters became Empress: HHS 9:388, and HHS 10B:452-55. 
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fighting, and although Sun Quan's fleet was damaged by a storm, Cao 
Cao could not take advantage.38 
 Not long afterwards, in the second month of spring, Cao Cao left the 
southeast. Unlike the previous occasion of 213, however, he did not 
withdraw all his troops; instead he left behind his senior generals Xiahou 
Dun and Cao Ren, the veteran Zhang Liao, and twenty-six "armies," 
evidently a considerable force, still at the advanced base of Juchao.39 
 This was an interesting arrangement, and faced Sun Quan with an 
awkward situation. Given the strength of his fortifications at Ruxu, and 
his unchallenged command of the Yangzi in this region, he was not 
concerned with the threat of actual invasion. On the other hand, it would 
be difficult to dislodge such a large force of the enemy, [384] established 
firmly on the defensive, and it could certainly not be done without great 
cost to his own men. This was no longer a matter of cutting out such an 
isolated city as Huan, or even an attack on Hefei. And yet, as long as 
Xiahou Dun kept his army in being so close to the Yangzi, Sun Quan's 
own movements were seriously restricted, and any operations to the east, 
whether in the Poyang region or in Jing province, would be under 
constant threat from raid or interception. 
 In these circumstances, Sun Quan sent Xu Xiang, who held the rank 
of Commandant but who was really a personal aide, to negotiate terms.40 
They were not particularly difficult. In exchange for withdrawal of the 
northern armies, Sun Quan made formal "surrender" to Cao Cao, and 
they renewed the alliance of peace and marriage which had been broken 
at the time of the Red Cliffs. 
 The terms of surrender appear very easy, and there is no record of 
any request for tribute or hostages. Xiahou Dun's forces were rather a 
card to play for the short term than the advance guard of a major 
initiative against the south, and Cao Cao would be reluctant to leave his 
                                               
38 See the biography of Dong Xi, in SGZ 55/Wu 10:1291, which tells how he refused 
to leave his post of command, however, and went down with his foundering 
flagship: also Chapter Five at 284. 
39 SGZ 9:268, the biography of Xiahou Dun. 
  The twenty-six military units are described as jun 軍 "armies," though it is 
unlikely that they were so large as the term would imply. They were probably 
separate but associated camps, perhaps of regimental size, five hundred to a 
thousand men each. 
40 Xu Xiang does not have a specific biography in Sanguo zhi, but he is mentioned 
several times in that of his colleague Hu Zong: SGZ 62/Wu 17:1413-18. 
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men too long in an exposed salient when there were so many other 
problems elsewhere. Nevertheless, the manoeuvre had shown its 
effectiveness against Sun Quan, and his surrender was an admission of 
weakness, involving some loss of face. Furthermore, by acknowledging 
Cao Cao's authority at this time Sun Quan acquiesced in his claim to the 
title of king, with all that implied for the Han dynasty. It would be 
difficult for him to make propaganda in future as a loyal supporter of the 
imperial house against the usurper. The offensive along the Yangzi had 
been as much a political affair as a military one, and both sides could be 
reasonably satisfied with their bargain.[385] 
 It was also in this year 217 that Lu Su died. Sun Quan paid him all 
respects, and personally accompanied the cortège to his tomb. In his 
stead, as commander of the forces in Jing province, he appointed Lü 
Meng, who took over the headquarters at Lukou with title as 
Administrator of Hanchang, and with personal supplies allocated from 
the counties of Xiajun, Liuyang, Hanchang and Zhouling, the same grant 
as that to Lu Su. He had ten thousand men under his direct command. 
 We have noted Lü Meng on several occasions, from his first 
appearance among the junior leaders when Sun Quan succeeded to power 
in 200, to his role as commander of a detachment against Cao Ren in Nan 
commandery in 208, to his more recent experience on active campaigns 
in Jing province and north of the Yangzi. Given the distance of Jing 
province from Sun Quan's headquarters, and the uncertainty of the 
settlement there with Liu Bei and Guan Yu, Lü Meng's new appointment 
made him the most important military commander under Sun Quan. 
 Lü Meng was originally a man of Runan commandery, but he came 
to the south of the Yangzi in his early teens and joined his brother-in-law 
Deng Dang, who was an officer under Sun Ce's command. It would 
appear that Lü Meng's father had died and he and his mother, whatever 
their status may have been in the north, were poor refugees. Later, 
however, Lü Meng made something of a name for himself, he became an 
attendant to Sun Ce, and when Deng Dang died he was given command 
of his troop. It was about that time Sun Quan came to power, and Lü 
Meng was able to impress him and gain advancement by his presentation 
of uniformed and well-drilled men.41 
 Lü Meng appears always to have been energetic and aggressive, and 
his early reputation, like that of his friend and colleague Gan Ning, was 
                                               
41 Chapter Four at 235. 
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rather that of a bullying fighter than a gentleman officer. [386] Later, we 
are told, as he began to be given more important commands Sun Quan 
and others urged him to acquire some veneer of culture. One account, in 
Jiangbiao zhuan, describes a conversation with Sun Quan, who urged Lü 
Meng and Jiang Qin to study in order to improve themselves. Lü Meng 
replied that he was too busy with military affairs to have the leisure to 
read. 
Sun Quan said, "Why should I want you to plough through the 
classics like some academic. Just browse about, and take note of 
things that have happened in the past. 
 "You say you're too busy, but surely I have more responsibilities 
than you have. When I was young, I read the Classic of History and 
the Classic of Poetry, the Ritual, the Zuo Chronicle and the Tales of 
the States. The only one I have never read is the Classic of 
Changes... 
 "You should look at the Art of War by Master Sun, the Six 
Stratagems, the Zuo Chronicle, the Tales of the States, and the three 
histories."42 
With this reading list, and with other encouragement, Lü Meng did 
embark on a course of scholarship, and he impressed his superiors, such 
as Lu Su, not only with his sense of military planning but also with his 
skilful turn of a classical phrase.43[387] 
 Lü Meng, however, was not Sun Quan's first choice to succeed Lu Su 
on the western front. The scholar Yan Jun, an expert on the classics, had 
held a series of posts at headquarters and Sun Quan intended to make him 
the new commander. Yan Jun, however, made firm excuses, pleading that 
he was only a scholar and had no training in war, and when Sun Quan 
examined the question further, Yan Jun confirmed his demurrals by 
repeatedly falling off his horse.44 
                                               
42 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1274-75 PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. Of the works 
recommended by Sun Quan, Six Stratagems was a text ascribed to the Zhou period, 
and "three histories" describes Shi ji, Han shu and Dongguan Hanji, this last being 
the history of Later Han compiled under that dynasty: Chapter Nine at 538. 
43 Jiangbiao zhuan, as above, tells how Lu Su had earlier tended to discount Lü 
Meng's abilities but then happened to pass by his headquarters after Lü Meng had 
taken his special reading course. He was surprised with the new scholarship and 
complimented Lü Meng. Lü Meng replied with an appropriate classical proverb, 
and Lu Su made a point of calling upon Lü Meng's mother as earnest of his 
friendship and collegiality: deC, Establish Peace, 417. 
44 SGZ 53/Wu 8:1248 and 1249 PC note 1 quoting Zhi lin. 
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 Yan Jun was admired by the people of his time for this show of 
sensible modesty, and he later rose to significant rank in civil offices at 
the court. One may suspect that he would have been a less active 
commander than Lü Meng. 
 According to Lü Meng's biography, from the time he was appointed 
in the west he made a fine show of respect and friendship for Guan Yu, 
and gave every sign that he intended to continue the policy of Lu Su in 
that region. We are also told, however, that he discussed future strategy 
with Sun Quan, and urged him to a forward policy in Jing province: 
Guan Yu and all his people are boastful of their strength. They are 
unstable, and we cannot trust them. The reason Guan Yu has not yet 
turned eastwards against us is the influence of your majesty's 
spiritual understanding, and because I and some others are there to 
face him. However, if you do not act while we are strong, and then 
one day we are gone and you wish to muster forces again, how will 
you manage it? 
Sun Quan was impressed with this argument, but raised the alternative 
policy of expansion against Xu province. Lü Meng replied, 
Now Cao Cao is a long way away, north of the Yellow River. He has 
destroyed the Yuan group, and he has collected You and Ji [388] 
provinces. He does not yet have time to spare to look to the east [and 
deal with us here]. 
 I have heard that the soldiers guarding Xu province are too few 
even to talk about; if you go there you can take them. But the region 
is all dry land, and good cavalry can gallop there. If your honour 
takes Xu province now, Cao Cao will surely come to fight for it 
within ten days, and even if you defend the territory with seventy or 
eighty thousand men it would still be cause of anxiety. 
 The best thing to do is to take Guan Yu and seize all the Long 
River. Those lands are very broad. 
Sun Quan felt that these words were absolutely right.45 
 One must suspect that this conversation, at least in its detail, is 
largely imaginary. Cao Cao had defeated Yuan Shao at Guandu in 200, 
and destroyed the last of his family in the northern campaign of 207. 
Since that time he had no rival in the North China plain. In recent years, 
moreover, Cao Cao had found opportunity to pay a good deal of attention 
                                               
45 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1278. 
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to the Yangzi frontiers, and Sun Quan had not found his defences in Xu 
province nearly so negligible as this speech of Lü Meng would imply. 
 Rather than trying to reconcile the anachronisms, or explain the 
apparent gross and misleading flattery of Lü Meng, it seems better to 
accept the passage as the invention of a historian, designed to bring out 
the contrasting strategy between the "northern" policy against Xu 
province and the valley of the Huai, and the "western" policy against Jing 
province and Guan Yu's positions there, and also to establish the position 
of Lü Meng as an advocate of the latter program. 
 The question of dry land and cavalry was obviously important, and 
experience had demonstrated the weakness and limited expectation of 
success for Sun Quan's forces north of the Yangzi. [389] Far from 
capturing Hefei, Sun Quan was now faced by an established defence line 
along the Huai, supported by supplies from agricultural colonies, and Cao 
Cao's offensive of 216-217 had largely deprived him of the initiative for 
the foreseeable future. 
 If Sun Quan was to expand and develop his state as an independent 
power, he must look to the west and the south. The south, as we have 
seen, was being colonised with energy and considerable skill, but there 
were limits to the aid which renegades and non-Chinese could be 
compelled to give, and dangers in a commitment too far in that direction. 
In the west, to say the least of it, expansion since the Red Cliffs triumph 
had been disappointing. Sun Quan still controlled less than half the 
territory of Jing province, and he was faced with a powerful ally or rival 
who might at any time decide to turn against him. For the last several 
years, the advice of Lu Su had been appropriate, and Sun Quan's chief 
attention had been given to the struggle against Cao Cao and 
development of the territory in Yang province. Now, however, by force of 
elimination, he must consider the possibilities and dangers of the west.  
 
The great betrayal (219): 
So the death of Lu Su in 217, and the formal surrender to Cao Cao in the 
same year, marked a potential change of policy, and this was only 
confirmed by the appointment of Lü Meng as commander in Jing 
province. With the information available to them, Liu Bei and Guan Yu 
would have done well to be cautious. 
 In fact, for one reason or another, the men of the west do not appear 
to have troubled to read the signs. It is possible Guan Yu was indeed 
misled by Lü Meng's dissemblance, but it seems more likely that he had 
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limited respect for his [390] neighbour. In the ten years since the Red 
Cliffs, Liu Bei's power had expanded greatly, and he had achieved 
considerable military success. Sun Quan, by contrast, had suffered a 
succession of defeats in his enterprises north of the Yangzi about Hefei, 
and his power looked much the same as it had before: a local warlord 
with small capacity beyond his immediate territory. 
 Admittedly, Sun Quan's forces had achieved some success in the 
campaign in Jing province in 215, but that had been a matter of trickery 
and lucky timing, and one might argue that the relative positions of the 
two sides could be seen from the agreement to return Lingling 
commandery as a condition of truce. Had Sun Quan felt strong enough to 
face Guan Yu and Liu Bei in the field, he would no doubt have done so, 
and would not have yielded territory he had already gained. So Guan Yu 
and his master had reason to discount any initiative of Lü Meng, and their 
first priority lay to the north. Once they had established a firm position 
against Cao Cao, it should not be difficult to expand eastwards against 
Sun Quan. 
 Liu Bei's chief current concern was in the north of Yi province, on 
the front against Hanzhong commandery. During 218 there was some 
skirmishing in the territory of Ba commandery between forces of Cao 
Cao and Liu Bei's generals Zhang Fei and Ma Chao, but by the end of 
that year Cao Cao's men had been driven back. Liu Bei then took 
command of a expedition against the upper Han valley, and Cao Cao 
brought an army to Chang'an, planning to cross the Qin Ling range and 
support Xiahou Yuan in an attack on the south. 
 Before Cao Cao could arrive, however, in the early spring of 219, his 
troops in Hanzhong were decisively defeated at Dingjun Mountain, near 
the Yangping Pass and Mianyang city, present-day Mian county in 
Shenxi. Xiahou Yuan was killed in the rout, and the remnants of the army, 
now commanded by Zhang He, could do no more than hold the passes to 
the north. In the third month, Cao Cao [391] came to their support, but 
Liu Bei had taken control of the river valley. There were some minor 
skirmishes, but no direct engagement, and by mid-summer Cao Cao had 
been compelled to withdraw his men across the mountains to Chang'an. 
Liu Bei now held Hanzhong. 
 It was a remarkable success, and the battle at Dingjun Mountain was 
one of the decisive victories of the time: Liu Bei had eliminated the 
immediate threat to his territory and gained an easily defensible mountain 
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frontier against his major enemy. With his base in Yi province secure, he 
could plan with confidence for the future. 
 In the autumn of that year, to confirm his control and to make 
propaganda as rival to the usurper in the north, Liu Bei proclaimed 
himself King of Hanzhong. In doing so, he was able to create a link with 
his distant ancestor the founding Emperor Gao of Former Han, who had 
become King of Han in 206 BC. The ceremony was held at Mianyang 
city, near the scene of his victory at Dingjun Mountain, and messages 
were formally addressed to the Emperor of Han, assuring him of Liu 
Bei's intention to act on behalf of the dynasty, and returning the seals and 
ribbons as general and marquis which had been granted him in the past. 
(One may wonder how the documents were delivered.) The new king, 
however, continued to maintain his capital at Chengdu, albeit with a 
military post-road to the northern frontier region.46 
 At the time of his accession Liu Bei gave new titles and honours to 
all his leading supporters, and in particular he named Guan Yu as General 
of the Van, first but essentially equal in rank with Zhang Fei, with Huang 
Zhong who had joined Liu Bei in Jing province,47 [392] and with the 
new-comer Ma Chao. It is said that Guan Yu was angry not to have been 
given clear distinction above his colleagues, as Liu Bei's oldest associate 
and leading commander, and he was only with difficulty persuaded to 
accept the new title and insignia without making a public show of his 
indignation.48 Besides the question of hierarchy, moreover, it was 
probably a source of some embarrassment that the great success in 
Hanzhong had been gained without him. Guan Yu may well have felt 
some loss of prestige, and resolved to add something more to this 
wonderful year. 
 And indeed there were signs that the twenty-fourth year of Jian'an 
might prove to be an annus mirabilis for the enemies of Cao Cao, and 
notably for Liu Bei. Striking eastwards down river from his new position 
on the upper Han, and north from Zigui county on the Yangzi just inside 
Jing province, Liu Bei ordered a two-pronged attack on Cao Cao's 
positions in the western part of present-day Hubei, the new 
                                               
46 SGZ 32/Shu 2:884 to 887 and 887 PC note 2 quoting Dian lue. 
47 The biography of Huang Zhong is in SGZ 36/Shu 6:948. He had held office in 
Changsha under Liu Biao, but joined Liu Bei when he took over the southern 
commanderies after the Red Cliffs campaign. He accompanied Liu Bei into Yi 
province and took part in the attack on Chengdu. 
48 SGZ 41/Shu 11:1015-16, the biography of Fei Shi. 
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commanderies of Fangling and Shangyong. Both territories surrendered, 
and Liu Bei had thus established a position east of the mountains which 
bordered Yi province, with a threat to the lower valley of the Han about 
Xiangyang and to the central commandery of Nanyang.49 In the [393] 
eighth month, in the middle of autumn, Guan Yu came north with his 
main forces both land and river, to support these moves and launch a 
direct attack on Cao Cao's defences at Xiangyang.50 
 Xiangyang, with its sister city Fan across the Han River, was a 
strategic centre of Jing province and had been the capital of Liu Biao's 
government before 208.51 It was on the southern borders of Nanyang 
commandery, about 120 kilometres from the old capital, Wan, with good 
communications in that direction and into the North China plain, and also 
towards the region of Luoyang. In Cao Cao's hands, this territory was a 
barrier to any attack from the south, but if Guan Yu could capture it he 
would have access, either for raids or for full invasion, into the heartland 
of the empire. 
 Cao Cao's defences were commanded by his cousin Cao Ren, whose 
headquarters were at Fan city, on the northern bank of the Han River. As 
Guan Yu approached, Yu Jin was sent with a second army to aid Cao Ren. 
They remained camped, in seven divisions, on open ground north of the 
city. 
                                               
49 SGZ 40/Shu 10:991, the biography of Liu Bei's adopted son, Liu Feng. 
  Cao Cao's Administrator of Fangling, Kuai Qi, who was probably a relative of 
Kuai Yue, Cao Cao's supporter in Jing province in the time of Liu Zong (Chapter 
Four at 248-249), was killed at that time. Shen Dan, Cao Cao's Administrator of 
Shangyong, surrendered and sent his wife and family as hostages to Chengdu. He 
was given title as a general, enfeoffed as a marquis, and appointed Administrator 
of Shangyong as before, while his brother, Shen Yi, was also given a general's 
command and appointed Administrator of the new commandery of Xicheng, just 
west of Shangyong. They probably had some local influence, and their attachment 
was worth maintaining. 
  Meng Da, who had commanded the expedition north from Zigui, was a former 
officer of the deposed Governor Liu Zhang, and was evidently not entirely trusted 
by Liu Bei: both sets of victorious troops were kept on station in the Shangyong 
region, with Liu Feng in overall command. 
50 For the description of the early fighting in the campaign about Xiangyang, see the 
biography of Guan Yu in SGZ 36/Shu 6:941, that of Cao Ren in SGZ 9:275-76, that 
of Yu Jin in SGZ 17:524, and that of Pang De, a hero of the defeated forces, in SGZ 
18:546. The story is also told in ZZTJ 67:2160-62; deC, Establish Peace, 532-534. 
51 Chapter Four at 247. Sun Jian had been killed in this region fighting for Yuan Shu 
against Liu Biao in 192: Chapter Two at 135. 
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 At this point, however, there came seasonal but exceptionally heavy 
rain, not only locally but also in the catchment area for the Han River 
among the mountains to the west. There was a flash flood and Yu Jin's 
forces were taken completely by surprise. Guan Yu commanded a 
considerable fleet, brought up along the course of the Han, and as the 
river broke its banks his sailors were in their [394] element against the 
soldiers from the north. Yu Jin's men were driven onto isolated hillocks of 
higher ground, and Guan Yu's boats concentrated against their places of 
refuge one by one. Many of Yu Jin's men were drowned, and almost all 
the rest of his army, including Yu Jin, was taken prisoner. 
 This was a major local disaster, and there was now a very high 
possibility that Guan Yu could establish a position in the north. Cao Ren's 
army was trapped inside Fan city, and the walls served as a defence 
against the floods as much as against the enemy: on some faces, Guan 
Yu's ships could sail right up to them. Elsewhere Guan Yu set up lines of 
siege-works, and the city was completely cut off from outside. South 
across the Han, the county city of Xiangyang was also isolated and under 
siege, and some secondary positions surrendered, but the major attention 
was paid to Cao Ren, and the fall of Fan could have been a misfortune for 
Cao Cao even greater than the loss of Hanzhong commandery. 
 Cao Ren may have contemplated retreat before the siege was fully 
joined, but the existence of his army, even in this critical situation, was 
sufficient to prevent Guan Yu from exploiting his success and causing 
disruption further to the north. Cao Ren still had several thousand men 
with him, including cavalry. The horses were little use in the floods, but 
they could be a source of food, and there was surely no shortage of water. 
In token of his determination to hold out, he held a ceremony of oath-
taking and drowned a white horse to make covenant with his men. 
 After the initial attack and the disaster to Yu Jin, the siege and 
defence were maintained for several weeks, and Cao Cao gathered forces 
for the relief. By the tenth month, the beginning of winter, he had set a 
base at Luoyang, and a force under Xu Huang had been sent forward – 
not strong enough to break the siege, but sufficient to harass Guan Yu's 
fixed positions and offer some encouragement to [395] Cao Ren and his 
men.52 On the other hand, Cao Cao was not yet ready to commit himself 
to the fray, and he was indeed advised by his attendant Huan Jie not to do 
                                               
52 SGZ 17:529-530, the biography of Xu Huang, also ZZTJ 67:2166-68; deC, 
Establish Peace, 543-545. 
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so. The very fact that he held his power in reserve would encourage Cao 
Ren and his men to hold out, and would demonstrate his military 
strength.53 
 In many respects, this show of confidence was as important to Cao 
Cao's position as the eventual defeat of Guan Yu. His rise to power had 
not been without political opposition, and there had been a number of 
small and unsuccessful plots against him by civilians at Xu and at Ye.54 In 
this transitional period, Cao Cao could never be [396] entirely confident 
of any but his closest associates, and he could not afford to stretch 
people's divided loyalties or offer them too great temptation to turn 
                                               
53
 SGZ 22:632, the biography of Huan Jie. 
  Huan Jie had an interesting and varied career. A man of Changsha, he was 
recommended by Sun Jian when he was Administrator there in the late 180s. He 
held office in the imperial secretariat at Luoyang, but later joined Sun Jian on his 
campaigns during the civil war, and when Sun Jian was killed Huan Jie was sent 
on embassy to request his body from Liu Biao. 
  He evidently returned to Changsha, and it is said that he encouraged the rebel 
Administrator Zhang Xian to stir up trouble against Liu Biao in order to prevent 
him intervening in support of Yuan Shao against Cao Cao at the time of the 
campaign about Guandu in 200. 
  Some time after the defeat of the Changsha rebellion, Huan Jie was again taken 
into Liu Biao's service: an appointment which speaks well of Liu Biao's tolerance, 
or reveals his ignorance of Huan Jie's political activities. He left again, however, 
pleading ill health, because he wished to avoid entanglement with the family of 
Liu Biao's wife of the Cai clan. 
  When Cao Cao captured Jing province, he took Huan Jie into his personal 
service, and Huan Jie later became a supporter of Cao Pi, the Heir-Apparent and 
successor. After the accession of Cao Pi and the proclamation of the new dynasty, 
Huan Jie became Director of the Secretariat of Wei, but died soon afterwards. 
54 In 214, for example, the Empress Fu of Emperor Xian of Han was dismissed and 
died for attempting to incite action against Cao Cao: HHS 10B:454. 
  In 217-218 there was a plot to seize Xu city by means of a military coup 
organised by a number of ministers and other officials. They planned to kill Cao 
Cao and call on Guan Yu to support the Han government. There was fighting but 
the rebellion was quickly defeated: SGZ 1:50. 
  In the winter of 218 there was a mutiny among the garrison of Wan city in 
Nanyang, which was not put down until the spring three months later: SGZ 51. 
  In the autumn of 219 there was a plot to seize Ye city, and several thousand 
people, including officials and leading gentry, were punished for their 
involvement: SGZ 1:52 and PC note 1 bis quoting [Wei-Jin] shi yu; SGZ 8:263; 
SGZ 21:599; et alii. 
  None of these incidents presented immediate danger to Cao Cao's authority, but 
they demonstrate some tensions in the state, and serve as warning what might 
happen if his power should appear to be wavering. 
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against him. No matter what ranks and titles might obtain, his 
government was still that of a warlord, and it was important to maintain 
his military prestige. 
 Through late autumn, therefore, and into the winter, Guan Yu and 
Cao Ren were bound in the siege at Fan city, and both sides had reason 
for their commitment to that position. 
 At the beginning of Guan Yu's campaign against the north, there was 
limited opportunity for Sun Quan or Lü Meng to take any action. Guan 
Yu left garrisons along the Yangzi at Gong'an and Jiangling, and if Lü 
Meng had made any early move Guan Yu could have returned with his 
army and his fleet down the line of the Han River and offered an effective 
counter-attack against Jiangxia. The very success of Guan Yu's operations 
against Yu Jin, however, bound him more closely to the hope of ultimate 
success against Cao Ren, and he began to draw upon his reserve troops, 
weakening his positions along the Yangzi. 
 It is possible that Sun Quan made an attack on Hefei about the time 
Guan Yu first struck against the north, though given the recent agreement 
with Cao Cao it seems unlikely.55 If he did make such a move it was 
rather a demonstration or a feint than a real attempt at conquest, and the 
major intention was probably to reassure Guan Yu. More specifically, it 
was now revealed that Lü Meng was ill, and he was recalled to Sun 
Quan's headquarters while Lu Xun was sent to take his place at Lukou. 
Lu Xun wrote effusive and encouraging letters to Guan Yu, and certainly 
there can have seemed small threat from an army in the process of 
reorganising its command structure. Guan Yu became still less concerned 
about his eastern front.56 
                                               
55 The only reference to an attack on Hefei at this time appears not in the biography 
of Sun Quan, but in that of the Wei officer Wen Hui, in SGZ 14:479, where it 
appears rather as the opportunity for an anecdote describing Wen Hui's 
perspicacious analysis of the dangers faced by Cao Ren at Xiangyang. See also 
ZZTJ 67:2161; deC, Establish Peace, 532. 
56 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1278, the biography of Lü Meng, and SGZ 58/Wu 13:1344-45, the 
biography of Lu Xun. 
  Lu Xun's biography tells how, when Lü Meng was returning from his post in 
the west, Lu Xun argued with him that he should rather take the opportunity to 
attack Guan Yu. His ideas fitted so well with the plans of Lü Meng and Sun Quan 
that he was naturally appointed to take Lü Meng's place. 
  Lu Xun, however, was not given the same rank as Lü Meng, for he was made 
only a Lieutenant-General. This further encouraged the belief that Sun Quan was 
planning no initiatives on that region. 
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 Lü Meng's sickness was real, but that did not prevent him from 
planning operations with Sun Quan. At one stage, Sun Quan intended that 
he should hold joint command with Sun Jiao, but he was persuaded to 
grant Lü Meng full authority over the direct attack, and Sun Jiao was 
given command of a reserve army.57 The main striking force was brought 
up to strength by gradual reinforcements, but it [398] was assembled at 
Xunyang city in Lujiang commandery, well behind the frontier. Guan 
Yu's intelligence service gave him no warning, and he was, indeed, 
sufficiently disdainful of Sun Quan's reactions that he seized some 
supplies for his armies from one of Sun Quan's storage bases on the 
Xiang River.58 
 At some stage Sun Quan and Cao Cao appear to have been in 
communication on the matter, though the anecdotes which describe their 
plotting are contradictory. According to one version, Cao Cao invited Sun 
Quan to attack Guan Yu, and offered him recognition as ruler of all the 
lands south of the Yangzi. Another story suggests that Sun Quan took the 
initiative by writing to Cao Cao, advising him of his plans, but asking 
him to keep the matter secret so that Guan Yu would be taken by surprise. 
Cao Cao, believing that his interests were best served by setting Guan Yu 
and Sun Quan at each others' throats, sent messages to Guan Yu; Guan 
Yu, however, refused to credit them and maintained the siege against Fan 
city.59[399>400] 
                                                                                                                   
  Extracts from Lu Xun's congratulatory letters to Guan Yu are preserved in his 
biography. 
57 SGZ 51/Wu 6:1207-08, the biography of Sun Jiao; and see note 4 to Chapter Five. 
58 The place is described as Xiangguan 湘關 "The Pass on the Xiang," but cannot be 
further identified. It was probably a small fortress by a crossing place of the Xiang 
River, between the territories of Sun Quan and Liu Bei and close to the junction of 
the Xiang with the Yangzi, south of Guan Yu's base at Gong'an and near present-
day Yueyang. 
  SGZ 54/Wu 9:1278, suggests this incident was the trigger for Sun Quan to 
move against Guan Yu, but it is clear that preparations had been made well before. 
The Xiangguan incident may have served as propaganda to justify the attack. 
59 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1120 has the simple story that Sun Quan wrote to Cao Cao, advising 
him of his plans. Cao Cao, hoping to turn Guan Yu and Sun Quan against one 
another to his own advantage, had the letter sent to Cao Ren in Fan city who in his 
turn passed it to Guan Yu. 
  SGZ 14:440, the biography of Dong Zhao, an old associate of Cao Cao, tells 
how he advised Cao Cao to betray Sun Quan's confidence. Cao Ren's men in Fan 
were encouraged, but Guan Yu paid no attention. (Though Cao Ren was quite 
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 It is possible that Cao Cao may have sought to urge Sun Quan 
against Guan Yu, and he may also have attempted to frighten Guan Yu 
away by threatening him with that possibility, but it is hard to imagine 
what real benefit Sun Quan might have hoped to obtain by entrusting his 
secret plans to Cao Cao. As with other great events of the time, one must 
suspect that tales of romance and trickery have gathered around the 
incident, and such stories are rather imaginative anecdotes than the 
records of serious diplomacy. 
 In the intercalary tenth month, about early December of 219, Sun 
Quan's forces moved against the west. Jiang Qin was in command of a 
fleet which advanced up the Han to guard against any counter-stroke. Sun 
Jiao brought his men forward to the region about the junction of the two 
rivers, to act as a reserve and also as a holding force in case Cao Cao's 
forces in the northern part of Jiangxia commandery sought to intervene 
against their line of communications. Lü Meng led the main attack, 
starting from the rearward position at Xunyang, and moving upstream 
along the Yangzi with most of his troops hidden in barges, while the ships 
were rowed by men dressed in plain clothes to look like merchants and 
traders. Taking Guan Yu's outposts by surprise, they captured them one 
by one before they could get out word. 
Guan Yu's two chief defence posts were at Gong'an, where the garrison 
was commanded by a certain Shi Ren,60 and Jiangling the capital of Nan 
commandery, held by Mi Fang. Both men felt they had been treated too 
casually by Guan Yu, and it is said that he had threatened them with 
punishment for some confusion about the despatch of supplies while he 
was in the north. [401] Whatever the level of their disaffection, Shi Ren 
proved vulnerable to the diplomatic wiles of Lü Meng aided by Yu Fan, 
the man who had formerly persuaded Hua Xin to surrender to Sun Ce and 
who seems to have specialised in such diplomacy.61 Then the army came 
to Jiangling, and Shi Ren added his voice to persuade Mi Fang to change 
sides. 
                                                                                                                   
surrounded, messages were shot by arrows between his troops and those of Xu 
Huang operating outside Guan Yu's lines). 
60 There is some confusion over the name of this man. It appears that his personal 
name was Ren, but the surname is given in SGZ 36/Shu 6:941 as Fushi 傅士, and 
this is followed by ZZTJ 67:2160. SGZ 45/Shu 14:10, SGZ 47/Wu 2:1120 and SGZ 
54/Wu 9:1278, however, refer to him as Shi Ren. It seems likely the character fu is 
a mistaken addition to the text of SGZ 36. 
61 Chapter Three at 192-193. 
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Map 13: The destruction of Guan Yu 219 
 
By this one stroke, Lü Meng changed the military strategy of the region. 
Guan Yu abandoned his operations at Fan city and Xiangyang and came 
directly southwards. He was not followed by Cao Cao's forces, for they 
preferred to let their two southern enemies fight things out. It was in fact 
possible, despite his disadvantage, that Guan Yu might be able to drive 
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Lü Meng away, or at least compel another negotiated settlement. He was 
faced, however, not only by a military coup, but also by admirable 
propaganda. 
 With the capture of Jiangling, Lü Meng had obtained control of Guan 
Yu's treasury and his family, and the families also of many of his soldiers. 
Placing strong emphasis on their rightful position in Jing province, Lü 
Meng and his master Sun Quan advertised their friendship and protection. 
Lü Meng enforced rigid prohibitions against looting and made public 
display of the civil proprieties: 
One man of Lü Meng's command, who came from Runan [Lü 
Meng's own commandery], took a straw rain-hat from a family of the 
people in order to cover a coat of mail belonging to the government. 
 Even though the armour was public property, Lü Meng still held 
that the man had disobeyed orders, and he could not remit the law 
simply because he came from his own district. He wept, but 
beheaded him.[402] 
 In the army there was fear and trembling, and no-one dared even 
to pick up things which had been dropped on the road. 
 In addition, Lü Meng sent men of his Companions morning and 
evening to ask after the old people and to enquire what they might 
lack. He gave medicine to the sick, and clothing and food to those 
who were hungry and cold.62 
As Guan Yu's army approached, he and Lü Meng sent messengers to one 
another, and Lü Meng showed the utmost generosity. In particular, he had 
the men from Guan Yu's army taken about freely, to meet with their own 
and their colleagues' families, so they would report back how well they 
were treated and how little there was to gain from fighting. Guan Yu's 
men from Jing province were now rather inclined to desert than to join 
him in an attack against their own homes and kindred. 
 In the mean time, Lu Xun had been sent further upstream towards the 
Yangzi Gorges and the route by which support must come from Yi 
province. He seized Yidu commandery, whose capital was near present-
day Yichang on the Yangzi, and then sent detachments west against Zigui 
and north against Fangling. Lu Xun also put in a special order for seals of 
gold, silver and copper to give appointments to the local Chinese and 
                                               
62 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1278-79. 
JING PROVINCE 
 
 
315 
non-Chinese leaders who came to support him, confirming them in their 
new allegiance.63 
 By the eleventh month, a few weeks after the start of the operation, 
Guan Yu had been isolated in the region of Dangyang, between the 
Yangzi and the Han, with Sun Quan's forces on three sides and Cao Cao's 
at the north. The greater part of his army [403] deserted him, and in a 
final petty skirmish he and his son Guan Ping were captured and killed.64 
 It may be doubted whether Sun Quan was pleased with this last 
development. He had earlier offered Guan Yu the opportunity to 
surrender, and if he had been returned a prisoner or even escaped as a 
solitary refugee it would have been obviously embarrassing to Liu Bei. 
As it was, Guan Yu could be claimed to have received a martyr's death, 
and Liu Bei was bound to seek revenge.65 
 In all other respects Sun Quan continued to make his occupation of 
Jing province as conciliatory and bloodless as possible. Guan Yu had 
controlled the region as a warlord and agent from outside, the man with 
the most powerful army. Though Sun Quan had taken power simply by 
the fact that he was for the time the stronger, he attempted to maintain as 
many as possible from the former local administration in office, and he 
came in person to take up residence in Jing province, first at Jiangling 
and then at the military base Gong'an. For the present, he could assume 
that Yang province was secure, and the move did a good deal to 
demonstrate [404] his local authority and secure the support of the 
people. To confirm his new regime, moreover, Sun Quan announced that 
                                               
63 SGZ 58/Wu 13:1345. 
64 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1121, SGZ 54/Wu 9:1279 and SGZ 55/Wu 10:1299-1300, the last 
being the biography of Pan Zhang, one of the commanders sent in pursuit of Guan 
Yu, refer to the capture of Guan Yu and the remnants of his party. SGZ 36/Shu 
6:941, tells how Guan Yu was beheaded at Linju. 
65 SGZ 47 and SGZ 55, cited in note 64 above, give credit for the capture to the major 
Ma Zhong, serving in the army of Pan Zhang. ZZTJ 67:2170; deC, Establish 
Peace, 550, takes the implication that Ma Zhong beheaded Guan Yu. 
  SGZ 36:942 PC note 3 quoting Shu ji, suggests that Sun Quan had hoped to 
keep Guan Yu alive and use him as an assistant against Cao Cao and Liu Bei, but 
his attendants pointed out that Guan Yu had always remained loyal to Liu Bei and 
would never serve anyone else. So Sun Quan had him killed. Pei Songzhi, 
however, remarks that this is a most unlikely story: it is hard to imagine Sun Quan 
would ever believe Guan Yu might support him; and in any case the operations 
against Guan Yu's remnant forces were taking place a considerable distance away, 
so he was in no position to make detailed decisions about life or death. 
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on account of recent widespread sickness, there was remission of all 
taxes from the province for that year. 
 Among the prisoners taken on this campaign, Cao Cao's unfortunate 
general Yu Jin, captured amongst the floods at Fan city a few months 
before, then held in Jiangling by Guan Yu, came now into Sun Quan's 
hands. He was treated with courtesy, but he was not yet sent back to the 
north.66 The former Governor of Yi province, Liu Zhang, who had been 
deposed and exiled by Liu Bei, and had also been at Jiangling, was re-
appointed to that title, with temporary residence at Zigui. He was 
evidently intended to act as a focus for opposition to Liu Bei in the west, 
but he died soon afterwards.67 And Mi Fang, the man who had 
surrendered Jiangling, later held command in Sun Quan's forces.68 
 Within the newly-conquered territory, Sun Quan appears to have met 
negligible opposition, which may perhaps be typified by the case of Fan 
Zhou, a local official in Wuling who sought to raise the people in support 
of Liu Bei. It was thought at first that a considerable army would be 
required, for Fan Zhou claimed support among the non-Chinese of the 
hills. Sun Quan, however, asked the advice of a certain Pan Jun, who 
came from Wuling, and had now changed allegiance and been appointed 
[405] to Sun Quan's staff. Pan Jun assured him that quite a small force 
would be sufficient. 
"How can you treat Fan Zhou so lightly?" asked Sun Quan. 
 "Fan Zhou comes from an old family in Nanyang," replied Pan 
Jun. "He can make good speeches, but he has absolutely no idea 
about making plans. The reason I know is because Fan Zhou once 
arranged a feast for the local people. By midday, there was still no 
food, and most of the people got up and went away. Once you have 
seen a performance like that, you can guess the rest." 
                                               
66 There was one unfortunate incident, when Sun Quan was riding with Yu Jin, and 
Yu Fan accosted Yu Jin, saying, "You are a surrendered prisoner. How dare you 
keep your horse level with our lord's?" He was about to hit him with a whip, but 
Sun Quan intervened to protect Yu Jin. 
67 SGZ 31/Shu 1:870. 
68 He took part in operations during 223 under the command of He Qi against the Wei 
forces in Qichun, the eastern part of Later Han Jiangxia commandery: SGZ 47/Wu 
2:1130 and SGZ 60/Wu 15:1380, and Chapter Seven at 435. 
  Since Mi Fang had initially held office under Cao Cao, but then left to follow 
Liu Bei, he achieved the remarkable record of serving each of the three rival states 
which succeeded to Han. 
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 Sun Quan laughed, and he sent Pan Jun there with five thousand 
men, and they cut off heads and put down the rebellion.69 
On his own side, Sun Quan suffered two notable losses. Firstly, his 
officer Jiang Qin, who appears to have something of a specialist as a fleet 
commander and who had been in charge of naval operations on the Han 
River, died of illness on his way back from the campaign. Second, still 
more important, Lü Meng also took ill and died soon after the end of the 
fighting. 
 Lü Meng was known to have been sick earlier in the year, and we 
have seen that he used his illness as a means to allay Guan Yu's anxieties. 
Soon after the fall of Jiangling and the arrival of Sun Quan in the 
province, however, even before he could receive the fief which should 
reward his achievements, his condition became acute. He was taken into 
care with lodgings next to Sun Quan's own quarters at Gongan, and 
rewards of gold were offered to any doctor who could cure him. 
When acupuncture was applied, Sun Quan was miserable for him. 
He constantly wished to see Lü Meng's face but was [406] afraid to 
be a nuisance, so he would peer through a hole in the wall to see how 
he looked. 
 If he saw Lü Meng could eat a little, Sun Quan would turn and 
smile to those about him and would even laugh. If Lü Meng refused 
his food, however, Sun Quan would sigh, and at night he could not 
sleep. 
 Then Lü Meng got better, an amnesty was given in celebration, 
and all Sun Quan's ministers sent in their congratulations. 
 Later, however, he had a relapse, and Sun Quan went in person 
to attend him, and he ordered Taoist masters to pray under the stars 
on his behalf. 
 Lü Meng died, at the age of forty-two, in the inner apartments. 
Sun Quan was struck with the utmost grief and distress.70 
                                               
69 SGZ 61/Wu 16:1397-98, the biography of Pan Jun, PC note 1 quoting Jiangbiao 
zhuan. 
70 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1279-80. Lü Meng's final illness, and that of the admiral Jiang Qin, 
may have been caused by a general sickness in Jing province, cited at this time by 
Sun Quan as a reason for tax relief. On the other hand, though plague had affected 
Sun Quan's attack on Hefei in 215 [see note 32 above], and devastated the capital 
of Wei in 217, there is no specific reference to disease among the contending 
armies in 219. 
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We have seen earlier, in the account of the death of Sun Ce, how the story 
of the magician Gan Ji and the accursed mirror proved more popular than 
the human account of Sun Ce's death.71 The death of Lü Meng is likewise 
ascribed by Romance to the majestic vengeance of Guan Yu, reaching 
even beyond the grave: 
[Sun Quan] rewarded his soldiers and spread a great feast at which 
Lü Meng was in the seat of honour. He made a speech, saying, 
 "After long waiting, the desire of my heart has come to me very 
easily through the magnificent efforts of my friend Lü Meng....." 
 Then he filled the goblet and in person presented it to the guest 
of the evening.[407] 
 Lü took the cup, but as he raised it a sudden change came over 
him. Dashing the cup to the ground, he seized Sun Quan, crying, "O 
green-eyed boy! O red-bearded rat! Do you know me? .....After I 
quelled the Yellow Turbans, I went hither and thither for thirty years. 
Now I have fallen victim to your base plots and you have overcome 
me. If living I have been unable to gorge upon the flesh of mine 
enemy, dead I will pursue the spirit of this bandit Lü. I am the 
Marquis of Hanshou, Guan Yunzhang."72 
 Terror stricken, Sun Quan was the first to fall prostrate, and all 
his officers followed him. 
 Thereupon Lü Meng fell over dead, with blood gushing from all 
his orifices.73 
Many people, of course, prefer propaganda and fiction to historical fact. 
                                               
71 Chapter Three at 199-200. 
72 Yunzhang 雲長 was the style of Guan Yu. He had been enfeoffed as Marquis of 
Hanshou Village 漢壽亭 by Cao Cao in 200: SGZ 36/Shu 6:939. [The headquarters 
of the Inspector of Jing province under Han had been at Hanshou in Wuling: 
Chapter One at 25 and Chapter Two at 113-114. It is most unlikely, however, that 
Guan Yu's fief was related to that city; it was presumably a small settlement 
somewhere in north China.]  
73 Romance chapter 77; translated Brewitt-Taylor, San kuo II, 180-181, amending the 
transcription to pinyin. This incident is also dramatised in a play "The Ghosts of 
Lord Guan and General Zhang [Fei] Return to Sichuan" by the celebrated Yuan 
composer Guan Hanqing, a work of which variant editions survive. See Liu Ching-
chih [1980], chapter 4, also Peking Opera Texts, 4415, and Jingju jumu chutan, 
101. 
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Introductory summary: 
Following the death of Cao Cao in 220, his son and successor Cao Pi 
proclaimed himself Emperor of Wei in replacement of Han. Liu Bei in the 
west followed suit, claiming to maintain the rightful descent of the imperial 
line. He also made preparations for an attack on Sun Quan to avenge Guan 
Yu and regain the territory which he had lost in Jing province. 
  Cao Pi enfeoffed Sun Quan as King of Wu. Sun Quan accepted the title 
and the alliance with the north so that he might be free to deal with Liu Bei's 
invasion. 
 In 222 Sun Quan's general Lu Xun defeated Liu Bei's army. Sun Quan 
now cut the connection with Cao Pi, and successfully defended the line of 
Yangzi against him. In 223 he restored the alliance with Shu-Han. 
 In the far south, after the death of Shi Xie in 226, Sun Quan's officer Lü 
Dai destroyed the Shi family and took over their territory. Sun Quan now 
controlled the greater part of three provinces of Han. 
 In 229 Sun Quan proclaimed himself Emperor of Wu.[409] 
 
Liu Bei's revenge: 
During the two years which followed the destruction of Guan Yu and the 
conquest of Jing province, a central element of Sun Quan's policy was the 
preparation, both military and diplomatic, for dealing with the attack that 
would be brought by Liu Bei downstream from Yi province. There was no 
question the invasion would come: the coup against Guan Yu was too easily 
seen as treachery to an ally, and the death Liu Bei's most senior comrade and 
commander gave an element of blood-feud to the already bitter quarrel. For 
his own honour and, equally important, his personal authority, Liu Bei could 
                                               
*  In the first edition of Generals of the South, published in 1990, Chapter Seven 
occupied pages 408 to 462. The original pagination is indicated with brackets []; 
indexing and cross-references refer to those pages. 
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not accept the loss with a show of equanimity, and it was impossible to 
contemplate a truce or any secure peace. 
 In such a situation it was essential for Sun Quan that he should not be 
faced with a threat from the north at the same time as he was dealing with 
Liu Bei, and in this matter of diplomacy he was both astute and fortunate. 
 The death of Guan Yu had taken place in the twelfth month of Jian'an 24, 
the beginning of the Western year 220. We are told that Sun Quan had the 
head of the defeated general sent to Cao Cao as a token of homage, while he 
arranged for the rest of the corpse to be buried with honour.1 This somewhat 
contradictory proceeding can have done little to assuage the grief and anger 
of Liu Bei and his associates, but it produced a positive response from Cao 
Cao. Sun Quan was recommended as General of Elite Cavalry, next-but-
highest rank in the traditional military structure of Han, he was recognised as 
Governor of Jing province, and he was [410] enfeoffed as Marquis of 
Nanchang, the capital of Yuzhang commandery.2 
 Cao Cao at that time was by the Mo Slope, south of Luoyang on the road 
to Xiangyang, where he had set up his rear base for the defence against Guan 
Yu. With the emergency at an end, he withdrew the troops that had been on 
active service, left Cao Ren to reconstitute the positions in that region, and 
returned to the north. He reached, however, only as far as Luoyang, and died 
there on 15 March 220, at the age of sixty-five.3 
 The death of Cao Cao, dominant figure in Chinese politics for the last 
twenty years, naturally brought a pause to the ambitions of the state of Wei 
against its rivals. He was succeeded by his eldest son Cao Pi, thirty-three 
years old, who had been established as Heir to the kingdom in 217.4 For the 
most part, the succession was recognised and approved, but there had been 
some suggestion earlier that Cao Cao's third son Cao Zhi might be a more 
suitable candidate, and his second son Cao Zhang also believed he had an 
interest. Neither claim was strongly pressed or widely supported at the time, 
                                               
1 SGZ 36/Shu 6:942 PC note 3 quoting Wu li. 
2 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1121. Sun Quan's former appointments under the Han government 
controlled by Cao Cao had been Administrator of Kuaiji and General Who 
Exterminates the Caitiffs, titles which had been granted him at the time of his brother's 
death and his succession to power in 200. Though Sun Ce had been Marquis of Wu, 
Sun Quan had not been granted any enfeoffment until this time. 
3 SGZ 1:53; Fang, Chronicle I, 1 and 15. 
4 The biography of Cao Pi, and the chronicle of his reign, is in SGZ 2. His posthumous 
title is Emperor Wen 文 of Wei. After Cao Pi had taken the title of Emperor at the end 
of this year, Cao Cao his father was given posthumous title as Emperor Wu 武. 
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and Cao Pi and his ministers were astute enough to nullify the opposition.5 
Nevertheless, the period of [411] transition in a warlord state, from the rule 
of an active man with celebrated achievements to that of his largely untried 
heir, introduced a period when the new chieftain would look to confirm his 
authority by ritual display rather than by political or military risk.6 
 The continued formal subservience of Sun Quan to the government of 
Wei, therefore, served the interests of both parties. Cao Pi gained the prestige 
of recognition from an outside power, and Sun Quan gained the benevolent 
neutrality of his most powerful potential enemy. At the time he dispatched 
Guan Yu's head to Cao Cao he also returned the prisoner Zhu Guang, former 
Administrator of Lujiang who had been captured at the storming of Huan in 
214, and he sent an emissary with tribute and a mission to purchase horses. 
Some months later, when Cao Pi had come to power, he again sent various 
items of tribute. He did not, however, seek to confirm the relationship by 
sending any hostages, nor did he make any territorial concessions. 
 In the tenth month of this year, on 11 December 220, Cao Pi took the 
final step in the establishment of his dynasty, receiving the abdication of 
Emperor Xian of Han and proclaiming himself first Emperor of Wei. The 
ceremony took place at the city of Xu, which was now, to match a prophesy, 
renamed Xuchang, "Xu Rising."7[412] 
 Sun Quan was reserved on the matter, but he accepted the end of Han 
and he made no protest or break with the Wei. In particular, he accepted the 
new reign title proclaimed by Cao Pi, and he continued to send tribute gifts 
as required.8 
                                               
5 On the possibility of Cao Zhi's succession to Cao Cao, see, for example, ZZTJ 
68:2150-52; deC, Establish Peace, 511-514. On Cao Zhang's interest in the succession, 
see ZZTJ 69:2176; Fang, Chronicle I, 2 and 29-20. The biographies of Cao Zhi and of 
Cao Zhang are in SGZ 19:557-76 and 555-57. 
6 ZZTJ 69:2175-77; Fang, Chronicle I, 1-4 and 18-23, describes some of the events and 
discussions which attended the succession of Cao Pi. Among other incidents, there was 
a disturbance among the troops at the capital, and there was a purge of the political 
adherents of Cao Zhi, while Cao Zhi himself was demoted. See also SGZ 15:481-82 
and PC note 2 quoting Wei lue. 
7 HHS 9:390, SGZ 2:62, ZZTJ 69:2182; Fang, Chronicle I, 36-39, and see Leban, 
"Managing heaven's mandate," which discusses the various prophecies used to justify 
the abdication and accession. On the change of the name of Xu city to Xuchang, which 
took place in the following year (SGZ 2:77), see also note 12 to Chapter Two, and cf. 
the name of the capital city of Wuchang established by Sun Quan, note 12 below. 
8 Late in 221 Cao Pi made what was regarded as an excessive demand for exotic tribute 
items; Sun Quan sent them nonetheless: SGZ 47/Wu 2:1124 PC note 6 quoting 
Jiangbiao zhuan; Fang, Chronicle I, 59-60 and 89-90. 
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 In the summer of the following year, on 15 May 221, Liu Bei responded 
to Cao Pi's challenge, and had himself proclaimed Emperor at Chengdu.9 By 
this time, moreover, he had prepared his armies for the revenge attack 
against Sun Quan, and in the autumn he embarked on that campaign. 
 In military terms, this period of eighteen months, through 220 and the 
first half of 221, had been quiet. In the autumn of 220, Liu Bei's general in 
the west of present-day Hubei, Meng Da, changed sides to join the Wei. He 
had felt under criticism for failure to assist Guan Yu in the fatal campaign the 
year before, and he had quarrelled with his supervisor Liu Feng, adoptive son 
of Liu Bei. Though some regarded him as a turncoat, Meng Da was given 
command as Administrator of the new commandery of Xincheng for Wei, 
which claimed the whole region of present-day Hubei and incorporated the 
smaller commanderies of Fangling, Shangyong and Xicheng. Soon 
afterwards, under Meng Da's influence, the renegade Shen Dan, who had 
been Administrator of Shangyong first under Cao Cao and then under Liu 
Bei, turned back to his first allegiance. Liu Feng was driven away and 
returned to Chengdu. It was suggested by Zhuge Liang that Liu Feng might 
cause difficulty for the succession of Liu Shan, Liu Bei's own young son and 
heir – Liu Feng had evidently outlived his usefulness and he was ordered to 
commit suicide.10[413] 
 This activity on his north-western frontier did not concern Sun Quan 
directly, and was a fairly natural adjustment after the destruction of Guan 
Yu.11 It did, however, ensure that Liu Bei's only route of access to Jing 
province was along the narrow line of the Yangzi Gorges. 
 Sun Quan had remained in residence in Jing province, and in 221 he 
established his second capital, at E city, which he renamed Wuchang. By the 
end of autumn, the city had been provided with defensive walls, while a 
                                               
9 SGZ 32/Shu 2:887-890. 
10 SGZ 40/Shu 10:991-94. 
  Liu Shan was seventeen sui when he succeeded his father Liu Bei in 223, so in 220 
he was thirteen years old by Western reckoning. On the earlier history of Liu Bei's 
family, and the adoption of Liu Feng, see note 8 to Chapter Five. 
  Liu Bei at this time had two younger sons, Liu Yong and Liu Li, born to 
concubines. Both received royal titles: SGZ 32/Shu 2:890 and SGZ 34/Shu 4:907 and 
908, which give their biographies. 
11 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1121, notes that some five thousand households came south from the 
counties of Yin, Zan, Zhuyang, Shandu and Zhonglu, being the northern part of Nan 
commandery and the southwestern part of Nanyang, along the Han River, to settle 
under Sun Quan's control. It does not appear, however, that Sun Quan actually gained 
territory, as opposed to population, from this incident. More probably, the evacuation, 
which was initiated by the surrender of the local Wei commander, Mei Fu, is indication 
of a developing no-man's land along that frontier. 
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special commandery was established to control the length of the Yangzi from 
the junction with the Han east to the region of the Pengli Lake. This new 
capital district extended across the borders of the two Han provinces 
controlled by Sun Quan, and gave him a central site of communications both 
east and west.12[414] 
 In the latter months of 221, as Liu Bei's expedition gathered way on its 
approach down the Yangzi, Sun Quan's officer Zhuge Jin sent a letter urging 
him to turn back, and Sun Quan too made offers of peace.13 Several of Liu 
Bei's advisers had doubts about the wisdom of the enterprise and its likely 
success, but no arguments would dissuade him, and certainly Sun Quan was 
offering no satisfaction or recompense for the past. 
 His more important exchange of missions was with the north. In the 
autumn of 221, he presented a most obsequious memorial, confirming 
himself as a subject of Wei, and he also sent the general Yu Jin and other 
prisoners of war who had surrendered to Guan Yu in the campaign about 
Xiangyang. There was some debate at Cao Pi's court whether it would be 
possible to reject the submission of Sun Quan, which was obviously forced 
by the circumstances of Liu Bei's attack, and instead join with Liu Bei to 
eliminate Sun Quan.14 Such a campaign, however, would clearly have 
entailed risks, and it was strongly argued that rejection of a peaceable 
suppliant would be a serious political error, destroying the air of credibility 
and natural authority which the regime was seeking to establish. The 
obviously enforced abdication of Han, natural and inevitable as it might 
appear in terms of Realpolitik, had nevertheless put a strain upon the [415] 
                                               
12 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1121. 
  The name of Wuchang 武昌, which may be rendered "Military Prosperity," appears 
thus for the first time in Chinese history. It should be noted, however, that Sun Quan's 
city was not at the same place as its modern namesake, by the junction of the Han 
River with the Yangzi, where it forms part of the conurbation of Wuhan; it lay some 
eighty kilometres downstream, at the city which has been renamed Echeng. 
13 SGZ 32/Shu 2:890; SGZ 52/Wu 7:1232-33. 
  Zhuge Jin was at this time Sun Quan's Administrator of Nan commandery, with 
headquarters at Gong'an, a position he had taken over after the death of Lü Meng. 
Some suggested he might be planning private contact and surrender to Liu Bei, but Sun 
Quan denied any such possibility, and his commander Lu Xun agreed. See also Fang, 
Chronicle I, 50-52 and 74-75. 
14 On this debate, see in particular the biography of Liu Ye, SGZ 14:446 and 447 PC 
quoting the Fuzi; Fang, Chronicle I, 52-53 and 79-81. 
  Liu Ye was a man from Jiujiang commandery who had joined the service of Liu 
Xun and attempted to warn him against Sun Ce's trickery in 199 (Chapter Three at 
189). He then went to Cao Cao, and held high rank and favour under Cao Pi. On this 
occasion, however, his advice was over-ruled. 
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acceptance of the new regime; a second crisis of good faith might have 
opened up even more serious tensions. 
 So a return embassy was sent to Sun Quan, granting him the Nine 
Distinctions, and also awarding him the title King of Wu. The embassy 
arrived in the eleventh month, being December of 221, though we have, 
curiously, no exact date for the ceremony. Certainly it was a triumph for Sun 
Quan, but its chief importance lay not in the formalities of rank but rather in 
the confirmation of political agreement with Cao Pi. Sun Quan had obtained 
neutrality from the north; and in exchange, by accepting this royal honour 
from the Wei he had confirmed his allegiance and ended any possibility that 
he could claim to act in future as supporter and champion of displaced 
Han.15[416>418] 
                                               
15 Sun Ce had held the title Marquis of Wu at the time of his death. This, however, is the 
first occasion Sun Quan was associated in title with the region. He had formerly been 
Marquis of Nanchang, capital of Yuzhang, under the auspices of the now demised Han 
dynasty: note 1 above. 
  The marquisate of Wu, of course, took its name from the county; the kingdom from 
that of the commandery. Hereafter, I refer on occasion to the whole state of Sun Quan 
by the name of Wu. 
  The honour of the Nine Distinctions is described in Bohu tong 20, translated by 
Tjan, White Tiger Discussions II, 504-509, and is discussed also in his Introduction, in 
the first volume of the work, at 25-29 and 37-39. 
  The Nine Distinctions had earlier been awarded to Wang Mang in 5 AD, a few 
years before he took the throne for himself in AD 9, and they were granted to Cao Cao 
at the time of his enfeoffment as Duke of Wei in 213. The edict of award to Wang 
Mang is cited in HS 99A:4074-75, and is translated by Dubs, HFHD III, 208-210. The 
edict of award to Cao Cao appears in SGZ 1:39, which text is translated by Tjan, White 
Tiger Discussions I, 26-27. 
  The edict of award to Sun Quan appears in SGZ 47/Wu 2:1122, and lists the Nine 
Distinctions, with the reason for each grant, as follows: 
1 Because you have given peace and comfort to the southeast and granted government to 
the lands beyond the Yangzi, so that the people may follow their occupations in peace 
and none of them go astray; therefore we grant you the Great Carriage and the War 
Carriage, one of each, with Two Black Stallions. 
2 You have paid attention to the revenues of the state and you have encouraged farming, 
so that the granaries and storehouses are filled to completion; therefore we grant you 
the Clothes and Bonnets of Honour, with Red Slippers to match. 
3 You reform the people by your virtue, and ceremony and teaching are brought to effect; 
therefore we grant you Suspended Musical Instruments to be displayed in your palace. 
4 You have propagated good customs among the people, and by your moral influence 
you have brought the many tribes of the Yue to submit; therefore we grant you the right 
to dwell behind Vermilion Doors. 
5 You have made best use of your talents and good judgement, and you give 
appointments to just and worthy men; therefore we grant you the right to ascend the 
Inner Staircase. 
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6 Your loyalty and bravery are displayed together, and you clear away and eliminate evil 
and vice; therefore we grant you One Hundred Warriors Rapid as Tigers. 
7 You have shown your authority far and wide, you have displayed your power in Jing 
and the south, you destroy and exterminate criminals and wrong-doers, and the caitiffs 
are taken; therefore we grant you the Ceremonial Axe and the Battle Axe, one of each. 
8 You have given good government and peace within your territory, and your valour and 
good faith are shown abroad; therefore we grant you One Scarlet Bow with One 
Hundred Scarlet Arrows and Ten Black Bows with One Thousand Black Arrows. 
9 You have taken loyalty and respect as the basis for your conduct, and generosity and 
diligence are your virtues; therefore we grant you One Goblet of the Black Millet 
Herb-flavoured Liquor, with a Jade Libation Cup to match. 
 Predictably, this series of virtues and achievements, with associated honours, follows 
the pattern of the edict of award for Cao Cao eight years earlier, and in general terms, 
behind the varied and flowery rhetoric, one may see some relation between the various 
virtues and achievements and the grant of distinction which matches it. Thus peaceful 
government is rewarded by the Carriages and Horses; prosperous government is 
rewarded by Garments of Honour; reform and ceremony by Musical Instruments; 
extension of moral civilisation by the Vermilion Door; the appointment of good 
officials by the Inner Staircase. Thereafter, the sixth, seventh and eighth Distinctions 
are granted for different aspects of military prowess; and, finally, personal virtue is 
rewarded with the Ceremonial Liquor and the Libation Cup. For some further 
discussion, see Tjan, White Tiger Discussions I, 27-29, and II, 504-509. 
  In theory, it appears the Nine Distinctions could be awarded individually to a feudal 
lord who had established his achievements or virtues in one field or another. Again in 
theory, the Distinctions were particular privileges granted by an imperial ruler to his 
subordinate: the most obvious is the Warriors Rapid as Tigers, which was the name of a 
regular unit of the imperial guards of Han (e.g. Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 24 and 27); 
the point of the sixth Distinction was that a subordinate ruler was granted the right to a 
body-guard of that name. 
  Cao Cao in 213 had been awarded three hundred such warriors by the Han dynasty, 
but Sun Quan was given the right to only one hundred by Cao Pi. The other notable 
difference between the entitlements listed in the two edicts is in the third grant: Cao 
Cao received Suspended Musical Instruments and Six Rows of Dancers; Sun Quan 
received only the Musical Instruments. 
  As we have seen, however, the only other men recorded as receiving the Nine 
Distinctions were Wang Mang and Cao Cao. Both received them in full, and in each 
case the grant proved a preliminary to the seizure of full power soon afterwards. Cao Pi 
was certainly showing Sun Quan high honour. 
  In the same edict, besides the Nine Distinctions, and the seal, tassel and imperial 
edict of enfeoffment as King of Wu, Sun Quan was given a variety of other honours. 
These included golden tiger tallies from the first grade to the fifth, and the left side of 
bamboo message tallies from the first grade to the tenth. In symbol of his sovereign 
status in the east, Sun Quan was awarded Green Soil (靑土 qing du) from the eastern 
side of the imperial Altar to the Gods of the Soils and Grains (社稷 sheji), wrapped in 
cloth of the baimao 白茅 "white rushes" plant. (On this ritual in Later Han, see the Du 
duan of Cai Yong, 12a-b, discussed by Mansvelt Beck, Treatises, 81, and Bielenstein, 
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 Though Liu Bei had embarked on his campaign against Sun Quan in the 
seventh month of 221, soon after his proclamation as Emperor, it was some 
time before his troops were readied for the invasion. Apart from the 
problems of concentrating such a major expeditionary force for advance 
along the narrow defile of the Yangzi Gorges, his arrangements received an 
early set-back when Zhang Fei, his senior general and sworn brother to Liu 
Bei and Guan Yu, was killed by renegades who then fled to Sun Quan.16 By 
the winter, however, an army claimed to number forty thousand men had 
been brought into position and prepared for the offensive.17 
 Sun Quan's most westerly outpost was at Wu county, where the 
mountain range is cut by the great Wu Gorge on the Yangzi. Behind that, the 
main frontier force was at Zigui, near the present-day city of that name and 
just inside the last main gorge, the Xiling Xia. In anticipation of the attack, 
this territory had been re-organised as the commandery of Guling, and Pan 
Zhang, the man who had been responsible for the killing of Guan Yu, was 
appointed Administrator and military commander of this first line of 
defence.18[419] 
                                                                                                                        
Lo-yang, 56: the account of a royal enfeoffment in HHS 95/5:3120-21, however, has no 
mention of the presentation of soil.) 
  In somewhat more practical, as opposed to purely symbolic and ritualistic terms, 
Sun Quan was granted appointment as General-in-Chief with credentials to govern Jiao 
province, and authority over the affairs (領… 事 ling ... shi) of the Governor of Jing 
province. In the fifth month of the following year, moreover, a special edict of Cao Pi's 
government rearranged the provincial borders of Han in this region: the commanderies 
south of the Yangzi in Jing province and in Yang province, being those held by Sun 
Quan, were grouped under a new Jing province; the northern part of Jing province, 
being that controlled by Wei, was renamed Ying province, and the northern part of 
Yang province continued under that name. The change was nominal, and was not 
retained for long, but it did mean Cao Pi was formally confirming Sun Quan's authority 
in all the territory that he controlled: SGZ 2:80, and note 36 below. 
16 SGZ 36/Shu 6:944; Fang, Chronicle I, 49-50 and 73-74. 
17 The figures of forty thousand men for the army of Liu Bei, and fifty thousand for the 
defence forces under Lu Xun (see below), are probably exaggerated. We may recall, 
however, the discussion of Zhou Yu with Sun Quan on the eve of the Red Cliffs 
campaign, when Cao Cao was seriously credited with more than a hundred thousand 
men, and Zhou Yu asked for fifty thousand men with which to oppose him. Armies at 
that time could be large, though how many of the troops were effective soldiers is 
another question. On this occasion, I suspect the numbers of men engaged may have 
been as many as half those we are told of: between twenty and twenty-five thousand on 
either side. 
18 There is a map of the campaign in Zhongguo shi gao ditu ji, 48 The chief accounts are 
in the biography/annals of Liu Bei, SGZ 32/Shu 2:890, and in the biography of Lu Xun, 
SGZ 58/Wu 13:1346-48. Much of the material is translated in Fang, Chronicle I, 49-
124. 
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 Toward the end of 221, Liu Bei launched his first attack. Sun Quan's 
local commanders were defeated, and Pan Zhang was driven back. Liu Bei's 
advance guard occupied Zigui, and his agents made contact with the non-
Chinese people of Wuling commandery, in the hill country south of the 
Yangzi, encouraging them to join forces against Sun Quan. 
 To deal with the threat, Sun Quan appointed Lu Xun as chief of 
operations, bearing the Staff of Authority, with fifty thousand troops under 
his command. Zhuge Jin, as general and Administrator of Nan commandery 
based on Gong'an, appears to have been commander of reserves and lines of 
communications.19 Lu Xun's own headquarters were in the newly-established 
Yidu commandery, whose capital was at Yidao, present-day Yidu, but the 
main concentration point of his forces was on the northern bank of the 
Yangzi, between Yidao and Yiling county, further upstream by present-day 
Yichang. As he remarked in a report to Sun Quan, 
Yiling is the vital strategic point, the key defence post on this frontier. It 
is easy to take it, and equally easy to lose it; and if we lose it there is no 
question of just one commandery; the whole of Jing province will be at 
risk.20 
For the time being Lu Xun was prepared to allow Liu Bei the region 
upstream about Wu and Zigui; the critical battle would come when Liu Bei 
sought to break out from that territory. 
 In the first month of spring in 222, Liu Bei arrived to take command at 
Zigui. His army was arranged in divisions, with an advance guard and a main 
body, but Liu Bei, now just over sixty years old, decided the strategy of the 
campaign, and gave his orders in person. In the second month he led the 
greater part of his forces [420] along the south of the Yangzi towards Yidao, 
while a secondary troop under the general Huang Quan advanced in parallel 
on the northern bank against Yiling. 
 Lu Xun was at this time in his late thirties. He had gained considerable 
experience, as we have seen, in the campaigns to develop Yang province, he 
had been recommended by Lü Meng as his deputy when plans were being 
made against Guan Yu, and he had served with distinction in that campaign.21 
On the other hand, he had not held a command of such responsibility before, 
                                                                                                                        
  SGZ 32 here refers to Lu Xun as Lu Yi 議; Yi was Lu Xun's original personal name: 
SGZ 58:1343. 
  The Staff of Authority (節 jie) delegated power of life and death to a senior official, 
without prior reference to the sovereign. 
19 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1232. 
20 SGZ 58/Wu 13:1346; Fang, Chronicle I, 101. 
21 Chapters Five and Six. 
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while the facts that he was man of good gentry family, was married to the 
daughter of Sun Ce and was a long-time personal adviser to Sun Quan, did 
not necessarily guarantee his ability as a high-level commander. The generals 
under his orders included a number of men with far longer service: among 
them, for example, were Han Dang, who had served Sun Jian on his earliest 
campaigns and joined Sun Ce when he first crossed the Yangzi; and Zhu 
Ran, Pan Zhang and Xu Sheng, all of whom had been with Sun Quan since 
the earliest days. Any of these men might hold themselves at least equal to 
Lu Xun in experience and competence, and they were not necessarily a band 
of loyal brothers.22 
 In this respect, Sun Quan had a problem among his officers. Both Lü 
Meng and Jiang Qin had died of illness at the time of the attack against Guan 
Yu in 219, and it was not easy to find a leader who had the ability to fight 
and the personal authority to [421] control his subordinates. There had been 
similar trouble with the general Zhou Tai, a brave soldier who was given 
command of the defences about Ruxu after Cao Cao's attack in 216. At that 
time, Zhu Ran and Xu Sheng were also under his orders, but they made 
considerable difficulties, and it required personal intervention by Sun Quan 
to restore some measure of co-operation and proper discipline. Zhou Tai 
remained at that post some time longer, but he never took command on 
active service.23 
 Lu Xun, therefore, had rivals and critics among his officers, and it is a 
measure of his ability and Sun Quan's good fortune that he was able to hold 
                                               
22 The biographies of Han Dang, Pan Zhang and Xu Sheng are in SGZ 55/Wu 10:1285-
86, 1299-130, and 1298-99. The biography of Zhu Ran is in SGZ 56/Wu 11:1305-08. 
  After the death of Lü Meng, Zhu Ran had been granted the Staff of Authority and 
given command of the defences of Jiangling, the capital of Nan commandery under 
Han. Lu Xun's appointment, therefore, represented a slight demotion for him. 
23 The biography of Zhou Tai is in SGZ 55/Wu 10:1287-88. At 1288 we are told how Zhu 
Ran, Xu Sheng and others were all his subordinate commanders, but none would 
accept his authority. 
  Sun Quan made a special tour of inspection to the Ruxu fortress and he called all 
his officers and held a great banquet. He himself brought wine before Zhou Tai, and he 
had him open up his robes and pointed to the marks of his old wounds, asking him how 
he had come by each one. 
  Zhou Tai replied with the story of each of those old engagements. When he has 
finished, Sun Quan told him to do his clothing up again, and they made merry all the 
rest of the night. Next morning, he sent a messenger to grant him an imperial umbrella. 
From that time on, Xu Sheng and the others all accepted Zhou Tai's authority. 
  A similar story, quoted from Jiangbiao zhuan by PC note 1, tells how Sun Quan 
spoke to Zhou Tai with the utmost affection, using his intimate style, and describing 
him as a most worthy minister of Wu. He awarded him a special escort, and a band of 
drums and horns. See also deC, Establish Peace, 509-510. 
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his men together against an experienced and aggressive enemy.24 Despite 
various urgings to action, Lu Xun insisted upon the defensive, and he was 
primarily concerned to keep his army intact and to force caution upon Liu 
Bei. Through spring and summer, though others grew impatient, Lu Xun 
[422] restricted his actions to a minimum, seeking only to prevent Liu Bei 
from a notable break-through, and preventing him from concentrating his 
forces at any point. The invader was rather shepherded than opposed 
outright. 
 With the long supply route of the Yangzi behind him, and the army of Lu 
Xun uncommitted in front, Liu Bei was compelled to move slowly, and he 
advanced his forces through a series of encampments and local defence 
positions along the high ground either side of the river. By the end of 
summer 222, his northern force under Huang Quan had engaged the defences 
of Yiling, and an advanced party on the south was besieging the city of 
Yidao, where the garrison was commanded by Sun Huan.25 Liu Bei had his 
headquarters at the village of Xiaoting, and he now sent troops south to 
maintain contact with the non-Chinese people of Wuling, granting them 
insignia of office and presents of gold and silk. 
 Lu Xun had steadily refused engagement. When his generals protested, 
he explained that Liu Bei had all advantage in the hills, and even on open 
ground he was not yet prepared to take the risk of battle – too much 
depended on the outcome. When his advisers urged him to rescue Sun Huan 
in Yidao, he argued there was yet no need, and Sun Huan was not in 
immediate danger. When Liu Bei sought to entice him by sending a few 
thousand men to set up camp in open ground, Lu Xun suspected a trap; and 
when he saw [423] the ruse was unsuccessful Liu Bei did indeed bring out 
the reinforcements which he had held in reserve as an ambush. 
 It can hardly have been easy for Lu Xun to hold back when all his 
advisers were looking for action. The story may be no more than a cliché of 
                                               
24 On at least one occasion, Lu Xun had to confront his subordinates and challenge them 
to defy the authority he had been given: SGZ 58/Wu 13:1347-48; Fang, Chronicle I, 
103 and 121. 
25 The greater part of the biography of Sun Huan, SGZ 51/Wu 6:1217, describes his 
engagement against Liu Bei. He was at that time twenty-five sui, and held junior rank 
as General of the Household Who Gives Tranquillity to the East. 
  Sun Huan was the second son of Sun He, a cousin of Sun Ce by the female line 
who had been adopted into the Sun surname: note 6 to Chapter Three. 
  SGZ 58/Wu 13:1347, says that Lu Xun was urged to move to the rescue of Sun 
Huan because he was a member of the royal family, while Sun Huan also expected 
stronger support at the time. Later, however, he congratulated Lu Xun on his planning. 
See also Fang, Chronicle I, 102-103 and 120. 
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the solitary hero, but there is no evidence in any other biography that Lu Xun 
had support in council for this Fabian strategy. Sun Quan, however, appears 
to have had no lack of confidence. The conquest of Hanzhong commandery 
by Liu Bei in 219 had been made possible by the mistaken aggression of Cao 
Cao's general Xiahou Yuan, and it is likely that Sun Quan and his 
commander had heard something of that campaign. So it was Lu Xun's 
intention to wait out Liu Bei's initial attack, and to maintain his men in 
readiness for the time when, as he said, Liu Bei had been standing a long 
time without any obvious success, when his troops were fatigued and their 
spirits were down, and Liu Bei had lost concentration.26 Sun Quan was 
prepared to trust his judgement. 
 In the sixth month, Lu Xun turned at last to the attack. The gradual 
advance through the hills country had separated Liu Bei from his fleet, and 
his position was now extended along either side of the Yangzi, while the 
chain of encampments he had established was vulnerable to attack from the 
flank. A first, minor, sortie by Lu Xun was unsuccessful, and may rather have 
been intended as a feint. Then, however, ignoring the threats which Liu Bei 
had applied against the garrisons at Yiling and Yidao, Lu Xun struck directly 
at his enemy's main position near Xiaoting. Each of the soldiers of Wu was 
ordered to carry a bundle of rushes, to burn the palisades of the various 
camps: attack with fire, which had worked so well on the water at the Red 
Cliffs, here proved its worth on land.[424] 
 Driven from his position, Liu Bei retreated to higher ground in the hope 
of regrouping, but the damage was done. Lu Xun's attacks isolated his 
divisions and rendered his army uncontrollable. Several units were 
surrounded and overrun, others were compelled to retreat in haste and were 
caught and destroyed piecemeal.27 As a measure of the speed with which Liu 
Bei's position collapsed, we may observe that his whole northern army under 
the general Huang Quan, which had been engaged against Yiling city, was 
completely cut off, so that Huang Quan and all his men were compelled to 
abandon the field and march north to surrender to neutral Wei.28 In Wuling 
                                               
26 SGZ 58/Wu 13:1346; Fang, Chronicle I, 101 and 118. 
27 SGZ 58/Wu 13:1347 says that two of Liu Bei's generals were killed, together with the 
barbarian (胡 hu) chieftain Shamoke, while several other leaders surrendered. 
  The Ji-Han fuchen zan of Yang Xi, quoted in SGZ 45/Shu 15 at 1088-89 and 1089-
90, tells of the heroic deaths of Fu Yong and Cheng Ji. There is parallel text in 
Huayang guo zhi 6:13a, and ZZTJ 69:2203-04; Fang, Chronicle I, 102-103 and 118-
120. 
28 SGZ 43/Shu 13:1044, the biography of Huang Quan. 
  Huang Quan was well-treated and rose to high favour in the state of Wei. One of his 
sons, Huang Yong, accompanied him; but his wife and the rest of his family remained 
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commandery, south of the battle, the tribesmen abandoned the losing side, 
and Liu Bei's agent Ma Liang was killed.29 
Not all of Liu Bei's army was destroyed, and great numbers escaped, but 
only at the cost of equipment, boats and baggage, and it was little more than 
a disorganised rabble which regained the territory of Yi province. It is said 
that Liu Bei was almost been captured, but he re-established his headquarters 
at Bodi "White Emperor" city [425] in Yufu county. The name of the county 
was changed to Yongan "Perpetual Peace," and Liu Bei stayed there for the 
remainder of his life.30 
Liu Bei's loyal general Zhao Yun came up with reinforcements to hold 
the frontier at that point and, rather touchingly, the biography of Liu Bei 
claims that when Sun Quan heard Liu Bei had re-gathered his forces at Bodi, 
he was filled with the utmost fear, and hastily sent envoys to ask for peace.31 
Little, indeed, could be further from the truth. There was no longer any threat 
from Liu Bei to Sun Quan's position in Jing province, and some of Sun 
Quan's more ambitious generals were urging that they should renew the 
attack and pursue Liu Bei the whole length of the Gorges into Yi province. 
Even on its own terms this would have been a dangerous venture, but the 
critical reason for halting the campaign at this stage was the growing threat 
from the north. Cao Pi was losing patience with Sun Quan's diplomatic 
pretences, and the armies of Wu had now to prepare quickly for defence on 
the northern front. 
 
Security in the north: 
With the full defeat of Liu Bei in the late summer and early autumn of 222, 
Sun Quan had obtained all possible benefit from his formal submission to 
Cao Pi and the empire of Wei, and he wasted little time in breaking that 
connection. It had never been popular with his officers, and even at the time 
of his enfeoffment as King of Wu there had been those who argued against 
accepting such a rank from the usurping Emperor, and suggested that Sun 
Quan should [426>427] take some independent title as Lord of Nine 
Provinces, claiming hegemony in support of Han.32 This was, as we have 
                                                                                                                        
in Shu, where his other son, Huang Chong, later died in battle against Wei: Fang, 
Chronicle II, 432-433. 
29 The biography of Ma Liang is in SGZ 39/Shu 9:982-83. He was a man from the 
Xiangyang region, an associate of Zhuge Liang, who had been appointed to the high 
court office of Palace Attendant when Liu Bei claimed the imperial title. 
30 SGZ 36/Shu 6:950 PC note 1 quoting Zhao Yun biezhuan. 
31 SGZ 32/Shu 2:890. 
32 For example SGZ 47/Wu 2:1123 PC note 3 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. The phrase 
Jiuzhou 九州 "Nine Provinces" may be understood here as referring to the whole 
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discussed, quite inappropriate and impractical in the circumstances, and the 
submission to Cao Pi was an essential preparation for dealing with Liu Bei. 
On the other hand, the alliance with the north was always a matter of 
expediency, and there seems no probability that Sun Quan intended it to last 
any longer than it needed. 
 The destruction of Liu Bei left Sun Quan with a surprisingly free hand, 
and it is unlikely that anyone at the time had expected such a triumph. Very 
probably, Cao Pi had hoped that his two major enemies would remain 
embroiled in the south, and he would be able to take advantage of Liu Bei's 
preoccupations by making an attack upon him in the west, while at the same 
time he could blackmail Sun Quan with the threat of intervention upon one 
side or the other. The speed of events, however, appears to have taken the 
rivals by surprise,33 and Sun Quan was able to repudiate the alliance within 
nine months of its agreement. 
 The break proved remarkably easy, for Sun Quan had not committed any 
hostages to the court of Cao Pi. His eldest son, Sun Deng, whom he had 
named as his Heir to the kingdom of Wu, was born in 209, and was thus 
about twelve or thirteen years old by Western reckoning. At the time Sun 
Quan was made a king, Cao Pi sought also to enfeoff Sun Deng as a marquis 
and appoint him a General of the Household, honours which [428] evidently 
implied his attendance at court in the north. Sun Quan sent a letter of 
apology, saying that his son was too young and delicate to be sent away from 
home, and for the time being Cao Pi did not press the matter. 
 The question was raised at the occasion of other embassies in the 
following months, but Sun Quan continued to temporise. Cao Pi appears to 
have believed the assurances, and he evidently considered that he could 
afford to wait. In the autumn of 222, however, realising that Sun Quan's 
critical need for alliance was passing, Cao Pi attempted to force the issue, 
and he sent a special embassy to the court of Wu to extract a formal covenant 
of agreement, and to obtain Sun Deng as hostage. Sun Quan "politely refused 
to receive the envoys."34 
                                                                                                                        
empire, the traditional nine regions of classical times, not just a majority of the 
administrative units under Han. The expression appears also, for example, in the title of 
the historical work Jiuzhou chunqiu, compiled by Sima Biao. 
33 SGZ 2:80; Fang, Chronicle I, 104, tells how Cao Pi heard of the manner Liu Bei had 
extended his encampments through the hill country, and forecast his defeat. Even if the 
anecdote is true, it is doubtful anyone foresaw such a catastrophic rout of the invaders. 
34 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1123 and 1125; Fang, Chronicle I, 107. At 1126, however, we are told 
that even during the conflict which followed, Sun Quan and Cao Pi continued to 
negotiate and exchange embassies. The full and formal breach was not made until the 
following year: note 41 below. 
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Map 14: The northern frontier of Wu 
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This, of course, meant war, and war came very quickly. In the ninth month, 
Cao Pi gave orders for three armies to move south against the Yangzi. One, 
under Cao Zhen and Xiahou Shang, attacked Nan commandery and its 
capital Jiangling on the middle Yangzi, the other two were deployed along 
the lower Yangzi south of the Huai: Cao Ren against the fortress at Ruxu and 
Cao Xiu against Dongkou, or Dongpu kou, which was evidently another, 
lesser fortified harbour situated downstream in the neighbourhood of Sun 
Ce's old crossing place by Liyang city of Later Han 
 Sun Quan made one further attempt to avoid open conflict, sending a 
letter in humble language, and suggesting he might retire to Jiao province if 
that would appease Cao Pi's indignation. And he also sent a letter to Hao 
Zhou, who had formerly acted on [429] his behalf in Wei, suggesting that he 
would be interested in a marriage alliance between Sun Deng and a lady of 
the Cao clan.35 
 None of this, however, had more than the most marginal influence in 
delaying the attack. Cao Pi was determined to obtain the guarantee of a 
hostage: "When Sun Deng comes in the morning, I shall recall my troops in 
the evening of that same day." 
 At this ultimatum, surely not unexpected, in the tenth month, being early 
November of 222, Sun Quan declared his independence of Wei. He 
continued to call himself King of Wu, but he now proclaimed his own reign 
title of Huangwu and he confirmed his preparations for defence along the 
Yangzi.36 
                                               
35 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1126. 
  Hao Zhou was an officer of Yu Jin, who had been captured by Guan Yu at the 
fighting about Fan city in 219, and who was returned to the north by Sun Quan in 221. 
He had spoken most earnestly in Sun Quan's cause at the court of Wei, and guaranteed 
to Cao Pi that Sun Quan would fulfil his undertakings and send hostages. He was at 
one stage sent on an embassy to Sun Quan, but when the agreement came to nothing, 
Hao Zhou's career at court was ended. He does not, however, appear to have been 
punished for his mistaken advice. 
  The biography of Hao Zhou from Wei lue is quoted in SGZ 47/Wu 2:1127-29 note 
3; it contains an account of his correspondence with Sun Quan. 
36 Establishment of the calendar was the prerogative of an independent sovereign. In the 
following year, Sun Quan likewise proclaimed a different system of calculating days 
and months: SGZ 47/Wu 2:1129. On this, and on the significance of the reign-title 
Huangwu, see below at 450-453 and note 70. 
  In response to this declaration of independence, Cao Pi went back on the 
arrangement of provinces that he had declared earlier in the year, by which Sun Quan, 
as Governor of Jing province, had held authority in the commanderies south of the 
Yangzi. Ying province was abolished, and Yang province and Jing province were 
restored to the system of Han: SGZ 2:82 and cf. note 15 above; the practical effect, of 
course, was nil. 
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 A few weeks later, in the twelfth month, January of 223, Sun Quan 
completed his circular diplomatic coup by sending an envoy to Liu Bei's 
government of Shu-Han in Yi province. The embassy was [430] returned, 
and the two states renewed the alliance which had been broken by the attack 
on Guan Yu a little over three years before. 
 In military terms, Liu Bei was now of slight significance. His biography 
claims that the armies of Wu were afraid to attack him once he had re-
established himself at Bodi. Wu lu tells us, however, that when Liu Bei 
offered to bring troops to support Wu against the attack from Wei Lu Xun 
replied, somewhat unkindly, 
I am afraid that your army has still not recovered from the recent 
disaster. Now that you have sought and obtained peace, the most 
important thing for you to do is to restore your strength. This is no 
occasion to return to all-out war. 
 If you fail to make a proper assessment, but seek instead to collect 
again your scattered remnants and offer them once more at this great 
distance, then I fear you may not escape alive.37 
One must admire the diplomatic and military energy and skill which Sun 
Quan and Lu Xun had shown: in a little more than a year Sun Quan had 
acquired rank second only to an emperor, had defeated his immediate enemy, 
declared himself as an independent ruler, and then restored the defensive 
alliance which at least confirmed his former enemy's neutrality and could yet 
be developed further. In many respects he was now back on the path of 
policy which his former adviser Lu Su had recommended. In the intervening 
period, however, he had seized all of Jing province, humiliated Liu Bei, and 
out-manoeuvred both Cao Cao and Cao Pi. Honesty and good faith had been 
in short supply, but it was nonetheless a brilliant record against equally tough 
and unscrupulous opposition. 
 It now remained, of course, to hold the line of the Yangzi against the 
forces of the north, but this did not prove so difficult. The [431] advance by 
the armies of Wei was no mere show of strength, but Cao Pi and his advisers 
realised the odds were against them, and it is said that Cao Pi spent some 
anxious moments when he believed that Cao Xiu, in a fit of over-confidence, 
might commit his army on a raid across the river. His adviser Dong Zhao 
assured him he need have no such worry: even if Cao Xiu was hot-headed 
enough to court such disaster, his wiser subordinates would be well aware of 
the dangers and would refuse to support him. Cao Pi may have been re-
assured that Cao Xiu would not do anything rash, but there is nothing in the 
                                               
37 SGZ 58/Wu 13:1348 PC note 1 quoting Wu lu; Fang, Chronicle I, 110. Cf. note 31 
above. 
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record to suggest that anyone under his command had any confidence of the 
most limited success.38 
 In fact, Cao Xiu's army achieved very little. At an early stage of his 
attack there was a moment when a break-through appeared possible. A 
number of ships of the Wu fleet, commanded by Lü Fan, were caught by a 
violent storm and were driven against the bank held by Wei. Numbers of 
men were drowned or killed or captured, and there was a short period when 
the southerners' defences fell into disarray. Cao Xiu's army, however, could 
not follow up the success quickly, and by the time they did so further ships 
had come up with reinforcements. Cao Xiu sent his general Cang Ba with a 
storming party on light boats in an attempt to establish a beachhead by taking 
the small fortress of Xuling. They were caught and defeated, however, and 
the Wei gained no further success.39 
 Further upstream, at Ruxu, the defence was under the command of Zhu 
Huan. When the fortress held out, Cao Ren sent a naval detachment which 
sought to capture an island, Zhongzhou, where the defenders' wives and 
children were camped. The attack was defeated, [432] and the siege force 
about Ruxu burnt their camp and retreated.40 
 In many respects, the operations in Nan commandery were the most 
critical. As Cao Zhen and Xiahou Shang advanced to the south, Cao Pi 
moved to Wan city in Nanyang in order to be closer to the action. This, after 
all, was the region which had only lately come into the control of Sun Quan, 
the defences had already been pushed hard by Liu Bei, and despite the 
renewed agreement the men of Wu could not be entirely sure he might not 
join against them. 
 The danger point was at Jiangling, capital of the commandery on the 
northern bank of the Yangzi, and Sun Quan's Administrator there, Zhu Ran, 
was besieged through all the winter and spring. At one stage some of the 
frightened defenders planned to open the gates and surrender to the mercy of 
the enemy, but the plot was discovered and crushed. At another time, during 
a period of low water, the attackers managed to seize an island in the river, 
join it with pontoon bridges to their camps on the northern bank, and cut the 
defenders off from support and supplies. The position, however, was too 
                                               
38 SGZ 14:441, the biography of Dong Zhao. 
39 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1311, and SGZ 47/Wu 2:1126; Fang, Chronicle I, 133. 
40 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1312-13, the biography of Zhu Huan; Fang, Chronicle I, 149. 
  We are told here that the sickness particularly affected Cao Pi's army before 
Jiangling. SGZ 2:82, however, notes that there was a general epidemic in the late spring 
of 223, while SGZ 9:276, and SGZ 2:82 remark that Cao Ren, who had been 
commander of the attack against Ruxu, also died of illness at this time. 
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exposed for the Wei forces to maintain themselves in safety, and the Wu 
armies launched a counter-attack which recaptured the salient. At last, after 
six months there was sickness in the invaders' camp and they withdrew to the 
north. By the beginning of summer Cao Pi had returned to Luoyang.41[433] 
 The attack on Nan commandery and the middle Yangzi had shown the 
best potential for success, but Cao Pi did not attempt any further invasion 
along that front in future years. Jing province may have been less well 
attached to Sun Quan than his home territory in the east, but there were two 
difficulties which must have influenced the northern strategy. Firstly, there 
was the possibility of intervention from Shu in the west if the invaders 
proved too successful and became committed too thoroughly south of the 
Yangzi. Second, it does not seem that the naval strength of Wei, based upon 
the Han River fleet, could ever be effectively co-ordinated with operations 
on land. 
 At the time of the Red Cliffs, Cao Cao had already taken Jiangling, and 
he was able to advance to the east with a fleet and an army in combination. 
From a starting point as far north as Xiangyang, however, any fleet of Wei 
had to be based upon the Han River, and this could be of no assistance to 
land operations against Jiangling. On the other hand, if the army sought to 
accompany the fleet down the Han without first capturing Jiangling, their 
southern flank would be constantly exposed to attack. And though the Wei 
held an advanced position in the northern part of Jiangxia commandery, and 
might have contemplated an advance on that line, east of the Han, their 
communications would still have been exposed to the threat from Nan 
commandery in the west. The salient in Jiangxia was always a zone of 
defence for the Wei, never the starting point for an offensive.42[434] 
 The forces of the north, of course, were always at a disadvantage in river 
fighting, and it was extremely difficult for Cao Pi's men to match Sun Quan's 
in naval matters, whether by numbers or in skill. Downstream, as we shall 
see, Cao Pi did attempt to cope with this problem in attacks on Yang 
                                               
41 As a gloss to the successful defence by Zhu Ran, we may note the titles of the fiefs he 
was awarded. After the defeat of Liu Bei, he was made Marquis of Yongan, that is, of 
the renamed county in which Liu Bei had taken refuge. After the withdrawal of Cao Pi 
and his forces, however, the name of the fief was exchanged to Marquis of Dangyang, 
being the county territory in Nan commandery north towards Xiangyang: SGZ 56/Wu 
11:1306. The changed title demonstrated Sun Quan's defiance of Cao Pi, and also 
offered a belated courtesy to the restored alliance with Liu Bei. 
42 Early in 223, as Cao Zhen's army was advancing towards Jiangling, Sun Quan had 
ordered the fortification of "the hills of Jiangxia," almost certainly referring to outcrops 
of higher ground in the vicinity of Xiakou, at the junction of the Han with the Yangzi, 
present-day Wuhan: SGZ 47/Wu 2:1129 and SGZJJ 25b. 
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province. In Jing province, however, he was faced with the final, 
insuperable, difficulty of the marsh-land which extended over much of the 
frontier. The marshes were an obstacle to any efficient manoeuvre by army 
or navy, and there is considerable evidence that they also harboured disease 
which could be extremely damaging to warriors from the dryer lands of the 
north. 
 Both Cao Cao in 208 and Cao Pi in 223 had seen their armies affected 
by sickness and, though the history does not specifically say so, this may 
well have been a critical consideration in Cao Pi's decision to concentrate in 
future upon the eastern section of the frontier, south of the Huai, rather than 
risking his men in the ill-drained wilderness about the lower reaches of the 
Han. 
 In the fourth month of 223, Liu Bei died at Bodi, aged in his early 
sixties. His son Liu Shan, sixteen years old by Western reckoning, succeeded 
him, but real power in the state was held by Zhuge Liang. 
 Sun Quan, not unreasonably, was doubtful of the stability of the new 
regime in the west. By the winter, however, Zhuge Liang had established his 
authority, and his envoy Deng Zhi, originally from Nanyang commandery, 
persuaded Sun Quan that the new regime was secure. Sun Quan gave Lu Xun 
plenipotentiary authority to deal with Zhuge Liang and the government of 
Shu, and alliance against Wei was confirmed and [435] maintained 
thereafter, with embassies exchanged at intervals by either side.43 
 In the summer of 223, Sun Quan's general He Qi attacked and 
eliminated an outpost of Wei in the new commandery territory of Qichun, on 
the southern slopes of the Dabie Shan,44 but for the next twelve months the 
                                               
43 SGZ 58/Wu 13:1348 and SGZ 47/Wu 2:1130 and 1131 PC note 4 quoting Wu li. It 
appears to have been at this time, after the death of Liu Bei and the renewed agreement 
with the government of Shu under the regency of Zhuge Liang, that Sun Quan made 
the final break with Cao Pi: cf. note 34 above. 
44 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1130, and SGZ 60/Wu 15:1380. 
  The Administrator of Qichun was Jin Zong, a former officer of Sun Quan who had 
deserted and joined the Wei. It appears he was given the commandery appointment at 
this time, in the hill country of the Dabie Shan on the border region between Lujiang 
and Jiangxia, so that he could disturb the communications routes along the Yangzi and 
across that river to the south. 
  There is evidence that Qichun commandery had been established a few years 
earlier, presumably on the basis of the county of that name in Jiangxia commandery of 
Later Han, but the territory had been abandoned by Cao Cao at the time of his 
withdrawal in 213: SGZ 47/Wu 2:1118. From this time, after the defeat of Jin Zong's 
infiltration, the territory was held by Wu. 
  SGZ 60 observes that one of the subordinate commanders in He Qi's attack on 
Qichun was Mi Fang, the erstwhile officer of Guan Yu who had surrendered Jiangling 
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northern front remained quiet. In the autumn of 224, however, Cao Pi 
embarked on a strategic program against the lower Yangzi. Using tributary 
rivers of the Huai, he brought ships and men from Xuchang to Shouchun and 
then southeast to Guangling, on the northern bank of the estuary opposite 
Jianye, present-day Nanjing. 
 In the past, attacks from the north had been launched further upstream, 
on the narrower reaches by Ruxu or Liyang. On this occasion, Cao Pi was 
operating in an area where the river was significantly wider, but he hoped the 
ships he brought with him [436] might be enough to establish local 
supremacy and support an invasion force. It is possible that this was no more 
than a reconnaissance in strength, for the river was at its height with the 
autumn floods. The Wei forces, however, evidently gained some surprise, for 
defences in that area were weak. A local general, Xu Sheng, organised the 
preparation of dummy defence walls and turrets along the southern bank of 
the Yangzi from Jianye downstream to Jiangcheng, and the Wu also managed 
to concentrate a reasonable fleet to oppose Cao Pi. No serious fighting took 
place, and by the end of the year Cao Pi had returned to Xuchang.45 
This, however, was only the first stage of his plans. Early in 225 Cao Pi 
arranged for the construction of the Canal to Smash the Caitiffs,46 and by the 
end of summer a new and larger naval force was on its way to the southeast. 
In mid-summer Cao Pi moved to Qiao city, and during the autumn he 
travelled with the army along the water route to the Huai and then 
downstream into Xu province. By early winter he was again at Guangling. 
He established headquarters in the former capital of the commandery, and it 
was claimed that the troops under his command was more than a hundred 
thousand.47[437] 
                                                                                                                        
to Lü Meng in 219: note 68 to Chapter Six. Qichun was evidently a proving ground for 
renegades. 
45 SGZ 2:84, SGZ 47/Wu 2:1131 with PC note 1 quoting the Jin ji of Gan Bao, and SGZ 
55/Wu 10:1298, the biography of Xu Sheng; also Fang, Chronicle I, 165-166 and 174-
176. 
46 SGZ 2:84. The course of the Canal to Smash the Caitiffs cannot now be determined, 
but it presumably improved water transport and communications among the network of 
streams along the upper reaches of the Ying and Ru rivers in present-day southern 
Henan and north-western Anhui.xxx CHECK Chi Ch'ao-ting 
47 SGZ 2:85 and SGZ 28:774, followed by ZZTJ 70:2224, mention a mutiny among the 
troops at Licheng, in the vicinity of present-day Lianyungang in northern Jiangsu. The 
rebellion was quelled and its leader Tang Zi fled to Wu by sea. The incident had no 
notable effect upon Cao Pi's campaigns. See Fang, Chronicle I, 185 and 194. Fang, 
however, misreads the identification of Licheng as a military unit (軍 jun) rather than 
as a commandery (君 jun); it was evidently a new establishment on the border between 
the Han commanderies of Donghai and Langye. 
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 This time Sun Quan's forces were ready for the attack, but far more 
serious from Cao Pi's point of view was the weather. The winter was harsh 
and early, the Yangzi was partially frozen, and the ships of Cao Pi were 
blocked by ridges of ice along the shore, with additional danger from small 
bergs breaking off and floating with the current. Looking at the unassailable 
barrier, Cao Pi sighed, "Alas. It is truly the will of Heaven which divides the 
south from the north." And he gave the order to withdraw.48 
 There was considerable difficulty in extracting the invasion force, with 
its ships and boats, from the exposed position they had reached. At one stage 
there seemed a possibility that the vessels would be stranded in the iced-up 
water-courses, so that they and their escort would become a prey to the 
attacks of Wu when conditions eased. The local commander Jiang Ji, 
however, dug extra canals, and he broke the ice-jam by bringing water into 
retaining dams behind the ships, then breaking the dams so that ships were 
swept clear by a man-made bore.49 
 Cao Pi returned past Xuchang and visited Luoyang, but it is probable he 
intended to return to the attack in the southeast. In the [438] summer of 226, 
however, Cao Pi became ill and died. He was only forty years old, he had 
reigned for six years since the death of his father, and he was succeeded by 
his son Cao Rui, later known as Emperor Ming, who was a little over 
twenty.50 
 Cao Pi had established a council of regency before he died, and although 
this marked a notable step in the rise of power of the Sima family which later 
took the throne, the operations of government were not yet affected seriously 
by faction quarrels. Nonetheless, the change from a single ruler in the prime 
of life and political ability to a young man as yet untried, with a group of 
powerful subjects sharing his authority, naturally provided opportunities for 
                                               
48 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1132 PC note 3 quoting Wu lu, and SGZ 2:84-85. 
  SGZ 2:85 PC note 1 bis contains the text of a poem said to have been composed at 
this time by Cao Pi and quoted in Wei shu. It tells how: 
  I marshal my troops by the shores of the Jiang, 
  How that stream surges and boils! 
  Halberds and lances like the mountain forests, 
  And the rays of the sun gleam upon black armour..... 
 Wu lu, without such literary excursion, claims that a raiding party from Wu attacked 
Cao Pi's headquarters by night, threw the enemy into confusion, and brought back 
trophies and insignia. 
  Curiously, the main text of SGZ 47, the annals of Wu, has no reference to this 
campaign. See also Fang, Chronicle I, 186-187 and 197-198. 
49 SGZ 14:451-52; Fang, Chronicle I, 187 and 199. 
50 SGZ 2:86; SGZ 3:91; and JS 1:4; Fang, Chronicle I, 201-202 and 212-214. 
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enemies of the state. For the next few years, Wei was on the defensive 
against Wu, and also against Shu in the west. 
 In the autumn, Sun Quan led an attack against the Wei positions in 
Jiangxia commandery, while another army under Zhuge Jin was sent further 
north up the Han against Xiangyang. Though loyal and competent, however, 
Zhuge Jin was not a fighting soldier, and his expedition was defeated by the 
new regent, Sima Yi.51 It was probably intended as a feint, but it did not 
delay the sending of reinforcements to Jiangxia. 
 At the beginning of the campaign, however, Wen Ping the Administrator 
of Jiangxia for the Wei had limited troops and was under heavy pressure 
from the invaders. Wei lue tells us that he gained time by opening the gates 
of his capital, Shiyang on the Han River, and ordering his people to keep 
quiet. He himself stayed at his official residence and made no move. When 
Sun Quan approached with his army, he could only suspect a trap, and so he 
halted and then withdrew.[439] 
 Apart from this incident, Wen Ping maintained his defence for several 
weeks, Sun Quan could make no headway, and the invaders were compelled 
to retreat as reinforcements arrived from the north.52 Further to the east, a 
secondary campaign in Lujiang commandery near Xunyang was defeated 
and driven back by Cao Zhen.53 
 In winter of the following year, 227-228, Wu and Shu engaged in their 
first joint action. Meng Da, who had formerly changed allegiance from Shu 
to Wei, and who had been maintained as Administrator of Xincheng, in the 
Han valley east of Nanyang, sought to change sides once more. Zhuge Liang, 
whose headquarters were now in Hanzhong commandery, encouraged him to 
do so, and sent a small expeditionary force in his support, while Sun Quan 
also despatched an army from the south. Sima Yi, however, reacted more 
swiftly than anyone had expected, and Meng Da was attacked, captured and 
executed before either of the allies could come to his aid.54 
 For the next few years, chief military activity took place in the 
northwest, in the region of Hanzhong, Chang'an and the Liang province of 
Later Han, where Zhuge Liang sought to establish a presence north of the 
                                               
51 SGZ 3:92. 
52 SGZ 18:549-50, the biography of Wen Ping, and PC note 2 quoting Wei lue; Fang, 
Chronicle I, 215-216. SGZ 3:92 tells how the imperial agent Xun Yu was sent with a 
small escort to mobilise local reinforcements; Fang, Chronicle I, 203. 
  On the strategy of the Empty City, see further in Chapter Nine at 585. 
53 SGZ 3:92. 
54 SGZ 3:93 PC quoting Wei lue; JS 1:5-6; Fang, Chronicle I, 230-232, 245-247, 249 and 
262. On the dual expeditions of support for Meng Da, see JS 1 and Fang, Chronicle I, 
231 and 247 at 15.8. 
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Qin Ling ranges in the valley of the Wei. This strategy was of no more than 
marginal interest to Sun Quan, and the campaigns indeed proved indecisive, 
but they relieved the pressure against his frontier which had obtained before 
the death of Cao Pi in 226.[440] 
 In the summer and autumn of 228, moreover, Sun Quan scored a 
considerable coup. He arranged for his Administrator of Poyang, Zhou Fang, 
to pretend to turn renegade and invite the armies of Wei to come to his 
support. The northerners were deceived, and Cao Xiu with ten thousand men 
was sent south toward Huan city in Lujiang to make contact with Zhou Fang, 
while two further armies were sent, one under Sima Yi against Jiangling in 
Nan commandery on the middle Yangzi, and the other led by Jia Kui against 
the region of Ruxu to the east. 
 The Wu, however, with Lu Xun as commander-in-chief, concentrated 
their forces against Cao Xiu. Engaging him in battle near Huan city, they 
defeated his men and put them to rout, then followed up the pursuit towards 
the Jiashi pass, north of Huan across a saddle of the Dabie Mountains. There 
was a very good chance that Cao Xiu's entire force could be cut off and 
captured, but the Wei general Jia Kui realised the danger and turned aside 
from his march against Ruxu to come to the rescue. Cao Xiu and the greater 
part of his men escaped, but they had been thoroughly defeated, and they left 
behind armour and weapons and great quantities of baggage. The plan had 
worked as well as could reasonably be expected, there was no comparable 
threat from the north for a number of years, and initiative on the Yangzi 
frontier had largely turned to Sun Quan.55[441] 
                                               
55 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1134, and SGZ 60/Wu 15:1387-92, the biography of Zhou Fang; also 
SGZ 9:279-80, the biography of Cao Xiu; SGZ 14:452, the biography of Jiang Ji; SGZ 
15:483, the biography of Jia Kui; SGZ 26:723, the biography of Man Chong; together 
with SGZ 56/Wu 11:1313, the biography of Zhu Huan; SGZ 58/Wu 13:1348-49, the 
biography of Lu Xun; and SGZ 60/Wu 15:1382, the biography of Quan Zong. See also 
Fang, Chronicle I, 254-256 and 276-282. 
  From the number of references to this campaign, and the comments of the officers, 
particularly on the Wei side, one may gather that the ill-fated enterprise served as a 
cautionary experience to the government and to Cao Rui. 
  Zhou Fang, prime mover in the stratagem, was a man from Yangxian in Wu, the 
county where Sun Quan had first served as a magistrate in the time of Sun Ce. He had 
thus early acquaintance with Sun Quan, and trust must have been an important element 
in this risky game of deception. 
  Two earlier incidents may have influenced the development of this plan. About 226 
and 227, when the local clan leader Peng Qi was in rebellion in the Poyang region, he 
invited support from the north. At that time the counsels at the court of Wei were more 
cautious: Peng Qi received no assistance and was destroyed by Zhou Fang and others: 
SGZ 47/Wu 2:1131 and 1134, SGZ 60/Wu 15:1387, and in particular SGZ 14:458 PC 
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Expansion in the south: 
A diplomatic and military balancing act, and the fortune of Cao Pi's early 
death, had enabled Sun Quan to confirm his frontier along the Yangzi in the 
east and his possession of newly-conquered Jing province in the west. 
Through the hill country, the process of conquest and colonisation continued, 
most notably through the agency of Quan Zong, who in 226 was appointed 
as general and Administrator of a new commandery, Dong'an, extending over 
the border regions south of Danyang and west of Wu and Kuaiji. Two years 
later, it was claimed that ten thousand people had been brought under 
administration, and the marcher commandery was broken up into its former 
component parts.56[442] 
 In the west of Jing province, the mountain people of the region known as 
Wuqi had long maintained their independence from the encroaching Chinese. 
They defied the great general Ma Yuan at the beginning of Later Han, and 
they had, as we have seen, operated independently in loose alliance with Liu 
Bei until the defeat of his invasion in 222.57 For the next few years, however, 
they posed no immediate threat to Sun Quan's security, and his concerns lay 
rather with the control of Chinese people and the defence against Chinese 
rivals in the north. Unlike his territories further east, Jing province was so 
newly come into his hands that there was no useful occasion or profit from 
any attempt at expansion beyond its established frontiers along the hills. 
                                                                                                                        
note 2 quoting Sun Zi biezhuan; Fang, Chronicle I, 223 and 233. About the same time, 
moreover, the commander of Sun Quan's garrison at Wuchang, Han Zong, defected to 
Wei. Han Zong's father Han Dang had been a loyal officer of the Sun family since the 
time of Sun Jian, but Han Zong was afraid that he might be punished for immorality 
and bad conduct, so he took all his family and dependents, and his father's coffin, and 
fled to the north. 
  It seems probable that these matters, and particularly the experience with Peng Qi, 
inspired Sun Quan and Zhou Fang with the idea of the deception, on this occasion with 
circumstantial and treacherous details. 
56 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1133 and 1134, and the biography of Quan Zong in SGZ 60/Wu 15, at 
1382. SGZ 47/Wu 2:1133 PC note 1 quoting Wu lu, says that the capital of Dong'an 
commandery was at Fuchun, the old homeland of the Sun family. 
  Quan Zong was a man from Qiantang whose father had joined Sun Ce when he 
conquered Wu commandery in 196. Quan Zong himself had attracted numbers of 
refugees from the north as his clients, and he had experience as a coloniser of the non-
Chinese people in the hills. When Sun Quan took the imperial title in 229, Quan Zong 
was married to one of his daughters, the Princess Luban: Chapter Eight at 511 and note 
113. 
57 See 422 and 424 above. 
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 The capture and possession of Jing province, however, presented new 
opportunities in Jiao province to the south. There, as we have seen, the 
dominant position had long been occupied by Shi Xie and his clan, but Sun 
Quan had been able to place officers of his own, notably the Inspector Bu 
Zhi, who had held that post since 210, establishing his administration in the 
eastern part of the province by the Bay of Canton, and maintaining a relaxed 
trading and tributary relationship with Shi Xie in the Red River basin about 
present-day Hanoi.58 
 In 220, Bu Zhi was recalled to the north, and led a substantial army to 
take part in the operations against Liu Bei's invasion. In particular, he held 
guard against Liu Bei's non-Chinese allies of Wuqi, and after the victory in 
the Yangzi Gorges he brought his [443] men south to confirm the 
pacification of Lingling and Guiyang commanderies. After a short spell at 
headquarters, he was stationed at Oukou in Changsha, near present-day 
Hengyang in Hunan, by the junction of the Lei river with the Xiang. From 
that base he acted as garrison commander and military chieftain of the 
southern part of Jing province.59 
 Lü Dai, Bu Zhi's successor in the south, was an experienced and trusted 
officer. Originally from Guangling, he had served Sun Quan in Wu 
commandery during the early years of his reign, he had been engaged on 
campaigns against the non-Chinese people south of Hangzhou Bay, and he 
was at one time sent on embassy to Zhang Lu in Hanzhong commandery 
before his conquest by Cao Cao. In 215 he took part in Lü Meng's campaign 
against Liu Bei's positions in the southern part of Jing province, and he 
defeated a local rebellion there. He was then appointed Administrator of 
Luling commandery, in the south of present-day Jiangxi, and from that 
position he took Bu Zhi's place as Inspector of Jiao province.60[444] 
                                               
58 Chapter Six at 349-353. 
59 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1237. SGZJJ 52/Wu 7:31a, quotes the Qing scholar Xie Zhongying, who 
says that the site of Oukou is unknown. I note, however, that one of the tributaries of 
the Lei River in southern Hunan is now called the Ou. It seems likely that under some 
circumstances the whole of the Lei River may have been described as the Ou. The site 
of Oukou would then have been by the junction of the present Lei River with the 
Xiang, near modern Hengyang. This would be a good position for supervision of the 
three southern commanderies of Jing province, Changsha, Lingling and Guiyang, and 
the area had been used for that purpose by Zhuge Liang in the period immediately after 
the victory at the Red Cliffs in 208. Zhuge Liang's base had been at Linzheng city, and 
I suspect that Oukou was a military encampment close by. 
60 The biography of Lü Dai is in SGZ 60/Wu 15:1383-87. Ten years earlier, before Bu Zhi 
was appointed to Jiao province, he had been Administrator of Poyang, a neighbouring 
commandery to Luling. He probably knew Lü Dai, at least by reputation. 
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 At the very beginning of his new appointment, Lü Dai showed his 
energy. First, he compelled the surrender of the local chieftain Qian Bo of 
Gaoliang, on the sea-coast between the Bay of Canton and the Leizhou 
peninsula, and he recognised Qian Bo as Commandant there. Then, further to 
the north, he attacked and subdued a number of non-Chinese groups on Yulin 
commandery, along the river systems of present-day Guangxi. Finally, on 
Sun Quan's orders, he turned north against the bandit Wang Jin, who came 
from the south of Guiyang commandery, and who was established in the 
mountain country of the Nan Ling north of Nanhai commandery. It is said 
that Lü Dai captured Wang Jin and more than ten thousand of his people; and 
both here and in previous campaigns one can observe the process of 
colonisation and recruitment under the traditional guise of self-defence 
against "rebels" and "bandits." As reward for his achievements, Lü Dai was 
given the rank of a general, the Staff of Authority, and enfeoffment as 
marquis of a chief district. 
 In these early years of the 220s, Lü Dai confirmed his authority in 
Nanhai and Cangwu commanderies, and extended his influence over the 
greater part of present-day Guangdong and Guangxi, while the area of Shi 
Xie's control was largely restricted to Jiaozhi commandery in the Red River 
basin, with Jiuzhen and Rinan commanderies to the south along the coast of 
present-day Vietnam. 
 When Shi Xie died at the age of ninety sui in 226, Lü Dai was ready to 
remove the last vestiges of his clan's former power.61 Shi Xie's son Shi Hui 
was given title as General Who gives Tranquillity to Distant Lands and office 
as Administrator of Jiuzhen, but [445] the honours and recognition were 
false. The critical territory in the region was the commandery of Jiaozhi, 
where Shi Xie had been Administrator. Sun Quan, on Lü Dai's advice, named 
a certain Chen Shi, colonel in his service, in Shi Xie's place, and that 
appointment would have removed the Shi clan from the heart of their power 
and left Shi Hui and his brothers isolated in the far south. 
 To confirm this development, Sun Quan also declared the division of 
Jiao province into two: the eastern part, in present-day China from Hepu 
commandery to Nanhai, was named Guang province and Lü Dai continued 
as Inspector; the western part, in present-day Vietnam, from Jiaozhi through 
Jiuzhen to Rinan, kept the name of Jiao province. Dai Liang, a general in 
Sun Quan's service, was named Inspector of this territory, with ultimate 
authority over Shi Hui in Jiuzhen commandery. 
                                               
61 On the government of Shi Xie in Jiao province before the 220s, see Chapter Five at 
341-347. The account of the destruction of the Shi family is told by Shi Xie's 
biography in SGZ 49 at 1193, and in the biography of Lü Dai in SGZ 60 at 1384-85. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
346 
 The clear intention was to force Shi Hui into either total subservience or 
outright defiance. Shi Hui chose the latter course. Taking his father's title as 
Administrator of Jiaozhi, he set guards at the ports and at the land passes 
from Hepu, and he refused entry to Chen Shi and Dai Liang. 
 Lü Dai, however, was ready for such a move, and he came with an army 
and a fleet to escort the new officials to their place. Naturally enough, there 
was uncertainty in the Shi camp at the thought of open warfare, there was a 
flurry of rebellion against Shi Hui, and Lü Dai arrived before Shi Hui had 
time to prepare his full defence. As he came up, he sent Shi Kuang, son of 
Shi Yi and nephew of Shi Xie, who had lived in Wu as a hostage, to act as 
envoy and persuade his cousins to surrender. Shi Hui and his five brothers 
came out to receive Lü Dai in suppliants' guise, their clothes pulled down to 
expose their shoulders. Ignoring their pleas and his own undertakings, Lü 
Dai had them executed and sent their heads to Sun Quan.[446] 
 This act of treachery removed the power of the Shi clan. Shi Yi, Shi 
Kuang and others were allowed to live, but they were reduced to commoner 
rank and deprived of all their possessions.62 There was short-lived local 
resistance in Jiaozhi and then in Jiuzhen, put down by Lü Dai with utmost 
firmness, and the power of Sun Quan was now confirmed along all the 
southern shore.63 
 The division of Jiao province was abolished as quickly as it had been 
made, and Lü Dai became once more the chief of the whole region, with 
enfeoffment as Marquis of Panyu. Further to the south, he sent embassies by 
sea to the various states of the peninsula, and envoys came in return, bearing 
tribute from Linyi on the coast of southern Vietnam, Funan in the region of 
Ho Chi Minh City, and Tangming in present-day Cambodia.64 Besides the 
prestige they gave the court of Sun Quan, these visits confirmed that the sea 
trade into southeast Asia would be peacefully maintained, so the prosperity 
                                               
62 Besides Shi Yi and Shi Kuang, we are told that Shi Yu, younger brother of Shi Xie and 
Shi Yi, and Shi Xin, a son of Shi Xie who had also been hostage at the court of Sun 
Quan, escaped the massacre. Shi Yi and Shi Kuang were later found guilty on other 
charges and were executed. Shi Xin the putative heir to Shi Xie died without children; 
his widow was granted a ration of grain and a donation of cash: SGZ 49/Wu 4:1193. 
63 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1134, notes that in 228 the name of Hepu commandery was changed to 
Zhuguan 珠官 "Office for Pearls." The name, however, was later changed back to 
Hepu. 
64 On Linyi and Funan, see Chapter One at 40; on Tangming, see Stein, "Lin-yi," 131. 
The embassies of these three states are recorded in SGZ 60/Wu 15:1385, though they 
are not precisely dated to 226. On later embassies and contacts, see Chapter Eight at 
480-481 with note 38. 
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of the Shi family at the entrepot in northern Vietnam was now continued to 
the advantage of Wu. 
 Though the destruction of the Shi clan had been a model of brutal 
success, and Lü Dai had extended the power of Sun Quan without challenge 
into the furthest territories of the south, there was one region where a 
possibility of expansion had been lost. As we have [447] observed, about 217 
the local leader Yong Kai of Yizhou had sought to maintain independence 
from the government of Liu Bei in the northern part of Yi province, and his 
request for support passed through Shi Xie to Sun Quan's representative Bu 
Zhi.65 
 Following the death of Liu Bei in 223, Yong Kai made a serious attempt 
to establish a separatist regime involving his own commandery of Yizhou 
and also Yongchang, Yuexi and Zangke. He was supported by local non-
Chinese people, notably the chieftain Meng Huo, but he met considerable 
resistance from other groups loyal to the government at Chengdu, and he 
could not gain a permanent position. In 225, Zhuge Liang attacked and 
conquered the south, Yong Kai was killed, and Meng Huo, after repeated 
defeats, was compelled to surrender.66 Zhuge Liang appointed non-Chinese 
chieftains as local officials, confirming their authority under his hegemony, 
and this region of present-day southern Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan 
remained reasonably quiet under the government of Shu for the next several 
years.67 
 It does not appear that Yong Kai ever received significant support from 
the government of Sun Quan, and this must have been due both to the 
distance of his area of operations and to the interposition of Shi Xie along the 
route. The valley of the Red River and its tributaries does afford 
communication from the coast inland towards present-day Kunming, but Bu 
Zhi and Lü Dai were never in a [448] position to take advantage of this 
means of access and Zhuge Liang was thus able to establish undisputed 
control of the south. 
 Even in this perhaps lost opportunity, however, there was cause for some 
satisfaction. The disturbances caused by Yong Kai and Meng Huo removed 
                                               
65 Chapter Five at 351. 
66 This campaign of Zhuge Liang in the south is one of his celebrated feats of arms, 
described in his biography, SGZ 35/Shu 5:921 PC note 2 quoting Han-Jin chunqiu, and 
in Huayang guo zhi 4:4b-5a; Fang, Chronicle I, 185-186 and 194-196, while a map of 
the campaign appears in Zhongguo shi gao ditu ji I, 48. An exaggerated account 
occupies chapters 87-91 of Romance. 
67 The settlement established by Zhuge Liang Is a contrast with the policy of Wu, which 
generally sought to impose a form of Chinese administration and colonisation, rather 
than rule through local chieftains. 
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Zhuge Liang's attention from any involvement in the affairs of Jing province 
during the time of Cao Pi's attacks against Wu in the early 220s; and once 
that matter was settled there was no real occasion for dispute between the 
allies about their territorial frontiers. Lü Dai's conquest of the western part of 
Jiao province, therefore, gave the government of Wu an extensive and 
prosperous territory without any rival claimants. 
 In 233, after thirteen years in the south, Lü Dai was recalled to take Bu 
Zhi's place in the garrison at Oukou. On the one hand, as his orders noted, 
Jiao province was now peaceful and settled, but at the same time, though the 
point was unstated, the change avoided any possibility that Lü Dai might 
have separatist ambitions of his own. In any event, his achievements, and 
those of Bu Zhi, were considerable. With minimal expenditure of military 
resources, they had first set up a presence in the south, then established full 
authority. As a result, the kingdom of Wu now extended over three provinces 
of Han, and the court of Sun Quan gained profit and prestige from the trade 
of the southern seas. 
 
Parity of esteem: 
By the beginning of 229 AD, Sun Quan had thus established a coherent and 
powerful military and political authority in south China. In the original 
heartland of his power, south of the Yangzi in Yang province, the lower 
course of the great river provided an impregnable line of defence, and 
colonisation of the country to the south was bringing increasing population 
and [449] economic development. In central China, the southern basin of the 
middle Yangzi, more than half the area of Jing province in Later Han, was 
securely in his hands: both his rivals, on the north and on the west, had 
sought to wrench the territory from his grasp, but neither had been 
successful. And in the far south, the aggression of Lü Dai had brought all the 
lands and the trade of the region under his control. 
 Certainly, the empire of Wei in the north was far more populous and 
potentially more powerful. After the death of Cao Pi in 226, however, the 
position of the Cao family had become more tenuous, and the new emperor 
Cao Rui was not a man of great personal authority. Wei, moreover, had a 
number of external problems apart from Sun Quan: to the northeast the 
energetic young warlord Gongsun Yuan occupied southern Manchuria with a 
guarded independence;68 northwest, the greater part of Bing and Liang 
                                               
68 On events in the northeast, see Fang, Chronicle I, 260-261 and 289, and Gardiner, "The 
Kung-sun Warlords" II, 141-142 and 147-150. Gongsun Yuan, son of Gongsun Kang 
and grandson of Gongsun Du, had seized power after overthrowing his uncle, the 
incompetent Gongsun Gong, in 228. 
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provinces of Later Han, the northern territories of present-day Shanxi and 
Shenxi, Ningxia and the greater part of Gansu, were now beyond all but the 
most nominal Chinese control. Further afield, the court of Wei had received 
embassies from the oasis kingdoms of central Asia, and had re-established 
Chinese authority along the Silk Road,69 but the line of communications 
along the Wei River valley and across the Yellow River to the Gansu corridor 
had [450] to be defended against the armies of Shu-Han based in Hanzhong 
commandery to the south. 
 As for Shu-Han, though the propaganda of Liu Bei had sought to justify 
a claim to empire on the basis of a distant relationship to the imperial clan 
and a virtuous authority, the high profile of foreign policy could not conceal 
the fact that the territory of the state was no greater than the single province 
of Yi under Later Han. Despite the efforts of Zhuge Liang in the south, and 
his consistent efforts to break out north from the upper Han valley, the 
catastrophic defeats of Guan Yu and Liu Bei by Sun Quan's forces had not 
been cancelled by any great success against the lands about Chang'an. 
 In these circumstances, Sun Quan could contemplate his own claims to 
imperial splendour, for if his was not the greatest state, he was surely the 
second of three. 
 Sun Quan, moreover, had already adopted many of the rituals of 
independence. Admittedly, he held the title King of Wu on the basis of a 
grant from Cao Pi, acting as Emperor of Wei. On the other hand, he had 
proclaimed his own reign-title in 222, and in 223 he had also announced a 
calendar based upon the Qianxiang system of the late Han scholar Liu Hong, 
rather than upon the Sifen method which had been used by Han and was 
followed by Wei and Shu. From this time, even the days of the month in Wu 
were different to those of the other states. Traditionally, determination of the 
calendar was the prerogative of a sovereign, so Sun Quan had proclaimed 
himself peer to his two enemies, and the court of Wu was noted for its 
interest and competence in the calculations and science of mathematics, 
astronomy and the calendar.70[451>452] 
                                               
69 Embassies were received at the Wei court in 222, and the government of Cao Pi 
restored the Wu and Ji Colonels, officials responsible in Han times for the supervision 
of the Western Regions: SGZ 2:79; Fang, Chronicle I, 98, and see Bielenstein, 
Bureaucracy, 110-113. 
  Wei lue, quoted in SGZ 30:858-63 PC, has substantially more information about 
land routes to the west than the parallel text in HHS 88/78. This may reflect the first 
reports of the situation in the Western Regions after the restoration of contact: personal 
communication from Dr K H J Gardiner. 
70 Liu Hong, who designed the Qianxiang 乾象 "Celestial Appearances" calendar with his 
colleague Cai Yong, was a man from Dong commandery who later held position as 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
350 
                                                                                                                        
Commandant of the Eastern Division of Kuaiji. He was a most competent 
mathematician and astronomer, he presented a memorial on lunar eclipses to the court 
of Emperor Ling of Han in 179, and he was the actual compiler of the text of the third 
section of the Treatise on Pitchpipes and the Calendar, HHS 93/3. For his memorial on 
eclipses, see HHS 92/2:3042-43, with commentary quoting his biography from the Hou 
Han shu of Yuan Shansong. For his authorship of HHS 93/3, see the Discussion by 
Sima Biao at 3082 analysed by Mansvelt Beck, Treatises, 61; the Preface by Liu Zhao 
to the commentary to the treatises (presented as an appendix to the Beijing edition of 
HHS); and the parallel treatise of JS 17:498. On Liu Hong, see also Needham, Science 
and Civilisation III, 29, 421 et saepe. 
  On the calendrical calculations of Later Han, see the three parts of Eberhard's 
"Contributions to the Astronomy of the Han Period" (reprinted in Sternkunde und 
Weltbild), and Sivin, "Cosmos and Computation." The Taichu 太初 "Grand Beginning" 
calendar of Former Han was adjusted by the Santong 三統 "Three Sequences" system 
designed by Liu Xin in the time of Wang Mang and was used by Later Han until 85, 
when a variant of the ancient Sifen 四分 "Quarter Day" calendar, compiled by Bian Xin 
and Li Fan, was put into effect. The Sifen system is described in HHS 93/3, and is 
discussed in detail by Eberhard, "Contributions to the Astronomy of the Han Period 
III," 204-220 [191-207]. 
  As Liu Hong was the true compiler of the third chapter of the Treatise of Pitchpipes 
and the Calendar, so is Cai Yong acknowledged by Sima Biao to have been the 
compiler of the second chapter, HHS 92/2 [HHS 93/3:3082, the Discussion of Sima 
Biao, with the other references above], and his report on the calendar appears at 3038-
40. 
  The Qianxiang system prepared by Liu Hong and Cai Yong is presented in JS 
17:504-05 ff, discussed by Zhu Wenxin [1934], 91-95. Eberhard, "Contributions to the 
Astronomy of the Han Period III," 204 [191], describes the work as "a more scientific 
study of the problem," and notes particularly that It sought to remove the influence of 
the theories of the New Text School and the influence of the apocryphal books, relying 
instead upon real observation and experience: see also Mansvelt Beck, Treatises, 60. 
Sivin, "Cosmos and Computation," notes at 65 that Liu Hong was the first great 
astronomer to pay serious attention to eclipse cycles, but though the Qianxiang 
calendar was theoretically better than the Sifen it did not greatly increase the number of 
confirmed predictions. Eberhard and Müller, "Contributions to the Astronomy of the 
San-Kuo Period," 149-150 [Sternkunde und Weltbild, 229-230], argue that although the 
calculation of the length of the year of the Qianxiang calendar was actually less 
satisfactory than the Sifen system, the Qianxiang represented a competent approach to 
fulfil the two requirements of a calendrical system: to agree as far as possible with 
observation, and to simplify calculation. 
  The main presentation of Eberhard and Müller's article is a translation of an essay 
by the third century scholar Wang Fan of Wu. At 149 [229] they remark that "The 
advance of mathematical science was particularly noticeable during the San-kuo 
period, when in the southern kingdom of Wu many mathematicians and astronomers 
were employed. Their astronomical work is not so funda-mentally individual as that of 
the earlier men [of Later Han], but from a mathematical point of view it is more 
advanced." 
CLAIM TO THE MANDATE 
 
 
351 
 Already in 223 Sun Quan's senior officials had urged him to claim the 
imperial title. Jiangbiao zhuan gives some account of his refusal: on the one 
hand, since he had been unable to prevent the abdication of the Han Emperor 
and the overthrow of that imperial house, it was not entirely proper that he 
should seek to step so quickly into the vacated place. At the same time he 
sought to keep his options open in relation to the government of Wei – it was 
yet too soon to commit himself firmly against the great power to the north, 
and he was equally concerned that Wei and Shu might join in alliance to 
destroy him. 
 Six years later, however, the situation was more stable and more 
favourable. Both rival states had junior and less impressive rulers, and Sun 
Quan had successfully withstood the attacks from Wei, while Shu was 
unprepared for another attempt against his western frontier on the Yangzi 
Gorges. Politically, the occasion was propitious, and in the spring of 229 the 
neighbouring territories of Wuchang and Xiakou reported the appearance of 
a yellow dragon and a phoenix. 
 By the end of the second century, it had been generally accepted that the 
colour which should succeed the red of Han was yellow, symbol of Earth. 
The Yellow Turbans had proclaimed that a yellow heaven would replace the 
blue sky of Han, and in the cycle of the five forces it was expected that Earth 
would emerge from the Fire of Han. It was for this reason that the reign-title 
proclaimed by Cao Pi when he received the abdication of Emperor Xian of 
Han was Huangchu 黃初 "Yellow Beginning;" and when Sun Quan 
announced his independent position by setting a new calendar, he [453] 
named the year 223 as the first of Huangwu 黃武 "Martial Yellow." Now a 
dragon and a phoenix, magical and imperial creatures of appropriate colour, 
provided a suitable introduction to the announcement of a new empire. 
 Apart from this, however, there were few propitious omens to support 
Sun Quan's claim to empire. His officer Chen Hua obtained a reputation at 
court for the occasion when, on embassy to Wei, he had interpreted classical 
text to provide authority for an imperial ruler in the south and east, and there 
had been a popular jingle in Wu which went: 
A carriage of yellow gold, coloured and elegant; 
                                                                                                                        
  In practical terms of the variance of the dating system from one state of the three to 
the next, one may compare the main chronology presented by Hsüeh and Ou-yang, 
Sino-Western Calendar, which follows the calendar of Wei and Jin, and their 
supplementary Tables 1 and 2, which give a summary account of the calendars of Shu 
and Wu: the overall pattern is naturally the same, but there are a number of places of 
difference. 
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Open the Chang Gate and the Son of Heaven will come out.71 
However, though the classics could always be re-interpreted, and popular 
songs, the voice of the people, were sometimes assumed to reflect the voice 
of a deity, there is no further good evidence of portentous support for Sun 
Quan. 
 Nonetheless, on 23 June 229, Sun Quan held ceremony at the Altar of 
Heaven established in the southern suburb of his capital Wuchang, and 
proclaimed himself Emperor of Wu. He unfurled a great banner with the 
insignia of a yellow dragon, and he changed the reign period to Huanglong 
黃龍 "Yellow Dragon."72 
 Wu lu recorded his petition to Heaven.73 In that text, Sun Quan recites 
how Han held the government for twenty-four generations and four hundred 
thirty-four years, but [454] then its inspiration came to an end and good 
fortune was exhausted, so that all was lost and the state was divided and 
crumbled. 
And so that evil minister Cao Pi snatched the sacred vessels, and Cao 
Pi's son Cao Rui has succeeded to his wicked work. They have 
destroyed the proper orders of names [between ruler and subject] and 
they have disrupted the system of good government. 
 I was born in the southeast, and I encountered these times. I 
succeeded to a position, and I now hold military power. It is my 
ambition to give peace to the world. I receive the commands of Heaven, 
I carry out its punishments, and whatever I do, I do it for the people. 
 My ministers and officials and officers, and the men in authority in 
every city of the commanderies and provinces, all believe that the favour 
of Heaven is gone from the house of Han and the sacrifices of Han to 
Heaven are likewise ended. So the imperial position is empty, and there 
is no ruler to maintain these sacrifices. 
 Favourable signs and fortunate omens have been reported one after 
another, all interpretations point to me, and I am compelled to accept. 
Fearful of the Mandate of Heaven, I have no choice but to obey. 
Respectfully I have chosen this auspicious day to mount the altar, to 
make the burnt offering and take the position of sovereign. If only you 
                                               
71 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1132 PC note 2 quoting Wu shu, and SGZ 47/ Wu 2:1134. 
72 SGZ 62/Wu 17:1414, the biography of Hu Zong. Hu Zong was commissioned to 
compose a rhapsody for the occasion, he is known to have composed the oath of 
covenant between Wu and Shu-Han later that year (see note 78), and it would appear 
that he was recognised as poet and essayist laureate to the court of Wu. He probably 
also wrote Sun Quan's proclamation of claim to empire. 
73 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1135-36 PC quoting Wu lu. 
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will accept this sacrifice and give your aid to the rulers of Wu, so the 
prosperity from Heaven may last forever. 
Sun Quan thus based his claim upon two predications: that the imperial 
position had been vacated by Han and had not been filled by any worthy 
successor; and that his own accession was justified by the virtue of his 
government, particularly by his concern for the people. He specifically 
dismissed the claims of his rival in Wei by describing them as criminal 
usurpers. As to Shu, without mentioning Liu Bei, he simply states that the 
fortune and [455] tradition of Han is ended, so that claim to succession was 
irrelevant. 
 From the point of view of later historians, Sun Quan's claim to the 
imperial title was unacceptable. With an elegant essay in Zizhi tongjian, 
Sima Guang discussed the concept of the "True Succession" (正流 zhengliu) 
as it applied to the history of Wei and Shu. As he observed, the dynasties of 
Zhou, Qin, Han, Jin, Sui and Tang had each united China under their rule and 
had maintained succession for a number of generations. By that standard, 
none of the rulers of Wei, Shu and Wu qualified for recognition as true 
emperors: and indeed, as at the end of the power of the Zhou kings, there 
was for a time no true sovereign. 
 On the other hand, as compiler of a chronicle history, Sima Guang had 
to decide upon some sequence of identification for the years of division. 
Unlike the West, China had no common and agreed point for the calculation 
of years, and at any one time it was essential to choose between the reign 
title of one rival state or another. Just for that purpose, Sima Guang accepted 
the principle that Han transmitted the throne to Wei, and Wei in turn passed it 
to Jin. Thereafter the line of succession was traced through the Southern 
Dynasties until Sui and Tang. 
 Sima Guang emphasised, however, that he made that determination 
simply in order to chronicle the events which took place in the various states: 
... we are not honouring one and treating another with contempt, nor 
making distinction between orthodox and intercalary positions. 
In later times Sima Guang's approach was rejected by the Neo-Confucian 
philosophers, who endorsed the legitimacy of Liu Bei and his state of Shu as 
successors to Han. In particular, Zhu Xi based the chronicle of his 
abbreviated Zizhi tongjian gangmu on the chronology through Shu Han.74 
                                               
74 For Sima Guang's justification of the choice of the calendar of Wei as the basis for his 
chronology, see ZZTJ 69:2185-88; Fang, Chronicle, 45-49. For Zhu Xi's contrary 
opinion, see his preface and the Fan li 凡例 "Rules" chapter of introduction to Zizhi 
tongjian gangmu. In that work the period 220-263 follows the calendrical system of 
Shu-Han, and for the period 264-280, when Shu-Han had fallen but Wu still 
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 It is a curious chance that such an alternative is available. For Sima 
Guang, taking the chronology through Wei, the Chinese year which extended 
from Western 22 February 220 to 9 February 221 is described as Huangchu 
1, based upon the proclamation by Cao Pi after his accession to the imperial 
throne on 11 December 220. For Zhu Xi and the sympathisers of Shu, the 
year is called Yankang 延康 1, being the reign title proclaimed under the 
auspices of the puppet Han government during that year (which had begun as 
Jian'an 建安 25); in the following year, on 15 May 221, Liu Bei assumed the 
imperial throne and proclaimed his own reign title of Zhangwu 章武. 
 Forty years later, in 263, Liu Bei's son Liu Shan surrendered to Wei, but 
Shu-Han was not entirely conquered until the following year, which would 
have been counted as Yanxing 炎興 2. And on 8 February 266, at the very 
end of the following Chinese year, Sima Yan, founding Emperor of Jin, took 
the throne from the house of Wei, and the entire year from 3 February 265 
was retrospectively [457] renamed as the first of the Taishi 泰始 period.75 For 
Sima Guang, therefore, the chronology from 263 through 265 and 266 would 
be represented by Jingyuan 4 and Xianxi 1 of Wei, then the Taishi period of 
Jin. For Zhu Xi it was Yanxing 1 and 2 of Shu, and then the Taishi period of 
Jin. 
 This debate is now of little more than academic interest, but it has had 
great influence upon modern views of the three rival claimants. On a base of 
continuous chronology, scholars can argue the merits and legitimacy of Wei 
and Shu, but no such chronology can be established for Wu: any count of the 
years between 221 and 228 must follow the system of Wei or of Shu; and the 
surrender of Sun Hao, last ruler of Wu, in 280, though it was celebrated in 
Jin by the proclamation of the new reign-title Taikang 太康, cannot be 
reconciled with the establishment or fall of that dynasty. 
 If, however, as we must, we ignore the fatal years to come and the future 
debates of scholars, then the position of Sun Quan in 229 was by no means 
                                                                                                                        
maintained its independence, the dates are set in smaller script, to indicate Zhu Xi's 
disapproval of the still-divided empire; he follows a similar method for the long period 
of division between 420 and 589. 
  The fourth century scholar Xi Zuochi was apparently the first to argue that the Shu-
Han dynasty should be regarded as the legitimate successor, by blood relationship, to 
Later Han, and Shu-Han's calendar should therefore be taken as the basis for 
continuing chronology by reign title. (Xi Zuochi's memorial is preserved in JS 
82:2154-58; see also note 66 to Chapter Nine.) 
  For further discussion of the debate on dynastic legitimacy, see Cambridge Han, 
373-376 [Mansvelt Beck, "The Fall of Han"]. 
75 JS 3:50-51; Fang, Chronicle II, 515. 
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illegitimate, neither in his own terms nor in the political theory of the time. 
The most obvious example was the period of the Warring States at the end of 
Zhou, with the rise of Qin and the foundation of Han. As Sima Guang 
observed, it was in the Han period that 
scholars began to propound the theory of mutual engendering and 
mutual destruction of the five Elements. Arguing that Qin had occupied 
an intercalated position between the elements of Wood [Zhou] and Fire 
[Han], they considered it as the dynasty of a hegemon, and would not 
accredit it as that of a true King. In this manner arose the theory of 
orthodox and intercalated positions [in the succession of dynasties]. 
 Thus the Zhou dynasty was ended [in 254 BC], and the empire of 
Qin was not proclaimed [until 221 BC], but scholars [458] such as Sima 
Qian of Former Han maintained their chronology through whichever 
state was appropriate, without political implications and judgement. 
Sun Quan, therefore, would have considered the years between 221 AD and 
229 as intercalary, a period of confusion before the virtues of Wu became 
apparent. By these terms, it is not the foundation in 229 that embarrasses his 
claim to empire, but the end of his dynasty in 280. Later critics have looked 
upon Cao Cao and the Wei dynasty as no better than hegemons, just because, 
with the preponderance of power in China, they failed to reunite the empire – 
and how much more does this apply to Wu, which also failed and eventually 
fell. The view of hindsight is not always kind or fair. 
 Concentrating, then, upon the situation in 229, we may observe that even 
in those terms Sun Quan's claim presented some interesting and awkward 
questions on the meaning and nature of the imperial title. This was shown 
most dramatically by the reaction in Shu. 
 As we have seen, by 223 Sun Quan had reached an understanding with 
the government of Shu, now controlled by Zhuge Liang on behalf of Liu 
Bei's son Liu Shan. There was no question that the alliance was valuable to 
both parties: if one of them should make an agreement of neutrality with 
Wei, and allow that state to concentrate upon the other, the victim of the full 
northern attack would be soon in desperate straits. Whether co-ordinated or 
not, the existence of threats against Wei by Sun Quan across the Huai or 
along the Han were important to the hopes of Shu, and Zhuge Liang's 
campaigns against the valley of the Wei were a valuable distraction for Sun 
Quan. 
 But now the claimant successor to Han in the west was faced by the 
pretensions of Wu. The Sun family had no possible connection with the 
imperial house, and Sun Quan owed his former royal title to a grant from the 
usurping Wei. If, in his proclamation, he claimed to rule by virtue, that was 
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quite as disconcerting to a [459] claim based upon legitimate descent as it 
was to a dynasty which had benefited from abdication. Moreover, while the 
empire of Wei could simply reject Sun Quan's claim as that of an upstart 
rebel, the government of Shu had to deal with him as an ally of great 
importance. 
 It appears that there was debate at the court of Shu. Certainly some were 
prepared to say that Sun Quan's claim to parity was unjustified, that there 
was no advantage in the alliance, and that all agreements with him should be 
abandoned. Zhuge Liang, however, contrived a form of words which could 
satisfy both the amour propre of the dynasty and the Realpolitik of the 
current situation.76 He gave examples of how Emperor Wen of Han had been 
prepared to treat with the Xiongnu, even in humble language, and how Liu 
Bei himself, despite the injuries he had suffered, eventually accepted a 
treaty: 
In each case they were coping with emergency, thinking profoundly of 
the advantage in the long run; they did not act like men of the common 
sort. 
Sun Quan, moreover, was an aggressive and energetic ruler. Though he and 
the forces of the north were currently at stalemate along the Yangzi frontier, 
should Shu maintain its planned attack against Wei, then Sun Quan in 
alliance would either make an attack of his own, or take advantage of the 
occasion to develop his strength by colonisation and recruitment in the south. 
In either case, he was a useful ally to hold Wei in check; without an alliance, 
however, he might decide to expand against the territory of Shu. 
If we now take advantage of his ... friendliness toward us, our northern 
expedition [against the valley of the Wei] can proceed without anxiety 
concerning the east, and Wei will not be able to concentrate all their 
forces westwards against us.[460] 
 In the light of this great advantage, it is not yet appropriate to 
emphasise Sun Quan's crimes of usurpation and rebellion. 
On this basis of expediency, the government of Shu swallowed its pride, at 
least for the time being, and sent the Minister of the Guards Chen Zhen as 
envoy to congratulate Sun Quan on his new glory. He arrived at Wuchang in 
the late summer, two months after Sun Quan's accession.77 
 Simple recognition, however, was not enough. Almost certainly at the 
initiative of Sun Quan, the two states also adopted a formal treaty by oath 
and covenant, recognising one another's identity and dividing the territory of 
                                               
76 SGZ 35/Shu 5:924-25 PC quoting Han-Jin chunqiu; Fang, Chronicle I, 292-293 and 
302-304. 
77 SGZ 39/Shu 9:984-85, being the biography of Chen Zhen. 
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Wei, when it should be conquered, between the two of them. The major 
ceremony was carried out at Wuchang by Sun Quan and Chen Zhen, who 
mounted an altar together and smeared their mouths with blood from 
slaughtered animals, and it is clear the matter had been planned and agreed to 
earlier. The text of the covenant, admired by the literary men of the time, and 
composed by Hu Zong, a scholar-official in the service of Sun Quan, tells us 
that Zhuge Liang, as Chancellor of Shu, had engaged in a parallel ritual:78 
Though there is heart-felt faithfulness between Han and Wu, yet since 
our lands are apart and borders divide us we should have a written 
alliance. 
 The power and authority of Chancellor Zhuge are shown far and 
wide. He shelters and maintains his state and he commands the army 
abroad. His fidelity moves the yin and the yang, his loyalty affects 
Heaven and Earth.[461] 
 And he renews the bonds of covenant and publishes the oath of 
alliance, so that the lands and the peoples of the east and the west may 
know of it. He has set up an altar and killed the beast of sacrifice and 
reported it to the gods; again he has smeared his mouth with blood and 
has written down the promises once more; and so he renews it for 
eternity..... 
 From this day forward Han and Wu are in alliance. They join their 
strengths and unite their hearts, and they attack the bandits of Wei 
together. They give help to one another in time of danger and they give 
sympathy in times of anxiety. They share in calamities and they share in 
rejoicing; in good or ill they take part together, and nothing shall ever 
divide them. 
 If anyone should injure Han, then Wu will attack them. If anyone 
should injure Wu, then Han shall attack them. Each shall keep to his 
own territory, and neither shall invade or attack the other. 
 This shall be handed down to generations to come, that it may 
continue forever in the manner it has begun, while every agreement that 
is made shall follow this pattern of this one. 
As to the common enemy, Cao Rui is described as the "little fellow" who has 
followed his father Cao Pi's path of evil and disgrace, while their 
predecessors, from Dong Zhuo down to Cao Cao , were no more than rebel 
ministers, who plundered and seized the powers of the state: 
                                               
78 The text of the covenant is preserved in SGZ 47/Wu 2:1134-35. The biography of Hu 
Zong, SGZ 62/Wu 17:1414, credits him with the composition and makes particular note 
of its fine literary quality. See also note 72 above. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
358 
Reaching for the limits of cruelty and the extremities of wrong, they 
have put the four seas into turmoil and ripped the nine provinces to 
shreds. The empire has lost its government, the hearts of the people are 
bitter and angry. 
 ..... In this present day, for the destruction of Cao Rui and the arrest 
of his followers, who can undertake the task unless it be Han and 
Wu?[462] 
 And now, to attack the evil men and destroy the oppressors ..... we 
should first divide up their territory and take away their lands, so the 
hearts of the people may know to whom they shall turn. 
As earnest of the future, therefore, it was agreed that Shu-Han should have 
the Later Han provinces of Bing, Liang, Ji and Yan, the northwest and north 
of the empire, while Wu would take the territories of Xu, Yu, You and Qing 
provinces, being the south and centre of the North China plain, with southern 
Manchuria and Korea. The former capital territory, the province of Sili of 
Later Han, was divided, with the region about Chang'an, in present-day 
Shenxi, going to Shu and that of Luoyang, present-day Henan, to Wu.79 
 All this, of course, was theoretical, but it did establish spheres of 
influence for the two parties, and it confirmed that Zhuge Liang and his 
forces would be attacking northwards into the valley of the Wei, not 
interfering with Sun Quan's interests in the middle Yangzi and the Han, still 
less in the region of the Huai. In practical terms, though the fine words of the 
treaty covered a natural mistrust and bitterness on both sides, the recognition 
by Shu meant that Sun Quan could feel reasonably secure of his defences in 
the west, by the Yangzi Gorges, and could give chief attention to his dealings 
with Wei in the north and to the maintenance of control inside his own 
territory. For the time being, his government was secure, his status had been 
recognised by his rivals, and his empire held sway over three former 
provinces of Han. No small achievement for an insignificant family from the 
marginal city of Fuchun; it remained to be seen what could be built upon this 
foundation. 
 
                                               
79 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1134 and SGZ 39/Shu 9:985; Fang, Chronicle I, 293. 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 15: The Empire of Wu in 229 
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Introductory Summary: 
Though Sun Quan had claimed the imperial title in 229, and made some 
pretence of establishing the forms of an imperial court, the government of 
Wu continued to reflect the structure of a warlord state. In human terms, 
the period of the foundation of Wu had been dominated by military 
commanders who held their authority by their courage and energy and 
who were celebrated for their individualism, and it was no small 
achievement that Sun Quan was able to keep such a group under control. 
 Politics at court were largely dominated by the intrigues and conflicts 
of powerful individuals and families. In particular, unlike the bureaucracy 
of Han, substantial official positions, and particularly those involving the 
command of troops, were regularly transferred by inheritance from one 
generation to the next. In the course of time, however, there was a shift of 
influence in the central government from the first generation of men who 
had risen to power in the early years of the state, many of them from the 
north and all chosen for their personal ability and loyalty, to men from 
south of the Yangzi, whose families had prospered under the Sun 
regime.[464] 
 Outside the court and the capital, moreover, great independent 
authority was held by these local families, which consolidated their 
power through the acquisition of tenants and other dependents who 
sought protection from the uncertainty of the times and the demands of 
government. This development, already begun in the time of Han, meant 
that the power of the central government was limited, and its capacity to 
exploit the resources of the state was heavily restricted. To a degree, the 
                                               
*  In the first edition of Generals of the South, published in 1990, Chapter Eight 
occupied pages 463 to 532. The original pagination is indicated with brackets []; 
indexing and cross-references refer to those pages. 
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state of Wu was run for the protection and the benefit of the great 
families who were its nominal subjects. 
 In this respect, with the establishment of a separate state in the south, 
the produce and profits of trade were no longer drained away to the north, 
while the pressures of defensive war encouraged the colonisation of new 
territory. At the same time, the capital at Jianye was celebrated for its 
splendour, and scholars of Wu made substantial contributions to the 
culture of China as a whole. The ultimate achievement of Wu was the 
expansion of Chinese civilisation in the south, preparing that ground for 
centuries of independent survival after the non-Chinese seizure of the 
north in the early fourth century. 
 
The forms of government: 
Internally, Sun Quan's regime made gestures towards the formalities of an 
imperial court. In 221, when Sun Quan was enfeoffed as King of Wu by 
Cao Pi, Sun Shao of Beihai had been appointed Chancellor, Gu Yong was 
made Director of the Secretariat,1 [465] and some appointments were 
made to the traditional ministries of Han. By 229, Sun Shao was dead and 
Gu Yong had succeeded him as Chancellor, with authority over the 
business of the imperial secretariat. 
 At the lower level of central government, though some names and 
appointments are given, there is not a great deal of detail in the texts. It 
appears, however, that Sun Quan established only six of the nine 
ministries which had been maintained at the imperial court of Han, and 
those posts were not always filled: the titles were used rather as 
supernumerary honours for men of political importance, sometimes with 
substantial duties elsewhere, rather than as part of a practical 
administration.2 
                                               
1 Sun Shao has no regular biography in SGZ. The record of his death as Chancellor, 
however, appears in the chronicle for the year 225 in SGZ 47/Wu 2:1131, and there 
is a brief biography for him, taken from Wu lu, in PC attached to that entry. 
  The biography of Gu Yong is in SGZ 52/Wu 7:1225-28. A man from Wu 
commandery, he had been a pupil of the great scholar Cai Yong and at one time 
held appointment as Assistant in Kuaiji commandery, acting as Administrator for 
Sun Quan. 
2 The formal structure of the government of Wu is discussed in Sanguo huiyao 9 and 
10, in the various chapters of Lidai zhiguan biao, and in the compilation of Hong 
Yisun in ESWSBB II. ESWSBB II also contains tables of the senior civil and 
military appointments in Wu, compiled by Wan Sitong and Huang Dahua from the 
scattered references in early texts. 
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 One appointment should be noticed, that of the senior official and 
scholar Zhang Zhao. There had been surprise amongst the followers of 
Sun Quan when Zhang Zhao was not appointed Chancellor of the 
kingdom in 221, and the post was given instead to the rather less 
distinguished Sun Shao, an immigrant from the north. Then, when Sun 
Shao died in 225, Zhang Zhao was again passed over in favour of Gu 
Yong. On the first occasion, Sun Quan explained that he was doing 
Zhang Zhao a kindness, relieving him from an arduous responsibility; the 
second time he observed more specifically that Zhang Zhao was too strict 
and critical, and it would be embarrassing for both of them if he became 
the official head of the bureaucracy.3 In 229, however, we are told that 
Sun Quan was [466] even more open, and that he had long held a grudge 
against Zhang Zhao for advising surrender to Cao Cao before the Red 
Cliffs: 
When he had proclaimed himself Emperor, Sun Quan called an 
assembly of all his officials, and he attributed the accomplishment to 
Zhou Yu. Zhang Zhao held up his staff of office and prepared to 
recite the achievements and the virtues of the new Emperor. Before 
he had uttered a word, however, Sun Quan said, "If I had followed 
Lord Zhang's advice, I would now have been begging for my food." 
In great shame, Zhang Zhao fell to the ground, dripping with 
perspiration.4 
As far as official ranks and titles go, Zhang Zhao had been named 
General Who Supports Wu, with status next to the Excellencies, and he 
held a marquisate valued at ten thousand households, but he resigned all 
his offices soon after the proclamation of the empire. If Sun Quan, the 
master he had served so long and so loyally, had indeed behaved in such 
boorish fashion, this is hardly surprising. Zhang Zhao died in 236 at the 
age of eighty. We are told he devoted himself to scholarship, though he 
sometimes returned to court and quarrelled with Sun Quan, who would 
apologise and show him honour once more. It had always been an uneasy 
relationship. 
 The highest military commander of Wu was the Supreme General-in-
Chief Lu Xun, with concurrent appointment as Area Commander on the 
Right, giving formal responsibility for military discipline and court 
                                               
3 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1221; Fang, Chronicle I, 183. 
4 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1222 PC quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
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martial, and specific command of defences on the middle Yangzi.A His 
headquarters were at Wuchang, and in the ninth month of 229, when Sun 
Quan moved his capital from Wuchang back to Jianye, Lu Xun was left 
with administrative and military responsibility for Jing province and the 
region of Yuzhang, the whole western part of the empire of Wu.5[466] 
 Next after Lu Xun was the General-in-Chief and Area Commander 
on the Left Zhuge Jin, with headquarters at Gong'an on the Yangzi south 
of Jiangling, and a watching brief to the west against Shu.6 Lu Xun's 
position as forward commander on the north and west was taken by Bu 
Zhi, General of Elite Cavalry based at Xiling, close to the border with 
Shu through the Gorges and to the frontier against Wei.7 Also in Jing 
province there were armies under the General of Chariots and Cavalry 
Zhu Ran, concurrently Protector of the Army on the Right, and the 
General of the Right Pan Zhang.8 The region required serious occupation. 
 In the east, besides the forces under Sun Quan's direct command at 
Jianye, and the local troops which could be raised from Danyang, Wu and 
Kuaiji, the fortress of Ruxu, on the northern bank of the Yangzi, was 
commanded by the General of the Van Zhu Huan, who had succeeded 
Zhou Tai about 220, and who bore the Staff of Authority as reflection of 
his responsibilities for that exposed garrison.9 Until his death in 228, the 
Governor of Yang province had been Lü Fan, veteran servant of Sun Ce 
and Sun Quan, who had also been granted title of honour as Commander-
in-Chief.10 For the next several years, however, there appears to have 
been no appointment to that position, presumably because of the re-
establishment of the capital at Jianye, from where the territory could be 
supervised directly by Sun Quan's own staff. 
 In the far south, subject to the supervision of Lu Xun in Jing 
province, the territory of Jiao province was still controlled by Lü [468] 
                                               
A  The Chinese title dudu 都督 has appeared earlier as that of a comparatively junior 
officer responsible for military discipline: Chapter Three at 166 and note 28. Later, 
however, as here, it came to describe a senior commander with responsibility for a 
broad military region. I amend my rendering to reflect the change in function. 
5 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1135 and SGZ 58/Wu 13:1349. 
6 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1232 and 1235. 
7 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1237. Xiling was the new name given to the city of Yiling in Yidu 
commandery after the victory over Liu Bei in 222: SGZ 47/Wu 2:1126. 
8
 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1306 and SGZ 55/Wu 10:1300. 
9 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1313-14. 
10 He was awarded the title in 228, but died before he had received the insignia: SGZ 
56/Wu 11:1311. 
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Dai, holding title as General Who Maintains the South in Peace. Lü Dai's 
special status gave him authority over the whole region as a single unit, 
but elsewhere, in the rest of Wu territory, the commandery was the basis 
of civil government. The critical decisions of the state, however, were 
based on military considerations, and the essential posts were those of the 
generals in their various strategic garrisons. 
 This, indeed, is what one might expect of a warlord state. There was 
no way that a regional power such as Wu would find it appropriate or 
desirable to recreate the massive bureaucratic apparatus of the now 
deceased Han. Wei in the north had slightly higher pretensions, and the 
structure of government there, to some extent taken over from Han, is 
better documented and was certainly more complex. But all three states 
were brittle, dependent upon continued success, or at least competence, in 
war, and constitutional formalities were a luxury. The fall of Han 
demonstrated how much that dynasty had depended upon military force, 
but the long reign of the house of Liu had allowed a layer of civilian 
velvet to cover the iron hand of power; among the new states of the Three 
Kingdoms, the reality of war was too immediate to be concealed so 
effectively. 
 On the other hand, though policies were largely determined by men 
in military commands, those of more clerical or scholarly abilities still 
had a role to play. All armies required administrative support, and some 
men known for their scholarship were also recognised as practical 
counsellors, regardless of their fighting prowess or their ability to 
command troops in the field. Sun Quan himself needed advisors and 
secretaries to maintain the links of his power, while for the sake of 
prestige in dealing with his rivals and allies he also maintained a form of 
imperial government. And some prestige and influence could be found in 
appointment as an envoy.[469] 
 Relations between the contending parties of the Three Kingdoms 
were not maintained by long-term resident ministers: the conventions of 
modern diplomacy are a Western development, which can be traced to the 
rival states of Renaissance Italy but which were never approved in 
traditional China.11 On the contrary, if the servant of one state spent too 
                                               
11
 See, for example, Mattingley, Renaissance Diplomacy. On the Chinese pattern 
maintained at a different time but in comparable circumstances, see Franke, 
Diplomatic Missions, discussing the exchange of envoys between the Song dynasty 
and its northern rivals the Liao and Jin from the tenth to the thirteenth century. 
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long at the court of another, he faced the possibility of suspicion that he 
had changed sides, or had at least suffered undue influence. Zhang Hong 
was suspect for some time in Wu on account of his service at the court 
under Cao Cao's control,12 and Zhuge Jin, minister of Wu but a brother of 
Zhuge Liang in Shu, had to behave with great circumspection lest he be 
suspected of private dealings with the rival state.13 
 It was the normal pattern, therefore, that envoys were sent from one 
court to another on individual missions of limited duration, and the 
system was maintained even between allies. Though Wu and Shu 
exchanged regular embassies, neither kept an accredited minister at the 
court of the other, so information on policy was not assessed day-to-day, 
but only on the discrete reports of individual visitors.14[470] 
 The very nature of these embassies, moreover, tended to set them 
into a pattern of hostile repartee. When Xing Zhen came as envoy from 
Cao Pi for the enfeoffment of Sun Quan as King of Wu, he sought to 
enhance the status of his master by failing to get down from his carriage 
when he met with Sun Quan, but he was faced by Zhang Zhao and 
publicly abused by Xu Sheng.15 For the return embassy, ostensibly to give 
thanks, Sun Quan dispatched a certain Zhao Zi from Nanyang, who was 
known as a learned man of quick wit and repartee, and we are told that 
Zhao Zi debated with Cao Pi in his own court, extolling the merits of Sun 
Quan and the capacities of his servants.16 A few months later, when Cao 
Pi sought further tribute and also required Sun Deng as hostage, another 
ambassador, Shen Hang of Wu commandery, also noted as a scholar, was 
                                               
12 Chapter Four at 220-223. 
13 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1231-32 tells how Zhuge Jin was sent as an envoy to Liu Bei in 215. 
Liu Bei was then an ally of Sun Quan, but Zhuge Jin spoke with his brother only in 
public assemblies, never meeting him in private (deC, Establish Peace, 488). In 
221, however, when Zhuge Jin wrote to Liu Bei to urge that he should give up his 
plan of attacking Wu, he came under suspicion of dealing privately and 
treacherously with the enemy: SGZ 52/Wu 7:1232-33 and PC note 2 quoting 
Jiangbiao zhuan; Fang, Chronicle I, 50-52 and 74-75. 
14 For example, SGZ 47/Wu 2:1145, where we are told how visitors returning from 
Shu in 244 forecast a break in the alliance, but Sun Quan rightly assessed the 
information as mistaken. 
15 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1221 and SGZ 55/Wu 10:1298; Fang, Chronicle I, 58-59 and 88. 
16 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1123 and PC note 4 quoting Wu shu; Fang, Chronicle I, 59 and 88-
89. 
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sent to take the goods but to make apologies for not sending Sun Quan's 
heir. He was similarly tested by Cao Pi, and emerged with credit.17 
 In many instances, these envoys were not of great rank or 
significance in the politics between states. There was, of course, the 
example of Zhuge Liang in 208, arguing before the court of Sun Quan 
that it was possible and sensible to defy Cao Cao. Despite the eulogies of 
later romance and drama, however, Sun Quan and his advisers were well 
able to determine their own policy, and they were not to be convinced 
against their best interests.18 Again, the embassy of Deng Zhi, sent by 
Zhuge Liang from Shu in 223 to establish an alliance with the Wu against 
Wei after the death of Liu Bei, was an [471] occasion for delicate high-
level negotiation,19 and that of Chen Zhen in 229, recognising the 
imperial claim of Wu, was an important formality.20 On the other hand, 
when Sun Quan sent Zhang Wen on the return embassy to Shu, he 
apologised for giving him such a lowly task;21 while Shen Hang, when 
asked whether Sun Deng would indeed be sent to Wei, avoided the 
question by saying that he was not of sufficient rank to be informed about 
Sun Quan's true plans – hardly the statement of a man with 
plenipotentiary authority. And there was the embarrassment of Hao Zhou, 
the officer of Wei who was convinced Sun Quan would honour his 
agreements and send Sun Deng as hostage, and who offered Cao Pi the 
lives of his family in pledge. In the event, of course, such confidence 
proved quite misplaced, and although Hao Zhou's family was spared, his 
political career was ended.22 
 Even between allies, however, the game of one-upmanship appears 
to have been an essential part of the ritual of embassies. We are told there 
was one occasion a messenger from Shu-Han to Wu was particularly 
arrogant and boastful, so that Sun Quan, embarrassed and at a loss, 
wished for the wit of Zhang Zhao to combat such a turbulent envoy.23 
And in the biography of Xue Zong we are told how the envoy Zhang 
                                               
17 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1123 and 1124 PC note 6 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan; Fang, Chronicle 
I, 60-61 and 92-93. 
18 Chapter Four at 255-260. 
19 Chapter Seven at 434 and the biography of Deng Zhi in SGZ 45/Shu 15:1071-72; 
Fang, Chronicle I, 144-145 and 162-163. 
20
 Chapter Seven at 460. 
21 SGZ 57/Wu 12:1330; on the embassy, see below. 
22 Chapter Seven at 428-429. 
23 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1222; Fang, Chronicle I, 293-294. 
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Feng from Shu was making fun of ministers at the court of Wu until Xue 
Zong observed: 
What is Shu? When it has a dog, it is independent; 
when it has no dog, it is Shu. 
A sidelong eye and a bent body, 
and a worm going into its belly.[472] 
Zhang Feng challenged him to analyse the character Wu, and Xue Zong 
replied: 
With no mouth, it is Heaven; 
when it has a mouth, it is Wu. 
Its lord can deal with all nations, 
and it is the capital of the world.24 
Xue Zong had a gift for exchanging riddles in this fashion, and he was, 
more substantially, a long associate of Lü Dai in Jiao province and 
responsible for an important memorial on the history of the far south and 
on appropriate policy in that region.25 
One may doubt these exchanges did anything to improve relations, to 
encourage trust or to exchange useful information between allies, but 
perhaps we mistake the point: literary repartee was a part of Chinese 
tradition, and it formed an established genre in collections of anecdotes.26 
Displays of extempore wit enhanced the prestige of the ambassadors and 
of the scholars who debated them, they added a touch of liveliness and 
entertainment to the court, and they demonstrated the courage of the 
debaters and the tolerance of the ruler. The very presence of such guests 
from an alien power, received with courtesy and granted a patient 
hearing, at least showed a common interest and humanity – [473] and one 
may assume that, outside the public displays of court and banqueting hall, 
some meaningful discussion took place.27 
                                               
24 SGZ 53/Wu 8:1250-51 and PC note 2 with text criticism by Pei Songzhi. The first 
stanza plays with the character shu 蜀, referring first to its extension, with the 
addition of the "dog" radical, into du 獨 "independent," and then to its component 
parts; the first, second and fourth lines rhyme. The second stanza refers to the 
component parts of the character wu 吳, with kou 口 "mouth" and tian 天 
"Heaven"; the second and fourth lines rhyme. 
25 SGZ 53/Wu 7:1251-53, and see note 84 to Chapter Five. 
26
 One may consider the examples in Shishuo xinyu, translated by Mather, and 
particularly section 25, "Taunting and Teasing." 
27 Franke, Diplomatic Missions, 16 and 17, emphasises the importance of ritual and 
"play" as a means of controlling and civilising human and inter-state conduct. 
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 From the patterns of appointments and influence described, however, 
the government of Wu had limited concern for civil matters. As one 
example, by contrast to the state of Wei, there was no serious attempt to 
establish a program of engineering works and agricultural colonies which 
might rival the achievement of the enemy along the Huai.A We have 
reference to the appointment of Lu Xun to supervise the agricultural 
colonies at Haichang county near Hangzhou,28 and there was at some 
time a special agricultural region at Piling, along the southern shore of 
the Yangzi estuary. It seems likely that both these territories were the 
scene of colonisation: at Haichang there was opportunity for land 
reclamation and for production of salt from the sea, and at Piling there 
was marshland which offered room for the extension of irrigation 
agriculture. These, however, were local developments, and we may note 
that in 202 the county of Piling, together with three neighbouring 
counties, was granted as personal appanage to Zhu Zhi, general and 
Administrator in Wu commandery. Later, in 222, Zhu Zhi was enfeoffed 
as Marquis of Piling, and during the last years of Wu the same title was 
held by a grandson of Lu Xun, so the central government gained small 
advantage from any special measures in that region.29[474] 
 In 226, following the death of Cao Pi and the easing of the threat 
from the north, Sun Quan issued a proclamation urging that the people be 
encouraged to develop the work of agriculture. Lu Xun presented a 
memorial suggesting that military commanders should be involved in the 
colonisation of arable land, and Sun Quan made an enthusiastic response, 
announcing that he and his sons would personally take part in such work. 
The Treatise of Economics of Jin shu tells us that the state of Wu was 
thenceforward dedicated to agriculture and the raising of grain,30 but this 
                                                                                                                   
  In more modern terms, it is generally accepted in a democracy that the futile 
abuse and formal hostilities of public and parliamentary debate are marginal to real 
negotiations between different parties and political interests. 
A JS 26:784-86; Yang, "Economic History," 164-170, has an account of the many 
works of engineering and colonisation by officials of the Wei dynasty. 
28 Chapter Five at 338. 
29 On the establishment of the area subordinate to the Director of Agriculture for 
Piling, see Wu and Yang, 2938/1, and Zhongguo lishi ditu ji III, 26-27. On the 
appanage and later fief of Zhu Zhi, see SGZ 56/Wu 11:1303-04. On the marquisate 
of Piling held by Lu Jing, see SGZ 58/Wu 13:1360. 
30 Sun Quan's published statements are recorded in SGZ 47/Wu 2:1232-33, with 
reference to Lu Xun's intervention. Cf. JS 26:782-83; Yang, "Economic History," 
159. Indeed, Lu Xun's proposals may be interpreted not so much as giving priority 
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is surely an exaggeration, for the government was always concerned 
rather with military expansion than with agriculture. Some years later, in 
240, when there was a severe famine, Sun Quan was compelled to 
recognise that the demands of the army and of corvée work were 
interfering with farming, and he urged restraint on his military 
commanders and his local administrators.31 
 For the situation south of the Yangzi was different to that of the 
north. Cao Cao and his successors in Wei had been faced with the 
problems of a settled society disrupted by civil war. Agricultural colonies 
brought vagrant people under a new form of administrative control, and 
did much to ensure supply for operations against enemy forces with 
comparable difficulties. 
 In their frontier region of the south, however, the major concern of 
Sun Quan and his government was not so much to restore stability in 
Chinese settled areas, but to increase the numbers of [475] people and the 
amount of farmland under their control. Their chief interest and 
advantage lay in aggressive action beyond their immediate borders, not, 
as in the north, in settlement and defence of people who were already 
under their rule. It is true that their military activity relied upon a 
reasonably effective agricultural base, but this was not the top priority: at 
the simplest level of calculation, there was more advantage to Sun Quan 
in the conquest and colonisation of a village or settlement which had 
been outside the control of his government than there was in the marginal 
improvement of yield in some territory that was already settled and 
obedient. 
 So the situation of Wei called for effective mobilisation of the 
resources of land and people in a large but limited region, while the best 
plan for Wu was to increase those resources by expansion against an open 
frontier. There was no need for a sophisticated program of political and 
economic development, for the commandery and county structure of Han, 
suitably amended and intensified, allowed for consistent local aggression 
against the Chinese and non-Chinese people of the hills and valleys, and 
this steady pressure could be backed, where necessary, by particular 
military force. As each advance was made, the people were placed under 
the control of new counties, they were registered as citizens and subjects, 
                                                                                                                   
to agriculture, but simply encouraging military commanders to pay at least some 
attention to it in addition to their more obvious responsibilities. 
31 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1144. 
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and their human and economic resources were made available for further 
expansion against their neighbours or for defence across the Yangzi 
against the north. The development and maintenance of the state of Wu 
were neatly linked in a traditional policy of warfare and colonisation. 
 It is difficult to assess the speed of this expansion. We have noted the 
campaigns of He Qi, extending authority from the isolated coastal 
counties by present-day Fuzhou up the valleys of the Min River into 
present-day Jiangxi and southern Zhejiang,32 while Lu [476] Xun, Quan 
Zong and others gained control over the upper Zhe River south of the 
Huang Shan mountains.33 
 In 234, at the instigation of the energetic and ambitious Zhuge Ke, 
eldest son of Zhuge Jin, a new assault was launched against the hills 
people of Danyang. Zhuge Ke was named Administrator of the 
commandery, and was empowered to co-ordinate operations in the whole 
region. The citizens were held in a system of fortified villages, all 
communication with the hills was forbidden, troops were sent to collect 
any grain that was sown outside the area of control, and at the same time 
he offered amnesty to those who surrendered. We are told that forty 
thousand people were starved into submission, and the new recruits were 
divided among the various military commanders. This operation gave 
final consolidation to Chinese authority in the Huang Shan region 
between the Yangzi and the Zhe River,34 but the process continued 
elsewhere on the open frontier, sometimes by official campaigns, 
regularly by informal, undocumented, private enterprise. 
 The best method to assess the expansion of Wu is by comparison of 
the counties listed at the time of the census of Later Han, about 140, with 
those in the Treatise of Geography of Jin shu, compiled soon after the 
conquest in 280. Since Jin dynasty figures for population were based 
upon a taxation list, they cannot be taken as a full census and it is not 
meaningful to make comparison at that level. The existence of a county, 
however, is good evidence of Chinese control.[477>478] 
                                               
32 Chapter Five at 328-332. 
33 Chapters Five at 333-338 and Six at 441. 
34 The biography of Zhuge Ke is in SGZ 64/Wu 19:1429-42, with the account of the 
campaign against the hills people of Danyang in the middle 230s at 1431-32; Fang, 
Chronicle I, 441-442 and 519-520. The precise date of the program is given by 
SGZ 47/Wu 2, which records (at 1140) Zhuge Ke's appointment in 234 and (at 
1142) his successful return in 237. See also note 38 below. 
EMPIRE IN THE SOUTH 
 
 
371 
 
 
Map 16: Establishment of counties in the territory of Wu 
south of the Yangzi c.140-280 
 
On this basis, the change is remarkable. Between 140 and 280, within the 
territory of Wu south of the Yangzi, the number of counties doubled, and 
they occupied territories where no such establishment had been seen 
before.35 There were recognised settlements in present-day southern 
                                               
35 The accompanying map is based upon research discussed in deC, "Prefectures and 
Population." See also the work of Bielenstein, "The Chinese Colonisation of 
Fukien," 103-106. 
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Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Fujian, there was strong development in the far 
south along the West River and the coastal route from Guangzhou 
towards the Red River delta in Vietnam, and all the former frontier region 
south of the Yangzi was now consolidated under central government. 
Though initiative for that achievement came from the needs of the state 
of Wu, it was Jin which received its chief benefit: at the beginning of the 
fourth century, when that dynasty was driven from the north, the émigré 
court found refuge and eventual security in the lands which had been held 
and developed under Sun Quan and his successors.[479] 
 
Patterns in the later history of Wu (230-280): 
Born in 182, Sun Quan was a little under fifty years old when he took 
title as emperor. He died in 252, at the age of seventy sui,36 and his 
empire of Wu lasted fifty years until the conquest by Jin in 280. In a 
sense, Sun Quan's proclamation of 229 may be regarded as a mid-point in 
the imperial history of his family, from the first achievements of Sun Jian 
in the 180s to the fall of dynastic fortune a hundred years later. 
 In the early years after the claim to empire, Sun Quan attempted to 
expand his ambitions to an imperial scale. Besides his interests in the 
south, where he re-established a Chinese presence on the island of 
Hainan,37 there were emissaries from Funan and other countries beyond 
                                                                                                                   
  The map shows county establishments of Later Han and Western Jin for the 
region of Wu from the Yangzi south to the Red River delta. In this territory, the 
number of counties had doubled, from 160 to 322. In Shu-Han during the same 
period, the number of counties increased by only 20 per cent, from 117 to 141 and 
some expansion to the far south was balanced by withdrawal in the west. 
  On the lists of commandery and county units in the Xu Han shu of Sima Biao, 
now forming the Treatise of Administrative Geography attached to the Hou Han 
shu of Fan Ye, see Chapter One at 7 and note 10. The arrangement of Jin shu 14-
15, the Treatise of Geography, is similar, and relates to the early years of the 
Taikang period, which was proclaimed after the conquest of Wu in 280. The list of 
counties is generally reliable, but population figures are given only by households, 
and these are low and summary. Bielenstein, "Census," 154-155, argues that they 
are taxation figures, numbering only able-bodied males, and they cannot be 
usefully compared to the figures for Later Han, which reflect a complete poll-
count. 
36
 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1147. 
37 The conquest of Hainan in 241, and the restoration of the Han territories of Zhuyai 
and Dan'er, is recorded in SGZ 47/Wu 2:1145 (cf. Chapter One at 36-37). We are 
told, however, that the expedition required thirty thousand troops. 
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the southern seas.38 In 230 Sun Quan despatched a force to [480] take 
control of non-Chinese people on the island of Taiwan, and he sought 
                                               
38 An embassy from King Fan Xun of Funan is recorded in the chronicle for 242, just 
after the conquest of Hainan: SGZ 47/Wu 2:1145. Liang shu 54:783, also tells us 
that the envoys Zhu Ying and Kang Tai were sent out on courtesy visits. On their 
return, both men wrote accounts of Funan, and fragments of the work of Kang Tai 
have been preserved. They were surely also given instructions to examine the 
strength of the kingdoms to the south, but the Wu government was evidently 
persuaded that Funan could not be brought under direct control. See Wang, "The 
Nan-hai Trade," 33, and Hall, Maritime Trade and State Development, 38, 48-68, 
also Chapter One at 40 and Chapter Seven at 446. 
  Liang shu 54:798 also says that in 226 a merchant from Daqin named Qin Lun 
came to Jiaozhi and was sent on to the court of Wu. It is generally accepted that the 
name Daqin indicated the Roman empire, though details of the route there and the 
significance of the Chinese descriptions of that region have long been a source of 
controversy. The basic Chinese texts for this period are HHS 88/78:2919-20,and 
SGZ 30:860-62 PC quoting Wei lue. 
  The surname given for Qin Lun 秦論 is quite likely an ethnikon, in the same 
fashion as that of the celebrated Buddhist missionaries An Shigao 安世高, a man 
from Parthia (Anxi 安息), and Kang Senghui 康僧會, whose family came from 
Sogdiana (Kangju 康居): see, for example, Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest I, 26 and 
47. It may even be that the whole name of Qin Lun should be understood as 
"Discussant (論 lun) of [Da]qin." 
  HHS 7:318 and HHS 88/78:2920 record an earlier mission from Daqin, also 
approaching by the southern sea route, which was received at the court of Emperor 
Huan of Han in 166. It is most unlikely that these earlier visitors were accredited 
envoys; one must assume that they too were enterprising merchants, from 
whatever real place of origin, who sought prestige and profit from the trade and 
generosity of the Chinese court. 
  There is difficulty with the dating given by Liang shu 54 for the visit by Qin 
Lun. The year is named specifically as Huangwu 5, equivalent to 226, but we are 
told that Qin Lun was first received by the Administrator of Jiaozhi commandery, 
Wu Miao. 226, however, was the year Jiaozhi was seized from the Shi family by 
Lü Dai, we have a detailed account of the appointments in that important region 
during that year, and Wu Miao is not mentioned (Chapter Seven at 445). Moreover, 
the record goes on to tell how Qin Lun was at the court of Sun Quan when Zhuge 
Ke returned from his expedition of colonisation and expansion in Danyang: he 
brought back some dwarf men, or at least people of small stature, presumably 
aborigines of the hills, and Qin Lun remarked that he had not seen people like that 
before. Yet we know Zhuge Ke began that campaign in 234 and did not conclude it 
until 237, and it is most unlikely that Qin Lun stayed at the court of Wu for ten 
years. 
  Despite uncertainties, I believe the visit did take place, probably in the 230s. 
Admittedly, Wu Miao is not mentioned anywhere in the records of Sanguo zhi, but 
it is possible there was an Administrator of that name in Jiaozhi some time after 
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diplomatic relations and an effective alliance with the Gongsun state in 
Liaodong, present-day southern Manchuria. Neither of these initiatives 
was successful.[481] 
 The history remarks succinctly of the expedition to Taiwan that the 
gains did not repay the costs,39 and the contact with Gongsun Yuan, north 
across the Yellow Sea, was made difficult and ultimately impossible by 
the dangers of the weather off the Shandong peninsula, interference and 
ambush by the naval forces of Wei, and a lack of any firm commitment 
on the part of Gongsun Yuan himself, who ambushed and plundered a 
major embassy from Wu in 233. Eventually, in 238, armies of Wei under 
Guanqiu Jian and Sima Yi destroyed Gongsun Yuan and incorporated his 
state into the northern empire. Sun Quan could do nothing to help his 
erstwhile ally and hoped-for vassal.40 
 Indeed, behind these imaginative enterprises, the formal military 
history was not impressive. Despite several attempts, the armies of Wu 
were unable to break the defences of Wei in the region of Hefei, and 
those defences were confirmed by the construction of a "New City" at 
Hefei during the 230s.41 Perhaps the greatest opportunity, [482] and the 
                                                                                                                   
the conquest by Wu, while the date 226 appears a natural error: it was the time that 
the authority of Sun Quan first extended over the whole of south China, and was 
thus an obvious date for a later writer to identify. 
39 On this project, and the objections offered by Lu Xun and Quan Zong, see SGZ 
47/Wu 2:1136, SGZ 58/Wu 13:1350 and SGZ 60/Wu 15:1383; Fang, Chronicle I, 
314, 323-326 and 337. 
  The original commission called for the conquest not only of Yizhou 夷洲 
"Barbarian Island,"generally identified as the island of Taiwan, but also of Tanzhou 
亶洲, perhaps the Ryukyus. A few thousand people from Yizhou were brought 
back, but the expedition failed to reach Tanzhou, which was too far away. SGZ 
58/Wu 13 remarks that the gains did not cover the costs, SGZ 60/Wu 15 says that 
eighty or ninety per cent of the expeditionary force died of illness, and SGZ 47/Wu 
2 tells how the unfortunate commanders returned one year later, and were put to 
death for their failure. 
40 The biography of Gongsun Yuan is at in SGZ 8:253-61. On the abortive 
relationship, see Gardiner, "The Kung-sun Warlords II," 150-157. The embassy of 
233 was intended to enfeoff Gongsun Yuan as King of Yan 燕王, a title taken from 
the name of an ancient state in north China. Its unkind treatment is described at 
SGZ 8:253 and in a memorial sent by Gongsun Yuan to the court of Wei, cited by 
SGZ 8: 254-55 PC note 1 quoting Wei lue; Gardiner has a detailed account at 153-
156. 
41 On the building of the New City at Hefei, see the biography of the Wei general 
Man Chong in SGZ 26:724-25; Fang, Chronicle I, 385-386 and 412. SGZ 47/Wu 
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greatest failure, occurred in 255, when Guanqiu Jian and others seized the 
city of Shouchun in a rebellion against the political dominance of the 
Sima family in Wei. They asked for help from Wu, but the court had been 
disrupted by internal feuding after Sun Quan's death and could provide 
no effective assistance, so Guanqiu Jian was destroyed. In 257 another 
general of Wei, Zhuge Dan, likewise rebelled at Shouchun and also 
sought assistance from the south, but the city was recaptured in the 
following year and the northern hold on the line of the Huai was 
confirmed.42 
 In similar fashion, though more understandably, given the 
geographical and political difficulties, the state of Wu could make no 
gains in the west towards present-day Sichuan and the state of Shu-Han. 
As early as 234, the death of the great minister and general Zhuge Liang 
brought signs of potential disorder in Shu, and the court of Sun Quan 
contemplated intervention but could not arrange a program.43 Still more 
seriously, in 263, when the armies of Wei began their final attack on the 
west and the government of Shu asked aid from Wu, there was little they 
could do. Rebellion in Vietnam prevented a full military commitment 
elsewhere, and though the forces of Wu sought to mount attacks along the 
Han and across the Huai, they were not sufficiently energetic or 
successful to distract the armies of the north from their conquest in the 
west.44 Again, after Shu surrendered, the Wu attempted to salvage 
something from [483] the wreckage by an advance up the Yangzi to take 
                                                                                                                   
2:1136 appears to date the enterprise to 230, but the record in the biography of 
Man Chong appears more consistent. 
  The important point about the New City was that it was established some thirty 
li (twenty kilometres) from the nearest lake of the region, and was closer to 
Shouchun in the north. It could thus be supported by the land-based armies of Wei, 
and was more difficult for attack by the forces of Wu, which relied upon water 
routes. 
42 The biography of Guanqiu Jian is in SGZ 28, with the account of his rebellion at 
763-66. The biography of Zhuge Dan is also in SGZ 28, and the account of his 
rebellion is at 770-73. On the course of operations about Shouchun, see Fang, 
Chronicle II, 190-196, 259-264 and 290-294. 
43 SGZ 45/Shu 15:1075-76, being the biography of Zong Yu, who was sent at that 
time as an envoy to Wu; Fang, Chronicle I, 441. 
44 See, for example, SGZ 48/Wu 3:1161; Fang, Chronicle II, 405 and 411. 
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over the eastern territories of their late ally, but they were blocked at the 
Gorges and gained nothing.45 
 And in the end, after the Jin dynasty of the Sima family had taken 
over the government of Wei in 265/266, the sheer power of that new 
state, combining the north and the west of China, ensured that the 
independence of Wu could not be maintained. Long-planned, the final 
invasion was made with overwhelming force and resulted in predictable 
triumph. Sun Hao, grandson of Sun Quan and last ruler of Wu, ended his 
days as a subject of Jin, with the title Marquis Who Returns to 
Obedience.46 
 For the government of Wu, the long reign of Sun Quan provided a 
welcome stability and a contrast to the situation in Wei: there, after Cao 
Pi had reigned only seven years, his son and successor Cao Rui died in 
239, leaving only an adoptive son, nine years old, and bringing thereby 
great weakness to the dynasty. In Shu-Han, though Liu Shan, son of Liu 
Bei, was sovereign from 223 to his defeat and surrender in 263, no-one 
regarded him as an effective ruler. 
 Sun Quan's very longevity, however, brought difficulties for his 
successors and misfortune at his death. His eldest son Sun Deng died in 
241.47 The next surviving son, Sun He, replaced him as Heir, but his 
position was bedevilled by feuding between those who supported Sun He 
and another faction which encouraged his uterine younger brother Sun Ba 
against him. In 250 Sun He was [484] deposed while Sun Ba was 
compelled to commit suicide,48 and though the elderly Sun Quan later 
considered restoring Sun He, he was persuaded instead to allow the 
succession to pass to his seventh and youngest son, the seven-year old 
Sun Liang, under the guardianship of Zhuge Ke.49 
                                               
45 See, for example, the biography of Luo Xian from Xiangyang ji, quoted in SGZ 
41/Shu 11:1008-09 PC; Fang, Chronicle II, 460-461 and 463-464. Luo Xian was a 
general of Shu who held back the advance of Wu at the border fortress of Yongan 
on the Yangzi, and later surrendered to Wei. 
46 SGZ 48/Wu 3:1177: the title Guiming hou 歸命侯 may be understood more 
literally as "Marquis Who Turns to [and accepts] the Mandate [of Heaven awarded 
to the Emperor of Jin]." 
47 The biographies of Sun Deng and four of his brothers are in SGZ 59/Wu 14. The 
death of Sun Deng, aged in his early thirties, is recorded at 1365. 
48
 See, for example, SGZ 59/Wu 14:1368-69 and 1371-72; Fang, Chronicle I, 651-
652, 682-685, II, 70-71  
49 SGZ 59/Wu 14:1370 PC note 3 quoting Wu shu; SGZ 64/Wu 19:1433-34 PC note 1 
quoting Wu shu; Fang, Chronicle II, 86-88. 
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 This was a recipe for further intrigue and instability. In 253, eighteen 
months after the death of Sun Quan and following a disastrous attack 
against Hefei, Zhuge Ke was assassinated by Sun Liang under the 
influence of Sun Jun, a distant cadet of the imperial family descended 
from a younger brother of Sun Jian. When Sun Jun died in 256, his 
cousin Sun Lin succeeded to his dominant position at a restless court.50 
Sun Jun's former ally Teng Yin made an unsuccessful attempt at a coup 
against Sun Lin,51 and in 258 Sun Liang, now in his mid teens, sought to 
remove the over-powerful minister, but was defeated and dethroned. Sun 
Lin replaced him with Sun Xiu, sixth son of Sun Quan and some twenty-
two years old.52 A few months later, Sun Xiu managed a successful coup 
against Sun Lin and took power himself.53 
 Apart from this achievement, however, the government of Sun Xiu 
was not particularly effective, and his death in 264 came just at [485] the 
time when the state of Shu had surrendered to Wei in the west. In that 
period of emergency, Sun Hao, son of the former Heir Sun He and aged 
in his early twenties, was chosen as an adult ruler who might restore the 
energy and fortunes of the state.54 He achieved only limited success, 
however, and indeed in the long term there was little to be hoped for 
against the might of Jin.55 
 So, after the three founders, Cao Cao, Liu Bei and Sun Quan, few of 
their successors in any of the rival dynasties were able to maintain real 
authority. It is possible that an energetic central government in Wu might 
have responded more effectively to the crisis of the 260s, but the 
                                                                                                                   
  Zhuge Ke thus held comparable position to that of his uncle Zhuge Liang in 
Shu-Han a generation earlier. His record was less successful, but the family 
achievement was remarkable. 
50 Fang, Chronicle II, 134-137 and 240. The biographies of Sun Jun and of Sun Lin 
are in SGZ 64/Wu 19, that of Sun Jun is at 1444-46, and that of Sun Lin at 1446-
51. 
51 Fang, Chronicle II, 240-241. The biography of Teng Yin is in SGZ 64/Wu 19:1443-
44. 
52 SGZ 48/Wu 3:1155; Fang, Chronicle II, 295-298. 
53 SGZ 48/Wu 3:1157; Fang, Chronicle II, 301-302. 
54 SGZ 48/Wu 3:1162; Fang, Chronicle II, 464-465. 
55 Sun Hao is commonly criticised as an oppressive ruler and a man of poor moral 
fibre. There is some evidence to support the argument, but his reputation suffers 
from the historical tradition that the last sovereign of a conquered state must, by 
definition, be lacking in virtue – and the difficulties of his situation might excuse 
some harsh and ill-considered words and deeds. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
 
378 
confusions at court were a reflection of inherent weaknesses in the very 
structure of the state, and it is questionable if any later sovereign could 
have established real control. 
 Despite these internal problems, there was one basic reason for the 
long independence of Wu, and that was the notable difficulty of 
conquering the state or even defeating it. The geography of the Yangzi, 
from the Gorges to the sea, presented a most effective barrier for defence; 
and military capacity of the time was not sufficient for any side in the 
civil war to win a decisive victory. 
 One can go further. There is no question that minor skirmishes and 
raids could be carried out with intense ferocity, and middle-range 
engagements, such as those of Sun Ce and Sun Quan against Huang Zu, 
when the fortunes of the nascent states within a particular region 
depended on the outcome, were frequently intense and [486] bloody.56 
Above this level, however, the armies and navies of the major contenders 
were neither trained nor equipped to inflict substantial damage on one 
another. The masses of men were collected from many different groups, 
there was no system of communication to co-ordinate their manoeuvres, 
and it was all their commanders could do to keep them together - 
frequently it proved to be more than they could do. Most great campaigns 
were stalemated, and a result was achieved only when one side or another 
suffered a breakdown of control, a collapse of morale, and a panicked 
retreat. 
 Of the three most important engagements in this period, none was 
decided by direct and simple combat. Instead, victory was achieved by 
the commander who maintained his own force intact while his enemy's 
disintegrated. 
 At Guandu in 200, Cao Cao set defence lines and held off an attack 
by Yuan Shao, then sent a raiding party which intercepted the enemy 
supply trains; Yuan Shao's great army dissolved and fled.57 At the Red 
Cliffs in 208, there was some indecisive early fighting, but Huang Gai's 
attack with fire-ships precipitated the retreat or rout of the invader.58 In 
                                               
56 See, for example, Chapter Three at 191 and Chapter Four at 240-241. Descriptions 
of the battles may have gained from literary embellishment, but they were serious 
engagements, hard-fought on both sides. 
57
 A description of the battle of Guandu, taken from a number of texts, appears in 
ZZTJ 63:2032-35; deC, Establish Peace, 283-289. See also Leban, "Ts'ao Ts'ao," 
316-381, and deC, Imperial Warlord, 135-152. 
58 Chapter Four at 268-269. 
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the campaign by the Yangzi Gorges in 222, Lu Xun refused battle against 
Liu Bei and waited until his enemy had become jaded and careless; then 
he launched an attack at one strategic point, and the whole of the Shu 
position collapsed.59 
 One may argue exceptions to the general rule, and Cao Cao did 
achieve remarkable successes in battle, as in his victory over [487] the 
Wuhuan in 207,60 and his destruction of the north-western warlords in 
211.61 On both occasions, however, he was dealing with an unstable 
military alliance, and his success owed a great deal to the surprise effect 
created by his strategy of oblique approach. In ideal fashion, the enemy 
had been demoralised by manoeuvre before the armies made physical 
contact.62 
 There is one occasion that a reasonably coherent Chinese army 
defeated another in combat, and that is the campaign in Hanzhong during 
219: Cao Cao's general Xiahou Yuan was defeated and killed in a 
substantial encounter at Dingjun Mountain, and Liu Bei took the 
commander. Cao Cao's forces, however, were rallied by Xiahou Yuan's 
lieutenant Zhang Ge, and they held their ground for several months. In 
the end it was the difficulty of supply through the Qin Ling passes, 
coupled with an increasing desertion rate among his troops, which 
compelled Cao Cao to order retreat.63 The death of Xiahou Yuan was a 
notable event, and the achievement of Zhang Ge is a tribute to his own 
abilities and to the coherence of the army, but the example tests and 
proves the rule: the final result of the campaign was not determined by a 
single battle, but by more general questions of strategy, supply and 
morale. 
 For the armies of this time were ramshackle affairs. The regular 
forces of the Han dynasty, professional soldiers based at the capital and 
experienced troops on the northern frontier, were well-disciplined and 
efficient, comparable to, though not necessarily of [488] such a high 
                                               
59 Chapter Seven at 423-424. 
60 See deC, Northern Frontier, 408-411. 
61 See deC, Northern Frontier, 163-165. 
62 One should not forget that Cao Cao wrote a notable commentary to the Book of the 
Art of War of Sun Wu. 
63 Chapter Six at 390-391. An account of the campaign in Hanzhong commandery, 
taken from a number of texts, appears in ZZTJ 68:2156-58; deC, Establish Peace, 
524-527. 
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standard as, the legionaries of contemporary Rome.64 From the end of the 
reign of Emperor Ling, however, the mobilisations required to deal with 
rebellion and civil war brought vast numbers of men to the competing 
banners, and there were neither time nor resources to train them properly. 
Many men with experience in the old imperial army gained advancement 
as commanders of the new recruits, but their units were overwhelmed by 
the hordes of newcomers, and the traditions, skills and discipline were 
lost. 
 There was some basic organisation in the armies of the contending 
warlords, such as the obvious division between horsemen and foot-
soldiers, and we have observed that a commanding officer would 
surround himself with a core of Companions, skilled soldiers who owed 
him personal allegiance and served as body-guards. As for equipment, 
uniforms, supply and general co-ordination, however, the texts indicate 
either that they were completely lacking or, when they were present, it 
was considered exceptional. For the most part, these armies were simple 
armed mobs, with soldiers driven variously by loyalty or fear of their 
commanders, by personal desperation, and by the hope of plunder to 
enhance their miserable lives. And they were accompanied by a mass of 
camp-followers – sometimes these were wives and children, but more 
normally they were cooks and prostitutes, peddlers and gamblers, and a 
few who specialised in care of the sick and wounded. 
 The command structure and fighting techniques of these armies were 
based upon small groups of men dependent upon individual leaders. The 
heart of each unit of battle was the commander himself, supported by his 
Companions, and the most important tactic was expressed in the common 
phrase "break the enemy line." In [489] aggressive action, the 
commander and his Companions acted as spearhead for a drive at the 
enemy array, and if they were successful they could hope to be followed 
by the mass of their followers, spreading out to exploit success and to 
attack the broken enemy from the flank and the rear. 
 As a technique of battle, such a system is well known. It was 
certainly used by Alexander the Great, and in sophisticated form it was 
the essence of German Blitzkrieg in the Second World War: concentration 
of force at a particular point, breakthrough by shock, and swift 
exploitation to roll up enemy positions left and right and disrupt their 
                                               
64 On the regular military organisation of Later Han, see Chapter One at 62-64, deC, 
Northern Frontier, 45-52, and deC, Fire over Luoyang, 151-160. 
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lines of supply. In earlier modern times, one may observe a similarity 
with the "forlorn hope," establishing a position within the enemy defence 
line as preparation for a full assault.65 
 Though the tactics are the same, however, the method is 
disconcertingly different when it is applied without the advantages of 
armoured transport or the confidence of disciplined support behind it. For 
a primitive army, such a style of attack requires immense courage by the 
leader and his immediate followers, and a high level of personal authority 
to attract the main body of his men to follow in the charge. 
 In one of Sun Jian's earliest engagements, the attack upon Wan city 
at the time of the Yellow Turban rebellion, we have a description of this 
form of attack against fortifications: 
Sun Jian himself was responsible for one side of the siege. He 
climbed the wall and was the first to get in. The soldiers swarmed 
[490] like ants to follow him, and because of this they completely 
defeated the enemy.66 
The story may over-emphasise Sun Jian's achievement, but the position 
of leader and followers is well displayed. And there are repeated accounts 
of personal heroism by the commanders of one side or another during 
later years. We may call to mind the gallant attack of Dong Xi and Ling 
Tong against the defences of Huang Zu at Xiakou in 208 and, from the 
other side, the sortie of Zhang Liao and his men which humiliated Sun 
Quan's army before Hefei in 215.67 
 This reliance upon leadership, mass and morale is a natural technique 
for dealing with the problems of an ill-disciplined force, and the approach 
can be identified in the pre-Qin book of Mozi.68 For more recent times, 
Huang has given a similar description of the armies of the late Ming 
dynasty operating against the Manchus. We are told that Western 
observers regarded the Chinese forces as being of poor combat quality, 
                                               
65 The English expression is a corruption of the Dutch verloren hoop "lost troop." 
This group of picked men, generally volunteers, was sent to establish a position 
within enemy lines, particularly inside the breach of a wall, and the main body of 
attackers would then seek to exploit this initiative. 
66 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1094; deC, Biography, 32-33. In Chapter Two at 90, however, I 
suggest that the account of the campaign in Sun Jian's biography is simplified, and 
the description of his achievements may be exaggerated. 
67 See Chapter Four at 240 and Chapter Six at 377-378. 
68 See, for example, the chapter Bei yifu 僃蛾傅 of the book of Mozi. 
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which they sought to make up for by simple numerical strength. The 
clumsy mass could not be manoeuvred, but 
It needed an elite corps of highly seasoned fighters to open up 
avenues of attack so that the bulk of the soldiers could then swarm in 
behind them, sustain the momentum of the attack, and exploit the 
results. These battle formations were nonetheless commanded by 
men of courage, who were themselves versed in [491] the martial 
arts and who personally led their soldiers in valiant charges.69 
Inevitably, the role for the high command of such an army was very 
limited. A major force, perhaps thirty thousand men, occupied a great 
area of ground, and placed heavy demands on the resources of an even 
wider territory. It was composed of disparate units with individual 
leaders, a great part of whose time was spent in foraging, while limited 
means of communication restricted any attempts at control and 
manoeuvre. And the cohesion of such a mass was particularly at risk 
when on the move: if an advance or an attack was checked, a notable 
leader discomfited or slain, numbers of men would be confused and 
uncertain, and could rapidly fall into panic and flight. There was small 
opportunity for sophisticated tactics or strategy, there must have been a 
constant concern about morale, and every general had to recognise that 
the mass of troops and weapons at his command was both brittle and 
volatile. 
 So great advantage lay with the defence, and the sensible plan was to 
wait for the enemy to commit himself, to hope and expect that he would 
suffer some check, and to strike then at his most vulnerable point. Such a 
program, to wait for the right moment, to identify it, and to seize it, called 
for swift judgement and considerable moral courage, but in general terms 
the situation favoured the defence and, so long as there was no excessive 
commitment to any particular sortie, a minor set-back could usually be 
restored. In effect, a well-conducted and determined defence would 
expect to hold out for a substantial length of time, and there was always 
the possibility that the attacker could be caught off balance and driven to 
utter ruin. 
 These comments apply with still greater force to the naval defence of 
the Yangzi. As we have discussed, in the aftermath of the Red [492] 
Cliffs, Cao Cao lost possession of Jiangling and the fleet that was based 
                                               
69 Cambridge History of China VII, 579-580 [Huang,"The Lung-ch'ing and Wan-li 
reigns, 1567-1620"]. 
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there. Thereafter ships could be prepared in the north for an expedition 
down the Han River, but the route led through swamp and marsh-land, it 
was vulnerable to flank attack, and the state of Wu could make full 
preparations to greet the invaders. Otherwise, for the length of the Yangzi 
from the Gorges to the sea, the Wei had no position on the bank and no 
water-borne access, and although Cao Pi made several attempts to cross 
the lower Yangzi, the difficulties proved insuperable. Without a 
permanent base on the river, his ships had to be brought from the Huai by 
portage or canal, and it was out of the question that they could rival those 
of Wu. From Jiangling, Wuchang, Ruxu and Jianye, the defence could 
move to cover any incursion – and they had, of course, ample warning of 
the advance. So long as the fleet of Wu remained in being, no attack from 
the north had any prospect of success. 
 In corollary, despite many efforts and several opportunities the men 
of Wu failed to gain any position beyond the Yangzi. The forward 
defences of Wei, at the New City of Hefei and the strategic base at 
Shouchun, remained unattainable to the southern armies, and most of the 
region between the Yangzi and the Huai was a no-man's land between 
two rivals - with raids and destruction from both sides, neither could 
establish a settled presence. In the long run, from the point of view of 
population and expansion, this stalemate worked to the disadvantage of 
Wu, but the final conquest took place only after the fall of Shu-Han in 
Sichuan, when the forces of Jin could mobilise a massive fleet on the 
upper Yangzi, sail it through the Gorges, and demolish the navy of Wu on 
their own home waters.70[493] 
 
Society and economics 
We have considered the proclamation of empire as a mid-point in the 
history of the dynasty of the Sun family and their state of Wu, and 
although the date itself is not critical, it may be looked upon as one 
marker in the steady transition from an aggressive military regime to a 
less ambitious regional government. To put it another way, from the 190s 
to the 220s Sun Ce and Sun Quan had been the leaders of a dynamic 
enterprise which sought successfully to extend its power from the lower 
                                               
70 For earlier discussion of this question, see Some Notes on Ships and Naval Warfare 
in Chapter Four, The Defences of Yang province in Chapter Five and Security in 
the North in Chapter Seven. On the campaign of the admiral Wang Jun in 280, see 
his biography in JS 42:1208-10, translated, summarised and discussed by 
Needham, Science and Civilisation IV:3, 694-695. 
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Yangzi westwards into Jing province and then across the far south. After 
that time, however, following the defeat of Liu Bei in 222, the northern 
and western frontiers of the state were largely fixed, and despite Sun 
Quan's ambitions and efforts they did not develop further. It was not so 
much that there were no more worlds to conquer, for indeed there were; 
but the power of Wu had reached the limits of its capability. The 
resources of the south had shown themselves sufficient to maintain a state 
of independence, but they were by no means adequate for the conquest of 
the other great regions of the old Han empire. The days of heroic 
expansion were over. 
 In these circumstances, and with the lapse of time, one may also 
observe a change in the nature of the state itself. In discussion of Wu, the 
modern scholar Tang Changru has described the Sun family as little more 
than leaders of an alliance of clans. Emphasising the local status of the 
Sun in their home county of Fuchun, he suggests that though the family 
was of minimal national importance it was nonetheless powerful in that 
locality.71 Tang observes also that the groups which joined the alliance 
under the Sun may be considered under two heads: those indigenous to 
the south, particularly to the region of Kuaiji, Wu and Danyang, and 
those [494] who had come as recent emigrés from the north of the 
Yangzi. And he points out that although the northerners occupied 
important positions in the regime during its early years, by the closing 
period of Wu the high positions of state were held by men whose families 
had been established in the south since long before the end of Han.72 
 On his own terms, Tang is correct. The last men of northern descent 
to hold substantial power in Wu were Zhuge Ke, the powerful minister 
assassinated in 253, and the unsuccessful Teng Yin, destroyed in 258. 
Thereafter the government was essentially in the hands of the cadets and 
relatives of the Sun clan and other men from the south. 
 However, when we consider the origins and early history of the state, 
it is less easy to look upon Sun Ce and the young Sun Quan as no more 
than leaders of a gentry alliance; or, if we are to do that, there remains the 
question why it was the Sun who succeeded where many others of 
potentially greater power and authority had failed. 
 It is, for example, perfectly true that Sun Jian and his sons were of 
some local status, but it is difficult to argue convincingly that medium 
                                               
71 Tang Changru [1955], 19. 
72 Tang Changru [1955], 23. 
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prosperity in an outlying area gave them rank and authority that would be 
recognised by any truly powerful clan in Kuaiji commandery as a whole, 
and I have sought to demonstrate in earlier chapters that Sun Jian and Sun 
Ce were consistently placed at disadvantage by their lack of real social 
standing. Whether we consider the relationship of Sun Jian with Yuan 
Shu, or the impossibility of Sun Ce making a serious attempt against Cao 
Cao's hold of the emperor in 200, we are surely dealing with men who 
would, at best, have been regarded as parvenus by their competitors for 
power. 
 And this picture is confirmed by the origins of the commanders who 
followed Sun Jian and his son during the 180s and 190s. Han [495] Dang, 
for example, came from Liaoxi commandery in the northeast; he was 
favoured by Sun Jian for his fighting skills, but he had gained no 
advancement in the regular imperial army because he was not a man of 
family.73 Zhu Zhi of Danyang was probably one of Sun Jian's first 
followers, and was certainly in his service by 188,74 while Huang Gai, 
commander of the fire-ships at the Red Cliffs, was a man from Lingling 
who joined Sun Jian in Changsha at the beginning of the civil war.75 Jiang 
Qin and Zhou Tai from Jiujiang, Chen Wu from Lujiang and Lü Fan of 
Runan were fighting men who chose to follow Sun Ce at the very 
beginning of his career in the early 190s.76 None of these men came from 
Kuaiji, and they joined Sun Jian and Sun Ce because of their personal 
authority and ability, not because of any family or local connection. 
 Even in his nominal home country south of the Yangzi, moreover, 
Sun Ce had to face two dangerous sets of rivals: at one level, there was 
the Governor Liu Yao and administrators such as Xu Gong and Wang 
Lang, all men of rank and family; and at the same time there were local 
magnates who had no respect for the pretensions of the young warlord, 
and who were only brought to heel by battle and death. Eventually, when 
the conquest was complete, the great clans of the region were compelled 
to accept the hegemony of the Sun, but that leadership amongst the 
gentry was neither willingly granted nor easily achieved, and the first 
notable recruits to the cause were men such as Dong Xi of Kuaiji, a big 
man noted for his skill at arms,77 Ling Cao of Wu commandery, [496] 
                                               
73 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1285 and 1286 PC note 1 quoting Wu shu. 
74
 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1303. 
75 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1284. 
76 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1286, SGZ 55/Wu 10:1287 and SGZ 55/Wu 10:1289. 
77 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1290. 
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who is described specifically as soldier of fortune,78 and Xu Sheng who 
had come to Wu commandery as a refugee from Langye.79 
 Indeed, Sun Ce and his companions may better be regarded as 
vagabond adventurers than as recognised gentry. Certainly Zhou Yu and 
others came from notable families, but they were entering a time of civil 
war, they realised the dangers and the opportunities, and they resolved to 
take their chances with a young and energetic commander. So the allies 
with whom Sun Ce and Sun Quan first established their position were 
serious military men, whose position as members of the gentry at one 
level or another gave them the means to gather troops – retainers or 
vassals or fellow-refugees – but whose fortunes thereafter would be 
based not upon birth, but upon personal achievement in political and 
military conflict. 
 Again, among the chieftains who served Sun Quan in his early days, 
men from the north played an all but dominant role. Of the two 
commanders against Cao Cao at the battle of the Red Cliffs, Cheng Pu 
came from Youbeiping, near present-day Beijing, and Zhou Yu came 
from Lujiang, north of the Yangzi. Zhou Yu's successor Lu Su was a man 
from Xiapi, or Linhuai, also north of the Yangzi, and Lü Meng, 
commander against Guan Yu, came from Runan, north of the Huai. It was 
only when Lu Xun of Wu commandery was appointed to command the 
defence against Liu Bei in the early 220s that a man from south of the 
Yangzi rose to comparable position. And on the civilian administrative 
side, the veteran Zhang Zhao was a man from Pengcheng, again north of 
the Huai, Sun Shao the first Chancellor came from Beihai on the 
Shandong peninsula, and Zhuge Jin, who became General-in-Chief when 
Sun Quan proclaimed his empire, and who was the brother of Zhuge 
Liang the Chancellor of Shu-Han, was a man of Langye. The second 
Chancellor, Gu Yong, did come from Wu commandery, and he was [497] 
succeeded by Lu Xun, but Bu Zhi, conqueror of the far south, who 
became Chancellor briefly in his old age, was another man from 
Xiapi/Linhuai. 
 There were, of course, important and trusted commanders and 
officers from south of the Yangzi, notably the Lu from Wu commandery, 
the two Zhu clans from Danyang and from Wu, Quan Rou from Qiantang 
                                               
78 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1295. 
79 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1298. 
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in Wu, and He Qi and Yu Fan of Kuaiji.80 The point is, however, that in 
the early years of the state the struggle for power was a career open to 
talent. As Sun Ce said to Taishi Ci, who came from Donglai on the north 
of the Shandong peninsula, "The only thing that concerns me is whether a 
man can prove himself to be of service."81 Family background and place 
of origin were irrelevant. 
 From this open beginning, however, the structure of the state became 
steadily more restricted. In particular, it was established principle that 
when a man died the right to command his troops was transferred to his 
son. Sun Ce himself had first gone to Yuan Shu to seek command of his 
father's men, and the core of that troop was indeed composed of family 
retainers and others brought into service by Sun Jian.82 These were 
personal regiments, and they were regarded as a military appanage which 
it was only right should be inherited. So the young Sun Shao was granted 
his father's garrison command after the assassination of Sun He, and Ling 
Tong, at the age of fifteen sui, succeeded to his father's position as a 
colonel after [498] Ling Cao was killed in battle.83 Still more specifically, 
when there was a proposal to augment the personal following of Lü 
Meng by adding the troops of three officers who had died, Lü Meng 
himself objected, arguing against the injustice to the three men's sons. It 
was certainly possible for Sun Quan to make changes in command on the 
basis of military reason, and Lü Meng benefited from the process when 
                                               
80 SGZ 58/Wu 13:1343, SGZ 56/Wu 11:1303, SGZ 56/Wu 11:1312, SGZ 60/Wu 
15:1381, SGZ 58/Wu 13:1377 and SGZ 57/Wu 12:1317. 
81 SGZ 49/Wu 4:1186. 
  One may observe the similar policy of Cao Cao, placing emphasis upon 
practical achievement rather than family background or formal moral quality. See 
his ordinances of 203, 210, 214 and 217: SKC 1:24, 32, 44 and 49-50 (the first and 
last citations being in PC quoting the Wei shu of Wang Shen), and also deC, 
Imperial Warlord, 367-369. 
82 Chapter Two at 151 and 154. 
83 Notes 42 and 46 to Chapter Four. 
  Later, when Ling Tong died, Sun Quan took his two sons under personal 
protection, and when they came of suitable age he gave them command of their 
father's troops: SGZ 55/Wu 10:1297. 
  We may note here that Sun Shao, son of Sun Ce (see Chapter Four at 215) 
appears never to have held command of troops, nor occupied any significant 
position in the state. In 229 he became Marquis of Wu, but the fief was later 
changed, and he died without further notice. In the time of Sun Hao, there was a 
suggestion that Sun Shao's son Sun Feng might be a better successor to the throne; 
he was executed: SGZ 46/Wu 1:1112. 
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other men's troops were allocated to him on account of his superior 
ability. But that was at an early stage, and represented an executive 
decision rather than a matter of inheritance.84 Basically, except in cases of 
misconduct, a man's troops remained with him and his family. 
 This, of course, meant that the military units were themselves 
hereditary: the warlord armies were maintained by marriage and 
breeding, so the veterans of each generation handed on their duties to the 
young men of the next. And to bring the model of feudalism still closer, 
we have the allocation of territory and people as private appanages to 
supply a general and his troops, so that when Lu Su succeeded to Zhou 
Yu's position as commander in Jing province, he also acquired the 
civilian resources of the four counties which supported that post.85 The 
system of semi-feudalism continued and developed: in 234 the 
commander Chen Biao was admired for the fact that he chose out able-
bodied men from his personal appanage of two hundred families and 
returned them to the government to serve as soldiers; but the implication 
of such a story is that [499] many of the economic and human resources 
of the state were being alienated to individuals and their families.86 
 Despite the principle of military inheritance and appanage, however, 
there were still restrictions on the possibility of a family thus involved in 
the army and the court maintaining high position for long. The basic 
inheritance of a father's troop did not guarantee high command, nor even 
secure status in the government. We are told that the son of Lu Su did rise 
to high rank, and a grandson inherited his fief and held command of 
troops.87 On the other hand, while the daughter of Zhou Yu was married 
to the Heir Sun Deng, one of Zhou Yu's two sons died young, and the 
other, though likewise married into the imperial clan, was later found 
guilty of some crime and was exiled to Luling. He was later brought back 
to court, and the prestige of the family was to some extent maintained 
through Zhou Yu's nephew and great-nephew, but the Zhou family were 
now only on the margins of power.88 Similarly, the son of Cheng Pu was 
made marquis of a village at the time of the empire in 229, and the son of 
                                               
84 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1275; cf. SGZ 54/Wu 9:1273 and Chapter Four at 235. 
85 Note 16 to Chapter Five. 
86 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1290. Chen Biao was the son by a concubine of Chen Wu, former 
general of Sun Quan, on whose unusual funeral see Chapter Six at 380. The term 
used for members of an appanage is 復人 furen. 
87 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1273. 
88 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1265-67. 
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Lü Meng succeeded to his father's fief, with income from three hundred 
households and fifty qing of land, but neither of them achieved 
distinction of their own.89 
 For those who were at first more successful, affairs of state produced 
their own dangers. We have noted the fate of the high-flying Zhuge Ke. 
Gu Tan, grandson of the Chancellor Gu Yong, and Zhang Xiu, son of 
Zhang Zhao, were both noted supporters of the Heir Sun He: when Sun 
He was dismissed, Gu Tan was exiled to the south and Zhang Xiu was 
compelled to commit [500] suicide.90 Lü Ju, son of Lü Fan, held high 
command in the army, but he rebelled against Sun Lin in 256 and was 
destroyed.91 
 So the fortunes of politics were not sufficient to ensure the survival 
of an immigrant family in a leading role within the state of Wu, and once 
the fluctuations and uncertainties of the early years were passed, and the 
situation on the frontiers had settled, there was small occasion for new 
men to appear at the court. The defeat of Guan Yu and the conquest of 
Jing province in 219 produced only one man of note, Pan Jun: he had 
earlier served Liu Biao and then Liu Bei, and he was later given 
substantial office by Sun Quan, proving himself particularly effective in 
dealing with the barbarians to the west of his own commandery Wuling.92 
 As a result, by virtue of attrition amongst their émigré rivals, it was 
the clans from the south of the lower Yangzi which came to dominance in 
Wu during the generations which succeeded the first years of foundation. 
In part this was because of their natural connection to the heartland of the 
state and their early history of support for the Sun family – and there 
were many families which picked the wrong side in the civil war and 
were not heard of again – but the important thing for leading families of 
local origin was that they had a base upon which they might maintain 
their power. 
 At the end of the third century, when Zuo Si composed his 
"Rhapsody on the Capital of Wu," he referred to the four great families of 
that state and territory, being the Yu and the Wei, the Gu and the Lu. All 
of them possessed great mansions in Jianye, and they were accompanied 
                                               
89
 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1284 and SGZ 54/Wu 9:1280. 
90 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1230-31 and 1225. 
91 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1312. 
92 Chapter Six at 404-405. 
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on their tours of the city and surroundings [501] by bands of armed 
retainers: 
Prancing horses follow track upon track; 
Vermilion wheels join rut upon rut. 
With armament displayed, they return to their homes, 
Where weapon-racks and crossbow frames are installed.93 
All four families came originally from the southeast, the Yu and the Wei 
from Kuaiji, and the Gu and the Lu from Wu county, present-day 
Suzhou, in Wu commandery. 
 The Yu family owed its fortunes in the state of Wu primarily to Yu 
Fan, minister and adviser to Sun Ce and Sun Quan. Yu Fan was a 
contradictory man. As member of a gentry family, he had held senior 
position on the local staff of the Administrator Wang Lang, but he readily 
joined Sun Ce when he came to Kuaiji. He was a scholar and debater of 
considerable skill and reputation,94 and he showed useful loyalty to Sun 
Quan from the beginning of his succession to power.95 He also held and 
expressed many unpopular opinions, frequently justifiably and correctly, 
he was often drunk, and there must have been times when he was 
extremely irritating. He was eventually sent away to the far south for his 
rudeness to Sun Quan and to Zhang Zhao, and he died there in exile in 
233.96 He was [502] survived, however, by several sons, and many of 
them became distinguished and held high rank.97 
                                               
93 Wen xuan 5:1141, from "Rhapsody on the Capital of Wu," translated by Knechtges 
at 399. On this work, see below. 
94 Yu Fan had joined Sun Ce at the time of his attack against Wang Lang in Kuaiji, 
and he persuaded Hua Xin to surrender Yuzhang to Sun Ce. 
  In scholarship, Yu Fan was admired by Kong Rong for his commentary to the 
Book of Changes (SGZ 57/Wu 12:1320), and he also wrote on the Daode jing, on 
the Analects of Confucius, and on Guo yu (SGZ 57/Wu 12:1321-22). 
95 See note 7 to Chapter Four. 
96 SGZ 57/Wu 12:1320 refers in general terms to Yu Fan's frequent arguments with 
Sun Quan and 1321 tells of his exile. For the occasion that he was nearly killed 
outright by Sun Quan at a banquet, see below. 
  Yu Fan later sent in a memorial protesting at the plan for alliance with Gongsun 
Yuan. When the project did fail Sun Quan remembered his words and sought to 
recall him, but Yu Fan had already died: SGZ 57/Wu 12:1324 PC note 1 quoting 
Wu shu and Jiangbiao zhuan. 
97 SGZ 57/Wu 12:1327 and PC notes 1 to 4 quoting Kuaiji dianlu. 
  Later descendants of Yu Fan held position under the Jin, and Yu Xiaofu 虞嘯父 
was a favourite of Emperor Xiaowu 孝武 and held high office in the early fifth 
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 Gu Yong, as we have seen, became Chancellor of the empire under 
Sun Quan. His family had held substantial position under Han, and when 
he was young he was recognised and admired by the great scholar Cai 
Yong.98 Gu Yong's sons and grandsons continued to hold significant 
office in Wu.99 
 And the Lu family, which we have noted at intervals during the 
history of this period, was long-established indeed. Hou Han shu refers 
to their lineage in the southeast from the time of Former Han. Lu Hong 
became Director of the Secretariat under Emperor Guangwu, founder of 
Later Han, and his grandson Lu Xu was implicated in the suspected 
treason of Liu Ying, King of Chu, [503] during the reign of Emperor 
Ming.100 Lu Kang, Administrator of Lujiang and enemy of Sun Ce, was a 
grandson of Lu Xu; and the general Lu Xun, who became a dominant 
figure in the state Wu, was a great-nephew of Lu Kang; and Lu Xun's 
                                                                                                                   
century: JS 76:2012-15, but cf. Zhou Mingtai at 2716, who traces the lineage only 
to Yu Fan's grandson. 
98 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1225 and 1226 PC note 2 quoting Jiangbiao zhuan and Wu lu. 
Jiangbiao zhuan says that Cai Yong gave Gu Yong his own personal name as sign 
of his respect and affection. 
  SGZ 52/Wu 7:1225 PC note 1 quoting Wu lu, says that Gu Yong's great-
grandfather was Administrator of the important commandery of Yingchuan. We are 
not told of the intervening generations, but Gu Yong held commissioned office as 
magistrate of various counties while he was still young, so it would appear the 
family had maintained status. 
99 Gu Rong, grandson of Gu Yong the former Chancellor of Wu, after a dangerous 
career at the court of Western Jin became a senior assistant to Sima Rui, founder of 
Eastern Jin: JS 68:1811-15. His descendants held more junior office, though it 
appears that the family maintained their position for some further generations into 
the Liu Song dynasty of the fifth century. See Shishuo renming pu "Register of 
personal names in Shishuo xinyu" compiled by Wang Zao of Southern Song, and 
claimed to be based upon family registers, 62a-66a, and Zhou Mingtai, Sanguo zhi 
shixi biao, at 2712. 
100 The biography of Lu Xu, which refers to Lu Hong and to the status of the family in 
the southeast, maintained for generations past, is in HHS 81/71:2682-83, the 
Chapter on Men of Unusual Conduct. When Liu Ying was accused of plotting 
rebellion, Lu Xu and a number of his colleagues were arrested and put in prison. 
When food was sent in to them, Lu Xu wept at the sight of it, and explained that he 
recognised the way in which his mother cut the pieces of meat and onion. On the 
basis of this display of filial sympathy, the case was re-examined, and Lu Xu and 
his colleagues were released, albeit under life-long proscription from further 
official appointment. On Liu Ying, see Cambridge Han, 258 [Bielenstein, "Wang 
Mang, the restoration of the Han dynasty, and Later Han"]. 
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younger brother Lu Mao, and Lu Ji the son of Lu Kang, both held high 
office.101 Their descendants continued this prosperity, combined with 
considerable literary achievement, through the last years of Wu and into 
the Jin.102[504] 
 In contrast, however, though the Wei are listed among the four great 
clans of the state, the family does not play a notable role in the history 
recorded by Chen Shou, nor in the works quoted by Pei Songzhi. Wei 
Lang, a gentleman from Kuaiji, had been involved in the Faction affair 
against the eunuchs of the court of Emperors Huan and Ling at the end of 
the 160s, and he committed suicide in 168.103 His grandson Wei Teng held 
office as a local magistrate in several counties, and became Administrator 
of Poyang, but his chief claim to remembrance is an occasion that Sun 
Quan was angry with him. Wei Teng was in serious danger of being put 
to death, but his friend Wu Fan, who came from the same county and was 
recognised at the court of Wu as a expert in calendrical calculations and 
in divination by the wind, pleaded successfully for his life.104 
 In this respect, the reference to the Wei family by Zuo Si provides an 
insight to the structure of the state of Wu. Though Wei Teng served as an 
                                               
101 On Lu Ji, see below. 
102 Of four grandsons of Lu Xun, two were killed fighting the invading forces of Jin in 
280, but the two younger, Lu Ji and Lu Yun, received patronage and favour at the 
northern court, and were distinguished as scholars and men of letters: SGZ 58/Wu 
13:1360-61 PC note 2 quoting [Lu] Ji [Lu] Yun biezhuan, also their biographies in 
JS 54. 
  Lu Xun's direct lineage appears to have died out with Lu Ji and Lu Yun, but the 
record continued through descendants of Lu Xun's brother Lu Mao. Lu Mao's 
grandson Lu Ye was a minister under the Jin, and Lu Ye's younger brother Lu Wan 
was a leading figure in the first generation of exile in the early fourth century. Lu 
Wan's son Lu Na also became a senior official, and Lu Na's nephew Lu Daosheng 
was Minister of Justice of Jin in the early fifth century: SGZ 57/Wu 12:1339 PC 
note 1 quoting Wu lu and Jin yangqiu, and JS 77:2023-27. Shishuo renming pu, 
27a-31a, continues the genealogy for another four generations, to Lu Shan who 
held high rank at the court of the Chen dynasty in the latter part of the sixth 
century (see also Zhou Mingtai at 2717-20). 
103 The biography of Wei Lang is in HHS 67/57:2200-01, the Chapter on the 
Proscribed Party. SGZ refers to him as a member of the list of worthy men praised 
by the dissident students of the time, and there is passing reference to him in Kuaiji 
dianlu, quoted in SGZ 57/Wu 12:1325 PC. 
104
 SGZ 63/Wu 18:1422-23. 1423 PC note 1 quoting Kuaiji dianlu, has a short 
biography of Wei Teng, describing him as the grandson of Wei Lang. Cf. the 
commentaries at Wen xuan 5:1141-43 and the note of Knechtges at 398. 
  On Wu Fan and divination by wind, see Chapter One at 14. 
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Administrator, such position was not of itself worthy of notice by 
historians concerned with the mainstream of political history, and the 
Wei, in contrast to the Yu, the Gu and the Lu, played no great part in the 
central government of Wu. They were, nevertheless, established and 
maintained as a great clan. 
 The Wei provide a notable example of the manner in which a clan 
could maintain high status without any close connection to the court or 
government, but there were numbers of families in a comparable position 
at the lower levels of society and the economy. Throughout the lands 
[505] of the southeast, those local leaders who supported Sun Ce and Sun 
Quan in the early years had gained immediately at the expense of their 
rivals, and they obtained influence in the developing imperial state. Over 
time, their positions as local magnates became increasingly well secured, 
and they could not readily be overthrown by the chances of politics. 
Besides, this, in acceleration of a process which may already be observed 
during Later Han, these local men of power attracted numbers of people 
into their service. Many followers came voluntarily; others found their 
direct and personal protection more attractive than the risks of individual 
enterprise and the demands of taxation; and there were also, of course, 
men and families originally conscripted or recruited for official military 
service who later transferred allegiance to their personal commander and 
his family.105 
 These leading local families could be and were kept under control, 
not only by the threat and reality of the military force available to central 
government, but also by a system of internal hostages. The process was 
not necessarily onerous, and relatives of powerful families might hold 
pleasant positions at court, but there was a general requirement in Wu, as 
in the other states of the Three Kingdoms, that men who held strategic or 
politically sensitive positions should guarantee their loyalty in this 
fashion.106 Such forced [506] obedience, however, is not the same as 
                                               
105 On local leaders and their attraction of tenants and retainers through 
commendation, see, for example, Cambridge Han, 627-630 [Ebrey, "Economic 
and Social History of Later Han"], and on the privatisation of official recruits, see 
Yang Chung-i, "Evolution of the Status of Dependents," summarised in Sun and 
DeFrancis, Chinese Social History at 144-145, and Ch'ü, Han Social Structure, 503 
note 458. 
106 The clearest statement is in SGZ 48/Wu 3:1177 PC quoting Soushen ji, where it is 
said that, "Because Wu was a new state, it had not established a firm basis of trust. 
The administrators and military commanders of positions on the frontiers were all 
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willing effort for the cause of the state, and it was the lack of 
commitment by the great families of the region, rather than their active 
disloyalty, which limited the energies of Wu. 
 Indeed, many local magnates had neither concern nor interest in the 
politics of the state of Wu. Most of the records have been written in terms 
of dynastic or imperial history, but the bulk of the population was 
occupied with more local business. If a great family such as the Wei 
could remain largely outside the affairs of court, we can be sure that other 
groups of middling gentry were similarly independent, and were content 
not to be noticed by the central government and its chroniclers. In effect, 
the apex of government in Wu, recorded by the histories with tales of 
generals and ministers and intrigue at court, rested upon a broad class of 
village and county gentry, who might accept office in one commandery or 
another but who had little to do with events at the capital. From this point 
of view, one may suggest that the same pattern was maintained as in the 
last years of Later Han: basic dues were paid to the imperial government, 
but so long as it remained intact the details of its activities were largely 
irrelevant to local power, influence and survival. 
 Years before, this attitude had been summed up by the argument of 
Lu Su on the eve of the Red Cliffs campaign in 208, when he urged Sun 
Quan to reject the advice of his more conservative advisers and to defy 
the claims of Cao Cao:107 
I could accept Cao Cao, but someone in your position cannot do so. 
Let me explain.[507] 
 If I received Cao Cao, he would send me back to my home 
district, he would have me graded by name and rank, and I would do 
no worse than be appointed as a junior official.108 I could ride in a 
carriage drawn by oxen, with an escort of soldiers, and I could 
                                                                                                                   
required to send their wives and children, and these were known as baozhi 保質." 
Though the statement introduces an anecdote of the supernatural, there is no reason 
to doubt its basis of fact. 
  See also Yang, "Hostages in Chinese History," particularly at 50-53, and Pong 
Sing-wai [1964]. 
107 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1270. 
108 The reference to grading by name and rank is identified by modern scholars with 
the recruitment system of nine categories (九品 jiu pin), administered by the 
officials known as Rectifiers (中正 zhongzheng; "Impartial and Just"), which was 
developed in the state of Wei by Cao Cao and his son Cao Pi. See, for example, 
Holzman, "Système médiévale des fonctionnaires," 392-393, and deC, Imperial 
Warlord, 247-249. 
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mingle with the gentry. I would be given promotion, and I would 
certainly finish with a province or a commandery. 
 But if you receive Cao Cao, where would you go? 
Sun Quan might have hopes of imperial state, but his subordinates had 
more limited ambitions, they could expect to maintain some position 
under any regime, and they had no strong commitment to the fortunes of 
Wu. 
 Even on such basic matters of coinage and taxation, moreover, the 
government of Wu had limited authority. One of the most significant 
changes, both for the immediate fortunes of the state of Wu and for the 
development of later centuries, was an increasing tendency to economic 
regionalisation and the growth of local interest. For the time of Han, there 
is evidence of widespread trade and exchange of goods, based to a 
considerable degree upon a monetary economy. The years of disturbance, 
however, brought disruption of commerce across the whole of China, and 
by the third century, at every level of the economy, those families which 
had maintained their landed estates were increasingly concerned for their 
own self-sufficiency. 
 Currency and inflation problems had already appeared during Later 
Han, but at the beginning of civil war, when the government of Dong 
Zhuo replaced the traditional wu-shu coinage with smaller units it 
destroyed the monetary system of the empire, and in 221 [508] the 
government of Cao Pi formally declared that grain and silk should be the 
official means of exchange in Wei. The coinage was later revived in the 
north, and was recognised by the government of Jin, but official economy 
still relied upon commodity exchange. Similarly, though Sun Quan 
attempted in 236 to establish an official currency of large coins, with a 
monopoly of copper and prohibitions against private minting, the policy 
was a failure and the project was ended in 246.109 
 As a result, just as the great families could hold their private 
followers from the direct control of government, so, throughout the 
countryside, local magnates could deal with their tenants and dependents 
in a system of barter and exchange of service. There was no opportunity 
for the government to obtain profit from the monopoly of minting and the 
                                               
109 The coinage policies of this period are described in JS 26:794-5; Yang, "Economic 
history," 191-2. See also the article of Ho Tzu-ch'üan, "Manorial Economy," 
summarised in Sun and DeFrancis, Chinese Social History, at 140. On the large 
coins of Wu, and the attempt to enforce a monopoly of minting, see SGZ 47/Wu 
2:1140, 1142 and 1146 PC quoting Jiangbiao zhuan. 
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enforcement of tax payments in cash,110 and it was difficult to obtain 
information or enforce demands. Taxation and other levies were obtained 
rather by negotiation on the basis of quotas than by formal assessment of 
value and obligation, and the greater part of economic activity in the 
community remained beyond the reach of government. 
 Behind the military stalemate along the Yangzi, therefore, the social 
and political structure of the south was based on low-level control by 
leading families, monopolising the infrastructure of local administration, 
and maintaining a sensible distance from the court and the capital. The 
formal histories do not often refer to the men of such families, but it was 
that network of local power, colonisation [509] and demographic 
expansion, which confirmed the development of Chinese authority in the 
south under the superficial auspices of the state of Wu. And eventually, 
where Sun Ce and Sun Quan had held the initiative over their local allies, 
in later years the local families, with their private armies of retainers, and 
their resources of agricultural land and vassals to work it, gained 
dominance in the state as a whole and over the policies of the 
court.111[510>511] 
                                               
110 On the Han monopoly of minting, and the compulsory payment of taxation in cash, 
see Cambridge Han, 587-589 [Nishijima, "Economic and Social History of Former 
Han"]. 
111 Ebrey, Aristocratic Families, traces the Cui lineage, from the northern territory of 
Boling, through the vicissitudes of the period of division which succeeded the fall 
of Western Jin at the beginning of the fourth century, and Johnson, Medieval 
Chinese Oligarchy, has shown that the great families of Tang were concerned to 
claim descent from Han, Three Kingdoms and Jin. Grafflin, "Great Family," points 
out, however, that three of the five so-called "super-elite" clans of the aristocracy 
traced their prosperity to association with the Sima government of Jin and suffered 
considerably from the misfortunes of that dynasty at the beginning of the fourth 
century and again at the beginning of the fifth, while the remaining two houses did 
not in fact appear on the national stage until the fourth century. 
  As Grafflin observes at 65-69, and as Fogel discusses in his introduction to 
Tanigawa, Medieval Chinese Society, xvii-xxix, the question of the hereditary 
aristocracy and gentry in the Chinese society of the Period of Division has been a 
feature of Japanese intellectual debate particularly since the time of Naito Konan 
in the first part of the present century. Miyakawa [1956] and Utsunomiya [1962] 
are regarded as members of the Kyoto school which follows the basic arguments of 
Naito, while Tanigawa and Kawakatsu Yoshio are less committed to the approach. 
Kawakatsu, in particular, has published detailed analyses of the structure of elite 
leadership in the third century, [1970] and [1974], and subsequent periods, and 
more recently in [1982]. See also the discussion of Naito and his school by Fogel, 
and his review article "New Direction." 
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  It is a matter of only marginal concern to the history of the state of Wu in the 
third century, but there is some interest in tracing the later histories of the leading 
families of the south. Though his research is not entirely comprehensive, the study 
is made very much easier by Zhou Mingtai's Sanguo zhi shixi biao. 
  Rather as one might expect, though three of the four great families of Wu, as 
listed by Zuo Si in his "Rhapsody on the Capital of Wu," and discussed above, 
showed remarkable longevity, many of those whose members held power in Wu 
failed to maintain their prominent position after the conquest by Jin in 280, and the 
turmoil which accompanied the exile of that dynasty to the south at the beginning 
of the fourth century. 
  As examples, SSXY B:68b-69a [VIII.142]; Mather, New Account, 243, refers to 
four old families of Wu commandery which had been prominent in the past, being 
the Lu and the Gu, the Zhang and the Zhu, and in another passage, SSXY B:50a-
51a [VIII.20]; Mather, New Account, 217, six names are given, being the same four 
together with a member of the Wu clan and a member of the Yan. 
  Of these families, Zhang Yan was a minister of Wu, his son Zhang Bo was 
author of Wu lu (Chapter Nine at 558-559), Zhang Bo's brother Zhang Chang was 
praised in SSXY for his moral qualities, and another brother Zhang Han was a 
respected poet and had a short official career towards the end of Western Jin: JS 
92:2384. Zhu Dan, Wu Zhan and Yan Yin all retired from public life after the fall 
of Wu, and no member of their families has a biography in Jin shu. 
  In similar fashion SSXY B:62a [VIII.85]; Mather, New Account, 232, and JS 
78:2062, refer to the four leading families of Kuaiji in the middle of the fourth 
century. The Yu are included, but the Wei 魏 family of the third century had been 
replaced by another clan whose surname is also transcribed Wei in pinyin but is 
written with a different character 衛 (see also the anecdote in SSXY B (8):65b 
[VIII.112]; Mather, New Account, 238, which refers to the decline of the first Wei 
clan: Mather has made a slight mistake in his note, for he identifies the declined 
Wei with the prosperous Wei; cf. his correct analysis in the Biography section at 
598 and 599). Of the two other families, the Kong 孔 came from the north at the 
end of Later Han, but do not appear to have risen to prominence until the latter part 
of the Wu period (JS 78:2051), while the Xie 謝 came to the south at the beginning 
of Eastern Jin (JS 49:1377-79 and 79:2069-90). 
  Though the He clan from Kuaiji, descendants of He Qi the conqueror of Fujian, 
are not mentioned among the elite group of four, He Qi's great-grandson He Xun 
was a high minister at the beginning of Eastern Jin, and other members of the 
family held substantial position in the southeast region for ten generations: SGZ 
60/Wu 15:1377-81, SGZ 65/Wu 20:1456-59, Shishuo renming pu 55a-60a, and 
Zhou Mingtai at 2721. 
  Again, though SSXY and JS have no discussion of the leading families of 
Danyang, Zhang Kai, great-grandson of the veteran minister Zhang Zhao of Wu, 
held high office and was awarded a marquisate in the first year of Eastern Jin: JS 
76:2018-19. 
  In general, however, few of the families which held a leading political position 
in third-century Wu were able to maintain their status under later dynasties. The 
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 The personal authority of Sun Quan had to some extent concealed 
this situation, but after his death in 252, in a time of younger, weaker 
rulers, it became very clear. We have noted the argument of Tang 
Changru, that the conflicts at the capital, of Zhuge Ke against Sun Jun, 
and of Teng Yin against Sun Lin, represent a transfer of power in the 
central government from the men of the north to those of the south. As 
Deng Ai of Wei observed to Sima Zhao after Zhuge Ke's failed attack on 
Hefei in 253, the great families of Wu, relying upon their military 
strength and their retainers, now held the real power in the state, and 
without support from an established ruler the minister Zhuge Ke would 
not survive their hostility. And indeed he proved to be correct.112 
 Still more significantly, at these highest levels of the state, we may 
observe the growing, ultimately dominant, role of various cadet branches 
of the Sun clan, markedly aided by palace politics in which two daughters 
of Sun Quan, Sun Luban the Princess Quan and Sun Luyu the Princess 
Zhu, played a considerable part.113 This constant conflict at the capital 
limited the authority of the ruler and the [512] effectiveness of his 
government, while these factions and rivalries among members of the 
imperial clan, with no personal power base among the general 
community, meant that the politics of the centre operated more and more 
in a closed system, isolated from and irrelevant to the interests of the 
provinces. 
                                                                                                                   
two major exceptions are the Lu family, which, as we have seen, could claim 
distinguished lineage from the first century to the sixth, and the He of Kuaiji. 
Sadly, one family which largely disappears from history within a generation of the 
fall of Wu is the Sun – but that is another story. 
112 SGZ 28:777. Several scholars, including Tang Changru [1955], at 22-23, and 
Miyakawa [1956], at 33, discuss this passage. The expression "retainers" is here 
expressed by the phrase 部曲 buqu: the compound originally referred to units of 
the regular imperial army of Han, but by this time it may be interpreted as a private 
military force, or even plain civilian dependents. See the classic article by Yang 
Chung-i on "Evolution of the Status of 'Dependents'," and note 104 above. 
113 Sun Luban, married to Quan Zong, was the elder full sister of Sun Luyu, married 
to Zhu Ju, whose biography is in SGZ 57/Wu 12:1340-41. Sun Luban encouraged 
the dismissal of Sun He from the position of Heir-Apparent and later supported 
Sun Jun, who became her lover. Sun Luyu supported Sun He, and was later 
slandered by Sun Luban and done to death by Sun Jun. Sun Luban was eventually 
involved in the failed coup of Sun Liang against Sun Lin; her husband was killed 
and she herself was sent into exile. See Fang, Chronicle I, 683-684 and 690, II, 70-
71, 89, 160, 181, 199, 228, 295-297 and 313. 
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 The government in these later years was no longer that of an 
ambitious and expansionist state, but represented little more than a group 
of magnates seeking to maintain their individual wealth and authority. 
Faced with such a collection of family interests, operating at every level 
from the court to the countryside, the Sun rulers were never in a good 
position to establish strong instruments of government, including the 
control and development of agriculture and the machinery of war, with 
which they might compete more efficiently against their rivals. And in 
the long run Wu was a marginal state, with a government which held 
power through its past military success, but which lacked the authority to 
establish coherent and effective policies against local interests. 
 On the other hand, through traditional historians of China may 
lament the division of the empire of Han, and may think less of the rulers 
of Wu for their failure to establish a truly imperial government, we 
should not assume that grand centralised authority was an advantage to 
the people or the culture of China. On the contrary, the break-up of Han 
and the limited power of Wu were of considerable advantage to the 
development of China. 
 In general terms, the independent existence of the state of Wu meant 
that the lands south of the Yangzi were no longer subject to exploitation 
for the irrelevant concerns of a central imperial government. During the 
Han dynasty, the wealth of the south, whether it was developed from the 
mines and fields within the boundaries, or acquired by trade beyond the 
seas, had been regularly removed to the profit of the court, or deployed to 
aid imperial ambitions along the northern frontier. For a government 
based upon [513] the Yellow River and the Yellow plain, south China was 
always of secondary political importance, and was looked upon as little 
more than a region for exploitation, with occasional difficulties from 
marginal rebellion. 
 From this perspective, the very existence of the separate state of Wu 
was an immediate gain for the people of the south. The long stream of the 
Han River, and the network of canals and waterways which led across the 
Huai to the north now gave a line of attack for armies to invade from the 
north, and the costs of maintaining defence along the Yangzi were 
considerable. But those waterways had formerly been a route by which 
prosperity was drained away and now, as communications to the north 
were broken, the wealth of the south remained in that region. The 
additional expenses of a local court and a regional army could readily be 
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absorbed in the profits to be made from the monopoly of southern trade 
and the reduced demands of tribute to the north. 
 In this context, it was in no sense necessary that the court and the 
capital should dominate the economic resources of the state, and the 
armed forces of the central government were most usefully deployed in 
defence along the Yangzi, and as an occasional support for large-scale 
enterprises of colonisation. Otherwise, the continuing development of the 
region was well assured by the individual enterprise of local leaders and 
commanders. They had no particular loyalty to the warlord state which 
shielded them, they offered little but exploitation and war to their 
dependents, and the non-Chinese people suffered desperately from their 
aggression, but it was the energy of these gentry magnates that developed 
the prosperity and the independence of the south. 
 
The achievement of Wu: 
Despite rhetoric and show, the empire of Wu was in no way a 
reconstruction of the fallen dynasty of Han. Much of the veneer which 
had formerly covered the force of government was gone, and there were 
times when men acted rather with haste than with dignity. We have, for 
example, the story of Sun Quan's gross discourtesy to Zhang Zhao at the 
very height of the enthronement ceremony, when he proclaimed aloud 
and in public that he owed his success to Zhou Yu, while Zhang Zhao's 
advice would have condemned him to beggary. The tale, of course, is too 
good to be entirely trustworthy, and one cannot be sure that that Sun 
Quan did indeed speak out in such shameful fashion.114 
 It is true, however, that Sun Quan could display a notable impatience 
with attempts by worthy scholars to insist upon decorum at inappropriate 
times. There are a number of stories of how he would give a banquet and 
get drunk. On one occasion he was reprimanded by Zhang Zhao, who 
compared his conduct to that of the vicious and last King Zhou of the 
ancient Shang/Yin dynasty. At another time we are told that Yu Fan 
refused to return the royal toast: lying on the ground, he pretended he 
could drink no more, but he returned to his place after Sun Quan had 
passed him by. Sun Quan was furious at the insult and drew his sword to 
kill him. When his minister Liu Ji grasped him about the arms to hold 
him back, Sun Quan complained peevishly that Cao Cao had been 
allowed to kill Kong Rong, and why couldn't he kill Yu Fan? Liu Ji 
                                               
114 See above at 466. 
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assured him that Yu Fan certainly deserved such a fate, but it might affect 
Sun Quan's own reputation, and Sun Quan was surely better than Cao 
Cao? So Yu Fan was spared, and Sun Quan gave orders that if he was 
drunk in future and gave orders for a man to be [515] killed, the 
execution should be delayed until he had sobered up and thought about 
the matter some more.115 
 One has the impression that wild parties were a feature of court life 
at Wu, that there were times they resembled a croquet match in 
Wonderland, and it was always dangerous to refuse a cup of wine.116 
 Other incidents confirm Sun Quan as a man of energy and 
impetuosity, sometimes erratic in his behaviour, and on occasion 
discourteous and ungenerous. But he was surely a man of strong 
personality. This was, after all, a warlord state, and it was essential for the 
ruler to maintain authority over a group of very tough military 
commanders. 
 In such circumstances, Sun Quan's conduct towards Zhang Zhao, and 
his outburst against Yu Fan, reflect the tensions in the society which he 
ruled. During Han, there had been formal and official links to regulate 
personal and family alliances and rivalries, and set boundaries to 
individual conduct; even then, however, there were notable incidents of 
bloody vendetta, sometimes disguised as political protest, but often no 
more than plain and brutal private feuding. Now, in time of civil war, that 
framework of conduct had broken down, and survival, let alone success, 
depended upon a man's own qualities and the allies he could make to 
assist him. 
 So this was an age of the individual, one of the comparatively few 
periods in Chinese history that some people were able to escape from the 
traditional bonds of expected conduct, and could even be [516] admired 
for their style and skill. Where the rulers of the end of Han, men such as 
Emperor Huan and Emperor Ling, are known to us only by the occasional 
anecdote, judged from the viewpoint of their role in history rather than as 
men of personal character, and hemmed about by the demands of 
protocol and courtly debate, the warlords who took their power, men such 
                                               
115 The stories are put together by ZZTJ 69:2198-99; Fang, Chronicle I, 61-62. They 
are drawn from a number of sources, being the biographies of Zhang Zhao in SGZ 
52/Wu 7:1221, of Yu Fan in SGZ 57/Wu 10:1321, and of Liu Qi in SGZ 52/Wu 
4:1186. 
116 In the later case of the unfortunate historian Wei Zhao, it was truly a fatal 
discourtesy: Chapter Nine at 553-554. 
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as Cao Cao, Liu Bei and Sun Quan, depended for success upon the 
strength of their personality and the force with which they expressed it. 
 Here, of course, we may see the attraction of the stories and plays 
which deal with the Three Kingdoms, and above all the splendid figure of 
Cao Cao, cynical strategist and brilliant villain. Though one must doubt 
some of the tales that are told, and question the judgement of traditional 
historians, there are surely echoes of reality in the legends that gathered 
about him and about the other heroes. 
 In comparison with Cao Cao, Sun Quan presents a less impressive 
figure. He was fortunate enough to inherit the military base established 
by his brother Sun Ce, and the major victories of Wu were won by his 
generals, notably Zhou Yu, Lü Meng and Lu Xun. Sun Quan was not 
himself a great military commander, and he suffered some serious and 
embarrassing set-backs when he took the field in person. He was, 
nonetheless, a man of physical courage, large ambition, and surely a 
strong nerve. In the two great campaigns which established the state, the 
defence at the Red Cliffs against Cao Cao and the attack on Guan Yu and 
Liu Bei in Jing province, Sun Quan was prepared to make harsh choices 
and act upon them with energy. His commanders at the front made the 
immediate tactical decisions, but he had the strength to back their 
judgement and he would surely have shared their fate had matters gone 
awry. 
 And the generals who consented to serve him were men of character 
and style. Zhou Yu impressed all who dealt with him; Lü Meng first made 
his mark when he dressed his troops in smart red leggings, he turned 
himself into a passable self-taught scholar, and he was a man of trickery 
and a decided sense of humour. And there was the contrast between a 
man such as Jiang Qin, who lived in most humble fashion, with his 
mother and his concubines in simple dresses of plain cloth, until Sun 
Quan ordered that they should be dressed from his own palace 
wardrobe;117 and He Qi the conqueror of the southeast, who took 
particular pride in the splendour of his raiment: 
By nature, He Qi was extravagant and gay, and he loved military 
affairs. His arms and armour and his engines of war were always 
first-class, the ships that he rode in were engraved with red chasing, 
he had black umbrellas, screens of deep red, halberds and lances 
decorated with flowers and fruits, while the green hides which 
                                               
117 SGZ 57/Wu 10:1287. 
EMPIRE IN THE SOUTH 
 
 
403 
covered his warships looked from far off as if they were 
mountains.118 
Gan Ning, we are told, had been the leader of a "knight-errants" when he 
was young, and he retained some of the same customs when he joined 
Sun Quan's service: 
Gan Ning would kill for pleasure, and he gave outlaws refuge and 
lodging in his commandery offices. Whenever he went in or out, if 
he was on land there were horsemen and chariots drawn up in array, 
and if he travelled by water there were lines of small craft, all with 
followers in embroidered clothing. Wherever he halted he used a 
silken rope to moor the boat, and when he moved on again he cut the 
rope and left it, to show how little he cared.119 
In real terms, reference to activity as a "knight-errant" may better be 
regarded as a euphemism for banditry or, at best, conduct as a masterless 
fighting man.120 Many of the Sun supporters, such as Zhou Yu, Lu Su, 
Cheng Pu, Lü Fan, He Qi and others, were men of family, who came 
accompanied by retainers or who had held some office or 
recommendation from the government, and we are told that Quan Zong, 
for example, took particular care to act as patron and attract refugees 
from the north into his service.121 There were, however, a number of 
others whose background was questionable. Ling Cao of Wu 
commandery, who appears to have been one of the hills people in that 
region, is described as a "wandering bravo," but he served Sun Ce and 
Sun Quan loyally as the leader of many attacks until his death at the 
hands of Gan Ning in battle against Huang Zu.122 Pan Zhang, the man 
who killed Guan Yu, began as an impoverished drunkard: when creditors 
came to his gate he would merely assure them that one day he would be 
                                               
118 SGZ 62/Wu 15:1380. 
119 SGZ 57/Wu 10:1292 PC note 32 quoting Wu shu. 
120 The term 遊俠 youxia has been discussed by James Liu as The Chinese Knight-
Errant, but the reality of most of the cases cited, even in literature, does not well 
reflect Western understanding of the English term. For a devastating, but to my 
mind most appropriate, critique of these "heroes" in literature, see Hsia, The 
Classic Chinese Novel, 86-114, discussing Shuihu zhuan. On the concept and 
conduct of youxia in Han, see Ch'ü, Han Social Structure, 185-195. 
121 See his biography in SGZ 60/Wu 15:1381. 
122 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1295 and note 42 to Chapter Four. The phrase rendered as 
"wandering bravo" is 輕俠 qingxia, one of the alternative expressions for youxia: 
Ch'ü, Han Social Structure, 186. SGZ 55/Wu 10:1297 refers to Ling Cao as a man 
from the hill country. 
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wealthy and powerful, and he would repay them then. He later became 
General of the Right under the imperial government, but he appears to 
have remained a ruffian, a scrounger and a scoundrel – in many respects 
an excellent commander for the time: 
Pan Zhang was rough, fierce man, whose orders were always 
respected. He loved to play a fine part, and even when the soldiers 
under his command were no more than a few thousand he would 
always act as if he had ten thousand. 
 When he was on campaign and halted for camp, he would set up 
a market in the army [and draw commission on the sales], and if 
there was anything his troop lacked, he would look for the chance to 
take what was needed. 
 By nature, however, he was wasteful and extravagant, and in his 
later years he became even worse: if one of his officers or soldiers 
happened to be well off, he would sometimes kill him and take his 
property; and he often defied the law. When investigating officers 
sent in memorials about this, however, Sun Quan considered Pan 
Zhang's record and asked no further questions.123 
Gan Ning, however, was perhaps the most spectacular of Sun Quan's 
military commanders. Originally from Nanyang, he migrated to the west, 
and besides his early experience as a knight-errant or bandit, briefly 
interrupted by a term as Assistant in Shu commandery, he later took a 
serious interest in scholarship. He was certainly extremely brave, he is 
described as rough and fierce, but he was also open and friendly, good at 
planning, caring for his soldiers, thought little of personal property and 
always showed respect for scholars. There was, predictably, a permanent 
feud between him and Ling Tong, whose father he had killed, and Sun 
Quan took pains to keep them apart. 
 Lü Meng had admired and acted as patron to Gan Ning from the 
beginning, but that relationship too was sometimes strained: 
One of the boys in Gan Ning's kitchen did something wrong, then 
ran away to shelter with Lü Meng. Lü Meng was afraid Gan Ning 
would kill him, so he did not immediately send him back. Later, 
however, Gan Ning brought a present for Lü Meng's mother and 
came into the hall to offer it. The kitchen boy came out and went to 
Gan Ning, and Gan Ning promised Lü Meng he would not kill the 
lad.[520] 
                                               
123 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1300. 
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 As soon as he got back to his ship, however, Gan Ning tied the 
boy to a mulberry tree and shot him with arrows till he died. Then he 
told his men to secure the mooring ropes, took off his clothes and 
went to bed. 
 Lü Meng heard about this and was furious. He beat a drum to 
gather his soldiers to attack Gan Ning. Gan Ning heard the noise, but 
stayed in bed. 
 Lü Meng's mother came barefoot and said to him, "His 
Excellency [Sun Quan] treats you like a brother and entrusts you 
with great affairs. How can you take the occasion of some private 
grievance to attack Gan Ning and seek to kill him? Should Gan Ning 
die, even if our master asked no questions about it, you would still be 
failing in your duty as his servant." 
 Lü Meng had always been very obedient to his parents. He 
attended to his mother's words and immediately gave up all thoughts 
of vengeance. He went to Gan Ning's ship and laughed and called 
out to him, "Xingba, my mother has a meal waiting for you; come 
quickly!" 
 Gan Ning wept and sobbed and said, "I let you down." And he 
went with Lü Meng back to visit his mother, and they made merry 
and feasted the whole of the day.124 
Such men as these were violent and emotional, their conduct could be 
cruel and erratic, and it sometimes passed even the lenient bounds of the 
time. In 237 the general Zhu Huan had a bitter quarrel with his superior 
Quan Zong, killing several attendants, then "pretended he was insane," 
left the army, and returned to Jianye for a cure. He was probably 
suffering from a bout of homicidal mania. Sun Quan, however, soothed 
him down, treated him with honour, and sent him back to the front with a 
largely independent command. Zhu Huan remarked that now he had the 
[521] opportunity to return to active service, his ailment would cure 
itself.125 
 There is, of course, one central reason for so many examples of 
extravagant conduct, and that is the military techniques we have observed 
above: if the coherence of an army depends upon the confidence which 
ordinary soldiers have in their commanders, and aggressive action 
depends upon the personal courage of these men – to "break the enemy 
                                               
124 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1295. Xingba was the style of Gan Ning. 
125 SGZ 56/Wu 11:1314; Fang, Chronicle I, 551-553. 
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line" and have that success followed up by their companions – then a 
flamboyant style and strong, even brutal, personality are important and 
indeed essential attributes of military achievement. Conduct as a gaudy 
hero or swashbuckling bully was part of a military leader's stock-in-trade, 
and one cannot ignore the nervous tension required by any man who must 
maintain his authority by regular personal defiance of an enemy array.126 
 So the needs of warfare in that heroic age tended to produce leaders 
who were arrogant, aggressive and occasionally hysterical, and this 
military egocentricity had inevitable influence on the political and social 
structure of the state as a whole. Since these were the people Sun Quan 
was dealing with, one can understand occasional vagaries in his own 
behaviour. 
 In such a society of individual conduct, some women were able to 
play a part for themselves. We are told of good advice being offered and 
accepted, as in the case of Lü Meng and his mother just cited above, the 
advice of Sun Ce's aunt on forcing the crossing of the Yangzi at the 
beginning of his campaigns,127 and the occasional comments of the Lady 
Wu, mother to Sun Ce and Sun [522] Quan.128 Sometimes women took a 
more active role, as did the widow of Sun Yi when she planned and 
executed revenge against his assassins.129 Though very little is told of her, 
Sun Quan's sister, married for a time to Liu Bei, was a woman with 
considerable force of personality,130 and we may also consider Sun Luban, 
eldest daughter of Sun Quan and wife of Quan Zong, who played a 
remarkable role in politics at court. She helped to engineer the dismissal 
of Sun He as Heir, she became the mistress of the chief minister Sun Jun, 
and she was heavily involved in plans for the overthrow of Sun Jun's 
successor Sun Lin.131 Though the imperial harem of Han had been less a 
haven of sensuality than a centre of political ambition, the roles of 
women were circumscribed, and the patterns of their conduct were quite 
strictly laid down. By contrast, if the turmoil of the Three Kingdoms 
                                               
126 On such tactics, see 488-491 above. 
127 Chapter Three at 163. 
128 As, for example, her appeals to Sun Ce to spare Wang Sheng and later Gan Ji in 
Chapter Three at 170-171 and 204; and her reported encouragement to Sun Quan 
to defy Cao Cao in 208: note 21 to Chapter Four. 
129 Chapter Four at 233-234. 
130 See note 8 to Chapter Five. 
131 See note 112 above. 
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period gave opportunity for men of talent, there was also, unusually in 
traditional China, some room as well for women of enterprise and spirit. 
 On the other hand, though there were times that military tempers 
could be soothed or persuaded to listen to calmer counsels, there is little 
to show that the civil administration of the state held any real control. 
Perhaps the decisive example of this institutional weakness may be seen 
in the case of Zhang Wen and his associates soon after the establishment 
of the kingdom. 
 Zhang Wen was a man from Wu commandery, son of a clerical 
officer under Sun Quan.132 Recognised as a scholar [523] and a man of 
fine morality, he was praised by the senior officials Zhang Zhao, Gu 
Yong and Liu Ji, and he was admired by Zhuge Liang. In 224 he was sent 
on embassy to Shu, to assure them that Sun Quan's negotiations with Cao 
Pi of Wei were not an indication of any lack of support for the alliance, 
but rather compelled by force of circumstances. Zhang Wen carried out 
his mission with success, but word came back to Sun Quan of the 
flattering terms with which he addressed the court of Shu, and Sun Quan 
was not entirely pleased. 
 Then, however, Zhang Wen recommended his fellow-countryman Ji 
Yan to take charge of personnel.133 Ji Yan was a strict man, and he insisted 
on judging and demoting those who had done wrong. He was 
increasingly criticised, and several colleagues warned Zhang Wen against 
such a rigid policy. Lu Mao and Zhu Ju argued that: 
... the monarchy has just lately been established, ... and this is the 
time one should give men employment ... by overlooking their faults. 
If we distinguish between good and bad ... and emphasise regular 
monthly criticism ... we would certainly improve custom and display 
a brilliant example. Unfortunately, however, such a program is not 
easily put into practice. It would be better to emulate the overflowing 
love of Confucius in ancient times, and follow the example of 
tolerance that was shown by Guo Tai in more recent days.134 
                                               
132 The biography of Zhang Wen is in SGZ 57/Wu 12:1329-33. 
133 The story appears in SGZ 57/Wu 12:1330, SGZ 57/Wu 12:1337 and SGZ 57/Wu 
12:1340; Fang, Chronicle I, 167-168 and 175-179. There are slightly different 
versions, but it appears Ji Yan became a member of the Imperial Secretariat with 
particular responsibility for selection of officials.  
134 SGZ 57/Wu 12:1337; cf. Fang, Chronicle I, 167. Guo Tai was a celebrated judge of 
character and capacity in the time of Emperor Huan of Han during the 160s: his 
biography is in HHS 68/58:2225-31; deC, Huan and Ling, 45-47. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
 
408 
The message was clear: it was not acceptable for strict standards of 
morality to be applied to the government of Wu. When Ji Yan ignored the 
warnings, and Zhang Wen failed to keep him in order, the trouble came to 
a head. Ji Yan [524] was ordered to commit suicide and Zhang Wen was 
reprimanded and dismissed. As Zhuge Liang is said to have remarked 
when he learnt of the crisis, "He sought to distinguish too sharply 
between good and bad."135 On such a precedent, there was no incentive to 
exercise censorial power, nor any serious supervision over practice of 
government. 
 As Hsü Cho-yün has remarked, the rival states developed from 
different origins. The government of Wei established by Cao Cao may be 
seen as a reconstruction of the imperial tradition in north China. The state 
of Shu-Han was based upon the take-over, through coup d'état, of a local 
government in Yi province, and it likewise represented the Han tradition, 
though on a smaller, regional, scale. The enterprise of Wu, however, 
came from nothing but the success and expansion of a warlord state. 
Where Cao Cao and Liu Bei may be said to have subverted the 
government institutions of Han, Sun Ce and Sun Quan achieved their 
power by replacing them with a new regime of their own. Naturally 
enough, the formalities of their government paid lip-service to the 
traditions of the past, but the state of Wu, as Hsü has said, represented a 
new type of regime, based upon force.136 
 So it was no small achievement for Sun Quan to have maintained 
authority for more than fifty years over such a collection of energetic, 
eccentric and frequently brutal individualists. The fourth-century 
commentator Sun Sheng disapproved of the usurpers of Wu, and looked 
with satisfaction at their eventual failure, but he did appreciate Sun 
Quan's personal qualities:137[525] 
If we look at the way Sun Quan cared for his men, he inclined his 
heart and he gave his utmost consideration in order to obtain their 
strength even unto death. He wept for Zhou Tai's injuries,138 he put 
the concubine into the grave with Chen Wu,139 he prayed for the life 
                                               
135 SGZ 57/Wu 12:1333-34 PC quoting Kuaiji dianlu; Fang, Chronicle I, 167-168 and 
175-179. 
136 Hsü [1967], 200. 
137
 SGZ 55/Wu 10:1297-98 PC note 1 bis quoting Sun Sheng (appended to the account 
of Ling Tong's two sons as cited in note 83 above). 
138 See note 23 to Chapter Seven. 
139 Chapter Six at 380. 
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of Lü Meng,140 and he cared for the sons of Ling Tong: this was how 
he encouraged the resolve of his followers. 
 For this reason, though there was little to be said of his authority 
or his political virtue, his personal sense of affection so touched the 
people that he was able to keep Jing [province] and [the region of] 
Wu under his control, and that is why he was able to maintain his 
wrongful power for so long. 
In the light of this background, however, it is not entirely surprising that 
the literary and scholarly achievement of the state of Wu compares rather 
poorly with that of the state of Wei under Cao Cao and his successors. 
Certainly, we are told that southern scholars such as Zhang Hong and Gu 
Yong were respected by expert critics, men such as Yu Fan and Xue Zong 
composed works of quality, and Sun Hao, last ruler of Wu, was a 
competent lyricist – but this cannot be compared to the galaxy of talent in 
the north. Cao Cao himself and his son Cao Pi were poets of ability, Cao 
Zhi, younger brother of Cao Pi, was one of the greatest in Chinese 
history, and they were supported by Wang Can and his colleagues, the so-
called Seven Masters of the Jian'an period, followed by Ruan Ji, Xi Kang 
and the other Sages of the Bamboo Grove.141 Similarly in philosophy, 
[526] though men of Wu wrote essays and commentary on the Confucian 
classics, particularly the Book of Changes, and on classical Taoism, there 
was nothing to match the works of Zhongchang Tong, Xu Gan, Xun Yue 
and the remarkable Wang Bi and He Yan, combining Confucianism and 
Taoism in the Study of the Mysteries.142 
 There is, however, one exception to the unfavourable comparison. Lu 
Ji and Lu Yun, grandsons of the general Lu Xun, were both less than 
                                               
140 Chapter Six at 406. 
141 On Wang Can, see Chapter Four at 243-244, and on the Seven Masters and the Cao 
family, see for example Miao, Early Medieval Chinese Poetry, and Frodsham, 
Anthology, 26-32. 
  On Ruan Ji, Xi Kang and their colleagues, see Holzman, "Les sept sages," Vie 
et pensée, and Poetry and Politics. 
  The poetry of Wu is collected in Quan Han Sanguo Jin nanbeichao shi 6. 
142 On the philosophy of this period, see for example Cambridge Han, 682 and 715 
[Loewe, " Religious and Intellectual Background"], 804-806 [Ch'en, "Confucian, 
Legalist and Taoist Thought"], and 829-832 [Demiéville, "Philosophy and 
Religion"]. 
  "Study of the Mysteries" is Demiéville's rendering of the Chinese term 玄學 
xuanxue, and he observes that there were three "mysteries," the Laozi, the 
Zhuangzi, and the Book of Changes with its appendices. 
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twenty at the time of the conquest of Wu by Jin, but both achieved 
distinction in the north.143 Lu Ji in particular was one of the leading 
composers of rhapsodies and lyric poetry in his day, and he was 
celebrated also for his "Rhapsody on Literature," a masterpiece of 
systematic criticism, and for his commentaries to the classics.144 He is 
commonly classified as a writer of the Western Jin, and his works were 
indeed composed in the last years of the third century, but by background 
and youthful training he may be equally regarded as representative of a 
last flowering in the literary culture of Wu. 
 And in another field of scholarship, mathematics and astronomy, the 
men of Wu had a leading role. We have discussed the calculations of the 
independent calendar established by Sun Quan, and noted the 
contribution of scholars from the southeast such as [527] Wang Fan and 
Lu Ji the son of Lu Kang, who was compared to the great Zhang Heng of 
Later Han and who, in similar fashion, constructed a working armillary 
sphere.145 There are frequent references in later texts to scholars at the 
imperial observatory of Wu, and at the beginning of the fourth century 
Chen Zhuo, who had been head of that office just before the conquest, 
repeated the lost work of Zhang Heng and compiled a definitive map of 
the constellations.146 Though the men of Wu were perhaps no more than 
competent in traditional philosophy and letters, they could claim 
distinction in other branches of knowledge. 
 When Sun Quan appointed his eldest son Sun Deng as Heir to the 
kingdom in 222, he arranged for him to have young men of quality as 
personal friends and companions. The first chosen were Zhuge Ke, son of 
Zhuge Jin, Zhang Xiu, son of Zhang Zhao, Gu Tan the grandson of Gu 
Yong, and Chen Biao the son of Chen Wu. As Sun Deng grew up, this 
policy developed further, and a coterie of scholars gathered about his 
                                               
143 See note 102 above. 
144 See, for example, Frodsham, Anthology, 89-91, and Knechtges, Wen xuan, 38, who 
observes that "If the size of his Wen xuan corpus means anything, Lu Ji was one of 
Xiao Tong's favourite poets. His fifty-two poems make up the largest shi selection 
in the anthology." 
145 See, for example, Needham, Science and Civilisation III, 359 and 389, also note 69 
to Chapter Seven. 
  Lu Ji 陸績 the mathematician, son of Lu Kang, must be distinguished from his 
cousin thrice removed, the scholar and writer Lu Ji 機 who was a grandson of Lu 
Xun. 
146 See, for example, Needham, Science and Civilisation III, 264 and 387, also 100, 
200, and 384-385. 
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personal court. According to later Buddhist texts, the translator Zhi Qian 
was recognised by Sun Quan as a man of wide learning and was attached 
to this group as an instructor to the Heir.147 Zhi Qian was a layman, not 
qualified for full [528] missionary activity, but his work of translation 
was not matched in south China until the end of the following century. 
 There had been some knowledge and acceptance of Buddhism in 
China from at least the first century AD, and it is very likely there was a 
Buddhist community in the area of the lower Yangzi. Liu Ying, King of 
Chu, is recorded as a patron, we have observed the unfortunate case of 
the energetic but untrustworthy Zhai Rong,148 and we are told that Zhi 
Qian worked on Buddhist scriptures that he found in that region, 
probably at Jianye itself. 
 In his study of the Buddhist Conquest of China, Zürcher gives some 
credence to the story of Zhi Qian's connection to the court of Sun 
Quan,149 and observes that Sun Quan's patronage represented an 
important development in acceptance of the creed in China. In the north, 
during the second century AD Emperor Huan of Han had sought to 
establish himself as a patron of Buddhism, but that official worship was 
confused with the Huang-Lao sect, and Buddhism at Luoyang remained 
on the margins of intellectual interest.150 Concepts of Buddhism were 
influential in the philosophy of the gentry at the court of Wei, but their 
chief concern was given to the synthesis of Confucianism and Taoism 
which reached its fullest expression in the Study of the Mysteries.151 
Contact with the imperial family of Wu, and the support which was given 
to the work of translation and exposition, meant that the doctrine was 
now presented in coherent form for the contemplation and 
comprehension of a Chinese elite.[529] 
                                               
147 The biography of Zhi Qian is in Gaoseng zhuan "Lives of Eminent Monks," 1, 
combined with that of Kang Senghui; Shih, Biographies, 20-31. Chu sanzang ji ji 
"Collection of Notes concerning the Translation of the Tripitika," 13, has a more 
expansive account. See Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest I, 49-50 and II, 335 notes 125 
and 129. 
148 On Buddhism in Later Han, see Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest I, 18-43, and on Zhai 
Rong, also note 22 to Chapter Three. 
149 On Buddhism in the Three Kingdoms period, particularly in the state of Wu, see 
Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest I, 46-55. 
150 For example, Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest I, 36-40, and deC, "Politics and 
Philosophy," 72-75. 
151 See note 142 above, also Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest I, 46. 
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 The leading figure in this process was the celebrated monk Kang 
Senghui, who came to the court of Sun Quan in 247. Though he traced 
his ancestry to Sogdiana, by present-day Samarkand, we are told that his 
family had been living for generations in India, and Kang Senghui was 
born in Jiaozhi commandery by present-day Hanoi. He joined the 
Buddhist order in his teens, and he acquired a good Chinese education as 
well as a knowledge of Sanskrit and the Tripitika. Under Kang Senghui's 
influence, and despite some later vicissitudes due to the hostility of Sun 
Lin and possibly of Sun Hao, the Buddhist church expanded its presence, 
and the Jianchu monastery was established and maintained under 
imperial patronage.152 
 Despite his brother Sun Ce's fatal quarrel with Gan Ji, Sun Quan was 
seriously interested in metaphysical speculation, and his patronage of 
Kang Senghui may be seen as parallel to his cultivation of Taoist teachers 
and magicians. We have noted the influence of the diviner Wu Fan, and it 
may be observed that Yu Fan had been exiled from court because he 
made fun of Sun Quan and Zhang Zhao discussing questions of 
immortality.153 In 241, even as Sun Deng was on his death-bed, he 
encouraged his father to maintain cultivation of the doctrines of Huang-
Lao, and towards the end of his reign Sun Quan was impressed by the 
spiritual Wang Biao, who persuaded him to change the reign title in 251 
to Taiyuan 太元 "Grand [530] Origin," no doubt in hope of a revival of 
the state, and an extension of his own life.154 
 And finally we may consider the physical achievement of Sun Quan: 
his new capital of Jianye, founded upon ancient Moling. In the north 
there were the three great cities of Wei: Luoyang, Ye and Xuchang, each 
adorned and embellished by Cao Cao and his successors. In the west 
                                               
152 Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest I, 52. As Zürcher observes, one must be careful in 
accepting too much of the hagiography maintained in such stories, some of which 
claim even that Sun Quan was converted to Buddhism: Buddhist Conquest I, 278. 
It would seem, however, that the growth of Buddhism under the empire of Wu is 
well enough established. 
  Zürcher, Buddhist Conquest II, 335 note 129 notes a Buddhist tradition that the 
Lady Pan, mother of Sun Liang who became empress of Sun Quan, showed 
support for the doctrine by establishing a monastery at Wuchang in 229; there is, 
however, no early authority for this statement. 
153 Above at 501. 
154 SGZ 59/Wu 14:1365 and SGZ 47/Wu 2:1148, discussed by Zürcher, Buddhist 
Conquest I, 53. 
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there was the old-established city of Chengdu. In culture and splendour, 
however, Jianye could rival each of these. 
 When Zuo Si of Jin composed his "Three Capitals Rhapsodies" at the 
end of the third century, he claimed in his Preface to have taken particular 
care that his descriptions of the regions and the metropolises of the three 
states should be true and accurate. He consulted maps and gazetteers, 
local custom and ancient tradition, and he rejected the hyperbole of his 
predecessors Sima Xiangru, Ban Gu and Zhang Heng, introducing 
impossible plants and imaginary creatures into their romantic accounts of 
hunting parks, palaces and cities. So his "Rhapsody on the Capital of 
Wu," one section of the Three Capitals Rhapsodies, should present a true 
picture, albeit enhanced, of Jianye and its imperial state, composed by a 
late contemporary.155 From his work, therefore, we may read how:[531] 
They formed jasper and carnelian into terraces and chambers. 
 High gateways tower upward; 
Through door after door chariots run side by side. 
Vermeil watchtowers stand in pairs; 
The imperial highway is as smooth as a whetstone. 
Where it is planted with pagoda trees, 
Crossed by clear streams, 
Dark shade hangs heavy and thick, 
A limpid current flows slow and easy. 
Seven li of official stations all in a row 
Are packed ridgepole to ridgepole along the southern road. 
Military camps are arrayed like the teeth of a comb; 
Offices and bureaus are scattered like chess-pieces, 
At Hengtang and Chaxia, 
The city houses are lavish and grand. 
The Changgan settlements stretch long and far, 
                                               
155 The biography of Zuo Si is in JS 92:2375-77, and is summarised by Knechtges, 
Wen xuan, 483-484. Zuo Si was born at Linzi in Qi, near present-day Linzi in 
Shandong, in 250 and he died about 305. Soon after the Rhapsodies were 
completed at the end of the third century, commentaries were compiled for each of 
the sections: that for "Rhapsody on the Capital of Wu" was written by the scholar 
Liu Kui. 
  The "Three Capitals Rhapsodies" appear in Wen xuan 4-6:865-1481. The 
Preface to Zuo Si's work [4:865-79] is translated by Knechtges, Wen xuan, 337-
341, and "Rhapsody on the Capital of Wu" [5:1021-1258] is most elegantly 
rendered at 373-427. 
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With soaring eaves adjoined one to another.156 
And how in the markets: 
Merchants and pedlars huddle shoulder to shoulder. 
Garbed in ramie and kudzu cloth, 
Chaotically congested, they are massed and crowded together. 
Light chariots, under slack rein, pass through the market streets; 
Storied boats, sails unfurled, pass by the waterfront stalls, 
Fruits and cloth gather here in ever-constant supply; 
Imported from afar are cone shells and glass.157 
Despite its pretensions, imperial Wu was a limited, brittle structure. For 
the time it lasted, however, it was a splendid achievement, and we may 
fairly praise the manner in which Sun Quan pursued his opportunities 
with imagination, taste and skill. He was a patron of the arts and of 
scholarship, the city of Jianye was [532] his creation, and within his 
lifetime it became one of the great metropolises of China. Through the 
conquest of the far south and the control of overseas trade which 
accompanied that achievement, Sun Quan had access to the exotic riches 
of southeast Asia, and his state gained wealth as middle-man for the 
north. 
 In longer terms, the settlement of Chinese people and their culture in 
the south, already begun during Han, was confirmed and expanded under 
Wu. In later times, from the fourth century to the sixth, while the north 
lay under the political control and cultural influence of alien occupation, 
the lands south of the Yangzi maintained the Chinese tradition. In that 
respect particularly, Sun Quan deserves great credit. He inherited a 
provincial warlord state, he developed it into a centre of culture and 
power, and he laid new foundations for the future of China. 
                                               
156 From Knechtges, Wen xuan, 399. 
157 Knechtges, Wen xuan, 401-403. 
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Story cycles: exaggeration and allegory 
The distortions of Romance 
 
Introductory summary: 
Sanguo zhi, the official history which deals with the period of the Three 
Kingdoms, contains both a main text by Chen Shou of the third century 
and, equally important, a commentary compiled by Pei Songzhi of the 
early fifth century. 
 The work of Pei Songzhi collects material from sources available at 
his time and, unusually for a Chinese historian, Pei Songzhi identifies the 
source and the author from which that material is taken. In consequence 
we have a remarkably broad and detailed picture of historical writing in 
the third and fourth centuries. 
 On the history of Wu, there were general works such as Wu shu, 
compiled by an official committee under the government of that state; the 
private compilations Wu li and Wu lu, likewise based upon archival 
records; and Jiangbiao zhuan, which records local material gathered soon 
after the conquest of Wu by Jin in 280. [534] In addition, moreover, there 
are a quantity of local histories, biographies and collections of works, and 
numerous clan records. 
 Many of these documents present largely fictional anecdotes and 
accounts of the supernatural, and it is often difficult to judge whether an 
item of information should be accepted as fact, fiction, fantasy or 
allegory. The question is further confused by the later development of 
                                               
*  In the first edition of Generals of the South, published in 1990, Chapter Nine 
occupied pages 533 to 589. The original pagination is indicated with brackets []; 
indexing and cross-references refer to those pages. 
  Some of the discussion and argument in this chapter is presented from a 
different perspective – that of Cao Cao – in Chapter Eleven of deC, Imperial 
Warlord. 
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story cycles about leading figures of the time, and by the vast popularity 
of the novel Sanguo yanyi, "Romance of the Three Kingdoms," which 
reached its developed form more than a thousand years after the events it 
celebrates, and which presents a strongly favourable view of Liu Bei, 
Zhuge Liang and the state of Shu-Han. One purpose of the present work 
has been to restore the balance, and to recount the history of Wu on the 
basis of fact, rather than the bias of romance. 
 
Chen Shou and Pei Songzhi: 
Sanguo zhi, official history of the Three Kingdoms, presents a special 
case in the historiography of China. Chen Shou, a former subject of Shu-
Han, compiled the initial work some time after the conquest of that state,1 
but it was initially just one general history among others. It was the 
imperial command that Pei Songzhi should compile a commentary which 
established Chen Shou's writing in the canon of Chinese tradition.[535] 
 Pei Songzhi was born in Hedong in present-day Shanxi in 372.2 He 
held office under Liu Yu, a general originally in the service of the Eastern 
Jin who seized the imperial title in 420 and established his own dynasty 
of [Liu] Song. A senior official under the new regime, Pei Songzhi was 
recognised for his scholarship. In 428 he received an imperial order to 
compile a commentary to the existing Sanguo zhi by Chen Shou, and the 
completed work, with its accompanying memorial, was presented to the 
throne in the following year. We may assume that the project was well in 
train before the official commission.3 
 In his memorial of 429, Pei Songzhi gave keen but qualified praise to 
the basic text:  
                                               
1 There are biographies of Chen Shou in Huayang guo zhi 11:9a-10a and in JS 
82:2137-38. Both texts are reproduced at the end of the Beijing edition of Sanguo 
zhi, pages 1475-76 and 1477-78. 
  On the historiography of Sanguo zhi, see also the introduction to the Beijing 
edition and the preface by William Hung to Harvard-Yenching Index No. 33. For 
an interpretation of Chen Shou as the historian of "fear," forever concerned about 
the political dangers of his work, see the article by Honda [1962]. 
2 The biography of Pei Songzhi is in Song shu 64:1698-1701. The text of his 
memorial is reproduced at the end of the Beijing edition of Sanguo zhi, pages 
1479-81. 
3 Pei Songzhi's memorial of presentation is reproduced at the end of the Beijing 
edition of Sanguo zhi, pages 1471-72.  
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The argument and design of Chen Shou's work are admirable, and in 
most things it is well judged. Indeed it is a garden of knowledge and 
the finest historical work of recent times. 
 It is, however, rather too short, and there are a number of 
omissions. 
 I have received the imperial decree to search into detail and to 
devote my efforts to discover every source. I have looked into old 
traditions from the past, and at the same time I have recovered 
records which have been neglected. 
The remarkable thing about the new compilation, which supplements 
Chen Shou's work and just about doubles the length of the whole, is that 
Pei Songzhi not only collected the sources, but identified them in his 
commentary. He was, moreover, not at all concerned to smooth variant 
accounts and discrepancies into an orderly, coherent narrative. On the 
contrary, some of the texts he quotes contradict the main text, and on 
several [536] occasions Pei Songzhi himself presents different accounts 
of the same incident. 
In his memorial of presentation, Pei Songzhi set out his policy: 
If there is something Chen Shou failed to mention, and if it is 
something that should be remembered, then I have collected 
other records to fill in the gap. Sometimes there are two 
accounts of the same incident, though there may be errors or 
irrelevancies in the text. Sometimes an event is described in two 
quite different ways and I do not feel that I can decide between 
them. In all such cases I include the variant versions to show the 
different traditions. If one account is clearly wrong, and what it 
says is not logically sound, then I note which is right in order to 
correct the mistake. On occasion, I argue with Chen Shou in his 
judgement of events or on minor points of fact. 
So Pei Songzhi presents the raw material of his research. Where possible, 
he provides the name of the author and the title of the work from which 
he has drawn his information, and he has no apparent concern that the 
record should reflect well upon one particular party or another, nor that it 
should impress the reader with a moral message. 
 Here is considerable contrast with the tradition of historical writing 
at this level in China before that time, and an equally great difference to 
that which came later. At the time Pei Songzhi was writing, the two great 
models were the Shi ji of Sima Qian and the Han shu of Ban Gu. Both 
were compiled as private works, but their authors held position in the 
CHAPTER NINE 
 
 
418 
official history offices of their day, and to a very high degree they are 
concerned to present a coherent narrative of events, with background 
messages on proper conduct and the right way of government.4[537] 
 It is well enough agreed among scholars that Chinese tradition was 
deeply and sincerely concerned with the past and with the records of 
proper action. It was the duty of the historian to tell the truth and to offer 
moral judgement, just as Confucius was assumed to have done when he 
compiled the Spring and Autumn Annals for the state of Lu. The choice 
of events to be recorded, however, and the praise or blame implicit in that 
choice, were naturally the result of the historian's judgement, and there is 
an automatic, albeit unconscious, bias towards the interests and attitudes 
of the landed class which produced scholars and officials, dominant 
members of the community.5 
 Furthermore, the very fact that Sima Qian, Ban Gu and their 
followers were members of the official history offices meant they were 
not only assisted by the established historical tradition, but were also 
dependent upon it. The hierarchy of information based upon the imperial 
court, from the Diaries of Activity and Repose to the annals compiled at 
intervals through the dynasty, added to again by edicts, memorials and 
other documents in the archives, provided a massive body of sources and 
a bureaucratic technique for handling it. The work of the historian was to 
weave this material into a story which might serve as guidance and even 
as a warning for future rulers. 
 Shi ji and Han shu were the greatest, but by no means the only, early 
works in this tradition. Dongguan Hanji, compiled by the history office 
of Later Han throughout that dynasty, was all but complete;6 and the Xu 
Han shu of Sima Biao, compiled one hundred [538] years later, described 
the doom of Later Han with a strongly didactic inspiration.7 At the end of 
the second century Xun Yue, in his Han ji, sought to account for the 
                                               
4 On the compilation of Shi ji, Han shu and the Hou Han shu of Fan Ye, see, for 
example, Chavannes, Mémoires historiques I, vi-lxi; Watson, Grand Historian of 
China; Hulsewé, "Historiography;" and Bielenstein's "Prolegomena" in RHD I, 9-
81. Loewe's "Introduction" to Cambridge Han, 2-6, has a general essay on written 
sources for the history of Han. 
5 See, for example, Gardner, Chinese Traditional Historiography, and Gardiner, 
"Standard Histories." 
6 On the history of the work finally entitled Dongguan Hanji, "Han Records of the 
Eastern Pavilion," see Bielenstein, RHD I, 10-11, and Lo-yang, 29-30, also Loewe, 
Early Chinese Texts, 471-473. 
7 See Chapter Eight of Mansvelt Beck, Treatises. 
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problems of the present by lessons from Former Han,8 and in the middle 
fourth century Yuan Hong compiled the matching Hou Han ji, in 
chronicle form with occasional comments.9 There were several other 
works on the Han dynasty in the two centuries which followed the end of 
the empire,10 and at the very time Pei Songzhi was working on his 
commentary, his younger contemporary Fan Ye was beginning the annals 
and biographies which comprise his Hou Han shu, the canonical History 
of Later Han.11 
 Fan Ye's compilation fits the mould established by Shi ji and Han 
shu. The chapters of annals, based so far as possible on the archival [539] 
records then remaining, present a chronological account of the imperial 
court and government, while the great majority of biographies tell us of 
the lives of men of political significance and of their official acts. The 
work is done with design and skill, which may be recognised in close 
reading, and it presents an elegant and coherent argument. It is, however, 
in the bureaucratic tradition of official history: it pays chief attention to 
matters affecting the prosperity and decline of the dynasty and 
government of Han, and it seeks to distinguish romantic fiction from 
official fact.12 
                                               
8 On Xun Yue (148-209; biography in HHS 62/52:2058-63), see the works by Ch'en 
Ch'i-yun. On Han ji, see particularly Ch'en Ch'i-yün, Hsün Yüeh: Life and 
Reflections, 84-126. 
9 Yuan Hong (328-376) was a celebrated scholar and writer of Eastern Jin. His 
biography is in JS 92:2391-99, and he is the subject of several anecdotes in 
Shishuo xinyu: Mather, Tales of the World, 610 et saepe. Yuan Hong composed a 
number of pieces on the Three Kingdoms, but Hou Han ji was his major work of 
history. 
  Both the Han ji of Xun Yue and the Hou Han ji of Yuan Hong have survived 
largely intact. Naturally, much of the early history of the Three Kingdoms is 
covered by Yuan Hong's work, which concludes with the abdication of Emperor 
Xian in favour of Cao Pi and with Liu Bei's claim to the throne in 221. 
Unfortunately, however, and particularly for a chronicle history, some items appear 
misplaced. For the most part, Hou Han ji has been overtaken by the Hou Han shu 
of Fan Ye, compiled half a century later, though there are occasions where Yuan 
Hong's account of an incident is better than that of the standard history. 
10 Bielenstein, RHD I, 12-13, discusses these early works on the history of Later Han. 
11 There are biographies of Fan Ye in Song shu 69:1819-31, and in Nan shi 33:848-
56. Born in 398, a generation younger than Pei Songzhi, he died in 446. 
12 Hou Han shu includes some items which may be regarded rather as tales of ghosts 
and magic than as sober history. One may consider, for example, the Chapter on 
Diviners and Magicians, HHS 82/72A-B, translated by Ngo and by DeWoskin, and 
the story of Wang Chun in the Chapter on Men of Unusual Conduct, who was 
CHAPTER NINE 
 
 
420 
 The work of Pei Songzhi, on the other hand, preserves a medley of 
disparate texts which reflect the literary and historiographical activity of 
their time far better than the standard dynastic histories. Pei Songzhi has 
noted not only the official histories of the rival states, he cites unofficial 
histories and local [540] records, clan registers and individual 
biographies, folk-tales and stories of the supernatural. And he also 
records the writings of pure propaganda and the comments of later 
essayists and critics, while just occasionally he inserts a judgement or 
comment of his own.13 
 The effect is remarkable, for we are presented with a broad sample of 
material which had been compiled over two hundred and fifty years, from 
the latter part of the second century to the beginning of the fifth. There is 
no comparable collection for any earlier period. It is possible and indeed 
likely that similar works existed during the centuries of Han, but the 
materials on which they were written were flimsy, copies were few, and 
the main stream of tradition represented by Shi ji, Han shu and the 
official histories so dominated the field that few rival accounts were 
popular enough to survive. Many of the works cited by Pei Songzhi 
survive only in the fragments which he quoted and in later encyclopaedic 
compilations of the Tang period. Very few have maintained an 
independent existence. 
 In some respects, indeed, Pei Songzhi was an encyclopaedist rather 
than a historian, and it is those later encyclopaedias which have 
                                                                                                                   
miraculously rewarded for his kindness to a dying student, and later solved a 
murder by interviewing the ghost of a female victim in a haunted post-house: HHS 
81/71:2680-81; deC, "The Ghosts that Were." 
  Shi ji and Han shu, which I similarly classify in the bureaucratic tradition, 
likewise contain chapters which are essentially non-factual: the Biography of Lord 
Meng Chang, in SJ 75, is fairly treated by Bauer and Franke, The Golden Casket, 
as fiction. 
  For the most part, however, traditional bureaucratic historians distinguished the 
material they were dealing with, and their readers understood which sections were 
intended as descriptions of fact and which were exemplary fiction. As Franke 
remarks, in his Introduction to the English-language edition of The Golden Casket, 
at 6, "historical novellas...are embedded in compilations such as [Shi ji]..., from 
which they can easily be extracted." Fan Ye generally maintains the separation, and 
he seldom inserts grossly exaggerated or obviously fictitious anecdotes into his 
biographies of notable political figures. This is quite different to the open style of 
Pei Songzhi's compilation. 
13 A list of works and authors cited by Pei Songzhi, based upon the compilation of 
Shen Jiaben, is provided in deC, Records of the Three Kingdoms. 
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maintained his style of compilation, while the histories of the dynasties 
which followed the Three Kingdoms, from Jin shu to Sui shu, represent a 
confirmation of the official style, compiled for the most part by 
committees of scholars working under imperial patronage. It was a great 
achievement of Tang to re-establish the official tradition of 
historiography: new histories were compiled and commentaries were 
added to Shi ji, Han shu and Hou Han shu. The result, however, perhaps 
not unintentional, was that the initiative represented by Pei Songzhi was 
abandoned, and the writing of [541] history returned to its earlier mould, 
in which differences between sources were ironed out in order to produce 
a coherent narrative.14 
 In their review of Sanguo zhi, the eighteenth century editors of Siku 
quanshu complained that Pei Songzhi was inconsistent and erratic, that 
he often included irrelevant items, and that his arrangement was 
haphazard.15 The criticism is justified, and there are many cases where a 
modern historian will find himself either confused by the selection, or 
doubtful of the reliability of the information. And yet this very 
eclecticism makes the work of Pei Songzhi a repository of so much 
information on what may well be described as the Matter of the Three 
Kingdoms.16 
 Furthermore, and quite exceptionally for the Chinese tradition, the 
material which has been preserved is clearly identifiable. When Pei 
Songzhi first quotes from a work he indicates the title and the author, and 
very often we are able to discover, from either this information or some 
other source, further details on the scholar concerned and the provenance 
of his work. Thanks to Pei Songzhi, we have a collection of the material 
which dealt with the period from the end of the second century to the 
latter part of the third century, and which was compiled between that time 
and his own. 
                                               
14 On the history offices and the historical work of Tang, see, for example, Lien-
sheng Yang, "The Organization of Chinese Official Historiography," and Wang 
Gungwu, "Later Standard Histories." 
15 The comments of the Siku quanshu congmu tiyao are reproduced at the end of the 
Beijing edition of SGZ, 1473-74. 
16 Here and below, I have been greatly influenced by the discussion and analysis of 
Johnson, "Epic and History in Early China," who considers the story of the pre-Qin 
hero Wu Zixu as it may originally have appeared in a legendary cycle of stories, 
and was later transmitted, in blander style, by Sima Qian (SJ 75). 
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 By contrast, the standard Chinese history incorporates information, 
as a matter of course, into a single narrative. We know, [542] for 
example, that a great part of Shi ji was taken directly from Zuo zhuan, 
from Intrigues of the Warring States or from similar works of the Zhou 
period. The earlier source of this material can often be identified by 
comparisons, but it is not provided by Sima Qian.17 And the same 
principle may be observed in the Zizhi tongjian of Sima Guang, more 
than a thousand years later: the historian chose his material from earlier 
works, he sometimes lightly redrafted the passages, and he arranged the 
information with elegance and skill, but he did not provide any regular 
system to account for the original source which he used.18 Still more to 
the point, a historian in such a tradition feels no prime obligation to 
discuss alternative stories: once a particular item has been chosen, other 
versions are neglected and often lost. In some respects, when reading 
such a work as Shi ji, one should not only contemplate the records that 
Sima Qian has preserved for us, but should also mourn those many tales 
which were available at the time, which failed to be identified and 
preserved, and which are now gone for ever. 
 From this point of view, the main text of Sanguo zhi is well within 
the bureaucratic tradition. Born in 233, Chen Shou held clerical office at 
the court of Shu-Han and after the conquest by Jin he rose to official 
position [543] through the patronage of the great minister Zhang Hua. He 
was a little over thirty at the time of the fall of Shu-Han, something under 
fifty when the empire of Wu surrendered in 280, and he died about 300. 
He composed a number of other scholarly works, and we are told that he 
had access to the records of the three rival states; there is every reason to 
believe he had good opportunity to consult the contemporary government 
sources.19 
                                               
17 In Mémoires historiques Chavannes supplies marginal notes to his translation, 
indicating earlier sources from which Sima Qian appears to have taken material. 
18 In his Kaoyi commentary, Sima Guang does compare and discuss some variant 
items of information in his sources. This, however, is done on a case-by-case basis, 
where specific texts are in disagreement. There is no consistent attempt to identify 
sources in general. 
  In his translation of ZZTJ chapters 60-78, Fang, Chronicle, has analysed and 
compared the text with the sources from which Sima Guang took material for the 
history of the period 220-265. In Huan and Ling and Establish Peace I also 
attempt to identify the original texts, but without Fang's detailed comparisons. 
19 The two biographies of Chen Shou differ on the date of his death. According to JS 
82, he spent a long time under the Jin without position, then held some minor posts 
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Historians of the South: 
A number of other general – or at least broadly concerned – histories 
were written during the third century. Each of the three courts had its own 
official history project, and the Wei shu, Shu shu and Wu shu were 
evidently designed to follow the pattern of Dongguan Hanji which had 
been compiled through generations of Later Han.20 [544] There were 
                                                                                                                   
in the capital and the provinces. About 297 he was appointed as Palace Cadet to 
the Heir, but died before he could take up the post. According to Huayang guo zhi 
11, Chen Shou held the position of Palace Cadet, then became Cavalry Regular 
Attendant, a position of high rank, but he was dismissed after the fall and 
execution of Zhang Hua in 300, and died soon afterwards. 
20 On Wei shu, see Hou Kang, Bu Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3174/3-3175/1, Yao Zhenzong, 
Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3220/3-3221/1, and SGZJJ 1:3a-b. The biography of the author, 
Wang Shen, is in JS 39:1143-46. 
  On Shu shu, see Yao Zhenzong, Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3221/1-2. No work of that 
title is quoted by Pei Songzhi, but Huayang guo zhi 11:8b-9a refers to a certain 
Wang Chong, who held the office of Gentleman at the Eastern Pavilion and took 
part in the compilation of a Shu shu. There is also a passing reference to a Shu shu 
in SGZ 45/Shu 15:1079 (SGZJJ 12b), where Chen Shou says that in 240 the 
scholar Yang Xi compiled the Ji-Han fuchen zan "Praises of the Ministers who 
Assisted Junior Han," and many items from that collection had been incorporated 
into the Shu shu. It seems probable that much of the Shu shu was absorbed into 
Sanguo zhi. 
  There is a curious controversy, however, about the actual "history office" of the 
state of Shu. In his Criticism (評 Ping), at the end of the biography/annals of Liu 
Shan, "Later Sovereign" of Shu, Chen Shou says that the state of Shu did not 
employ historians (國不置史), that there was no office responsible for collecting 
essential material, and that as a result many items of information, notably accounts 
of portents, are missing. Chen Shou suggests that the military urgencies of the time 
prevented Zhuge Liang from paying proper attention to that responsibility: SGZ 
33/Shu 3:902-03. 
  As we have seen, however, there is evidence that the state of Shu, like its rivals, 
had a history office, or at least that it had such institutions as an Eastern Pavilion, 
presumably parallel to that of Han, and a body of scholars who recorded events 
and compiled works of history. The biography of Chen Shou in Huayang guo zhi 
says that he held appointment as Gentleman of the Private Library in the Eastern 
Pavilion of Shu, and that office would surely have collected and preserved some 
documents. 
  There has been considerable debate on the statement by Chen Shou, and the 
opinions of various scholars are summarised in the commentary of Lu Bi at SGZJJ 
33:21a-b. The best explanation appears to be that Chen Shou was saying that the 
state of Shu did not establish a regular archive: items of information were 
recorded, but there was no system for collecting and keeping data day-by-day in 
the manner which the Han had developed, so he could not find all the details that 
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semi-official compilations by historians who either worked for the 
government or had access to the archives: Liu Ai, who held position 
under Dong Zhuo in the 190s and was at the imperial court under Cao 
Cao in 216, compiled annals of the [545] reign of Emperor Ling, the 
Lingdi ji, and continued with annals of the reign of Emperor Xian.21 Yu 
Huan, who is described as a subject of Wei, wrote a Dian lue, 
"Authoritative Account" and a Wei lue, "Authoritative History of Wei," 
dealing in turn with the last years of Han and with the history of the 
successor state.22 
                                                                                                                   
he wanted. The men appointed to the history office had not paid proper attention to 
their responsibilities, and although individuals were able to compile works of 
history, no such project was formally maintained by the state. 
  We have noted in Chapter Eight at 465, discussing the administrative structure 
of Wu, that there were a number of posts which were formally filled but whose 
incumbents had other priorities. In Wu, however, compilation of the official history 
was regarded as a matter of some importance, and this may also have extended to 
the maintenance of regular records: below at 550-554. 
21 On Liu Ai, see note 36 to Chapter Two. Both Lingdi ji and Xiandi ji are quoted by 
Pei Songzhi: e.g. SGZ 46/Wu 1:1094; and SGZ 1/Wei 1:13 (JJ 34b). 
  Sui shu 33:960, lists a Han Ling-Xian erdi ji "Annals of the Two Emperors 
Ling and Xian of Han," by Liu Fang 劉芳, while Jiu Tang shu 46:1991, and Xin 
Tang shu 58:1459, have a work of the same title ascribed to Liu Ai 劉艾. It seems 
that the personal name Fang in Sui shu has been miswritten for Ai. The Tang 
encyclopaedia Chuxue ji 30:737 quotes a Handi zhuan "Account of the Emperor[s] 
of Han" by Liu Ai, and refers to the year 194, which was in the reign of Emperor 
Xian. By definition, the phrase Xiandi could not have been included in the title of 
any book before 234, when the abdicated Emperor died and received his 
posthumous title, but it appears that Liu Ai, or perhaps some later collaborator, 
continued his chronicle under the more general name, that the specification Xiandi 
was added later, and the whole work was variously known in one or two books, 
sometimes described as ji and sometimes as zhuan. See also Yao Zhenzong, Hou 
Han yiwen zhi, 2352/1-2. Only fragments of Liu Ai's compilations now remain. 
22 Sui shu 33,961 has a Dian lue by Yu Huan, a Gentleman of the Palace of Wei, in 89 
chapters; Jiu Tang shu 46:1994 and 1989 lists Dian lue in 50 chapters and Wei lue 
in 38 chapters in the Miscellaneous Histories (雜史 za shi) and Standard Histories 
(正史 zheng shi) categories respectively; Xin Tang shu 58:1464, has only Wei lue in 
50 chapters in the Miscellaneous Histories category; the title may have been 
miswritten for Dian lue. It seems possible that the Dian lue listed by Sui shu 
represents a combined work, being 50 chapters of the original Dian lue, covering 
the last years of Han, together with 38 chapters of a continuation Wei lue, and one 
further chapter of introduction. See Yao Zhenzong, Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3224/1-2. 
  Though there is some blurring between Dian lue and Wei lue, it is clear from 
quotations that Wei lue covered the period at least to 254 AD: SGZ 4:130 PC note 
2; Fang, Chronicle II, 165-167 and 184-187. 
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 We know of these, and of a multitude of other works, primarily 
because of the extracts preserved in the commentary of Pei Songzhi. 
[546] One must recognise, however, that great quantities of the material 
which they contained have been incorporated, without trace, into the 
compilation of Chen Shou. Like his forerunners in the bureaucratic 
tradition, Chen Shou seldom acknowledged his sources, and when Pei 
Songzhi was preparing his commentary he was seeking only to 
supplement, not duplicate, the text of Chen Shou. We must assume that 
much of the text of Chen Shou has taken over material which was 
originally presented in the official histories of the states or in other major 
works; curiously enough, moreover, when a passage was adopted by 
Chen Shou that very fact disqualified it from being quoted and identified 
in the commentary of Pei Songzhi. 
 For the most part, this is not a matter of major concern. Pei Songzhi's 
collection is sufficiently wide-ranging that we may assume most 
historical sources of importance in the third century are at least 
represented in his commentary, and one needs only to be aware that the 
range of quotations preserved does not necessarily represent the original 
scope of the work.23 In some cases, however, it seems likely that Chen 
Shou has taken information from some important but lesser source so 
comprehensively that Pei Songzhi had no reason to quote the original 
work, and its very identity has been lost thereafter. 
 As an example, we may consider the biographies of Sun Jian and his 
son Sun Ce, described in the first chapter of the section in Sanguo zhi on 
the state of Wu. [547] The main text of Sanguo zhi 46/Wu 1 has a 
detailed anecdotal account of the life of Sun Jian to his death in 192/193, 
then picks up the story of the career of Sun Ce, with his first major action 
being the attendance upon Yuan Shu about 193-194. Pei Songzhi 
supplements Chen Shou's biography of Sun Jian with some stories of his 
early life and career, including the portents observed by his mother at the 
time of her pregnancy, but the bulk of the material in the commentary 
                                               
23 There were, of course, a great number of works not quoted by Pei Songzhi. 
Fragments of some of them have been preserved in later collections, such as the 
great Tang encyclopaedias, while others can be known only by their titles, often 
through the Treatises of Bibliography of Sui shu, Jiu Tang shu and Xin Tang shu. 
The compilations of Hou Kang and Yao Zhenzong, already cited, represent a 
reconstruction of the list of works written during the Three Kingdoms period, and 
similar lists have been compiled for the Jin period by Ding Guojun, Wen Tingshi, 
Qin Rongguang, Wu Shijian and Huang Fengyuan, qqv. Bibliography sub voce.  
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relates to the general history of the empire, with items such as the 
biography of Sun Jian's early patron Zhu Jun and comments about him by 
Dong Zhuo, chosen to present his career in a broader context. And 
indeed, as I have discussed in the study of Sun Jian's life in Chapter One, 
there are a number of occasions, such as the account of his involvement 
with the campaigns in Liang province and the story of his discovery of 
the Great Seal of State, when Chen Shou's information appears erratic 
and unsatisfactory as compared with facts well established from other 
sources. 
 These comments apply less strongly to the biography of Sun Ce. 
Chen Shou's text there is supplemented by extracts from Jiangbiao zhuan 
and Wu lu, with items of the latter work quoting from memorials, letters 
and other documents composed by Sun Ce or on his behalf. For this 
period, particularly between the time of Sun Ce's establishment as an 
independent warlord about 195 and his death in 200, we have a fairly 
integrated account of his career both from Chen Shou and from Pei 
Songzhi; and this is supported by other sources, notably the biographies 
of men and women associated with Sun Ce in the foundation of the state 
of Wu. 
 The two biographies reflect the different careers of the father and of 
the son. Sun Jian was a player, albeit with a minor part, upon the broad 
imperial stage, but Sun Ce was a man of primarily local importance, and 
the details of his life do not generally lend themselves to checking against 
great events elsewhere. There is less room for contradiction between the 
sources; but we may also [548] observe that there was a quantity of 
additional material which was not used by Chen Shou but was later 
preserved by Pei Songzhi. 
 One text, however, which is known to have existed, but which is not 
cited by Pei Songzhi, is the Record and Eulogy of Sun Jian and Sun Ce, 
compiled by Zhang Hong and presented to Sun Quan soon after his 
succession to power in 200. Wu shu, quoted by Pei Songzhi, tells us that 
Zhang Hong considered the merits of [Sun Jian the General Who] 
Smashes the Caitiffs, defeating Dong Zhuo and putting him to flight, 
and supporting the house of Han, and how [Sun Ce the General 
Who] Exterminates Rebels pacified and settled the lands outside the 
Yangzi and established the state, and he believed that these affairs 
should be recorded and commemorated, to manifest their 
achievements. 
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 When the work was completed, he presented it to Sun Quan, 
who studied it carefully and was touched by emotion. He said to 
Zhang Hong, "You are indeed aware of the traditions of my family."24 
We may fairly assume that this work of Zhang Hong was taken into the 
archives of Sun Quan's government, that it was preserved until the end of 
the state of Wu, and that it was available to Chen Shou when he was 
compiling Sanguo zhi. Indeed, I suggest that the chapter containing the 
biographies of Sun Jian and Sun Ce is a very close copy, made by Chen 
Shou, of the text originally compiled and presented by Zhang Zhao. The 
earlier work has been overwhelmed by, but yet survives in, the later. 
 Nonetheless, while it is encouraging to believe that the history of the 
careers of Sun Jian and Sun Ce can be traced back within a few years of 
their time, one must bear in mind that the [549] circumstances of the 
embryonic warlord state of Wu did not guarantee mature reflection and 
well-balanced history. The very description of Zhang Hong's work 
implies an element of hagiography. and it cannot have been easy for him 
to reconstruct the career of Sun Jian, which took place for the most part 
in territories other than south-eastern China, and which had ended ten 
years earlier.25 For the most part, he must have dealt with a broad outline 
of generally accepted facts, filled in with anecdotes from local tradition 
and the recollections of former associates. This is the pattern we would 
expect to find, and this is the form which the history takes. With such a 
distant view, and erratic sources of information, the biography of Sun 
Jian must still be read with care. 
 The story of Sun Ce is more securely based. If we accept that the 
basic biography was compiled soon after his death, then it is probable 
that many documents were still extant, and certain that many former 
comrades were ready and eager to tell of the heroic days just past. 
Difficulty would come rather from the wealth of material, and a natural 
tendency to exaggeration. 
 Despite this, however, something is lacking in accounts of that 
period. Outside the biography of Sun Ce himself, and the documents 
preserved by Pei Songzhi, there is little information about those years. 
The biographies of his leading generals and counsellors frequently say 
only that the man accompanied Sun Ce on a particular campaign, or that 
                                               
24 SGZ 53/Wu 8:1244 PC note 2. See also Yao Zhenzong, Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3223/3, 
and Chapter Four at 223. 
25 One must observe that Zhang Hong, writing after 200, was separated by almost 
half a century from the time of Sun Jian's birth and young manhood. 
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he was stationed at a particular place. There are anecdotes, some of 
doubtful reliability, but not until the time of Sun Quan does one have the 
sense of a broad-based historical tradition. 
 This is not surprising. Sun Ce held independent power for only five 
years, and the tension and excitement of the time would not encourage 
the maintenance of regular archives and chronicles. [550] Historical work 
on the period was eventually carried out by the government of Sun Quan, 
and though they had taken place just a short time before, and had been of 
vital importance for the establishment of the state, the local triumphs of 
Sun Ce in the lands south of the Yangzi paled almost to insignificance 
when compared to the stirring and desperate years which followed, with 
war on open fronts to the north and the west, and the great crisis of the 
Red Cliffs. Sun Ce was worthy of legend, but Sun Quan created a greater 
drama after him. 
 Wu shu, the official "History of the State of Wu," was first 
commissioned by Sun Quan, probably about 250. Our authority for the 
matter is a memorial of Hua He submitted to Sun Quan's grandson and 
last successor, Sun Hao, about 273.26 Hua He says that towards the end of 
his reign Sun Quan ordered the Court Historian Ding Fu and the Palace 
Gentleman Xiang Jun to compile the Wu shu. According to Hua He, 
however, neither Ding Fu nor Xiang Jun were capable of the work, and a 
few years later, in the time of Sun Quan's youngest son and first 
successor Sun Liang, probably about 252, another committee was 
established. The leading scholars involved were Wei Zhao, Zhou Zhao, 
Xie Ying, Liang Guang and Hua He himself. 
 The biography of Wei Zhao, leader of this group, tells us something 
of his career and the difficulties that the historical bureau was faced 
with.27 Born about 200, Wei Zhao was a man from Wu commandery who 
acquired a high reputation for scholarship. [551] He was appointed Court 
Historian about 252, presumably in succession to Ding Fu, by Sun Liang 
                                               
26 The memorial is quoted in SGZ 53/Wu 8:1256, the biography of Xie Ying, on 
whom see below. The biography of Hua He is in SGZ 65/Wu 30:1464-69. 
27 The biography of Wei Zhao 韋昭 is in SGZ 65/Wu 20:1460-64. His personal name 
frequently appears as Yao 曜, a change made to avoid taboo on the character of the 
personal name of Sima Zhao, father of the founding Emperor Wu of Jin, who later 
received posthumous title as Emperor Wen: JS 2:32 and 44.  
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acting on recommendation of his minister Zhuge Ke.A Zhuge Ke was 
destroyed at the end of 253, but Wei Zhao and his colleagues continued 
their work, and Wei Zhao was also placed in charge of the collation of 
books for the Palace Library, first as a Gentleman and later with title as 
Libationer [i.e. Supervisor] of Academicians; his responsibilities were 
said to be comparable to those of the celebrated Liu Xiang, editor of the 
Confucian classics during the last years of the Former Han 
dynasty.28[552] 
 During the reign of Sun Xiu, elder brother and successor to Sun 
Liang, who took a particular interest in scholarship, Wei Zhao was 
invited regularly to the palace, until protests by the powerful Zhang Bu 
                                               
A  The title 太史令 taishi ling is variously rendered as Prefect Grand Astronomer, 
Court Astronomer, and Court Historian. In this context Court Historian appears 
most appropriate. 
28 On Liu Xiang, celebrated scholar and expert on the Guliang Commentary to the 
Spring and Autumn Annals during the first century BC, see Tjan Tjoe Som, White 
Tiger Discussions I, 91-93, and Loewe, Crisis and Conflict, 240-243 and 300-303. 
  On the comparison of Wei Zhao with Liu Xiang, see SGZ 65/Wu 20:1462. We 
should note here that there is some potential confusion in the names of the libraries 
and similar offices established by the various states of the Three Kingdoms; in my 
description below I follow the discussion of Hong Yisun, Sanguo zhiguan biao, 
2775-2777. 
  In the state of Wei, it appears that Cao Cao had a Private Library (祕書 mishu 
or bishu) with two responsibilities, one being the collecting and collation of works 
that had been lost from the imperial libraries of Han during the disturbances which 
accompanied Dong Zhuo's seizure of power, and the other, significantly more 
political, being the checking of material which was handled by the regular 
secretariat, the Masters of Writing. This roughly matched the system of Han, but 
early in the reign of Cao Pi the office was divided, with the supervisory section 
named as the office of Palace Writers (中書 zhongshu) and the Private Library 
maintained as a scholarly enterprise. 
  It is possible that there was a comparable arrangement in Shu-Han, though 
there is only passing reference to the office of Palace Writers. We have discussed 
in note 20 above the likelihood that the Private Library in the Eastern Pavilion, 
where Chen Shou held appointment, may have collected and held literary and 
archival material. 
  There is no record of an office called the Private Library in the state of Wu. 
Wei Zhao, however, is described as zhongshu lang 中書郎, and the description of 
his responsibilities seems to indicate scholarly and not censorial concerns. I 
suggest, therefore, that the zhongshu of Wu was comparable rather to the Private 
Libraries of Wei and Shu than to the office of the Palace Writers in those two 
states, and in this context I therefore render the term as Palace Library. 
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persuaded Sun Xiu to desist. Wei Zhao was known for his ideals of 
honesty, and Zhang Bu was said to have been concerned lest he inform 
the ruler of his minister's failings – Sun Xiu felt obliged to accede to 
Zhang Bu's objections, but he was not pleased. 
 Sun Xiu died in 264 and Zhang Bu remained in a position of 
influence and power, but Wei Zhao continued to serve the new 
government of Sun Hao. His work in the library appears to have been 
completed, for we are told that the post was abolished and he was 
reappointed a Palace Attendant, with the additional title of State Historian 
on the Left and continuing responsibility for the official history. His 
colleague Hua He was State Historian on the Right.29 
 In the twenty years since this second committee for the official 
history had been established, Zhou Zhao and Liang Guang had died. We 
are told nothing more about Liang Guang, but at the end of the biography 
of Bu Zhi, who had been Inspector of Jiao province, became Chancellor 
of the empire of Wu in 246, and died in 248, there is a long and 
favourable discussion of Bu Zhi and of the Director of the Secretariat Yan 
Jun; the text is [553] attributed to Zhou Zhao. A supplementary note by 
Chen Shou says that Zhou Zhao was an émigré from Yingchuan, that he 
was associated with Wei Zhao, Xie Ying and Hua He in work upon Wu 
shu, and that he also became a Gentleman of the Palace Library. Later, 
during the time of Sun Xiu, he was sent to prison for some crime, and 
although Hua He memorialised on his behalf, he received no relief.30 
 The misfortune of Zhou Zhao presumably took place some time after 
260, and the unsuccessful appeal in his favour by Hua He was only the 
first of a series. About 272 Sun Hao asked Wei Zhao to prepare a chapter 
of "annals" for his father Sun He. Sun He, third son of Sun Quan, was 
Heir for a time but had been dismissed before the death of his father. 
When Sun Hao came to the throne he gave his father a posthumous 
imperial title, but such a proclamation, however appropriate in terms of 
                                               
29 SGZ 65/Wu 30:1462 and 1467. Hua He at this time held the formal position of 
Prefect of the Eastern Pavilion, an appointment which is also recorded as being 
held by the scholars Zhu Yu (SGZ 57/Wu 12:1326 PC quoting Kuaiji dianlu, and 
SGZ 60/Wu 15:1394 PC quoting Kuaiji dianlu) and Zhou Ju (SGZ 60/Wu 
15:1392). Apart from the special commission of Wei Zhao and his colleagues, it 
seems likely that Wu maintained an Eastern Pavilion, in the same manner as Han 
had done, as a repository of literary and archival material. See also note 20 above 
on the existence of a similar institution in Shu. 
30 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1240-42. 
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filial piety, could not alter the fact that Sun He had never been ruler of the 
state. Wei Zhao, therefore, observed that Sun He should be allocated only 
a biography, not a chapter of annals. Sun Hao was not pleased, he was 
very likely similarly dissatisfied when Wei Zhao poured scorn on a rush 
of favourable omens being reported by people seeking advancement from 
the new regime, and he was angry and suspicious when Wei Zhao, who 
had sought to retire from court on the grounds of old age, refused a 
ceremonial toast at a banquet, claiming medical reasons for not drinking 
wine. For this last offence, Wei Zhao was sent to prison. Hua He pleaded 
for him, emphasising the importance of Wei Zhao to the success of the 
history project, the significance of that work for the reputation of the 
dynasty, and comparing the whole enterprise to the Shi ji of Sima Quan 
and the Han shu of Ban Gu. Once again, however, his appeal [554] had 
no success, and Wei Zhao was executed at the age of more than seventy. 
His family was sent to exile in Lingling commandery.31 
 Xie Ying, last of Hua He's colleagues, had led a military and political 
as well as a scholarly life.32 He had at one time held command in the 
garrison at Wuchang, but about 273, soon after the disgrace of Wei Zhao, 
he was punished for his involvement in a mistaken strategy and was 
punished with exile in the far south. At some stage, however, Xue Ying 
found time to compile a major history of Later Han in one hundred 
chapters,33 and in the memorial referred to above Hua He argued that Xie 
Ying was one of the few men who could assist his work. On this occasion 
his words received a hearing: Xue Ying was recalled to the capital and 
appointed State Historian on the Left, evidently in succession to Wei 
Zhao. 
 The project, however, did not advance much further. In 275 Hua He 
himself was dismissed for some minor offence and he died at home one 
year later. Xue Ying in the mean time had been involved in some unlucky 
intrigue and was once more exiled to the south. He was again recalled, 
                                               
31 Not drinking at an imperial banquet in Wu was obviously hazardous. Compare the 
difficulty experienced by Yu Fan under Sun Quan: Chapter Eight at 514-515. 
32 The biography of Xue Ying is in SGZ 53/Wu 8:1254-57, following that of his 
father Xue Zong. Xue Zong had married a daughter of Sun Quan, so Xue Ying was 
connected to the imperial family. 
33 Sources vary on the question of whether Xue Ying's work was entitled Hou Han 
shu 書 or Hou Han ji 記. Fragments comprising one chapter, described as Hou Han 
shu, are preserved in the collection Qijia Hou Han shu. See also Yao Zhenzong, 
Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3219/3. 
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and appointed to a ministerial position, but his chief service to the 
declining state of Wu was to compose the document of surrender that Sun 
Hao sent to his victorious rival, Sima Yan of Jin. Xue Ying travelled to 
Luoyang, and he may well have met Chen Shou there, but he died soon 
after the surrender, in 282.[555] 
 So the history office of Wu during the later period of that state was a 
sensitive area, and it is likely that the change of committee after the death 
of Sun Quan reflects a contest of factions. Though Hua He claimed that 
Ding Fu and his associate Xiang Jun were incompetent, we know that 
Ding Fu was enough of a scholar to have compiled studies of the rituals 
and of the official selection systems of Han,34 and there is reference to the 
work of those two men which provides evidence of political controversy. 
 In the Annals of the reign of Sun Quan we are told of the death in 
225 of Sun Shao, a man originally from Beihai, who was not a member 
of the imperial clan but had been appointed first Chancellor when Sun 
Quan became King of Wu in 221.35 There had been debate over his 
appointment, first because Sun Shao was given the post instead of the 
veteran minister Zhang Zhao, whom many considered more worthy,36 and 
later, during his term of office, because Sun Shao was fiercely criticised 
by the reformer Zhang Wen and his outspoken protégé Ji Yan. When Ji 
Yan in turn suffered accusations from his enemies and was forced to kill 
himself, Zhang Wen was dismissed and disgraced.37 
 The commentary of Pei Songzhi, attached to the record of the death 
of Sun Shao, contains an extract from the Zhi lin, "The Forest of 
Records," by the scholar and commentator Yu Xi of the Jin [556] 
dynasty.38 Yu Xi remarks that he had been surprised a man so eminent as 
Sun Shao had failed to obtain an individual biography in the history, and 
he asked the learned Liu Tingshu his opinion of the matter. Liu Tingshu 
believed that the original Wu shu, as compiled by Ding Fu and Xiang Jun, 
would indeed have contained such a text, but he noted that Sun Shao had 
                                               
34 See Yao Zhenzong, Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3228/1, discussing the Hanguan yishe 
xuanyong "Selection and Appointment in the Official System of Han," listed in Xin 
Tang shu 58:1476, and Yao Zhenzong, Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3230/3-3231/1, referring 
to the Han yi "Rituals of Han," by Ding Fu, cited in Nan Qi shu 9:117. 
35 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1131. 
36 SGZ 52/Wu 7:1221 and Chapter Eight at 465. 
37 The biography of Zhang Wen is in SGZ 57/Wu 12:1329-34 and the affair of Ji Yan 
is described at 1330-31; see also Fang, Chronicle I, 167-168 and 176-179, and 
Chapter Eight at 523-524. 
38 SGZ 47/Wu 2:1132 PC note 1 quoting Zhi lin. 
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been attacked by Zhang Wen. He suggested that Wei Zhao, a sympathiser 
of Zhang Wen, had accepted his opinion of Sun Shao and so deprived 
him of a formal biography. 
 The explanation is plausible, and there are comparable lacunae in 
other histories. We are told that when Zhuge Ke came to power at the end 
of the reign of Sun Quan he sought to demonstrate liberal and reformist 
policies,39 and it is possible that his change of the history committee was 
motivated as much by political as by scholarly consideration. In any 
event, the eclipse of Ding Fu and Xiang Jun was almost complete, and 
those portions of their work which were accepted were presumably taken 
over by their rivals and successors. 
 In any event, though the bibliography of Sui shu records a holding of 
the Wu shu by Wei Zhao and his colleagues in twenty-five chapters of an 
original fifty-five, and the two Tang bibliographies claim the full fifty-
five chapters,40 the work was later lost. No substantial, identified, portion 
now remains outside the quotations of Pei Songzhi – and the likely 
incorporation of great quantities of material, without attribution, by Chen 
Shou. 
 The official history of Wu was probably not completed. The death of 
Wei Zhao and Hua He removed the two chief organisers of the project, 
and it is doubtful whether Xie Ying, last survivor of the [557] second 
committee, had the time, the inclination or the opportunity to finish the 
work before his death. Wu shu is quoted in biographies of Cao Cao and of 
Dong Zhuo, indicating that the period covered included the career of Sun 
Jian during the last years of Han rule,41 but there is not a great deal of 
information about men who played a role in the last years of the empire 
of Wu, and in all the annals of the three successors to Sun Quan Pei 
Songzhi's commentary has only one, rather irrelevant, quotation.42 One 
cannot be certain, of course, that this lack of citations occurs because Wu 
shu had little information on the period, or because Chen Shou had taken 
                                               
39 SGZ 64/Wu 19:1434; Fang Chronicle II, 105. 
40 Sui shu 33:955, Jiu Tang shu 46:1992, Xin Tang shu 58:1455, Yao Zhenzong, 
Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3221/2-3222/1, and SGZJJ 1/Wei 1:29b. 
41 E.g .SGZ 1/Wei 1:11 PC note 1, where Wu shu is quoted on the murder of Cao 
Cao's father Cao Song in Xu province in 194, and SGZ 6/Wei 6:172 PC note 2 
quoting Wu shu on the early career of Dong Zhuo in the northwest. 
42 SGZ 48/Wu 3:1167 PC note 1 bis quoting Wu shu on a prophetic dream of the 
minister Ding Gu of Sun Hao. 
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over its material, but the situation seems to confirm the complaints of 
Hua He about the difficulty of maintaining the program. 
 In addition to this work of the history office, based upon the official 
archives, there were three substantial private accounts of the history of 
Wu: Jiangbiao zhuan, "Account of the Lands Beyond the Yangzi," by Yu 
Pu; Wu lu, "Record of Wu," by Zhang Bo, and Wu li, "Calendar of Wu," 
by Hu Zhong. All are quoted extensively and to good purpose by Pei 
Songzhi. 
 Yu Pu was a man from Gaoping on the north China plain who lived 
in the second half of the third century.43 He was a scholar and 
commentator on the Confucian classics, and he also composed essays and 
poetry. After the conquest of Wu he was appointed to the local 
government of the Poyang region in present-day Jiangxi, and there he 
compiled Jiangbiao zhuan, a history of the south compiled by a man 
from the north. Yu Pu died early in the fourth century, [558] but 
Jiangbiao zhuan was presented by his son, Yu Bo, to the throne of 
Emperor Yuan of Eastern Jin, who gave orders that it be placed in the 
imperial library. By that time, the Jin government had been driven from 
the north by non-Chinese invaders, and the reconstructed empire was 
appropriately interested in the history of its predecessors of the south. 
 Jiangbiao zhuan is described by Pei Songzhi in his memorial as a 
thorough work, but uninspired in style. Drawn from a different local 
tradition than that which had formed the basis for Wu shu, it provided a 
rich source of material for the early history of the state, including the 
career of Sun Ce and the first years of Sun Quan. Some stories appear 
unduly anecdotal or exaggerated, and they can be contradicted by sources 
of greater reliability, but the general thrust of the history is consistent 
with information from other texts. The bibliography of Sui shu has no 
listing for the work, but the two Tang histories record it in thirty 
chapters.44 It survives now only in fragments. 
 Zhang Bo, compiler of Wu lu, is said to have been the son of Zhang 
Yan, a man from Wu who became Minister Herald and died in 266 while 
returning from an embassy to Wei.45 Zhang Yan himself compiled a work 
entitled Mo ji, "Private Records." It is cited only twice by Pei Songzhi, 
                                               
43 The biography of Yu Pu is in JS 82:2139-41. 
44 Jiu Tang shu 46:1995, Xin Tang shu, 58:1464. 
45 On Zhang Yan, see SGZ 48/Wu 3:1165 and 1166 PC note 1 quoting Wu lu. On the 
relationship of Zhang Bo to Zhang Yan, see the Suoyin commentary of Sima Zhen 
of Tang to SJ 66:2173 at note 3. On Wu lu, see SGZJJ, 37/Shu 7:4a. 
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but provides the source for the celebrated "Second Memorial on the 
Occasion of Starting a Campaign" sent by Zhuge Liang to his master Liu 
Shan, Later Sovereign of Shu-Han about 228, and it has a discussion of a 
letter from Zhuge Liang to his enemy Sima Yi of Wei.46 Zhang Yan was 
[559] evidently interested in such documents, perhaps in the form of a 
commonplace book, and he was evidently involved in negotiations with 
Shu-Han at an appropriate time. 
 Zhang Bo was probably born between 220 and 230, and succeeded to 
his father's interests. We know nothing of his official career, but he must 
have had access to the archives, for his Wu lu preserves a number of early 
documents such as the letters and memorials of Sun Ce. Other items 
quoted by Pei Songzhi must be based on official records, and the work 
probably included a treatise of geography, or a history of the 
administrative units of the empire. Several pieces, however, not 
specifically documentary, are simply anecdotes or fragments. Zhang Bo 
lived into the period after the Jin conquest, for an extract from Wu lu 
gives a date for the death of the last ruler, Sun Hao, in the winter at the 
beginning of 285.47 The bibliography of Sui shu has no entry for Wu lu, 
but the two Tang histories record the work in thirty chapters. It survives 
now only in fragments. 
 The third private compilation on the history of the state is the Wu li 
of Hu Chong. 
 The biography of Hu Chong's father, Hu Zong, records that he was a 
man of notable scholarly and literary attainment who came south from 
Runan as a refugee and joined Sun Ce when he conquered Kuaiji in 
196.48 He served at the court of Sun Quan, he was granted enfeoffment 
when Sun Quan became King of Wu in 221, and he died in 243. Hu 
                                               
46 For the Second Memorial, see SGZ 35/Shu 5:923-24 PC note 3 quoting Han-Jin 
chunqiu "Chronicle of Han and Jin" by Xi Zuochi, particularly at the end of the 
citation, where it is observed that this text did not appear in the Collected Works of 
Zhuge Liang, but was preserved in the Mo ji of Zhang Yan. Some believe, 
however, that the Second Memorial is a forgery: see the discussion by Lu Bi in 
SGZJJ 35:22b-23a. The text from ZZTJ 71:2247-49 is translated by Fang, 
Chronicle I, 257-259, with notes at 283-285; Fang makes no comment on its 
authenticity. 
  On the letter to Sima Yan, see SGZ 35/Shu 5:935-36 PC note 1. 
47 SGZ 48/Wu 3:1178 PC note 3. 
48 The biography of Hu Zong is in SGZ 62/Wu 17:1413-18, and Hu Chong is 
mentioned at 1418. Hu Chong was also the author of a work entitled Dawen 
"Answers to Questions:" SGZ 59/Wu 14:1370 PC note 2. 
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Chong, who was probably born about 210, inherited his father's position 
and survived to serve the [560] conquering state of Jin; according to Wu 
lu he was a member of the secretariat and ended as Administrator of Wu 
commandery under the new regime. 
 Hu Chong had been Prefect of the Palace Library of Wu and so had 
access to official material. His Wu li has information on the date of Sun 
Jian's death which is probably more reliable than some other sources;49 
and it provides the more rational account of the death of Sun Ce – in 
contrast to the eerie story from Soushen ji about the ghost of Gan Ji.50 
From quotations used by Pei Songzhi, material in Wu li was closely 
connected with the court and the imperial family. There are occasions it 
provides information on such matters as portents and embassies; and it is 
Wu li which tells the story how Sun Shao was murdered and his wife took 
revenge on the assassins.51 
 There is no entry for Wu li in the bibliographical chapters of Sui shu, 
but the work is recorded in some six chapters in the two Tang histories.52 
It survives now only in fragments. 
 Of these sources, therefore, Jiangbiao zhuan was compiled from 
local information after the end of Wu, but the official Wu shu and the two 
private works Wu lu and Wu li were prepared by men who had been 
subjects of the state and had access to archival material. It is perhaps 
curious that Zhang Bo and Hu Chong are not mentioned as official 
historians of Wu, but we can have confidence in their essential reliability, 
and although individual texts may be contradictory and confusing, the 
historiographical tradition, thanks to the records maintained by Pei 
Songzhi, is very strong.[561] 
 
Historical writing in the third and fourth centuries: 
Besides the records which depended on state archives and official 
sponsorship, the collection of Pei Songzhi reflects also the energy and 
activity of local and individual historians and biographers. Already in 
Later Han there was established a genre of biezhuan "Unofficial 
Biographies," giving details of the life of any significant person, and at 
the end of Later Han and the beginning of the Three Kingdoms period, 
                                               
49 See note 1 to Chapter Two. 
50 Chapter Three at 199. 
51 Chapter Four at 233-234. 
52 Jiu Tang shu 46:1996, Xin Tang shu 58:1464. 
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there was a wide variety of similar compositions.53 Among them were 
unofficial biographies of the eccentric scholar Ni Heng, and of the later 
Wang Bi and Xi Kang of Wei, of Chen Yun the soldier of Shu-Han, and 
of Yu Fan in Wu, of the dominant but short-lived minister Zhuge Ke, and 
of the sons Lu Ji and Lu Yun of the great Lu Xun. Cao Man zhuan, the 
marginal biography of Cao Cao written by a subject of Wu, though 
hostile to its subject, was a work in similar vein.54 
 There were also collections of biographies, often arranged by 
categories such as the Wenshi zhuan, "Biographies of Literary 
Gentlemen," probably compiled by Zhang Zhi,55 and the series by 
Huangfu Mi: Gaoshi zhuan, "Biographies of Eminent Gentlemen;" Yishi 
zhuan, "Biographies of Gentlemen in Retirement;" and a Lienü [562] 
zhuan, "Biographies of Exemplary Women."56 And the talented scholar 
Wang Can, who died in 217 at the age of forty, and who had personal 
contact with many of the men that he described, wrote Hanmo yingxiong 
ji "Records of the Heroes and Champions at the End of Han."57 
 It was also common to publish the collected works of leading 
political and literary figures. The Collected Works of Zhuge Liang were 
edited by Chen Shou in twenty-four chapters, and presented to the court 
of Jin in 274.58 There was naturally a collection of Cao Cao's writings, 
                                               
53 See, for example, HHS 103/13:3270, the Treatise on the Five Powers, commentary 
of Liu Zhao quoting the Liang Ji biezhuan, dealing with the leader of the clan of 
the imperial relatives by marriage, who dominated the government of Han for 
twenty years until his overthrow by Emperor Huan in 159; and for the popularity 
of this genre, whose compilers are often anonymous, see the list in Yao Zhenzong, 
Hou Han yiwen zhi, 2370/2-2374/1, and his Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3237/3-3241/2. 
54 See SGZJJ 1/Wei 1:7b-8a: it was said that Cao Cao's childhood name was A'man 
阿瞞: SGZ 1:1 PC note 1. 
55 See SGZJJ 9/Wei 9:23a, discussing the contradictory evidence on the personal 
name of the author of this work. 
56 See the biography of Huangfu Mi in JS 51:1409-18 at 1418. Huangfu Mi also 
compiled a chronicle work Diwang shiji, "Annals by Generations of the Emperors 
and Kings." 
57 See SGZJJ 1/Wei 1:18a. Commonly referred to by the shorter title of Yingxiong ji, 
the work is listed in Sui shu 33:960 as the work of Wang Can. See also Yao 
Zhenzong, Hou Han yiwen zhi, 2354/1. The biography of Wang Can is in SGZ 
21/Wei 21:597-99. 
58 Chen Shou includes the list of chapters in his biography of Zhuge Liang, SGZ 
35/Shu 5:929. For his work as an editor, see Huayang guo zhi 11:9b and JS 
82:2137 [SGZ 1475 and 1477], also Yao Zhenzong, Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3283/2-
3283/1. 
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and the Wei mingchen zou was a general compilation of memorials by 
leading ministers of Wei. In more scholarly fields, there are collected 
works recorded for Kong Rong and Wang Lang, and a number of officials 
in Wu were similarly honoured.59 Such collections are frequently of only 
minor importance for the history of the time, but it is not insignificant 
that these works were identifiable and available to Pei Songzhi more than 
a hundred years later. 
 Alongside the individual biographies and collections of writings, 
there was continuing interest in clan and family records, already attested 
from the Han period. Great families such as the Kong of Lu, who claimed 
descent from Confucius, and the Xun of Yingchuan, who produced the 
philosophers Xun Shuang and Xun Yue and the [563] great assistants to 
Cao Cao Xun Yu and his cousin Xun You, compiled genealogies, records 
and eulogies of their ancestors and relatives; and their activity was 
matched by families of more provincial status such as the Lu of Wu 
commandery, the He of Lujiang and the Shao of Kuaiji, with many 
others.60 The concept of family, always important in China, had 
developed to a very high level during the last years of Han, when kinship 
was first a means of seeking power and later a manner of searching for 
survival, and the tradition was only encouraged by the turmoil of the 
centuries which followed.61 
 Apart from family relationship, one may also note the style of local 
history which flourished in this period, works with titles including some 
such phrase as qijiu zhuan "accounts of venerable men and ancient 
affairs" or xianxian zhuan "accounts of worthy men of the past." 
According to one account, the genre was initiated by the scholar official 
Yuan Tang when he was Administrator of Chenliu during the second 
                                               
59 On collected works of scholars and writers of Wu, see Yao Zhenzong, Sanguo 
yiwen zhi, 3284/3-3286/3. 
60 For the Kongshi pu, "Register of the Kong Clan," see SGZ 16/Wei 16:514 PC (JJ 
36b). For the Xunshi jiazhuan, "Account of the Xun Family," see SGZ 10/Wei 
10:316 PC note 1 (JJ 17b); the author of that work, Xun Bozi, has biographies in 
Song shu 60:1627-29 and Nan shi 33:856-57. For the Lushi shisong, "Praises for 
the Generations of the Lu Clan," and the Lushi zitang xiang zan, "Eulogies for the 
Portraits in the Ancestral Temple of the Lu Clan," see SGZ 58/Wu 13:1343 (JJ 1b-
2a). For the Lujiang Heshi jiazhuan, "Account of the He Family of Lujiang," see 
SGZ 21/Wei 21:622 PC note 5 (JJ 53b). For the Kuaiji Shaoshi jiazhuan, "Account 
of the Shao Family of Kuaiji," see SGZ 48/Wu 3:1170 PC note 1 (JJ 35a). 
61 On this development, see in particular Ebrey, Aristocratic Families. 
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century.62. Later, there [564] were collections of biographies for such 
places as Runan commandery, the region of Chu, and Lingling in the 
further south,63 while Chen Shou himself took part in the recension of the 
Yibu qijiu zhuan, the collection which related to the region of Yi 
province, [565] heartland of Shu-Han.64 Two notable compilations were 
                                               
62 The Hou Han ji of Yuan Hong, 21:8b, says that Yuan Tang became Administrator 
of the commandery under Later Han in 153, and that he commissioned the Chenliu 
qijiu zhuan. Sui shu 33:974, lists two books of that title, one ascribed to Quan 
Cheng of Han and the other to Su Lin of Wei, and the Tang bibliographies are 
similar. It appears that the work inaugurated by Yuan Tang was continued by later 
scholars. 
  Another early work in this genre was Sanfu juelu, "Evaluative Record of the 
Three Adjuncts," a collection of biographies of gentlemen from the three 
commanderies about the Former Han capital, Chang'an, compiled by Zhao Qi, who 
died in 201. The work is now lost, but it is quoted by Pei Songzhi and in notes to 
the Hou Han shu of Fan Ye compiled by Li Xian and his colleagues of Tang. See 
Cambridge Han, 645 [Ebrey, "Economic and Social History of Later Han"]. 
63 On the Runan xianxian zhuan, ascribed to Zhou Fei of the third century, see SGZ 
23/Wei 23:658 (JJ 5a), and Sui shu 33:974. [The two Tang catalogues give the 
personal name as Pei 裴, but modern editions agree on Fei 斐.] 
  On the Chuguo xianxian zhuan, by Zhang Fang of the Jin period, see SGZ 
4/Wei 4:141 (JJ 50b), and Sui shu 33:974. Under the Wei, from 232 to 252, Chu 
was the fief of Cao Biao, son of Cao Cao (see his biography in SGZ 20/Wei 
20:586-87); that territory was in the region of Later Han Huainan commandery, in 
present-day Anhui. The men described in extracts from Chuguo xianxian zhuan 
cited by Pei Songzhi, however, are associated with the commanderies of Nanyang 
and Xiangyang, about present-day Henan. It seems that the appellation Chu was 
used by Zhang Fang as a literary reference to that region, and possibly to Jing 
province in general, as the heartland of the pre-Qin state of Chu (cf. HS 28B:1665-
66, and note 9 to Chapter One). 
  On Lingling xianxian zhuan, see SGZ 6/Wei 6:216 (JJ 90a). There is no good 
early evidence for the identity of the author, but some modern editions ascribe the 
work to the historian Sima Biao, author of Xu Han shu. 
  On the genre of local biographies, see the list in Yao Zhenzong, Hou Han yiwen 
zhi, 2369/1-2370/1, and in his Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3236/1-3237/3. We may note, 
however, that there were a number of works which included the phrase qijiu zhuan 
or xianxian zhuan as part of their title, but were not associated with any specific 
region of the empire: thus Pei Songzhi quotes from works entitled Xianxian 
xingzhuang "Conduct and Character of Worthy Men of the Past" (e.g. SGZJJ 1:69b 
and note 75 to Chapter Three), while Sui shu 33:974 and the Tang catalogues list a 
Hainei xianxian zhuan "Accounts of Worthy Men of the Past Within the Seas." 
Such works, of course, should be classified as general collections. 
64 Huayang guo zhi 11:10a, says that a certain Chen Shu and others wrote a Ba-Shu 
qijiu zhuan, relating to Ba and Shu commanderies, and that Chen Shou used this 
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the Kuaiji xianxian zhuan of Xie Cheng, brother of Sun Quan's concubine 
the Lady Xie, who also wrote a Hou Han shu in 130 chapters, and the Wu 
xianxian zhuan of Lu Kai, a cousin of Lu Xun who became Chancellor 
on the Left during the reign of Sun Hao.65 
 This tradition of local history was cautiously maintained after the 
unification by Jin in 280. There was no fourth century work on south 
China comparable in scope and style to the Huayang guo zhi, "Record of 
the Countries to the South of Mount Hua," in which Chang Qu traced the 
history of the independent states of the Sichuan region from the time 
before Qin to the empire of Shu-Han and into the fourth century. 
Jiangbiao zhuan, however, was compiled by the northerner Yu Pu, and 
another Jin official, Wang Fan, who held office in the far south, compiled 
a Jiao-Guang erzhou chunqiu, "Chronicle of the Two Provinces Jiao and 
Guang," and presented it to the imperial court in 287.66 Later, after the 
displacement ]566] of the Jin to the south, Yu Yu, a man from Kuaiji, 
compiled Kuaiji dianlu "Authoritative Record of Kuaiji" in twenty 
chapters, as well as a history of the dynasty, Jin shu.67 
 Amongst the scholarship of the Jin period, moreover, there was a 
considerable body of historical analysis and criticism, direct and explicit, 
                                                                                                                   
work as a basis for his own work dealing with the broader region of Yi province, 
Yibu qijiu zhuan. The biography of Chen Shou in JS 82 records him as the 
compiler of an Yidu qijiu zhuan. Sui shu 33:974, lists an Yibu qijiu zhuan in 14 
chapters by Chen Changshou, while Jiu Tang shu 58:1479, and Xin Tang shu 
46:2001, both list a book with the same title and number of chapters by Chen 
Shou. It seems likely that the additional character chang in the Sui shu citation is a 
miswriting. 
65 Neither of these works are cited by Pei Songzhi, but they are attested by Sui shu 
33:975 and by the Tang bibliographies. See Yao Zhenzong, Sanguo yiwen zhi, 
3236/1 and 3237/1. 
  On Xie Cheng, see SGZ 50/Wu 5:1196-97. Fragments comprising eight 
chapters of his Hou Han shu are preserved in the collection Qijia Hou Han shu. 
  The biography of Lu Ji is in SGZ 61/Wu 16:1399-1409. 
66 SGZ 46/Wu 1:1110 PC (JJ 33a). SGZ 60/Wu 15:1385 (JJ 13a), refers also to a 
Jiao-Guang ji "Records of Jiao and Guang [Provinces]" by Wang Yin. Wang Yin, 
whose biography is in JS 82:2142-43, was the author of a number of works 
including a Jin shu "History of Jin" and a Shu ji "Records of Shu," both of which 
are quoted by Pei Songzhi. It seems likely, however, that the Jiao-Guang ji 
ascribed to him is actually a miswriting for the Jiao-Guang erzhou chunqiu of 
Wang Fan. 
67 SGZ 21/Wei 21:605 (JJ 23b-24a), and SGZ 46/Wu 1:1100 (JJ 14b). The biography 
of Yu Yu is in JS 82:1143-47. He was also the author of Zhu Yu zhuan "An Account 
of All the Yu [Clan]." 
SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY 
 
 
441 
and generally more hostile than the indirect Confucianist tradition of 
praise and blame through the selection of facts. Sun Sheng of the fourth 
century was the author of several books cited by Pei Songzhi, including 
Weishi chunqiu "Chronicle of the House of Wei," and Jin yangqiu, 
"Chronicle of Jin," and his Zaji, "Miscellany," presents a number of 
critical comments on character and conduct,68 while Sun Sheng's direct 
contemporary Xi Zuochi, [567] author of Han-Jin chunqiu, "Chronicle of 
Han and Jin," and the local history Xiangyang ji, "Records of 
Xiangyang," made specific judgements in his historical writings.69 
 So far we have been dealing with works that are primarily concerned 
to describe the real and practical history of their chosen time and place. 
There may be anecdotes which exaggerate or embellish reality, but they 
                                               
68 The biography of Sun Sheng is in JS 82:2147-49. He had an active and eventful 
official career as well as a scholarly one, and he appears to have died about 375 at 
the age of seventy-two sui. We are told that his Jin yangqiu 晉陽秋 was particularly 
praised for its direct moral comments. [The character 陽 yang was substituted for 
the normal and expected 春 chun to avoid tabu: the Lady Zheng Achun 鄚阿春 
(d.326), posthumously honoured as an empress, was the favoured concubine of 
Emperor Yuan of Jin and the mother of Emperor Jianwen: JS 32:979, and Mather, 
Tales of the World, 503. Other works also made the change, but most returned later 
to their original titles.] 
  Besides Zaji, Pei Songzhi also cites Zayu "Miscellaneous Comments," Yitong 
zayu "Comparisons and Comments," Yitong ping "Comparisons and Criticisms," 
and sometimes simply Ping "Criticisms," all of which he ascribes to Sun Sheng. 
The different citations in fact very likely refer to the same collection of essays. As 
examples of Sun Sheng's comments, which are frequently hostile to the men of 
Wu, one may cite his indignation at the surrender of Hua Xin to Sun Ce at the 
instigation of Yu Fan, in Chapter Three at 193-194, and also his discussion of the 
transfer of warlord power in Wu from Sun Ce to his brother Sun Quan, SGZ 46/Wu 
1:1113 PC note 1. 
69 The biography of Xi Zuochi is in JS 82:2152-58. Much of the biography, 2154-58, 
consists of the text of a memorial arguing that the Shu-Han dynasty should be 
regarded as the legitimate successor, through blood relationship, to the Later Han, 
and thus the basis for the continuing chronology by reign title. He was the first 
scholar of the Jin state to do so, and his Han-Jin chunqiu was composed to cover 
the period from the time of Emperor Guangwu of Later Han to the reign of 
Emperor Xiao-Min, last ruler of Western Jin in the early fourth century, in order to 
emphasise the continuity from Later Han to the surrender of Shu-Han to Jin, rather 
than the succession by abdication through the Wei. See also note 74 to Chapter 
Seven. 
  As an example of Xi Zuochi's commentary, see the remarks taken from his 
"Discussion" (論 lun) on the death of Zhuge Liang, SGZ 40/Shu 10:1001 PC note 
3, quoted again by Sima Guang in ZZTJ 72:2300; Fang, Chronicle I, 440. 
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are generally based upon, and can be tested against, other critical sources. 
The collection of Pei Songzhi, however, gives ample evidence of a 
romantic and mystical streak in the writings of this time. In their review 
of the imperial edition of Sanguo zhi, the eighteenth-century editors of 
Siku quanshu complained that Pei Songzhi was sometimes inconsistent 
and erratic, and also that he was excessively fond of strange stories. And 
there is no question that several of the items in his commentary may 
better be regarded as fantastic fiction than as serious history. We have 
examined in some detail the account of the death of Sun Ce after his 
wounding by the clients of his late enemy Xu Gong, and one must 
conclude that the whole series of incidents involving the master Gan Ji, 
culminating in his ghostly appearance to Sun Ce as he lay upon his sick-
bed, must be discounted from any description of reality.70[568] 
 That story comes from Soushen ji, "Records of Enquiry about the 
Spirits," compiled by Gan Bao of the early fourth century. Gan Bao was a 
recognised scholar, author of a Jin ji, "Annals of Jin," and of studies on 
Zuo zhuan and on the offices and rituals of the Zhou dynasty. He was also 
interested in the Book of Changes, and particularly in the interpretations 
of the mystical school of Jing Fang.71 Such a variety of scholarly interest 
was by no means unusual: from the period of Later Han, trends of 
thought had encouraged men to combine the preternatural with the real, 
and during the third and fourth centuries one may find a variety of 
approaches which sought a synthesis of traditional Confucianism, popular 
and philosophical Taoism and the new imported faith of Buddhism.72 
 One aspect of this development was an interest and concern with 
tales of the marvellous and the unusual. Among the works cited by Pei 
Songzhi is Lieyi zhuan, "Accounts of Strange Things," which appears to 
have been first compiled by Cao Pi, Emperor Wen of Wei, and completed 
                                               
70 Chapter Two at 200-212. 
71 The biography of Gan Bao is in JS 82:2149-51. On the school of Jing Fang, which 
developed during the first century BC, see, for example, Tjan Tjoe Som, White 
Tiger Discussions I, Table I, and pages 94, 95, 146. The biography tells us that Gan 
Bao was particularly drawn to the study of the supernatural because of various 
incidents in his own family; notably the experience of a concubine of his father, 
who was shut into his tomb by the jealous former wife but was found in a coma 
and revived ten years later. 
72 See, for example, the chapters "Confucian, Legalist and Taoist Thought" by Ch'en, 
and "Philosophy and Religion," by Demiéville, in Cambridge Han, 766-807 and 
808-846. 
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by the minister of Jin, Zhang Hua, towards the end of the third century,73 
and similar collections were popular [569] throughout the centuries of 
division. We have noted earlier the Yiyuan, "Garden of Marvels," 
compiled by the fifth century scholar Liu Jingshu, as a very doubtful 
source for the given name of the father of Sun Jian, included in a story on 
the supernatural origins of the fortunes of the family.74 
 Pei Songzhi did not refer to that tale of Sun Zhong and the melons, 
but he did include other items of magic or prophecy, such as the dreams 
which promised greatness to Sun Jian, Sun Ce and Sun Quan,75 and 
besides Gan Bao he also made use of the Taoist encyclopaedist Ge Hong 
of the fourth century, not only his basic work Baopu zi, "The Master Who 
Embraces Simplicity," but also his Shenxian zhuan, "Accounts of Spirits 
and Immortals."76 
 So the commentary contains several anecdotes which fit ill with a 
rationalist taste, but Pei Songzhi well reflected the patterns of his time 
and the traditions of Chinese history. More than that, however, with his 
respect for his sources and his concern to reflect alternative opinions, he 
created a record of the past which provides both entertainment and 
information. His approach is exceptional among [570] early Chinese 
                                               
73 SGZ 13/Wei 13:405 (JJ 22b-23a), and Yao Zhenzong, Sanguo yiwen zhi, 3266/1. 
Sui shu 33:980, ascribes the compilation to Cao Pi, but Jiu Tang shu 46:2005, and 
Xin Tang shu 59:1539, both have Zhang Hua as the writer. Some passages in the 
surviving portions of the work describe events after the death of Cao Pi, so 
although the collection may have been begun by him, it was completed by a later 
hand. 
  Zhang Hua (232-300), statesman and scholar of Western Jin, was the author of 
another collection, Bowu zhi, "Records of Many Things." See Greatrex, The Bowu 
Zhi, particularly 25 and 169-170 note 111. 
74 See note 4 to Chapter Two. 
75 On the omens which accompanied the birth of Sun Jian, see Chapter Two at 74. 
SGZ 50/Wu 5:1195 PC quoting Soushen ji tells how when the Lady Wu, wife of 
Sun Jian, was pregnant with Sun Ce she had a dream that the moon entered her 
womb; when she was pregnant with Sun Quan she dreamt in similar fashion of the 
sun. 
76 On Ge Hong (283-343) and his work, see Sailey, The Master Who Embraces 
Simplicity. The biography of Ge Hong is in JS 72:1911-13, and is translated by 
Sailey at 521-532. 
  SGZ 49/Wu 4:1192 PC note 1 quotes a story from Shenxian zhuan which tells 
how Shi Xie was taken ill and died, but was revived three days later by the 
immortal Dong Feng of Houguan. The anecdote has some value as evidence for 
contact by sea along the south-eastern coast of China: Chapter One at 34-35. 
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historians, but it is one we can admire and appreciate. Pei Songzhi is a 
sympathetic and agreeable colleague to any modern reader. 
 
Story cycles: exaggeration and allegory: 
This brings us to contemplate a basic inspiration for all the recording and 
recounting of the events of the Three Kingdoms period which Pei 
Songzhi preserved for our attention. To men of that time, and of the years 
which followed, the fall of Han and the long-drawn civil war between 
north, south and west was not only a period of historical importance, it 
was an age of romantic deeds and high moral conduct. There had been 
brave ministers and critics in the centuries of Han, and members of the 
Proscribed Party during the reigns of Huan and Ling suffered 
courageously for their sense of what was right. Nevertheless, the 
immediacy of civil war, with an empire in ruins, with everything to gain 
or to lose for those who took part in the contest, gave high profile to the 
individual's sense of personal conduct and honour, which had found 
fewer opportunities for expression against the background of an 
established state. 
 Given the possibilities for exemplary exaggeration, therefore, and the 
intensity and excitement of the period, it is hardly surprising that 
anecdotes and even whole cycles of stories should have added an air of 
romance to the already dramatic facts of history. Though the degree to 
which this embellishment took place is often impossible to assess, and 
one cannot always be sure which anecdote is based upon reality and 
which is splendid imagination, one can discern, among the incidents 
recounted by Chen Shou and Pei Songzhi, a pattern of romantic historical 
fiction. 
 We have referred to the manner in which the story of the Taoist Gan 
Ji is interwoven with that of Sun Ce, and one may imagine how the 
activities of that young warlord must have attracted such tales. In [571] 
similar fashion, the biography of He Qi, conqueror of the Yue people of 
the south on behalf of Sun Ce and Sun Quan, may also contain remnants 
of a popular cycle of stories. The main text of Chen Shou, among a series 
of incidents which demonstrate He Qi's courage and determination, tells 
how he stormed a camp of his enemies on the top of a precipice by 
ordering his soldiers to use their arrows as pitons in the cracks of the rock 
to gain footholds for the climb. Immediately afterwards, Pei Songzhi 
quotes a supplementary tale from Baopu zi, which relates the occasion He 
Qi was faced by a master of preventive magic who used his spells to 
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blunt the swords and arrows of his men. He Qi solved the problem by 
ordering his troops to arm themselves with cudgels so they might beat the 
enemy rather than piercing them; the technique was fully successful and 
another victory was recorded.77 
 It is not difficult to comprehend how a commander such as He Qi 
would have attracted such tales, and it is not surprising that similar tales 
gathered about other notable individuals of the time. Many incidents from 
such story-cycles can be found in the commentary of Pei Songzhi, and in 
some instances we can actually observe the process of accretion:78 
According to the biography of Cao Cao as written by Chen Shou, 
Cao Cao abandoned Dong Zhuo after his usurpation of power at 
Luoyang in 189, and sought to escape under a false name to join the 
rebel forces in the east. On the road, he was arrested on suspicion, 
but someone spoke for him and he was able to continue on his way. 
The commentary of Pei Songzhi to this passage quotes a series of texts 
with elaborations of the incident:[572] 
Firstly, Wei shu, the official history of the dynasty, tells how Cao Cao 
and a small escort called upon the house of an old friend, Lü Boshe, 
in Chenggao. Lü Boshe was not at home, but his son led out a party 
of retainers to attack the apparent intruders, and seized some horses 
and goods. In the fighting, Cao Cao himself killed a number of men. 
This tale may be true, or it may represent an apologia against those 
which follow. 
 Second, there is Wei-Jin shiyu, "Tales of the Generations of Wei 
and Jin," by Guo Song of the latter part of the third century. A first 
extract tells how Cao Cao went to call upon Lü Boshe, and Lü Boshe 
with his five sons came out to welcome him with appropriate 
ceremony. Cao Cao, however, became suspicious that there might be 
a plan to take him, and during the night he fled away, killing eight 
people in the course of his escape. 
 A further extract from Wei-Jin shiyu tells how when Cao Cao 
later came to Zhongmou, a short distance east of Chenggao and thus 
further along his way of escape, he was arrested as a fugitive. A 
junior official of the county, however, who recognised Cao Cao and 
admired him as a man of great potential in the troubled times to 
                                               
77 Chapter Five at 330 and note 63, SGZ 60/Wu 15:1378-79 and PC note 1. The 
"Magic of Yue" is also discussed in Chapter One at 14. 
78 SGZ 1/Wei 1:5 and PC notes 2 and 3. 
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come, concealed Cao Cao's true identity and argued successfully for 
his release. 
 Thirdly, there is a note from the Zaji, "Miscellany," of Sun 
Sheng, who says that Cao Cao mistook the sounds of food being 
prepared as indication that he was about to be attacked, and it was 
for that reason he made his murderous escape. It is Sun Sheng who 
ascribes to him the devastating explanation, "I would rather betray 
others than have another man betray me!" 
After all this, one can see the development which culminates in the 
incident in Romance; the story of how Cao Cao is rescued at Chenggao 
and joined by the honest Chen Gong, how the two men then visit the 
home of Lü Boshe, how they misinterpret the conversation overheard 
from the kitchen about slaughtering pigs, [573] how Cao Cao 
consummates his treachery by slaying their host as he returns with wine 
for their banquet, and how Chen Gong leaves him in horror and disgust, 
later to become his bitter enemy.79 
 This tale of Cao Cao, with its critical delineation of his cruelty, craft 
and selfishness, is a notable example of the progressive development of a 
single incident, and it also shows the degree to which Romance has 
adapted and extended the historical record for its own artistic purposes. 
 We shall consider Romance further below, but even without such 
later embellishments it is obvious that some of the material extant quite 
close to the time of the historical events, and which was accepted for 
preservation by Pei Songzhi, already represents the exaggeration of fact 
into fiction, or even a complete work of imagination, applied for one 
reason or another to a central figure or incident.80 
 A dominant figure in his time, Cao Cao naturally became the centre 
of a host of tales. Another example, not recorded by Pei Songzhi but 
preserved in the contemporary collection Shishuo xinyu, tells of Cao Cao 
and his later rival Yuan Shao when they were both young men about the 
imperial Han capital of Luoyang. One evening they broke into a wedding 
                                               
79 Romance chapter 4, discussed by deC, Imperial Warlord, 48-49. The incident is 
also the theme of a celebrated traditional drama, commonly called Zhuofang Cao, 
"Capture and Release of Cao Cao" (Arlington and Acton, Famous Chinese Plays, 
132-151, Peking Opera Texts, 46, and Jingju jumu chutan, 69). 
80 Plaks, Four Masterworks, 373, also refers to "such largely pseudo-historical 
sources" as Yingxiong ji and Cao Man zhuan. Cao Man zhuan is certainly a piece 
of hostile propaganda, and in many respects must be considered unreliable, but I 
would give Wang Can's Yingxiong ji more credit than a number of other works. 
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party, kidnapped the bride, and Cao Cao raped her. As they were pursued, 
Yuan Shao became caught in a thorn hedge. Cao Cao called out, "Here's 
the villain!" Yuan [574] Shao, in panic, forced his way out, and both men 
managed to escape.81 
 It is possible to regard this as the account of a real incident, typical of 
the behaviour of young men of rank during the last years of Han, but I 
believe that no serious credit should be given it. It is a good story about a 
celebrated historical figure, but it is better taken as an allegory for later 
political events. If we consider the situation in the years after 196, after 
Cao Cao had taken Emperor Xian into his protection and custody, then 
Cao Cao appears as the successful kidnapper. Yuan Shao would have 
been pleased to share the spoils, but Cao Cao pre-empted him and later, 
in his propaganda at the time of the campaign about Guandu in 200, 
accused Yuan Shao of seeking to seize the Emperor. So he blamed his 
rival for what he had actually done himself.82 
 If the story is interpreted in this way, there is no need to grant it any 
reality in fact: it is a purely allegorical fiction. 
 While this is an extreme case, and the truth of the story is hardly 
important, there are other anecdotes recorded by Pei Songzhi which are 
likewise based only in abstract form upon any historical reality. In 
discussing the drama about the death of Sun Ce and the magic of Gan Ji, 
I have questioned whether Sun Ce, in the situation of the year 200, had 
any plan to make an attack to the north against Cao Cao, let alone 
whether he actually embarked upon such a foolhardy venture.83 Similarly, 
the [575] Xiandi chunqiu of Yuan Ye, quoted by Pei Songzhi, has a 
detailed account of how, in the period after the Red Cliffs, Sun Quan sent 
his cousin Sun Yu to lead an invasion of Shu province in present-day 
Sichuan, but this plan was halted because of the objections and the 
military activity of Liu Bei. I argue, however, that though the plan may 
have been discussed, no such expedition was launched. Once Liu Bei had 
declared his opposition, the project became impossibly dangerous - and 
                                               
81 Shishuo xinyu C (27), 538; Mather, Tales of the World (Guile and Chicanery), 441, 
discussed by deC, Imperial Warlord, 31. Mather interprets the character 刦 jie 
simply as "made off with," but in context of the story the more vicious reading 
seems appropriate. 
82 See, for example, deC, Establish Peace, 252, translating the passage in Zizhi 
tongjian 65:2015, based upon HHS 74A/64A:2390, recording a debate in Yuan 
Shao's council in 200. 
83 Chapter Three at 208-211. 
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the circumstantial description by Yuan Ye may better be regarded as the 
account of a war game than of any real campaign.84 
 Dealing with this early history of the Three Kingdoms, therefore, we 
are faced with a great range of material, from reasonably well-established 
and reliable fact to accounts which are either grossly exaggerated or 
completely fictitious, even though they may be based upon known 
historical individuals or situations. 
 In the Introduction to his admirable translation of Shishuo xinyu, 
Mather has observed that the vast majority of the characters appearing in 
that collection are known to history from other reliable sources, and the 
background information is likewise consistent with attested facts. As he 
observes, and we may agree, some degree of embellishment, 
exaggeration, local colour and fictionalisation was more or less expected 
even in the standard histories. On the other hand, the fact that a historical 
novel in the West gives, for example, the correct date of the battle of 
Bosworth in 1485 does not mean that any other statement in the book, as 
for example the true fate of the princes in the Tower at the hands of their 
uncle Richard III, is necessarily correct.[576] 
  Mather himself observes that "the writing of history does not seem 
to have been the intention of the author" of Shishuo xinyu,85 and certainly 
in the Tang period the compilers of the standard history Jin shu were 
criticised for using anecdotes from Shishuo xinyu.86 Nienhauser has 
remarked that "The T'ang dynasty ... marks the era in which scholars first 
came to distinguish fiction from history,"87 but the achievement of Tang 
was the culmination of development over several centuries. Several 
commentators of the sixth century criticised Shishuo xinyu on matters of 
fact,88 and the memorial of Pei Songzhi, writing in the early fifth century, 
taken with a number of items in his commentary, suggests that he was 
interested in comparing texts with a view to judging which was correct. 
                                               
84 See note 29 to Chapter Five, and on the fictional development of this theme, see 
below. 
85 Tales of the World, xiv. 
86 Liu Zhiji, Shitong 5:2b-3a, cited and translated in Lee, "Historical Value," 121-122. 
87 Nienhauser, "Some Preliminary Remarks on Fiction," 1.4. 
88 See, for example, Mather, Tales of the World (10: Admonitions and Warnings), 286 
and 287, recording a note from the Wenzhang zhi 文章志 sponsored by Emperor 
Ming 明 of the Liu Song dynasty in the later fifth century which casts doubt upon 
Incident 18, and the Commentary of Liu Jun of the early sixth century, which 
remarks baldly of Incident 21 that "This account...is badly mistaken." 
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 So Shishuo xinyu and similar collections are primarily anecdotal 
fiction. It is possible to view the incidents they recount as examples or 
reconstructions of the mores and customs of the time they describe, and 
they certainly echo the tales which were told about the men and their 
time, but they were not designed, nor do they serve, as history. It is not 
that all the stories are false, but it is generally impossible to judge which 
may be true and make meaningful use of them for modern historical 
writing. And I believe the Chinese [577] distinguished quite early 
between items of entertainment and those which sought seriously to 
provide factual information.89 
 The problem becomes more difficult, however, when we consider the 
material preserved in the work of Chen Shou and of Pei Songzhi, not to 
mention the numerous works which were composed during the third and 
fourth centuries, which are not specifically cited in the text or 
commentary of Sanguo zhi, but which sometimes survive in whole or in 
part through other means. As we have seen, there are occasions when 
formal statements in these early histories must be discounted in the 
context of other material, or even by contrast with likely reality. And such 
judgement must often be uncertain, for we are seeking to apply modern 
standards of proof to a complex body of history, anecdote and fiction. In 
a very special way, we are dealing not with simple categories of truth and 
falsehood, but with a spectrum from one to the other. 
 Perhaps the most important point is that the commentary of Pei 
Songzhi, with the original text of Chen Shou, has preserved a great 
quantity of literature, compiled close to the time which it purports to 
describe, and reflecting the interests and emphases of that period and the 
years which immediately followed. As such, the whole of Sanguo zhi 
represents a remarkable literary compilation, with the authority of 
standard history tradition on one side and the vitality of the great 
collections on the other. This is an impressive achievement, and it is 
appropriate that Pei Songzhi, Fan Ye of Hou Han shu, and Liu Yiqing of 
Shishuo xinyu should have been direct contemporaries.[578] 
 
The distortions of Romance: 
I have hitherto paid small attention to Sanguo [zhi] yanyi, the Romance of 
the Three Kingdoms, for the compilation of that work is well separated in 
time from the events it purports to recount, and the material it contains 
                                               
89 See also the discussion in note 12 above. 
CHAPTER NINE 
 
 
450 
has no independent authority. Disconcertingly, however, Chinese 
tradition for much of the last thousand years has viewed the history of the 
Three Kingdoms period through the distorting glass of the romantic 
tradition. In modern times, the novel has been too often described as 
"seven parts history, three parts fiction,"90 and some have suggested that it 
has value as a means to interpret the history of that time. In fact, 
however, Romance must be regarded as a special piece of literary 
composition, strongly influenced by the period of its development and 
completion during the Song and Ming dynasties. 
 In light of their later popularity, there is surprisingly little evidence 
of the existence or content of tales about the Three Kingdoms among 
surviving literary material from the latter part of the first millennium. 
Though many items of fiction have been preserved from the Tang 
dynasty, none deal directly with any aspect of the Three Kingdoms 
period, and it is only by passing references that we can confirm the 
existence of some popular tradition associated with the heroes of the end 
of Han.91[579] 
 By the latter part of the Northern Song period however, the eleventh 
and early twelfth centuries AD, we have evidence for the popularity of 
tales about the Three Kingdoms, and the poet and writer Su Shi records 
that children were entertained by stories about Liu Bei and Cao Cao, and 
that they supported the former against the latter.92 So Liu Bei was already 
popular, and Cao Cao was seen as the powerful villain. In his own works, 
                                               
90 This celebrated judgement is commonly credited to the modern writer and critic Lu 
Hsün in his Brief History of Chinese Fiction. As Yang, "Literary Transformation," 
points out at 81-82, similar comment had been made by the eighteenth-century 
scholar Zhang Xuecheng. 
91 The article on Three Kingdoms stories during the Tang period by the 
pseudonymous Yisu presents evidence for the circulation of such tales, and in the 
poem Jiaoer shi, "The Arrogant Child," Li Shangyin (813-858) describes how his 
young son laughs at his father's guests for being "barbarous like Zhang Fei" or 
"stammering like Deng Ai." Zhang Fei and Deng Ai are characters of the Three 
Kingdoms period, and stories concerning them must have been well-known for a 
child to have been aware of them. See, for example, Hsia, The Classic Chinese 
Novel, 9-10 and 327-328 note 26, but also Ma, "Professional Story-Telling," 233. 
  Plaks, Four Masterworks, 368, summarising the discussion on evidence for this 
early tradition, concludes "that from an early period on the hero cycles that grew 
up around the exploits of the San-kuo figures became a major subject of oral story-
telling, and this tradition has continued right down into the twentieth century." 
92 Dongpo zhilin 1:7; but cf. Ma, "Professional Story-Telling," 233, and Plaks, Four 
Masterworks, 368 and note. Su Shi in fact ascribes the observation to a friend. 
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moreover, the two fu rhapsodies on the Red Cliff, and one ci poem 
"Meditations on the Red Cliff," Su Shi indicates that the site of that battle 
had already acquired a patina of heroism and splendour. In particular, in 
the first of the rhapsodies and in the lines from the poem: 
I think of Zhou Yu in those days, 
Newly married to the young Qiao girl – 
His heroic looks, majestic and spirited, 
Holding a feather fan and wearing a silk kerchief, 
Amidst talk and laughter, 
He reduced his enemy to flying ashes and smouldering smoke; 
he gives an important position to that commander, while the later 
celebrated Zhuge Liang has no such dominant role.93[580] 
 On the other hand, though we know that some story-tellers 
specialised in tales of the Three Kingdoms,94 there are no extant huaben 
story scripts which might provide information on their content. The 
earliest significant written source on popular fiction concerning the Three 
Kingdoms is Sanguo zhi pinghua, dating from the Yuan dynasty in the 
early fourteenth century. That work, though clumsy in style, and 
concerned rather with the sensationalist and supernatural than with 
serious history, confirms the popular regard of Cao Cao and his state of 
Wei as the forces of evil, and emphasises the achievements of Zhuge 
Liang and the legitimacy of Shu-Han.95 
 In more scholarly terms, the view of Shu-Han as true successor to 
Later Han had been supported by the arguments and arrangements of the 
                                               
93 Chibi huaigu and Chibi fu. The lines quoted come from the translation of the ci 詞 
by Liu Wu-chi, Introduction to Chinese Literature, 110. Translations of the two 
rhapsodies 賦 by A C Graham appear in the Anthology edited by Birch, 385-388. 
See also note 78 to Chapter Four at 265. 
  On the comparative importance of Zhou Yu and Zhuge Liang at the Red Cliffs, 
see also Chapter Four at 271-275. We may note, incidentally, that Zhou Yu had 
taken the Lady Qiao as his wife in 199, so they had been married almost ten years. 
94 Dongjing meng Hua lu 東京夢華錄 "A Record of the Dreaming of Hua [Xu] in the 
Eastern Capital," by Meng Yuanlao 孟元老 of the early twelfth century, records that 
during the last years of Northern Song there was a story-teller in Kaifeng named 
Huo Sijiu who specialised in tales of the Three Kingdoms. 
95 On the evolution of Romance, see Liu Ts'un-yan, "Authenticity of the Historical 
Romances," 221, and "Lo Kuan-chung and his Historical Romances," 93, also 
Yang, "Use of the 'San-kuo chih'," 50-61. 
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great philosopher Zhu Xi in his Zizhi tongjian gangmu.96 For the men of 
Southern Song, maintaining a state in the south and west, but exiled from 
the Chinese heartland about the Yellow River, the claim of Liu Bei 
appeared more legitimate and attractive than the great but morally flawed 
power of Wei, and from that time of Southern Song ideal scholarship and 
popular opinion were fully agreed on the true values of the Three 
Kingdoms.[582] 
 To some extent in parallel with the vernacular tradition, plays about 
the Three Kingdoms appear to have flourished from the time of Northern 
Song, in early "shadow plays" (piying xi), popular during the eleventh 
century, on the regular stage during Southern Song, and in the yuanben 
theatre scripts of the contemporary Jin dynasty in the north. During the 
Yuan period of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, several 
zaju "variety dramas" were concerned with the Three Kingdoms, and 
some have survived to this day. Like the popular stories, theatrical 
tradition generally sympathises with Shu-Han and the heroes of that 
state.97 
 It is, however, the novel Sanguo yanyi, here cited as Romance, which 
represents the major and most influential version of later tradition 
concerning the Three Kingdoms. The essential composition is commonly 
ascribed to Luo Guanzhong of the late fourteenth century, but Luo 
Guanzhong's work, which appears to have been commonly titled Sanguo 
zhizhuan, became the basis for a number of different publications of 
                                               
96 As we have observed, Zhu Xi chose the calendar of Shu-Han in preference to that 
of Wei, formerly accepted by Sima Guang in Zizhi tongjian: Chapter Seven at 455-
457, also note 69 above. 
97 For a general discussion of the development of the dramatic tradition in China, see, 
for example, Liu Wu-chi, Introduction to Chinese Literature, 159-184. 
  Plaks, Four Masterworks, has discussed the early dramatic tradition of the 
Yuan and Ming. At 371 he notes that: 
when one reviews the extant plays, one finds very little in the way of textual overlap 
that might indicate direct reliance on any of these dramatic works as sources, and 
even the basic story elements often depart very radically from the narratives of the 
Yen-i. 
  On occasion during discussion of the history, I refer to plays in the Yuan and 
Ming drama, and in the traditional repertoire of the Beijing opera and of modern 
China, as recorded or summarised in Guben Yuan-Ming zaju, in Arlington and 
Acton, Famous Chinese Plays, in Peking Opera Texts, and in Jingju jumu chutan. 
Apart from those of the Yuan and Ming periods, however, most plays performed at 
the present day owe a great deal to the novel and no longer represent a truly 
independent tradition. 
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varying quality. Most notably, a more literary and sophisticated version 
of the novel, Sanguo zhi tongsu [582] yanyi, appeared in 1522, and more 
than a hundred years later, at the beginning of the Qing dynasty in the 
mid-seventeenth century, a revised version was published by the scholar 
Mao Zonggang. The Mao Zonggang edition forms the basis for the 
present-day text of Romance.98 
 In his discussion of the development of the novel, however, Plaks 
has argued that the 1522 edition is based upon interpretations of that 
time, not upon the earlier work ascribed to Luo Guanzhong: 
the San-kuo chih yen-yi, as we know it from the 1522 text and later 
editions, [is] an example of the sixteenth century literati novel, one 
that was either newly created during the second Ming century or was 
substantially altered by that time.99 
Through detailed reading of the treatment of various incidents and 
characters, Plaks has demonstrated the skill with which the author of the 
novel has taken the popular and historical tradition well-known in his 
time and created a work "which pointedly transforms the earlier material 
as it casts it into a new generic mold."100 In particular, as Plaks points out 
with repeated examples, a central theme of the novel is the "Limitations 
of Valor," with an ironic reinterpretation of such popular heroes as Liu 
Bei, Guan Yu, Zhang Fei and Zhuge Liang. The novel accepts the heroic 
and romantic tradition, but then demonstrates the manner in which the 
qualities of the heroes are flawed, and their ambitions destroyed, by these 
very weaknesses. Thus Guan Yu's emphasis on personal honour leads him 
to an [583] arrogance which brings repeated failures and ultimate 
destruction,101 while Zhuge Liang's cleverness is corrupted into a "self-
destructive egotism."102 
 I shall return to Plaks' approach and interpretation of the novel in its 
present form. At this stage, however, we may observe that, by the end of 
the fourteenth century, the essential pattern of what may be referred to as 
                                               
98 Liu Ts'un-yan, "Authenticity of the Historical Romances," 221-229, describes and 
analyses the relationship between the Sanguo zhizhuan of Luo Guanzhong, the 
edition dated to the first year of Jiajing (1522), and the revised form of the novel 
prepared by Mao Zonggang, and he presents a table comparing the work as revised 
by Mao with an earlier edition of Sanguo zhizhuan. 
99 Plaks, Four Masterworks, 363-364. 
100 Plaks, Four Masterworks, 369. 
101 Plaks, Four Masterworks, 410-413. 
102 Plaks, Four Masterworks, 443. 
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the romantic tradition was well established and confirmed in popular 
imagination, in early story cycles, and in works for the stage. And it is 
with that pattern, the culmination of several centuries' development of 
story cycles, that we should deal here. 
 In his comparison of the history told by Sanguo zhi and the version 
of Romance, Winston Yang has discussed the manner in which the 
historical characters of Cao Cao, Liu Bei, Zhuge Liang and Zhou Yu were 
re-interpreted by later tradition. In particular, he has pointed out the 
degree to which the authority and prestige of Zhuge Liang has been 
emphasised at the particular expense of Zhou Yu, his some-time 
colleague and long-term rival from the state of Wu. Yang, however, is 
inclined to accept the picture presented by Romance as an appropriate 
development, and indeed an improvement, from the material presented by 
Chen Shou and the other early historians. Where Sanguo zhi, for 
example, is "Nothing more than a collection of historical facts put 
together with little historical imagination," Luo Guanzhong presents a 
"more dramatic and interesting account."103 Yang does not often put the 
case so bluntly, but he and other readers show a tendency to regard 
Romance as an alternative, equally valid and perhaps superior version of 
the history of the late second and third centuries AD. And indeed, as Yang 
observes, far more people have gained their [584] knowledge of the 
Three Kingdoms period from the novel than from the official history.104 
 Nonetheless, despite the importance and the influence of the work, to 
regard Romance as "the retelling of history in a plainer language," and 
Luo Guanzhong as a "popular historian" demonstrates a strange sense of 
what any historian is trying to do.105 Yang has suggested that the genre of 
yanyi "popular elaboration" can find no parallel in Western language; it 
can readily be argued, however, that the "History" plays of Shakespeare, 
giving an impressive, lively, imaginative and heroic, but frequently 
inaccurate, view of English history for a hundred years from the time of 
Richard II to that of Richard III, are very close in style.106 And just as the 
emphasis upon Shu-Han and Zhuge Liang may be seen as reflections of 
the problems and needs of Song society, so it has been observed that the 
plays of Shakespeare reflect the opinions and interests of his own time, 
                                               
103 Yang, "Literary Transformation," 48. 
104 Yang, "Literary Transformation," 81. 
105 Yang, "Literary Transformation," 81. 
106 Yang, "Literary Transformation," 81-84. The same parallel with Shakespeare has 
been advanced by Ma, "The Chinese Historical Novel," 292. 
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and may totally ignore the real concerns of the period they purport to 
describe.107 Though it is true that all writers are bound [585] by their own 
cultural and intellectual background, the playwright and the novelist may 
be allowed a freer rein than the historian. 
 If we view the whole matter from the beginning, Romance may be 
regarded as one particular development of a story cycle tradition which 
had already begun in the third century, during the Three Kingdoms period 
itself. I have demonstrated the manner in which tales gathered about Cao 
Cao's encounter with Lü Boshe and how the affair reached its ultimate 
description in Romance.108 We have noted also the possibility of a cycle 
of stories told about the conquests of He Qi in the service of Wu against 
the hills people south of the mouth of the Yangzi,109 and it may well be 
that the several chapters of Romance which describe the seven campaigns 
of Zhuge Liang against the non-Chinese peoples of the southwest under 
their chieftain Meng Huo represents an achieved story cycle in similar 
vein to that of He Qi.110 And perhaps most insidious of all, there are a 
number of incidents, tricks and stratagems, which were originally 
attributed to other men but which Romance has transferred to Zhuge 
Liang. Two which I have noted elsewhere are the stratagem of the Empty 
City, which the history records as being played by Wen Ping against Sun 
Quan in Jiangxia in the autumn of 226, not by Zhuge Liang against Sima 
Yi;111 and the incident at Ruxu in 213, when Sun Quan was compelled to 
turn his boat about lest the arrows sticking in one side should cause it to 
capsize. It is very possible that the latter story was developed into Zhou 
                                               
107 See, for example, Campbell, Shakespeare's "Histories" at 141-142 where in a 
detailed discussion of "The Troublesome Reign of King John," she observes how 
Shakespeare reflected the contemporary concerns of Elizabeth with her Roman 
Catholic cousin and rival Mary Queen of Scots, so that his play King John placed 
great emphasis upon John's conflict with the Pope and his dealings with his cousin 
Arthur. In contrast, the earlier King Johan by John Bale, written in the time of 
Henry VIII, places great emphasis on the role of Sedition supported by Religion, 
but makes no mention of the unfortunate Arthur. Henry did not have the same 
problems as Elizabeth, and the different concerns of the two plays reflect the 
different concerns of their audiences. Professor Campbell applies similar analysis 
to the later history plays. 
108 Above at 572. 
109 Above at 571. 
110 Romance chapters 87-91. 
111 Chapter Seven at 438. 
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Yu's and then Zhuge Liang's celebrated feat of acquiring a hundred 
thousand arrows, also from Cao Cao, at the time of the Red Cliffs.112[586] 
 As an example of doubtful history developed for dramatic effect, we 
may also consider the matter of Zhou Yu's proposed attack against Liu 
Zhang in the west, soon after the victory at the Red Cliffs, which 
provides a notable incident in the novel: 
In the biography of Zhou Yu in Sanguo zhi, we are told only that he 
was planning an attack up the Gorges of the Yangzi, but was taken ill 
and died before the preparations were complete.113 
In the Xiandi chunqiu of Yuan Ye it is said that Sun Quan later 
proposed a similar expedition under the command of Sun Yu, but it 
was opposed by Liu Bei and the plan was abandoned; I have argued 
that the expedition probably never got under way.114 
In Romance, however, this putative attack is developed into the 
final, fatal triumph of Zhuge Liang over his rival Zhou Yu: as the 
unfortunate general of Wu struggles against the stream in a futile 
attempt to break through to the west, he looks up and see Zhuge 
Liang, comfortable on a hill-top, laughing at his discomfiture. This 
proves to be the culminating humiliation, and Zhou Yu dies of grief 
and rage.115 
It is the account in the novel of this last incident which moved Plaks to 
comment upon the arrogance and egotism of Zhuge Liang, and the 
hypocrisy of his ostentatious sympathy for Zhou Yu's sad end, but one 
may also observe the manner in which a story has developed from the 
early records into a notable scene in the romantic tradition. 
 And finally, there is the matter of the Red Cliffs campaign itself, 
central item of Romance and a major theme of the dramatic tradition. In 
Sanguo zhi, the confrontation of Cao Cao by the allied armies of [587] 
Zhou Yu and Liu Bei, and the defeat and retreat of Cao Cao, are referred 
to in a number of different passages, for the most part in the section 
dealing with the history of Wu. Even allowing for bias between the rival 
powers, it is clear that Sun Quan's forces played the decisive role, first in 
holding Cao Cao's advance, and then, through the fire-ship attack led by 
Huang Gai, inflicting the tactical defeat which compelled Cao Cao to 
                                               
112 Note 86 to Chapter Four. 
113 SGZ 54/Wu 9:1264. 
114 See note 29 to Chapter Five, and above. 
115 Romance chapters 56-57, and see also Plaks, Four Masterworks, 443, cited in note 
102 above. 
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withdraw.116 There is no justification for Romance to enlarge the part 
played by Liu Bei's men, particularly that of Zhuge Liang. 
 As I have suggested, moreover, while the campaign of the Red 
Cliffs, viewed in retrospect, was an important and even decisive event in 
the civil war, it may not have been a major military engagement. Despite 
the success of the allied forces in preliminary skirmishes and in the fire 
attack, it is very likely true, as Cao Cao claimed, that retreat was forced 
upon him through sickness among his troops rather than through 
devastation wrought by his opponents.117 
 For the purposes of literature and drama, of course, it is fully 
appropriate that the Red Cliffs should have a central position in the novel, 
and that the events of that time and place should be painted with broad 
brush upon a splendid canvas. Such artistic embellishment, however, has 
no historical authority, and tells us nothing about the actual events of that 
time. Romance, and the whole tradition which it represents, is no form of 
history as a modern historian understands it. 
 One would hardly believe it necessary to make this point, for no 
serious scholar of the West would regard a traditional work of fiction, 
compiled under different auspices more than one thousand years later, 
without any new or independent evidence, as a source of authority for 
analysis of the original events it purports to [588] describe. Such 
statements in Romance which appear to be true obtain that status only 
because they are based upon material from Sanguo zhi or some 
comparable historical authority. And true statements in Romance are 
accompanied by others for which there is no good justification, while 
some episodes have a foundation in earlier records but are re-interpreted 
and applied according to the requirements of literary artifice and 
propaganda, not at all upon the original record or facts. 
 In any such discussion as this, where one must deal with both the 
"historical tradition," based upon Sanguo zhi and other early works, and 
the "romantic tradition" developed in later centuries and culminating in 
the present-day novel, one is faced with this constant dichotomy and 
contradiction. In "Literary Transformation," though Yang does not claim 
specifically that Luo Guanzhong was writing as a historian or that 
Romance is a full alternative source for the history of the Three 
Kingdoms, he does get very close to such a position. In many respects, 
                                               
116 See Chapter Four at 267-269. 
117 See note 83 to Chapter Four. 
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the difficulty is that Yang begins his study of the Three Kingdoms from 
the point of view of Romance, and then seeks some factual basis for the 
interpretations of the novel. 
 The contrasting approach of Plaks' Four Masterpieces, which 
considers Romance as a work of fiction and analyses its treatment of the 
traditional material in terms of literary style and philosophy, is markedly 
more satisfactory. By such means one may observe the occasional contact 
of the novel with historical fact, but give chief and proper attention to the 
way the compiler has formulated and presented his message. 
 The real problem is that in studying the history of the Three 
Kingdoms we are operating at many different levels of knowledge and 
interpretation. Not only must we deal with fragmentary and often 
distorted records from the past, we are also viewing that past through the 
interpretations of a literary and artistic tradition which [589] has attracted 
the interest, enthusiasm and emotions of people for hundreds of years, 
and which has been responsible for a multitude of popular tales and 
sayings, for numbers of dramatic works, and for one of the greatest 
compilations of fiction in any language. It is striking tribute to the quality 
of the novel, and to the romantic tradition founded on the Three 
Kingdoms, that our view of that time is so largely influenced by the 
perspective of Luo Guanzhong, his colleagues and successors. If it is hard 
to find the true figure of Richard III behind the magnificent distortions of 
Shakespeare, the reality of Wei, Shu and Wu is yet further away.118 
 And at a higher level than simple matters of misapplied anecdotes, or 
even the misplaced emphasis upon a military engagement, there is one 
more disservice which the Romance has done to history. In all the 
concern about the potential might of Cao Cao in the north or the putative 
right of Liu Bei in the west, the role of Wu in the south and east has been 
neglected or distorted. With its concern for fictionalised characters rather 
than the pattern of events, the romantic tradition has neglected the real 
development which took place at that time. For the centuries which 
followed, the success of the Sun family in establishing an independent 
                                               
118 One may well compare the influence of Romance with that of Shakespeare's libel 
against King Richard III. Despite the efforts of modern revisionist scholars, and 
even the propaganda of amateur societies which favour Richard III, no historian 
dealing with the history of England in the late fifteenth century can avoid taking 
account of the villainous image of the king, first presented by the protagonists of 
his successful rival Henry VII, but maintained throughout the Tudor period and 
brilliantly supported by the play one hundred years later. 
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government south of the Yangzi was of far greater importance than the 
local conflicts between warlords in the west. So the present work has 
given chief attention to the "third kingdom," Wu, in an attempt to redress 
the balance and to discover both the romance and the achievement of the 
generals in the south. 
 

  
 
 

  
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Part I: Early Chinese Works 
 
Abbreviations: 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
462 
 
 
  
EARLY CHINESE TEXTS 
463 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
464 
 
  
EARLY CHINESE TEXTS 
465 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
466 
 
  
EARLY CHINESE TEXTS 
467 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
468 
 
  
EARLY CHINESE TEXTS 
469 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
470 
 
  
EARLY CHINESE TEXTS 
471 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
472 
 
  
 
 
Part II: Modern Works in Chinese and Japanese 
 
Ttranscriptions are given for the names of authors and for the titles of 
most books and journals. The English-language titles of articles 
within quotation marks "…" are those provided by the editors of the 
journals concerned; renderings within brackets […] paraphrase the 
topic of the item. 
 Transcriptions of the names of scholars writing in Chinese are 
normally given in pinyin, and the names of Japanese scholars follow 
the Hepburn system. However, where a person has published work 
under a differently transcribed name – as notably in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong – I follow that style. In similar fashion, where a journal has 
established its title with a particular romanisation or translation, I 
refer to it in that fashion. 
 In all cases, Chinese characters are given in full. Many books and 
articles published in the People's Republic of China have been written 
and titled in the abbreviated style, and the names of many scholars 
appear regularly in abbreviated form. There are some inconsistencies 
of presentation, however, and it seems most convenient to provide the 
characters in full. 
 
Abbreviations: 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
474 
 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
475 
 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
476 
 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
477 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
478 
 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
479 
 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
480 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
481 
 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
482 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
483 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
484 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
485 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
486 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
487 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
488 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
489 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
490 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
491 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
492 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
493 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
494 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
495 
 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
496 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
497 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
498 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
499 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
500 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
501 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
502 
 
  
MODERN CHINESE AND JAPANESE WORKS 
503 
 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
504 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Part III: Works in Western Languages 
 
Abbreviations: 
BMFEA Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities 
[Ostasiatska Samlingarna], Stockholm 
BEFEO Bulletin de l'Ecôle Française d'Extrême-Orient 
Cambridge Han The Cambridge History of China: Volume 1, The 
Ch'in and Han Empires 221 BC - AD 220, edited by 
Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe, Cambridge 
UP 1986 
CLEAR Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews 
HJAS Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 
JOSA Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia 
PFEH Papers on Far Eastern History, The Australian 
National University, Canberra 
TP T'oung Pao, Leiden 
 
Ames, Roger T., The Art of Rulership: a study in ancient Chinese 
political thought, Hawaii UP 1983 
Arlington, L.C., and Acton, Harold, Famous Chinese Plays, New 
York 1963 
Aurousseau, L., "La première conquête chinoise des pays annamites," 
in BEFEO 23 (1923), 137-265 
_____
, "La crise sociale et la philosophie politique à la fin des Han," in 
TP 39 (1949-50), 83-131 [also in Chinese Civilization and 
Bureaucracy, 187-225] 
_____
, "Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: variations on a theme, 
translated by H.M. Wright, edited by Arthur F. Wright, Yale UP 
1965 
_____
, "La Traité Economique du "Souei-chou," Leiden 1953 
Bauer, Wolfgang, and Franke, Herbert, translated by Christopher 
Levenson, The Golden Casket: Chinese novellas of two millennia, 
London 1965 
Beasley, W.G., and Pulleyblank, E.G. [editors], Historians of China 
and Japan, Oxford UP 1961 
Bielenstein, Hans, "The Census of China during the period 2-742 
A.D.," in BMFEA 19 (1947), 125-163 
_____
, "The Chinese Colonisation of Fukien until the end of Tang," in 
Studia Serica Bernhard Karlgren Dedicata, edited by Søren 
Egerod and Else Glahn, Copenhagen 1959, 98-122 
_____
, The Restoration of the Han Dynasty [cited as RHD]: 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
506 
 volume 1 (with prolegomena on the historiography of the Hou 
Han shu), in BMFEA 26 (1954); 
 volume II (The Civil War), in BMFEA 31 (1959); 
 volume III (The People), in BMFEA 39 (1967); 
 volume IV (The Government), in BMFEA 51 (1979) 
_____
, Review of Cartier and Will, "Démographie et institutions en 
Chine," in TP 61 (1975), 181-185 
_____
, Lo-yang in Later Han Times, in BMFEA 48 (1976) 
_____
, The Bureaucracy of Han Times, Cambridge UP 1980 
_____
, "Wang Mang, the Restoration of the Han Dynasty, and Later 
Han," in Cambridge Han, 223-290 
Biot, E., Le Tcheou-li ou rites des Tcheou, 3 volumes., Paris 1851 
[cited as Rites] 
Birch, Cyril [editor], Anthology of Chinese Literature from earliest 
times to the fourteenth century, Penguin 1967 
Blakeley, Barry B., "Recent Developments in Chu Studies: a 
bibliographic and institutional overview," in Early China 11-12 
(1985-87), 371-387 
_____
, "The Geography of Chu," in Cook and Major [eds] Defining 
Chu, 9-20 
Bodde, Derk, "Some Chinese Tales of the Supernatural: Kan Pao and 
his Sou-shen chi," in HJAS 6 (1941), 2338-357 
_____
, Festivals in Classical China, Princeton UP 1975 
Brewitt-Taylor, C.H., San Kuo, or Romance of the Three Kingdoms 
[an English version of Sanguo zhi yanyi q.v. Part II], 2 volumes, 
Shanghai 1929 
Campbell, Lily B., Shakespeare's "Histories": mirrors of Elizabethan 
policy, San Marino, California 1958 
Cartier, Michel, and Pierre-Etienne Will, "Démographie et 
institutions en Chine: contributions à l'analyse des recensements 
de l'époque impériale (2 ap. J.-C. - 1750), in Annales de 
démographie historique 1971, 161-245 
Chang Kwang-chih, The Archeology of Ancient China (3rd edition), 
Yale UP 1977 
Chavannes, Edouard, Les mémoires historiques de Se-ma Ts'ien: 
traduits et annotés, 5 volumes, Paris 1895-1905, reprinted Leiden 
1967; with supplementary volume VI, Paris 1969 [cited as MH] 
Ch'en Ch'i-yün, Hsün Yüeh (A.D. 148-209): the life and reflections of 
an early medieval Confucian, Cambridge UP 1975 
_____
, Hsün Yüeh and the Mind of Late Han China: a translation of 
the Shen chien with introduction and annotations, Princeton UP 
1980 
WORKS IN WESTERN LANGUAGES 
 
507 
_____
, "Han Dynasty China: economy, society and state power - a 
review of Cho-yun Hsu, Han Agriculture: the formation of early 
Chinese agrarian economy," in TP 70 (1984)127-148 
_____
, "Confucian, Legalist and Taoist Thought in Later Han" in 
Cambridge Han, 766-807 
Cheng Shibo, "An Iron and Steel Works of 2,000 years ago," in 
China Reconstructs 27.1 (January 1978), 32-34 
Chi Ch'ao-ting, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History, as revealed 
in the development of public works for water control, London 
1936 
Chittick, Andrew, "History and the Three Kingdoms: Three Recent 
Approaches," in Early Medieval China, 2001:1, 79-107 
_____
, "The Life and Legacy of Liu Biao: Governor, Warlord, and 
Imperial Pretender in Late Han China," in Journal of Asian 
History 37 (2003), 155-186 
China Proper, British Naval Intelligence Division, 3 volumes 1944-
45 
Ch'ü Tung-tsu, edited by Jack L. Dull, Han Social Structure, 
Washington UP, Seattle 1972 
Cook, Constance A., and Major, John S, Defining Chu: image and 
reality in ancient China, Hawaii UP 1999 
Couvreur, S., Mémoires sur les bienséances et les cérémonies [Li ji], 
2 volumes, Paris 1951 
Crowell, William Gordon, "Government Land Policies and Systems 
in Early Imperial China," doctoral thesis, University of 
Washington 1979 
Cutter, Robert Joe, and Crowell, William Gordon, Empresses and 
Consorts: selections from Chen Shou's Records of the Three States 
with Pei Songzhi's commentary, translated with annotations and 
an introduction, Hawaii UP 1999 
Daudin, "Sigillographie sino-annamite," in Bulletin de la Société des 
Etudes Indochinoises [new.series] 12, Saigon 1937, 1-322 
de Crespigny, Rafe [cited as deC], The Biography of Sun Chien: 
being an annotated translation of pages 1 to 8a of of chüan 46 of 
the San-kuo chih of Ch'en Shou in the Po-na edition, Canberra 
1966 
_____
, "The Military Geography of the Yangtse and the Early History 
of the Three Kingdoms State of Wu," in JOSA 4.1 (June 1966), 
61-76 
_____
, "The Recruitment System of the Imperial Bureaucracy of Later 
Han," in The Chung Chi Journal 6.1 (November 1966), 67-78 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
508 
_____
, "An Outline of the Local Administration of the Later Han 
Empire," in The Chung Chi Journal 7.1 (November 1967), 57-71 
_____
, "Prefectures and Population in South China in the First Three 
Centuries A.D.," in BIHP 40 (1968), 139-154 
_____
, The Last of the Han: being the chronicle of the years 181-220 
A.D. as recorded in chapter 58-68 of the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien of 
Ssu-ma Kuang, Canberra 1969 [revised and republished as 
Emperor Huan and Emperor Ling 1989 and To Establish Peace 
1996: see below] 
_____
, The Records of the Three Kingdoms, Canberra 1970 
_____, "The Chinese Warlord in Fact and Fiction: a study of Ts'ao 
Ts'ao," Bulletin of the Chinese Historical Association, Taipei, 4 
(1972), 304-328 [translated into Chinese by Lu Jianrong, Cao 
Cao, q.v. Part II, 195-217] 
_____
, "The Ghosts that Were," in Hemisphere 20.5 (Canberra, May 
1976), 34-38 
_____
, Portents of Protest in the Later Han Dynasty: the memorials of 
Hsiang K'ai to Emperor Huan, Canberra 1976 
_____
, "Two maps from Mawangdui," in Cartography: Journal of the 
Australian Institute of Cartographers 11.4 (September 1980), 211-
222 
_____
, "Politics and Philosophy under the Government of Emperor 
Huan 159-168 A.D.," in TP 66 (1980), 41-83 
_____
, "Inspection and Surveillance Officials under the Two Han 
Dynasties," in State and Law in East Asia, edited by Dieter 
Eikemeier and Herbert Franke, Wiesbaden 1981, 40-79 
_____
, Northern Frontier: the policies and strategy of the Later Han 
empire, Canberra 1984 
_____
, Emperor Huan and Emperor Ling: being the chronicle of Later 
Han for the years 157 to 189 AD as recorded in chapters 54 to 59 
of the Zizhi tongjian of Sima Guang, translated and annotated, 
Canberra 1989 
_____
, Man from the Margin: Cao Cao and the Three Kingdoms, the 
Fifty-first George Ernest Morrison Lecture on Ethnology, 
Australian National University, Canberra 1990 
_____
, "The Three Kingdoms and Western Jin: a history of China in 
the third century AD" [2 parts] in East Asian History 1, 1-36 and 
2, 143-165, Canberra 1992 
_____
, To Establish Peace: being the chronicle of Later Han for the 
years 189 to 220 AD as recorded in chapters 59 to 69 of the Zizhi 
tongjian of Sima Guang, translated and annotated, Canberra 1996 
WORKS IN WESTERN LANGUAGES 
 
509 
_____,
 A Biographical Dictionary of Later Han to the Three Kingdoms 
(23–220 AD), Leiden 2007 
_____
, "Recruitment Revisited: the imperial commissioned service of 
Later Han," in Early Medieval China 13-14.2 (2008), 1-47 
_____
, Imperial Warlord: a biography of Cao Cao 155-220 
AD, ,Leiden 2010 
_____
, Fire over Luoyang: a history of the Later Han dynasty, Leiden 
2017 
deC: see de Crespigny, Rafe as above 
Demiéville, Paul, "Philosophy and Religion from Han to Sui," in 
Cambridge Han, 808-872 
DeWoskin, Kenneth, "The Six Dynasties Chih-kuai and the Birth of 
Fiction," in Chinese Narrative: critical and theoretical essays, 
edited by Andrew H Plaks, Princeton UP 1977 
_____
, Doctors, Diviners and Magicians of Ancient China: biographies 
of fangshih, Columbia UP 1983 
_____
, "On Narrative Revolutions" in CLEAR 5, 1 and 2 (1983), 29-45 
Diény, Jean-Pierre, Les Dix-Neuf Poèmes Anciens, Paris 1963 
Dreyer, Edward L., "The Po-yang Campaign, 1363: inland naval 
warfare in the founding of the Ming dynasty," in Chinese Ways in 
Warfare, edited by Frank A Kierman, Jr, Harvard UP 1974 
Dubs, H H, The History of the Former Han Dynasty by Pan Ku, 3 
volumes, Baltimore 1938, 1944, 1955 [cited as HFHD] 
Eberhard, Wolfram, Sternkunde und Weltbind im Alten China, Taipei 
1970 [reprints Eberhard and Müller, R., "Contributions to the 
Astronomy of the Han Period III: the astronomy of Later Han," 
first published in HJAS 1, (1936), and Eberhard and Müller, 
"Contributions to the Astronomy of the San-Kuo Period," first 
published in Monumenta Serica 2, (1936)] 
Ebrey, Patricia, The Aristocratic Families of Early Imperial China: a 
case study of the Po-ling Ts'ui family, Cambridge UP 1978 
_____
, "The Economic and Social History of Later Han," in Cambridge 
Han, 608-648 
Eichhorn, Werner, "Bemerkingen zum Aufstand des Chang Chio und 
zum Staate des Chang Lu," in Mitteilungen des Instituts für 
Orientforschung 3 (1955), 292-327 
_____
, "T'ai-p'ing und T'ai-ping Religion," in Mitteilungen des Instituts 
für Orientforschung 5 (1957), 113-140 
_____
, "Allgemeine Bemerkung über das Religiöse in alten China," in 
Orients Extremus 26 (1979), 13-21 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
510 
Eisenberg, Andrew, "The Pogang Canal of the Eastern Wu and the 
Southern Dynasties," in Early Medieval China Group Newsletter 3 
(1990), 8-20 
Elvin, Mark, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, London 1973 
Fang, Achilles, The Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms (220-265): 
chapters 69-78 from the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien of Ssu-ma Kuang 
(1019-1068), translated and annotated; edited by Glen W. Baxter, 
2 volumes, Harvard UP 1952 and 1965 
Fitzgerald, C P, The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People: 
"Southern Fields and Southern Ocean," Canberra 1972 
_____
, Why China? recollections of China 1923-1950, Melbourne UP 
1985 
Fogel, Joshua A., Politics and Sinology: the case of Naitō Kōnan, 
Harvard UP 1984 
Fogel, Joshua A, "A New Direction in Japanese Sinology," in HJAS 
44 (1984), 225-247 
_____
, see also below sub Tanigawa Michio 
Franke, Herbert, Diplomatic Missions of the Sung State 960-1276, 
Canberra 1981 
_____
, and Trauzettel, Rolf, Das Chinesische Kaiserreich, Frankfurt 
1968 
Frodsham, J.D., An Anthology of Chinese Verse: Han Wei Chin and 
the Northern and Southern Dynasties, Oxford UP 1967 
Gaillard, Le P. Loius, S.J., Nankin d'alors et d'aujourd'ui: aperçu 
historique et géographique, Shanghai 1903 
Gardiner, K H J, The Early History of Korea: the historical 
development of the peninsula up to the introduction of Buddhism 
in the fourth century A.D., Canberra 1969 
_____
, "The Kung-sun Warlords of Liao-tung (189-238)," Part I in 
PFEH 5 (March 1972), 59-107; Part II in PFEH 6 (September 
1972), 141-201 
_____
"Standard Histories, Han to Sui," in Essays on the Sources for 
Chinese History, edited by Donald D Leslie, Colin Mackerras and 
Wang Gungwu, Canberra 1973, 42-52 
Gardner, Charles S, Chinese Traditional Historiography, Harvard UP 
1938 
Gaspardone, Emile, "La chasse du roi de Wou," in Mélanges de 
l'Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises II, Paris 1960, 69-111 
Grafflin, Denis, "The Great Family in Medieval South China," in 
HJAS 41 (1981), 65-74 
Greatrex, Roger, The Bowu Zhi: an annotated translation, Stockholm 
1987 
WORKS IN WESTERN LANGUAGES 
 
511 
Griffith, Samuel B, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, translated, with an 
introduction, Oxford 1963 
Hall, Kenneth R., Maritime Trade and State Development in Early 
Southeast Asia, Hawaii UP 1985 
Haloun, Gustav, "The Liang-chou Rebellion 184-221 A.D.," in Asia 
Major (New Series) 1 (1949-50), 119-138 
Hawkes, David, Ch'u Tz'u: The Songs of the South, an ancient 
Chinese anthology, Oxford UP 1959 
_____
, "The Quest of the Goddess," in Asia Major 13 (1967), 71-94 
Henricks, Robert G., review of Mather, Tales of the World, in CLEAR 
2.2 (1980), 274-281 
Hervouet, Yves, Le Chapitre 117 de Che-ki (Biographie de Sseu-ma 
Siang-jou); traduction avec notes, Paris 1972 
Hirth, F., China and the Roman Orient, Shanghai/Hong Kong 1885 
Holmgren, Jennifer, Chinese Colonisation of Northern Vietnam: 
administrative geography and political development in the 
Tongking delta, first to sixth centuries A.D., Canberra 1980 
Holzman, Donald, "Les sept sages de la forêt des bambous et la 
société de leur temps," in TP 44 (1956), 317-346 
_____
, "Les debuts du systéme médiéval de choix et de classement des 
fonctionnaires: les neuf catégories et l'Impartial et Juste," in 
Mélanges de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises I (Paris 1957), 
387-414 
_____
, La vie et la pensée de Hi Kang (223-262 ap. J.C.), Leiden 1957 
_____
, review of Rogers, The Chronicle of Fu Chien, in TP 57 (1971), 
182-186 
_____
, Poetry and Politics: the life and works of Juan Chi (A.D. 210-
263), Cambridge UP 1976 
Hsia, C T, The Classic Chinese Novel: a critical introduction, 
Columbia UP 1968 
Hsu, Cho-yun, Han Agriculture: the formation of early Chinese 
agrarian economy (206 B.C. -A.D. 220), Washington UP 1980 
see also sub Hsü Cho-yün in Part II 
Hsüeh Chung-sen and Ou-yang Yi, A Sino-Western Calendar for Two 
Thousand Years 1-2000 A.D., Changsha 1940 
Huang, Ray, "The Lung-ch'iang and Wan-li Reigns," in The 
Cambridge History of China 7: the Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, 
Part I, edited by Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett, 
Cambridge UP 1988 
Hughes, E R, Two Chinese Poets: vignettes of Han life and thought, 
Princeton UP 1960 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
512 
Hulsewé, A F P, "Notes on the Historiography of the Han Period," in 
Beasley and Pulleyblank, Historians of China and Japan, 31-43 
_____
, with Loewe, M A N, China in Central Asia: the early stage: 125 
BC – AD 23, an annotated translation of Chapters 61 and 96 of 
the History of the Former Han Dynasty, Leiden 1979 
Idema, W L, Chinese Vernacular Fiction: the formative period, 
Leiden 1974 
_____
, "The Illusion of Fiction" in CLEAR 5, 1 and 2 (1983), 47-51 
Johnson, David, The Medieval Chinese Oligarchy: a study of the 
great families in their social, political and ideological settng, 
Boulder 1977 
_____
, "Epic and History in Early China: the Matter of Wu Tzu-hsü," 
in Journal of Asian Studies 40.2 (February 1981), 255-271 
Kaltenmark, Max, "The Ideology of the T'ai-p'ing ching," in Facets 
of Taoism: Essays in Chinese Religion, edited by Holmes Welch 
and Anna Seidel, Yale UP 1979, 19-45 
Kandel, Barbara, Taiping Jing - the origin and transmission of the 
'Scripture on General Welfare' - the history of an unofficial text, 
Hamburg 1979 
Kao, Karl S.Y. [editor], Classical Chinese Tales of the Supernatural 
and the Fantastic: selections from the third to the tenth century, 
Bloomington 1985 
Kawakatsu Yoshio, "L'aristocratie et la société féodale au début des 
six dynasties," in Zimbun 17 (1981), 107-160 
_____
, see also Part II 
Keegan, John, The Face of Battle, London 1976 
Knechtges, David R., Wen xuan, or Selections of Refined Literature, 
by Xiao Tong (501-531), translated with annotations and 
introduction, Volume I: Rhapsodies on Metropolises and Capitals, 
Princeton UP 1982 
Krause, F., "Fluss- und Seegefechte nach chinesischen Quellen aus 
der Zeit der Chou- und Han-Dynastie unter der Drei Reiche," in 
Mitteilungen der Seminar für orientalischen Sprachen 18 (Berlin, 
1915), 61-94 
Kunstler, Mieczyslaw Jerzy, "Activité culturelle et politique des 
différents regions de la China sous les Han Orientaux," in Rocznik 
Orientalistyczny 30 (Warsaw 1966), 7-29 
Lattimore, Owen, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (second edition), 
New York 1951 
Leban, Carl, "Ts'ao Ts'ao and the Rise of Wei: the early years," 
doctoral dissertation, Columbia University 1971 
WORKS IN WESTERN LANGUAGES 
 
513 
_____
, "Managing Heaven's Mandate: coded communication in the 
accession of Ts'ao P'ei, A.D. 220," in Ancient China: studies in 
early civilisation, edited by David T Roy and Tsuen-hsuin Tsien, 
Hong Kong 1978, 315-342 
Lee, Gary Way, "Battle of the Red Wall: a comparison of the 
accounts given in San Kuo Chih Yen I and San Kuo Chih," 
master's dissertation, Columbia University 1949 
Lee, Lily Hsiao Hung, "The Historical Value of Shih-shuo hsin-yü," 
in PFEH 34 (September 1986), 121-148 
Legge, James, The Confucian Classics, Hong Kong 1960 [cited as 
CC]: 
volume I: The Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, The 
Doctrine of the Mean; 
volume II: The Works of Mencius; 
volume III: The Shoo King, or the Book of Historical Documents; 
volume IV: The She King, or the Book of Poetry; 
volume V: The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen. 
Leslie, D D, and Gardiner, K H J, "Chinese Knowledge of Western 
Asia during the Han," in TP 68 (1982), 254-308 
Levy, Howard S., "Yellow Turban Religion and Rebellion at the end 
of Han," in Journal of the American Oriental Society 76 (1956), 
214-227 
_____
, 'The Bifurcation of the Yellow Turbans in Later Han," in Oriens 
13-14 (1960-61), 251-255 
Lewis, Mark Edward, 'The Han Abolition of Universal Military 
Service," in Warfare In Chinese History," edited by Hans van de 
Ven, Leiden 2000, 33-75 
Li Shi-yi, "Growth of the Chinese Empire: the Nan Yüeh kingdom," 
in Orient 5 (1955), 80-88 
Liu, James J.Y., The Chinese Knight-Errant, London 1967 
Liu Wu-chi, An Introduction to Chinese Literature, Indiana UP 1966 
Loewe, Michael, Military Operations in the Han Period, London 
1961 
_____
, "The Measurement of Grain during the Han Period," in TP 49 
(1961), 64-95 
_____
, Records of Han Administration [RHA], 2 volumes, Cambridge 
UP 1967 
_____
, Crisis and Conflict in Han China, London 1974 
_____
, "The Campaigns of Han Wu-ti," in Chinese Ways in Warfare, 
edited by Frank A. Kierman, Jr., Harvard UP 1974 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
514 
_____
, "Water, Earth and Fire - the symbols of the Han dynasty," in 
Nachrichten der Gesellschaft für Natur- und Volkerkunde 125 
(Hamburg 1979), 63-68 
_____
, Ways to Paradise: the Chinese quest for immortality, London 
1979 
_____
, Chinese Ideas of Life and Death: faith, myth and reason in the 
Han period (202 BC-AD 220), London 1982 
_____
, "The Conduct of Government and the Issues at Stake (A.D. 57-
167)," in Cambridge Han, 291-316 
_____
, "The Religious and Intellectual Background," in Cambridge 
Han, 649-725 
_____
 [ed.], Early Chinese Texts: a bibliographical guide, Early China 
Special Monograph Series 2, Berkeley 1993 
Lu Hsün, A Brief History of Chinese Fiction, translated by Yang 
Hsien-yi and Gladys Yang, Beijing 1959 
Ma, Y W, "The Chinese Historical Novel: an outline of themes and 
contexts," in Journal of Asian Studies 34.2 (February 1975), 277-
293 
_____
, "The Knight-Errant in Hua-pen Stories," in TP 61 (1975), 266-
301 
_____
, "The Beginnings of Professional Story-Telling in China," in 
Etudes d'histoire et de littérature chinoises offertes au Professeur 
Jaroslav Prusek, Paris 1976, 227-245 
Madrolle, C, "Le Tonkin ancien," in BEFEO 37 (1937), 263-332 
Mair, Victor H, "The Narrative Revolution in Chinese Literature: 
ontological presuppositions" in CLEAR 5, 1 and 2 (1983), 1-27 
Mansvelt Beck, B J, "The Date of the Taiping jing," in TP 66 (1980), 
149-182 
_____
, "The Fall of Han," in Cambridge Han, 317-376 
_____
, The Treatises of Later Han, doctoral thesis, Leiden 1989  
Maspero, Henri, "Etudes d'histoire d'Annam," in BEFEO 14 (1916), 
1-55 
_____
, Mélanges posthumes sur les religions et l'histoire de la Chine, 3 
volumes, Paris 1950 
Mather, Richard B, Shih-shuo Hsin-yu::A New Account of Tales of 
the World, by Liu I-ch'ing, commentary by Liu Chün, translated 
with an introduction and notes, Minnesota UP, 1976 
Mattingley, Garrett, Renaissance Diplomacy, London 1955 
McLaren, A E, "Chantefables and the Textual Evolution of the San-
kuo-chih yen-yi," in TP 71 (1985), 159-227 
McNeill, William H, Plagues and Peoples, New York 1976 
WORKS IN WESTERN LANGUAGES 
 
515 
Miao, Ronald C, Early Medieval Chinese Poetry: the life and verse of 
Wang Ts'an (A.D. 177-217), Wiesbaden 1982 
Michaud, Paul, "The Yellow Turbans," in Monumenta Serica 17 
(1958), 47-127 
Miyakawa Hisayuki, "The Confucianization of South China," in The 
Confucian Persuasion, edited by Arthur F Wright, Stanford UP 
1960, 21-46 
_____
, see also Part II 
Nagel's Encyclopaedia-Guide China, Geneva 1982 
Needham, Joseph, and others, Science and Civilisation in China, 
Cambridge UP from 1954 
Ngo Van Xuyet, Divination, magie et politique dans la Chine 
ancienne, Paris 1976 
Nienhauser, William, "Some Preliminary Remarks on Fiction, the 
Classical Tradition and Society in Late Ninth-century China," in 
Yang and Adkins, Critical Essays on Chinese Fiction, 1-16 
Nishijima Sadao, "The Economic and Social History of Former Han," 
in Cambridge Han, 545-607 
Norman, Jerry, and Mei, Tsu-lin, "The Austroasiatics in Ancient 
South China: some lexical evidence," in Monumenta Serica 32 
(1976), 274-301 
Peking Opera Texts see Part II 
Pelliot, Paul, "Le Fou-nan," in BEFEO 3 (1903), 248-303 
_____, "Deux itinéraires de Chine en Inde à la fin du VIIe siècle," in 
BEFEO 4 (1904), 131-413 
_____
, "Les classiques gravés sur pierre sous les Wei en 240-248," in 
TP 23 (1924), 1-4 
Plaks, Andrew H, Four Masterworks of the Ming Novel: Ssu ta ch'i-
shu, Princeton UP 1987 
Raschke, Manfred G,"New Studies in Roman Commerce with the 
East," in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt: 
Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung 
II.9, edited by Hildegard Temporini and Wolfgang Haase, Berlin 
and New York, 2, 604-1361 
Read, Bernard E, Chinese Materia Medica; Animal Drugs, Peking 
1931 reprinted Taipei 1976 
Ricaud, Louis, and Nghiem Toan, Les trois royaumes, 3 volumes, 
Saigon 1961-63 [an annotated translation of the first forty-five 
chapters of Sanguo [zhi] yanyi q.v. Part II] 
Rogers, Michael C, The Chronicle of Fu Chien: a case of exemplar 
history, California UP 1968 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
516 
_____
, "The Myth of the Battle of the Fei River," in TP 54 (1968), 50-
72 
Romance see Brewitt-Taylor, Ricaud and Toan, and also Sanguo [zhi] 
yanyi in Part II 
Sailey, Jay, The Master Who Embraces Simplicity: a study of the 
philospher Ko Hung A.D. 283-343, Taipei 1977 
Schafer, Edward H, The Golden Peaches of Samarkand: a study of 
T'ang exotics, California UP 1963 
_____
, The Vermilion Bird: T'ang images of the south, California UP 
1967 
_____
, Shore of Pearls, California UP 1970 
Shiratori, Kurakichi, "The Geography of the Western Region, studied 
on the basis of the Ta-Ch'in accounts," in Memoirs of the Research 
Department of the Toyo Bunko 15 (1956), 73-163 
Seidel, Anna, La Divinisation de Lao tseu dans le Taoisme des Han, 
Paris 1969 
_____
, "The Image of the Perfect Ruler in Early Taoist Messianism: 
Lao-tzu and Li Hung," in History of Religions 9.2/3 (November 
1969 - February 1970), 216-247 
Shih, Robert, Biographies des moines éminents (Kao seng tchouan) 
de Houei-kiao, traduits et annotés, Louvain 1968 
Sivin, N, "Cosmos and Computation in Early Chinese Mathematical 
Astronomy," in TP 55 (1969), 1-73 
Somers, Robert M, "The Society of Early Imperial China: three 
recent studies," in Journal of Asian Studies 38.1 (November 1978), 
127-143 [review article of Ch'ü Tung-tsu, Han Social Structure, 
Johnson, Medieval Chinese Oligarchy, and Ebrey, Aristocratic 
Families] 
Stein, Rolf A, "Le Lin-yi: sa localisation, sa contribution à la 
formation du Champa et ses liens avec la Chine," in Han-hiue: 
Bulletin du Centre d'Etudes Sinologiques de Pékin 2.1-3 (1947) 
_____
, "Remarques sur les mouvements de Taoisme politico-réligieux 
au IIe siècle ap. J.-C.," in TP 50 (1963), 1-78 
_____
, "Religious Taoism and Popular Religion from the Second to 
Seventh Centuries," in Facets of Taoism: Essays in Chinese 
Religion, edited by Holmes Welch and Anna Seidel, Yale UP 
1979, 53-81 
Straughair, Anne, "I-yüan: The Garden of Marvels; a collection of 
Chinese stories of the supernatural from the fifth century A.D.," 
Master of Arts, Asian Studies, thesis, Australian National 
University 1974 
WORKS IN WESTERN LANGUAGES 
 
517 
Stuart, G.A., Materia Medica; Vegetable Kingdom, Shanghai 1911 
republished Taipei 1976 
Sun, E-Tu Zen, and DeFrancis, John, Chinese Social History: 
translations of selected studies, Washington 1956 
Swann, Nancy Lee, Food and Money in Ancient China: the earliest 
economic history of China to A.D. 25, Han shu 24 with related 
texts Han shu 91 and Shih chi 129, Princeton UP 1950 
Tanigawa Michio, Medieval Chinese Society and the Local 
"Community," translated, with an Introduction, by Joshua A. 
Fogel, California UPO 1985 
Taylor, Keith Weller, The Birth of Vietnam, California UP 1983 
The Times Atlas of China, London 1974 
Tjan Tjoe Som, Po hu t'ung: the comprehensive discussions in the 
White Tiger Hall, 2 volumes, Leiden 1949-1952 [cited as White 
Tiger Discussions] 
Tran Van Giap, "La Buddhisme en Annam des origines au XIIIe 
siècle," in BEFEO 32 (1932), 191-268 
Tsunoda Ryūsaku, edited by L Carrington Goodrich, Japan in the 
Chinese Dynastic Histories: Later Han through Ming dynasties, 
South Pasadena 1951 
Waley, Arthur, The nine songs: a study of shamanism in ancient 
China, London 1955 
Wang Gungwu, "The Nan-hai Trade, a study of the early history of 
Chinese trade in the South China Sea," in Journal of the Malayan 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 31.2 (1958), 1-135 
_____
, "Some Comments on the Later Standard Histories," in Essays 
on the Sources for Chinese History, edited by Donald D Leslie, 
Colin Mackerras and Wang Gungwu, Canberra 1973, 53-63 
Wang Zhongshu, Han Civilization, translated by K.C. Chang and 
others, Yale UP 1982 
Watson, Burton, Ssu-ma Ch'ien: Grand Historian of China, 
Columbia UP 1956 
_____
, Records of the Grand Historian of China, translated from the 
Shih-chi of Ssu-ma Ch'ien, 2 volumes, Columbia 1969 [cited as 
RGH] 
_____
, Chinese Rhyme-Prose: poems in the fu form from the Han and 
six dynasties periods, Columbia UP 1971 
Welch, Holmes, The Parting of the Way: Lao Tzu and the Taoist 
movement, Boston 1966 
Wheatley, Paul, The Golden Khersonese: studies in the historical 
geography of the Malay Peninsula before A.D. 1500, Malaya UP 
1961 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
518 
Weins, J. Herold, China's march toward the tropics, Hamden 1954 
Wilhelm, Richard, Frühlung und Herbst des Lü Bu We, Jena 1928 
Worcester, G.R.G., The Junks and Sampans of the Yangtze, Naval 
Institute Press, Annapolis 1971 
Yang Lien-sheng, "Notes on the Economic History of the Chin 
Dynasty," in Studies in Chinese Institutional History, Harvard UP, 
1961, 119-197 [originally printed in HJAS 9 (1947), 507-521] 
_____
, "Hostages in Chinese History," in Studies in Chinese 
Institutional History, Harvard UP, 1961, 43-57 [originally printed 
in HJAS 15 (1952), 119-197] 
_____
, "The Organisation of Chinese Official Historiography: 
principles and methods of the standard histories from the T'ang 
through the Ming dynasty," in Beasley and Pulleyblank, 
Historians of China and Japan, 44-59 
_____
, see also Part II 
Yang, Winston Lih-yeu [L Y], "The Use of the 'San-kuo chih' as a 
Source of the 'San-kuo-chih yen-i," doctoral dissertation, Stanford 
University 1971 
_____
, "The Literary Transformation of Historical Figures in the San-
kuo chih yen-yi, a study of the use of the San-kuo chih as a source 
of the San-kuo chih yen-yi," in Yang and Adkins, Critical Essays 
on Chinese Fiction., 48-84 
_____
, and Adkins, Curtis P [editors], Critical Essays on Chinese 
Fiction, Chinese UP, Hong Kong 1980 
Young, Gregory, Three Generals of Later Han, Canberra 1984 
Yu, Anthony, "History, Fiction and Reading Chinese Narrative," in 
CLEAR 10.1 and 2 (1988), 1-19 
Yü Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China: a study in the 
structure of Sino-barbarian economic relations, California UP 
1967 
_____
, "Han Foreign Relations," in Cambridge Han, 377-462 
Yule, Henry, Cathay and the Way Thither, volume I, London 1915 
Zinsser, Hans, Rats, Lice and History, London 1935 
Zürcher, E, The Buddhist Conquest of China, 2 volumes, Leiden 1959 
 
  
 
 
INDEX 
 
Part 1: General Index 
 
Page references are made to the original pagination of the 1990 edition, 
identified in the text by brackets [….]. 
 
acting (行 xing), 82n and see provisional and temporary 
Abundant Talent (茂才 maocai), 78, 167n 
Administrator (太守taishou), 60 and see by name of commandery 
agriculture, 3-5, 11, 59, 325, 474, 475 
agricultural colonies (屯田 tuntian), 287, 313-318, 322, 325, 327, 335, 
339, 389, 473-475 
Alexander the Great, 489 
Altar of Heaven (南郊 Nan jiao), 453 
An Shigao 安世高, 480n 
Anding 安定 commandery, 362 
Anhui [modern province], 48, 54-56, 147, 149, 157-160, 167, 180, 182, 
189, 230, 288, 323-324, 330 
Area Commander (都督 dudu) 
on the Left (左 zuo dudu), 467 
on the Right (右 you dudu), 466 
see also Chief Controller 
Assistant [magistrate of a county] (丞 cheng), 83, 86-87 and see 
magistrate 
astronomy, 526 
Attendant Officer (別駕從事biejia congshi), 248 
Au Lac see Oule 
auxiliary troops, 63, 96 
 
Ba 巴 commandery, 357, 361, 365n, 367, 376-377, 390 
Badong 巴東 commandery, 365n 
 Dependent State 屬國, 365n 
Bai River 百河, 18 
Ban River/canal 汳水, 58 
Ban Gu 班固, compiler of Han shu, 530, 536-537, 553 
Bao 保 settlement, 237, 239, 327-328 
Bao-Ye Road 褒斜道, 53 
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Baqiu 巴丘, 227 
Baxi 巴西 commandery, 364, 365n 
Bay of Canton, 34-35, 42, 442, 444 
Beauty Wang 王美人 [concubine of Emperor Ling], 106 
Bei Jiang 北江/North River, 27, 32, 52 
Beihai 北海 commandery, 464, 496, 555 
Beijing [modern city], 91, 226, 250, 496 
Bian Canal 卞河, 58 
Bian 卞, the Lady, consort of Cao Cao, 198n 
Bian He卞和, 138 
Bian Hong 邊鴻/洪, 232 
Bian Xin 編訴, 450n 
Bian Zhang 邊章, 97 
Bing 并 province, 449, 462 
Blitzkrieg, 489 
Bo Cai 波才, 94 
Bodi 百帝 "White Emperor" city, 424-425, 430, 434 
Boling 博陵, 509n 
Bu Zhi 步騭, 67n, 236, 288, 349-352, 442-443, 447-448, 467, 497, 552 
Buddha and Buddhism, 90, 162n, 346n, 527-529, 568 
 
Cai 蔡 family of Nan commandery, 247 
Cai蔡, the Lady [wife of Liu Biao], 246-247 
Cai 蔡, the Lady [wife of Liu Zong], 246 
Cai Mao 蔡瑁, 272n 
Cai Yong 蔡邕, 450n, 464, 502 
calendar 曆, 450-453 
Cambodia, 446 
Canal to Smash the Caitiffs 破虜渠, 436 
Cang Ba 藏霸, 431 
Cangwu 蒼梧 commandery, 32-33, 341, 344, 348-351, 444 
Cao 曹 family, 429, 449 
Cao Biao 曹彪, 564n 
Cao Cao 曹操, 112, 140, 156 et passim 
Cao Huan 曹奂, 141 
Cao Pi曹丕, Emperor Wen 文 of Wei, 140, 284, 408 et passim 
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Cao Ren 曹仁, 290-292, 298, 354, 383, 385, 393-396, 410, 428, 431 
Cao Rui 曹叡, Emperor Ming 明 of Wei, 438, 449, 454, 461 
Cao Song 曹嵩, 156 
Cao Xiu 曹休, 428, 431, 440 
Cao Yin 曹寅, 113 
Cao Zhang 曹彰, 197, 262n, 410 
Cao Zhen 曹真, 428, 432, 439 
Cao Zhi 曹植, 410, 525 
Cape Varella, 42 
Cavalry Regular Attendant (散騎常待 sanqi changshi) [Jin office], 543n 
census, 18, 20, 25, 29, 33, 49, 50-51, 339, 340, 476 and see population 
Cham, 39 
Chancellor 相 [of a kingdom], 60 and see by place-name 
Chancellor 相 [of a marquisate], 60 and see by place-name 
Chancellor of Wu kingdom/empire, 464-465, 496, 499 
Chang Gate 昌門 of the city of Wu, 74, 453 
Chang Qu 常璩, 566 
Chang Slope 長坡, 253-255 
Chang'an 長安, 20, 70, 96, 98, 127, 133, 158, 176, 210, 243, 292, 362, 
364, 390-391, 439, 450, 462 
Changgan長干 suburb of Jianye, 532 
Changsha 長沙 commandery, 8, 10, 24, 26-27, 29, 33, 51-52, 102-106, 
112-114, 119, 136, 147, 150, 241, 290, 300, 340, 348, 372-373, 
375, 443, 495 
Chao Lake 巢湖, 56, 319 
Chaxia 查下 suburb of Jianye, 532 
Chen 陳 dynasty, 503n 
Chen Biao 陳表, 498, 527 
Chen Deng 陳登, 198, 209, 210 
Chen Fan 陳蕃, 101n 
Chen Gong 陳宮, 572-573 
Chen Hua 陳化, 453 
Chen Shi 陳時, 445 
Chen Shou 陳壽, author of Sanguo zhi,504, 534-535, 542-544, 546-548, 
553-554, 556, 562, 564, 571, 577, 583 
Chen Wen 陳溫, 149n 
Chen Wu 陳武, 380, 495, 525, 527 
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Chen Youliang 陳友諒, 276n 
Chen Yu 陳瑀, 149n, 176, 178-180, 198, 220 
Chen Zhen 陳震, 460, 471 
Chen Zhuo 陳卓, 527 
Cheng Ji 程畿, 424n 
Cheng Pu 程普, 152, 218, 225-226, 237, 259, 262, 265, 270-271, 289, 
291-292, 298-299, 301n, 306, 309-310, 355, 381, 496, 499, 518 
Chengdu 成都, 351, 356, 362, 367, 369-370, 377, 391, 412, 447, 530 
Chenggao 成臯, 572 
Chenliu 陳留 commandery, 111, 130, 149, 563 
Chi Jian 卻儉 see Que Jian 
Chief (長 zhang)/magistrate [of a county], 60 and see by place-name 
Chief Clerk (長史 changshi), 218 
Chief Controller (都督 dudu), 166, 220 
 Grand Chief Controller (大都督 da dudu), 232n 
 see also Area Commander 
Chong 沖 dynasty of Yuan Shu q.v., but cf. Zhong 仲 dynasty, 173n 
Chongming Island, 47 
Chu 楚 [pre-Han state], 13, 22-23, 26, 44-45, 138, 318-319 
Chu "Territory" 楚地, 6n, 20 
"Eastern" Chu 東楚, 47 
"Southern" Chu 南楚, 30 
"Western" Chu 西楚, 19 
Chu 楚, King of [Later Han], 502, 528 
ci 詞 poem, 579n and see Chibi huaigu in Part II 
Ci Chong 茨充, 11 
clans, see families 
coinage, 508 
colonel (校尉 xiaowei), 160n, 197n, 336, 497 
Colonel Who Breaks the Enemy Lines (折衝 zhechong xiaowei), 159 
Colonel Who Cherishes Righteousness (懹義 huaiyi xiaowei), 154 
Colonel Who Displays Firmness (奮武 fenwu xiaowei), 299 
Colonel Who is First to Scale [the Enemy Ramparts] (先登 xiandeng 
xiaowei), 191n 
Colonel Who Serves the Great Work (奉鄴 fengye xiaowei), 191n 
colonisation, 8-9, 21, 29, 35, 51, 53, 60, 69, 448, 473, 513 and see 
migration and population 
GENERAL INDEX 
 
523 
Commandant [of a commandery] (都尉 duwei), 63 and see by place-
name 
Commandant [of a county] (尉wei), 79 
Commandant of the Capital (中尉 zhongwei), 63 
Commandant of Cavalry (騎都尉 ji duwei), 176, 178 
Companions (親進 qinjin), 115, 378n, 488-489 
Confucius and Confucianism, 10, 15-16, 526, 528, 537, 551, 562 
conscription, 62, 64, 82, 112, 315, 337 
Consultant (議郎 yilang), 101 
corvée, 315, 339 
Court Historian (太史令 taishi ling), 550-551 
county, 60 and see by place-name 
 
Da Nang [modern city], 40 
Daba range 大巴山, 3 
Dabie range 大別山, 3, 18, 20-21, 55, 180, 323, 435, 440 
Dagu Pass 大谷關, 126 
Dai Liang 戴良, 445 
Dai Yuan 戴員, 232-234 
Damo 大末 see Taimo 
Dan River 丹江, 20 
Dan'er 儋耳 commandery, 36-37 
Dangli 當利, 158, 160-163 
Dangqu 宕渠, 377 
Dangtu 當塗, 288 
Dangyang 當陽, 22, 244, 253, 255, 266-267, 402, 433n 
Dantu 丹徒, 50, 198, 229, 234, 237, 311, 318, 319 
Danyang 丹陽 commandery, 47-48, 50-51, 55-57, 136, 146, 151, 154, 
158, 160, 167, 169, 171, 178, 180, 182-183, 185-186, 188, 194, 
220, 226-227, 229-230, 232, 234, 236-237, 293, 311-312, 321, 
323, 326, 330, 332-333, 337-338, 441, 467, 476, 493, 495, 497 
Daqin 大秦 [the Roman empire], 42, 43n, 352n, 479n 
Deng 鄧 city, 135 
Deng Ai 鄧艾, 511 
Deng Dang 鄧當, 385 
Deng Long 鄧龍, 239 
Deng Xi/Yi 鄧羲/義, 249 
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Deng Zhi 鄧芝, 434, 470 
dependent states (屬國 shuguo), 63n and see by name 
designated appointment (領 ling), 191n 
Ding Fu 丁孚, 550-551, 555-556 
Ding Gong 丁宮, 342 
Ding Gu 丁固, 557n 
Dingjun Mountain 定軍山, 390-391, 487 
diplomacy, 468-469 
disease, 271n, 406n, 432 
Diwu Lun 第五倫, 16 
Dong houguan 東候官, 44n and see Houguan 
Dong Jiang/East River 東江, 32 
Dong, Empress-Dowager 董太后 of Emperor Ling, 107 
Dong Feng 董奉, 347n 
Dong Xi 董襲, 184n, 225-226, 240, 284, 490, 495 
Dong Zhao 董昭, 431 
Dong Zhuo 董卓, 70, 97-100, 109-129, 153n, 176, 243, 340, 461, 507, 
547-548, 557, 571 
Dong-Ou 東甌 [state], 45-46 
Dong-Yue 東越 [state], 45, 280 
Dong'an 東安, 334, 441 
Dongcheng 東城, 303 
Donghai 東海 commandery, 45, 62, 179 
Dongkou 洞口, 428 
Donglai 東來 commandery, 158, 497 
Dongpu kou 洞浦口, 428 
Dongting Lake, 24-26, 33, 113, 241, 266, 302, 355 
Dongye 東冶, 43, 169, 170, 261n, 328, 347n 
Dongzhou troops 東州兵, 361 
Dou 竇 family, 108 
Dou Fu 竇輔, 249n 
Dou Wu竇武, 109, 249n 
doujian 鬬艦 "Fighting Junks," 277, 279-280 
Duan Jiong 段熲, 102n 
 
E 鄂 city, 255, 265n, 413 
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Eastern Pavilion (東觀 Dongguan) 
of Shu, 552n; Gentleman (郎 lang), 552n 
of Wu, 552n; Prefect (令 ling), 552n 
and see libraries 
emperor 皇帝 
of Han 漢 
Emperor Gao 高 [Former Han], 139, 305, 382, 391 
Emperor Guangwu 光武 [Later Han], 11, 16, 19, 28, 68, 139, 
304, 502, 567n 
Emperor Huan 桓 [Later Han], 90, 201, 341, 504, 516, 528, 561, 
570 
Emperor Jing 景 [Former Han], 250, 297 
Emperor Ling 靈 [Later Han], 17, 36, 61, 68, 70, 81, 88, 90, 92, 
103, 106-108, 110-111, 119, 342, 488, 504, 516, 545, 570 
Emperor Ming 明 [Later Han], 37, 54, 503 
Emperor Shun 順 [Later Han], 17, 44, 46, 49, 201, 206 
Emperor Wen 文 [Former Han], 459 
Emperor Wu 武 [Former Han], 27, 30, 36, 45, 280 
Emperor Xian 獻 [Later Han], 106-107, 110-111, 117, 133, 139-
140, 144, 176, 205, 210, 245, 250-251, 411, 452, 545, 
574 
Emperor Yuan 元 [Former Han], 139, 202 
and see Liu Bian, Little Emperor of Later Han 
and see Liu Bei and Liu Shan, Sovereigns of Shu-Han  
of Jin 晉 
Emperor Jianwen 簡文 [Eastern Jin], 566n 
Emperor Wen 文 [i.e. Sima Zhao q.v.], 551n 
Emperor Wu 武 [i.e. Sima Yan q.v.], 551n 
Emperor Xiaomin 孝愍, 558, 566n 
Emperor Yuan 元 [Eastern Jin], 567n 
of Liu Song 劉宋 
Emperor Ming 明, 576n 
of Wei 魏, 411 et passim 
Emperor Ming 明 [i.e. Cao Rui q.v.], 438 
Emperor Wen 文 [i.e. Cao Pi q.v.], 410n, 568 
of Wu 吳, 453 and see Sun Quan et passim 
empresses and empress-dowagers, see by name 
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eunuchs, 107-110, 119, 128 
 
Fa Zheng 法正, 295n, 364, 367 
families, powerful, 65-67, 109, 120, 167, 183-185, 228, 249, 303, 315, 
326, 328, 331, 334, 341, 344, 361-362, 463-464, 493-512 and see 
by name 
Fan 樊 city, 22, 135, 251, 354, 393-394, 396, 398, 401, 404 
Fan Neng 樊能, 160, 163, 165 
Fan Ye 范曄, compiler of Hou Hanshu, 538, 540, 577 
Fan Zhou 樊伷, 404-405 
Fangling 房陵 commandery, 392, 402, 412 
Fankou 樊口, 255, 263, 265 
Fei Zhan 費棧, 337 
Fengqiu 封丘, 149 
Filial and Incorrupt (孝廉 xiaolian), 78, 83-84, 136, 167n 
fireships, 268-269, 283 
Five Dou of Rice teaching 五斗米道, 357 and see Rice Sect 
five grains, the 五穀, 4 
Five Powers (五行 Wuxing), 89n, 452, 457 
Former Zhao 前趙 dynasty, 141 
Fu River 涪水, 367 
Fu 涪city, 367 
Fu 伏, Empress of Emperor Xian, 393n 
Fu Xuan 傅選, 208 
Fu Ying 傅嬰, 234 
Fu Yong 傅彤, 424n 
Fuchun River 當春江, 72, 78, 330 
Fuchun 當春, 49, 71-72, 74, 77-78, 82, 217n, 323, 334, 441n, 462, 493 
Fujian [modern province], 8, 29, 43, 44, 45, 46, 169, 287, 330, 337, 478 
Fuling 當陵 commandery, 365n 
Fuling 阜陵 county, 56 
Funan 扶南 [state], 40, 446, 479 
Fuzhou [modern city], 43, 45, 230, 289, 330, 475 
 
Gan River 贑水, 51-52, 227, 260, 347 
Gan 甘, the Lady [concubine of Liu Bei], 253, 294-295n 
Gan Bao 干寳, 200, 568, 569 
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Gan Ji 干吉, 14, 57, 199-208, 406, 529, 560, 567, 570, 574 
Gan Ning 甘寧, 238n, 291, 322, 379, 385, 517-520 
Gansu [modern province], 314, 449 
Gao 高 family of Wu commandery, 67 
Gao Dai 高岱, 207 
Gaoliang 高涼/高梁 commandery, 36, 444 
Gaoling 高陵, 136n, 229n 
Gaoping 高平, 557 
Gaoxing 高興 commandery, 36n 
Gaoyao 高要 narrows, 350 
Gate of Ghosts 鬼門, 37 
Ge Hong 葛洪, 202, 569 
general (將軍 jiangjun), saepe 
General of Agile Cavalry (驃騎 piaoji jiangjun), 409 
General of Chariots and Cavalry (車騎 juji jiangjun), 108n 
General of the Right (右 you jiangjun), 467, 518 
General of the Van (前 qian jiangjun), 467 
General of Towered Ships (樓船 louchuan jiangjun), 280 
General Who Destroys Criminals (殄寇 tiankou jiangjun), 164, 177 
General Who Displays Majesty (奮威 fenwei jiangjun), 321n 
General Who Exterminates Rebels (討逆 taoni jiangjun), 179, 548 
General Who Exterminates the Caitiffs (討虜 taolu jiangjun), 222, 410n 
General Who Gives Tranquillity to Distant Lands (安遠 anyuan 
jiangjun), 444 
General Who Glorifies Han (明漢 ming-Han jiangjun), 176 
General Who Pacifies the South (平南 pingnan jiangjun), 468 
General Who Smashes the Caitiffs (破虜 polu jiangjun), 117, 548 
General Who Subdues the Caitiffs (征虜 zhenglu jiangjun), 262n 
Lieutenant- General (偏將軍 pian jiangjun), 300 
General-in-Chief (大將軍 da jiangjun) [of Han], 107, 108n 
General-in- Chief (大將軍 da jiangjun) [of Wu], 496 
Supreme General-in-Chief (上 shang da jiangjun) [of Wu], 466 
General of the Household (中郎將 zhonglang jiang), 116n, 117, 276n 
General of the Household Controller of the Army (叔軍 dujun zhonglang 
jiang), 160 
General of the Household Who Comforts the South (綏南 suinan 
zhonglang jiang), 349 
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General of the Household Who Eliminates Criminals (蕩寇 tangkou 
zhonglang jiang), 191n 
General of the Household Who Establishes Firmness (立武 liwu 
xiaowei), 349-350  
General of the Household Who Establishes Majesty (建威 jianwei 
zhonglang jiang), 191n 
General of the Household Who is Majestic and Firm (威武 weiwu 
zhonglang jiang), 330 
General of the Household Who Settles Firmness (定武 dingwu zhonglang 
jiang), 217n 
General of the Household Who Subdues the Caitiffs (征虜 zhenglu 
zhonglang jiang), 191n 
General of the Household Who Supports the Army (撫軍 fujun 
zhonglang jiang), 218 
General of the Household Who Gives Tranquillity to the East (安東 
andong zhonglang jiang). 422n 
General of the Peaceful Heaven (平天 pingtian jiangjun) [rebel], 103 and 
see Guan Gu 
Gentleman (郎 lang), 84 
Gentleman of the Palace [of Wei] (郎中 langzhong), 545n 
Gong Chong 宮崇, 201-202 
Gong'an 公安, 290, 294, 296, 370, 373, 396, 400, 403, 405, 419, 467 
Gongsun 公孫 family, 480 
Gongsun Du 公孫度, 449n 
Gongsun Gong 公孫恭, 449n 
Gongsun Kang 公孫康, 246 
Gongsun Shu 公孫述, 68, 173n 
Gongsun Yang 公孫陽, 320 
Gongsun Yuan 公孫淵, 449, 481 
Gongsun Yue公孫越, 132-134 
Gongsun Zan公孫瓚, 132-134, 251 
Gorge Mountains, 18 
Goujian勾踐, 318 
Governor (牧 mu), 61, 116n and see by name of province 
Grand Canal, 50, 58 
Grand Commandant (太尉taiwei), 148 
Great Seal of State (傳國璽 chuan'guo xi), 128-129, 138-145, 172, 547 
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Great Yu Pass 大庾關, 52-53 
Greek fire, 283 
Gu 顧 family of Wu commandery, 500-501, 509n 
Gu Li 谷利, 378 
Gu Rong 顧榮, 502n 
Gu Shao 顧邵, 336n 
Gu Tan 顧譚, 499, 527 
Gu Yong 谷永, 229, 464-465, 496, 499, 502, 523, 525, 527 
Guan Gu 觀鵠, 103-104 
Guan Hanqing 關漢卿, 407n 
Guan Ping 關平, 403 
Guan Yu關羽 [style Yunchang 雲長], 251-254, 263, 270, 280n, 293, 355, 
368-369, 372-373, 375, 381, 385, 387-398, 400-414, 418, 420, 
430, 450, 496, 500, 518 
Guandu官度, battle, 197, 208, 213, 222, 245, 251, 269, 317, 388, 486, 
574 
Guang 廣 province, 445 
Guangcheng Pass 廣城關, 120 
Guangdong [modern province], 29, 44-45, 75, 102, 310, 340, 344, 444 
Guanghan 廣漢 commandery, 364, 369 
Guangling 廣陵 commandery, 50, 58, 83, 149, 152-153, 171, 178, 198, 
209, 435-436, 443 
Guangling 廣陵 county, 50 
Guangxi [modern province], 29, 33, 40, 310, 340, 344, 444 
Guangxin 廣信, 341 
Guangyang 廣陽 commandery, 91 
Guangzhou [modern city], 9, 31, 34-35, 52, 288, 341, 343, 478 
Guanqiu Jian 毌丘儉, 481-482 
Gui River 桂江 [modern name], 32-33 and see Li River 
Gui Lan 媯覽, 232-233 
Guiyang 桂陽 commandery, 11, 27-28, 29, 32, 52, 102-104, 112, 114, 
241, 290-291, 372-373, 375, 443-444 
Guizhou [modern province], 10, 18, 40, 447 
Gulf of Tongking, 34-35 
Guling 固陵 commandery, 365n, 418 
Guling 固陵 county, 169 
Guo Jia 郭嘉, 211n 
Guo Shi 郭石, 103-104 
INDEX 
 
 
530 
Guo Song 郭頌, 572 
Guo Tai 郭泰/太, 523 
Guzhang 故鄣, 333 
 
Haichang 海昌, 335-336, 339, 473 
haihu 海鶻 "Sea-Hawks," 277 
Haihun 海昏, 186-189, 326 
Hainan 海南 Island, 35-37, 350, 479 
Hainan 海南 strait, 35 
Haixi 海西, 178 
Haiyan 海盬, 349 
Han River 漢水, 18, 20-24, 33, 53, 56, 119, 132, 135, 187, 190, 213, 241, 
243, 247, 253-254, 263, 275, 277, 285, 287, 292-293, 297, 354-
355, 361, 363, 375-377, 390, 392-394, 396, 400, 402, 405, 413, 
433-434, 438-439, 449, 458, 462, 482, 492, 513 
Han 漢 dynasty, passim 
Han "Territory" 韓地, 20 
Han Dang 暢 
當, 152, 225, 333, 420, 441n, 494 
Han Fu 韓馥, 130 
Han Ji 韓曁, 249, 537 
Han Rong 韓融, 126n 
Han Song 韓嵩, 248 
Han Yan 韓晏, 170, 328 
Han Zong 韓綜, 441n 
Hanchang 漢昌 commandery, 300, 355, 373, 385 
Hanchang 漢昌 county, 300n 
Hangzhou [modern city], 46, 49, 52, 70, 72, 78, 331, 473 
Hangzhou Bay, 8, 14, 34, 44-46, 49, 75, 80, 169-170, 224, 229, 289, 323, 
331, 336, 443 
Hanning 漢寧 commandery, 359n and see Hanzhong commandery 
Hanoi [modern city], 33, 288, 344, 350, 442, 529 
Hanshou 漢壽 city, 25, 113-114 
Hanshou Village 漢壽亭, marquis [i.e. Guan Yu], 407 
Hanzhong 漢中 commandery, 20, 297, 354, 359, 362-363, 373, 376-377, 
382, 390-392, 394, 423, 439, 443, 450, 487 
 King (王 wang), 391 and see Liu Bei 
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Hao Pu 郝普, 373, 375 
Hao Zhou浩周, 428, 471 
Haoming Mountain 鵠鳴山, 356 
harem, 522 
He 賀 family of Kuaiji, 67, 509n, 563 
He 何 family of Nanyang, 107-109 
He 何, Empress [of Emperor Ling], 106-110 
He Jin 何進, 107-110, 120 
He Miao 何苗, 109-110 
He Qi 賀齊, 170, 184n, 230, 287, 328, 330-334, 336-379, 435, 475, 497, 
517-518, 571, 585 
He Xia 和洽, 249 
He Xun 賀循, 509n 
He Yan何晏, 526 
Hebei [modern province], 88, 245 
Hedong 河東 commandery, 249, 536 
Hefei 合肥, 56-58, 219n, 232, 288, 311-312, 316-317, 319-323, 377, 378, 
380, 383, 389-390, 397, 481, 484, 492 
New City 新城, 481, 492 
hemp, 4 
Henan [modern province], 18, 20, 94, 111, 131, 149, 197, 247, 462 
Henan 河南 commandery, 21, 94, 120 
Henei 河內 commandery, 111, 121, 131, 249 
Hengjiang 橫江, 158, 159, 160 
Hengtang 橫塘 suburb of Jianye, 531 
Hengyang 衡陽 commandery, 375n 
Hengyang [modern city], 290, 443n 
Hengshan 衡山, 26 
Hepu 合浦 commandery, 35, 41, 170, 344, 352, 445 
history offices see sub libraries  
Hong gou 鴻溝/Vast Canal complex, 57 
Hong Zi 弘咨, 86n 
Hongnong 弘農 commandery, 127 
Hongze Lake 洪澤湖, 86 
Hongzhou 洪州, 52 
hostages, 175n, 224n, 427-429, 505-506 
Houguan 候官, 43, 170, 347n and see Dong houguan 
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Hu Chong 胡沖, 557, 559-560 
Hu Teng 胡騰, 249n 
Hu Yu 胡玉, 78, 79, 81 
Hu Zhen 胡軫, 122, 124n 
Hu Zong 胡綜, 460, 559 
Hua He 華覈, 550, 553-557 
Hua Tuo 華佗, 14 
Hua Xin 華歆 [style Ziyu 子魚], 185, 187-188, 192-195, 401, 566n 
huaben 話本 story texts, 580 
Huai River 淮水, 7, 14, 20, 33, 45, 52, 54-58, 93, 132, 146, 149-150, 
156, 173, 175, 179-180, 209, 231, 287-288, 292, 303, 311, 313, 
316, 321, 323, 326, 335, 355, 371, 376-377, 383, 388-389, 428, 
434-436, 458, 462, 482, 492, 496, 513 
Huaiyang 淮陽 range, 55, 56 
Huan 皖 city, 56, 189, 227, 231, 322-323, 327, 355, 371, 381, 383, 440 
Huan Jie 桓階, 136, 395 
Huang Gai黃蓋, 152, 225, 267, 268, 270, 271, 272, 274, 276, 283, 333, 
486, 495, 587 
Huang Quan黃權, 364, 420, 422, 424 
Huang Shan 黃山 range, 48, 168, 180, 287, 330, 332, 338, 476 
Huang She黃射, 190 
Huang Shui 湟水 river, 314 
Huang Zhong黃忠, 391 
Huang Zu黃祖, 135, 187, 190-192, 197, 209, 213, 220, 227, 237-241, 
247, 268, 277, 293, 312, 327, 485, 490, 518 
Huang-Lao 黃老, 90, 528, 529 
Huangfu Mi 皇甫謐, 561 
Huangfu Song 皇甫嵩, 92, 94, 97, 98 
Huarong 華容, 265n, 266, 269, 270 
Huayin 華陰, 362, 370n 
Hubei [modern province], 3, 18, 23, 119, 190, 238-239, 243-244, 247, 
253, 265, 289, 293, 327, 392, 412 
Hué [modern city], 40 
Hunan [modern province], 10, 18, 102, 113, 289, 290, 341, 443 
Huo Sijiu 霍四究, 580n 
 
Imperial Secretariat of Han, Director (尚書令 shangshu ling), 502 
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Imperial University (太學 taixue), 221 
India (天竺 Tianzhu), 43n 
Inspector (刺史 cishi), 60, 112, 116n, 118 and see name of province 
irrigation, 3, 59 
 
Ji 冀 province, 88, 130-132, 134, 387, 462 
Ji Kang 嵇康 see Xi Kang 
Ji Yan 暨豔, 523, 555 
Jia Cong 賈琮, 343 
Jia Kui 賈逵, 440 
Jia Long 賈龍, 343 
Jia Xu 賈詡, 216n 
Jialing River 嘉陵江, 367 
Jiameng 葭萌, 367 
Jian Shi 蹇碩, 107, 109 
Jian'an 建安 commandery, 330 
Jianchu 建初寺monastery, 529 
Jiang Gan 蔣幹, 272n 
Jiang Ji 蔣濟, 282n, 313n, 321n, 437 
Jiang Qin 蔣欽, 230, 337, 400, 405, 420, 495, 517 
Jiangcheng 江乘, 436 
Jiangdu 江都, 149, 152, 219, 220 
Jiangling 江陵, 22-25, 253-254, 257, 263, 266, 269, 275, 285, 287, 290-
292, 298, 309-310, 372, 396, 400-405, 428, 432-433, 440, 467, 
492 
Jiangsu [modern province], 47, 50, 83, 86, 149, 157, 162, 179, 198, 218, 
323 
Jiangxi [modern province], 11, 18, 44-45, 51, 237, 239, 260, 289, 323, 
330, 443, 475, 478, 557 
Jiangxia 江夏 commandery, 21-23, 55, 190, 227, 238, 241, 247, 249, 
258, 263, 266, 292-293, 296, 300, 302, 310, 327, 355, 396, 400, 
433, 438, 585 
Jiangzhou 江州, 367, 369 
Jianping 建平, 330 
Jianye 建鄴 city, 318, 319, 323, 336, 435, 436, 466, 467, 492, 520, 530, 
531 
Jiao 交 province, 9, 29-43, 204, 206, 246, 261, 288, 296, 340-353, 428, 
442-448, 467, 472, 552 and see Jiaozhi region 
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Jiao 焦 family of Kuaiji, 67 
Jiaoqiu 椒丘, 192, 237 
Jiaozhi 交趾 region, 31-32n, 61 and see Jiao province 
Jiaozhi 交趾 commandery, 10, 33-34, 39, 41-42, 64, 341-343, 444-446, 
529 
Jiashi Pass 夾石關, 440 
Jiayu [modern city], 238, 265, 266, 327 
Jin 晉 dynasties 
Western Jin 西晉 (266–316), 140-141, 206, 455-457, 483, 526, 533, 555 
Eastern Jin東晉 (317–420), 140-141 
Jincheng 金城 commandery, 96-97 
Jing 涇 county, 167, 180, 182 
Jing Fang 京房, 221n. 568 
Jing 荆 province, 18-29, 32, 39, 52, 64-65, 71, 112-113, 119-120, 125, 
132, 134, 146, 149, 188, 191, 213, 227, 237, 241, 243-244, 247, 
249, 251-252, 254-256, 258, 267-269, 275, 285, 289-290, 292-
293, 298-299, 302, 306, 308, 310, 312, 317, 327, 339-342, 344, 
347, 349, 353-407, 409, 413, 430, 433-434, 441-443, 448-449, 
466-467, 493, 498, 525 
Jing Shan 荆山 range, 22 
Jingcheng 京城 "Capital City,"[i.e. Dantu q.v.], 229n 
Jingzhou 荆州 see Jing province 
Jinling 金陵, 318, 319n 
Jiuhua Shan 九華山 range, 180 
Jiujiang 九江 commandery, 11, 53-54, 56-58, 131, 134, 155, 159, 222, 
225, 227, 231, 239, 495 
Jiuzhen 九眞 commandery, 11, 39, 41, 64, 344, 444-446 
Ju River 沮水, 22 
Juchao 居巢, 171, 321n, 323n, 383 
Julu 鉅鹿 commandery, 88, 91 
Juzhang 句章, 80 
 
Kang Senghui 康僧會, 529 
Kang Tai 康泰, 479n 
Khmer, 39 
King (王 wang), 60 and see by state/fief 
King of Yan 燕王, 481n and see Gongsun Yuan 
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King Si, 347 and see Shi Xie 
Kong Rong 孔融, 195-196n, 221, 514, 562 
Kong Zhou 孔宙, 118n 
Korea, 246, 462 
Kou 寇 family of Changsha, 295n 
Kou Feng 寇馮, 295n and see Liu Feng 
Kuai Qi蒯祺, 393n 
Kuai Yue蒯越, 248, 393n 
Kuaiji 會稽 commandery, 14, 16-17, 45-46, 48-50, 57, 64, 67, 70, 80, 92, 
130, 146, 159, 168, 170-171, 176, 178-180, 192, 195, 202, 207, 
217n, 222-223, 225-226, 229, 232, 236, 289, 312, 319, 323, 328, 
336, 337, 410n, 441, 467, 493-495, 497, 501, 504, 559, 563, 566 
Kunlun massif, 2 
Kunming [modern city], 351, 447 
 
Lai Gong 賴恭, 348, 349 
Land Within the Passes (關內 kuannei), 20 
Langtang Qu 浪湯渠 canal, 57-58 
Langye 琅邪 commandery, 14, 57, 156, 201-202, 236, 252, 496 
Lantian 藍田, 138 
Lanzhong 閬中, 361 
Lanzhou [modern city], 97 
Later Zhao 後趙 dynasty, 141 
Le'an 樂安 commandery, 101n 
Lei River 耒水, 27, 102, 290, 443 
Lei Xu 雷緒, 312n 
Leiyang 耒陽, 28 
Leizhou peninsula, 35, 36, 350, 444 
Li River 漓江, 25, 27, 32, 33 and see Gui River 
Li Ao 李翱, 52 
Li Fan 李梵, 450n  
Li Gu 李固, 39 
Li Jue 李傕, 125-126n, 157n, 176 
Li Meng 李蒙, 121 
Li Min 李旻, 121 
Li Nan 李南, 14n 
Li Quan 李權, 277 
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Li Shangyin 李商隱, 578n 
Li Shu 李術/述, 189, 231, 232, 311 
Li Si 李斯, 139 
Li Yi 李異, 363 
Liang 涼 province, 6, 70, 88, 96-100, 102, 362, 372, 439, 449, 462, 547 
Liang 梁 county, 120-122, 137 
Liang Guang 梁廣, 550, 552 
Liaodong 遼東 commandery, 480 
Liaoning [modern province], 245 
Liaoxi 遼西 commandery, 494 
Libationer of the Academicians (博士祭酒 boshi jijiu), 551 
libraries, archives and history offices, 544n, 550-557 
Licheng 利城 commandery, 436n 
Lieutenant-General (偏將軍 pian jiangjun), 300 
Linchuan 臨川commandery, 333 
Ling Cao 淩操, 238n, 240n, 495, 498, 518 
Ling Qu 靈渠"Magic Trench" canal, 27-28, 32-33, 341 
Ling Tong 淩統, 240, 378, 490, 497, 498n, 519, 525 
Lingling 零陵 commandery, 27-29, 51, 102-103, 104, 112, 114, 241, 290-
291, 348, 372-373, 375, 390, 443, 495, 554, 564 
Lingyang 陵陽, 182 
Linhuai 臨淮 commandery, 303, 496-497 and see Xiapi 
Linju 臨沮, 403n 
Linshui 臨水, 331 
Linxiang 臨湘, 102 
Linyi 林邑 [state], 40, 446 
Linyuan 臨沅, 25, 113 
Linzheng 臨蒸, 290, 443n 
Liu River 柳江, 33 
Liu 劉 [imperial family of Han], 19, 60, 105, 174 
Liu Ai 劉艾, 99, 125n, 544, 545n 
Liu Bei 劉備 [style Xuande 玄徳], First Sovereign of Shu-Han 蜀漢先主
, 171, 214, 250-253, 274, 285, 287, 289-302, 319n, 339, 354-355, 
363-392, 403-404, 408-425, 430, 442, 450, 454-456, 470, 485-
487, 493, 496, 500, 516, 522, 524, 534, 575, 579, 582-583, 586-
589 
Liu Bian 劉辯, [Little Emperor 少帝 of Later Han], 106-107, 111 
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Liu Biao 劉表 [style Jingsheng 景升], 71, 119-120, 132-136, 146, 149, 
187, 190-193, 209-210, 214, 216n, 237, 241-252, 285, 305, 327, 
347, 500 
Liu Cong 劉聰 [ruler of Former Zhao 前趙/Northern Han 北漢], 141 
Liu Dan 劉誕, 356n 
Liu Fan 劉範, 356n 
Liu Fang 劉芳, 545n see Liu Ai 
Liu Feng 劉封, 412 
Liu Fu 劉馥, 231, 232, 272n, 289, 311, 312, 313, 316, 335 
Liu He 劉賀 [deposed emperor of Former Han], 138 
Liu He 劉和 [son of Liu Yu], 133 
Liu Hong 劉弘, 450 
Liu Ji 劉基, 195n, 514, 523 
Liu Jingshu 劉敬叔, 569 
Liu Li 劉理, 295n 
Liu Pan 劉磐, 193 
Liu Qi 劉琦, 214, 246-247, 252, 254, 258, 262-263, 266, 289 
Liu Shan 劉禪, Later Sovereign of Shu-Han 蜀漢後主, 253, 294, 371, 
412, 434, 456, 458, 483, 558 
Liu Shang 劉尚, 195n 
Liu Shuo 劉鑠, 195n 
Liu Tingshu 劉聱叔, 556 
Liu Xian 劉先, 248 
Liu Xiang 劉向, 6n, 551 
Liu Xie 劉協 see Emperor Xian of Later Han 
Liu Xin 劉歆, 450n 
Liu Xiu 劉秀 see Emperor Guangwu 
Liu Xun 劉勳, 155, 188-190, 192, 231, 326, 369 
Liu Yan 劉焉, 246n, 297, 356, 358, 361-362 
Liu Yao 劉曜 [ruler of Former Zhao 前趙/Northern Han 北漢], 141 
Liu Yao 劉繇, 158-159, 160-167, 171, 180, 182, 185-187, 198, 226, 319, 
495 
Liu Yin 劉隱, 262n 
Liu Ying劉英, 502, 528 
Liu Yiqing 劉義慶, 577 
Liu Yong 劉永, 295n 
Liu Yu 劉虞, 132-133 
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Liu Yu 劉裕,  
Liu Zhang 劉璋, 246, 296-298, 307-308, 356, 362-371, 404 
Liu Zong 劉琮, 213, 216n, 246-254, 257, 267, 272n, 292 
Liu'an 六安 commandery, 54 
Liucheng 柳城, 208 
Liuyang 劉陽, 300n, 385 
Liyang 歴陽, 56, 158n, 159, 167, 180, 428, 435 
Long River 長江, 388 and see Yangzi 
Longbian 龍編, 41, 42, 288, 344 
Lord of Nine Provinces (九州伯 jiuzhou bo), 427 
louchuan 樓船 "Towered Warship," 55n, 277, 279, 280 
Office (官 guan), 55, 280 
Lu 魯 [pre-Han state], 257n, 537 
Lu 陸 family of Wu commandery, 67, 335-336, 497, 500-502, 503n, 509n 
Lu Daolong 陸道隆, 503n 
Lu Hong 陸閎, 502 
Lu Ji 陸績 [son of Lu Kang], 155n, 335, 503, 527,  
Lu Ji 陸機 [grandson of Lu Xun], 503n, 526, 527n, 561 
Lu Kai 陸凱, 565 
Lu Kang 陸康, 101n, 105n, 155, 334, 503, 527 
Lu Mao 陸瑁, 335, 503, 523 
Lu Na 陸納, 503n 
Lu Shan 陸繕, 503n 
Lu Su 魯肅 [style Zijing 子敬], 175, 236, 254-259, 267, 299-306, 309-
310, 355, 373, 385-386, 389, 430, 496, 498-499, 518 
Lu Wan 陸玩, 503n 
Lu Xu 陸續, 502-503 
Lu Xun 陸遜, 156n, 318n, 332, 334-339, 397, 402, 408, 419-424, 430, 
434, 440, 466, 467, 473-475, 486, 496-497, 503, 526, 561, 565 
Lu Ye 陸曄, 503n 
Lu Yun 陸雲, 503n, 526, 561 
]Lü Boshe 呂伯奢, 572 
Lü Bu 呂布, 122, 127, 157, 175-176, 251 
Lü Dai 呂岱, 34, 337, 342n, 408, 443-449, 467-468, 472 
Lü Fan 呂範, 150, 153, 166, 179, 218-220, 284, 431, 467, 495, 500, 518 
Lü Ju 呂據, 500 
GENERAL INDEX 
 
539 
Lü Meng呂蒙 , 235, 280n, 281, 291n, 320, 322-323, 333, 355, 372-375, 
378, 381, 383, 385-390, 396-397, 400-402, 405-407, 420, 443, 
496, 498-499, 516, 519-521, 525 
Luan Ba 欒巴, 16 
Lujiang 廬江 commandery, 53-58, 67, 147-148, 155, 158, 171, 185-186, 
188-189, 197, 214, 227, 231, 280, 233, 311-312, 322-323, 326-
327, 334, 355, 371, 383, 398, 411, 439-440, 495, 496, 503, 563 
Lukou 陸口, 300, 373, 385, 397 
Luling 廬陵 commandery, 171, 186, 192, 193, 260-261, 326, 443, 499 
Luo 雒 city, 369 
Luo Guanzhong 羅貫中, 581-584, 588-589 
Luo Tong 駱俊, 235 
Luoyang 洛陽, 18, 20-21, 38, 52, 57-58, 90, 92, 98, 110-111, 119-121, 
124-129, 131, 137, 139-141, 143-145, 172, 221, 241, 339, 342, 
393-394, 410, 432, 437, 462, 528, 530, 554, 571, 573 
Luyang 魯陽, 111, 120, 124, 129, 137 
 
Ma Chao 馬超, 370, 390, 392 
Ma Liang 馬良, 424 
Ma Teng 馬騰, 370n 
Ma Yuan 馬援, 10, 37-39, 304, 442 
Ma Zhong 馬忠, 403n 
Major (司馬 sima/軍 jun sima), 92, 101 
Associate Major (佐軍司馬 zuo jun sima), 92 
Senior Major (部別司馬 biebu sima), 92, 95, 101, 235 
magic, 13-14 
magic of Yue (越巫 yuewu/越方 yuefang), 14 
 preventive magic (禁 jin), 331n 
magistrate [i.e Prefect (令 ling) or Chief (長zhang) qq.v.], 60, 64, 66, 
165, 167n, 250, 303n, 328, 333, 343, 502n, 504 and see by county 
Malay peninsula, 40 
Man Chong 滿寵, 481n 
Manchuria, 208, 246, 449, 462, 480 
Manchus, 490 
Mao Zonggang 毛宗崗, 582 
Marco Polo, 49 
marquis (侯 hou), 60 et saepe and see by fief 
Marquis Who Returns to Obedience 歸命侯, 483 
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mathematics, 526 
Mawangdui excavations, 13, 26, 30 
Mediterranean Sea, 34, 282 
Meiyang 美陽, 97-98, 100 
Mekong delta, 40 
Meng Crossing 孟津, 121 
Meng Da 孟達, 364, 393n, 412, 439 
Meng Huo 孟蒦, 447-448, 585 
mengchong 蒙衝 "Armoured Breaker" [or "Covered Swooper"], 277-280 
mengchong doujian 蒙衝鬬艦 warships, 276, 279 
merchants, 80 and see trade 
Mi 麋, the Lady [wife of Liu Bei], 295n 
Mi Fang 麋芳, 400-401, 404, 435n 
Mi Heng 禰衡 see Ni Heng 禰衡 
Mi Zhu 麋竺, 295n 
Mian River 沔水, 238n, 240n and see Han River and Xia River 
Mianchi 澠池, 127 
Miankou 沔口, 240 and see Xiakou 
Mianyang 沔陽, 390-391 
Mianyang [modern city], 367 
Middle Jiang 中江, 47 and see Yangzi River 
migration, 8, 29, 49, 325, 324 and see colonisation and population 
militia, 62-64, 82, 93 
millet, 59 
Min River 閩江, 34, 43, 169, 330, 338, 347, 475 
Min-Yue 閩越 [state], 45 
Ming 明 dynasty (1368–1644), 490, 578, 582 
Minister of Ceremonies (太常 taichang), 297 
Minister Coachman (太僕 taipu),  
Minister of Finance (大司農 da sinong),  
Minister of the Guards (衛尉 weiwei), 
Minister Herald (大鴻臚 dahonglu),  
Minister of the Household (光祿勳 guangluxun), 
Minister of the Imperial Clan (宗正 zong zheng),  
Minister of Justice (廷尉 tingwei),  
Minister Steward (少府 shaofu),  
Minzhong 閩中commandery, 30n, 45 
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Mo 摩 settlement, 237, 239, 327-328 
Mo Slope 摩陂, 410 
Moi people, 39 
Moling 秣陵, 160, 163, 318-319, 530 
Mongolia, 3 
Mufu Shan 幕阜山 range, 18 
mulberry, 4 
 
Nan 南 commandery, 21-23, 25, 119, 241, 253, 266, 290, 292, 296, 298-
299, 301, 306, 308n, 342, 354-355, 372, 385, 400, 419, 428, 432-
433, 440 
Nan Ling 南嶺 range, 8-10, 18, 27, 29-30, 102, 296, 341, 444 
Nan-Yue 南越 [state], 27, 30, 34, 36, 38, 45, 280, 351 
Nanchang 南昌, 52, 192-193, 227, 237, 410; marquis, 410 and 415n 
Nanhai 南海 commandery, 30, 32-33, 52, 343-344, 347, 350-351, 444-
445 
Nanjing [modern city], 48, 50, 56, 131, 162, 318, 435 
Nanyang 南陽 commandery, 18, 20-21, 24, 92, 94, 97, 111-112, 114-116, 
119-120, 132-135, 149-150, 204, 243, 247, 249, 361, 392-393, 
405, 432, 434, 439, 470, 519 
naval warfare, 275-286 
New Text school, 90 
Ni Heng 禰衡, 196n, 561 
Nile River, 34 
Nine Distinctions 九鍚, 415 
Ningbo [modern city], 80, 224 
Ningxia [modern province], 449 
Niuzhu Mountain 牛渚山, 160, 163-165 
North River 北江 see Bei Jiang; cf. Northern Jiang below 
Northern Army 北軍, 63 
Northern Han 北漢 dynasty, 141 
Northern Jiang 北江, 47 and see Yangzi River 
 
Office for Copper (銅官 tong guan), 48 
Office for Iron (鐵官 tie guan), 20, 28 
Office for Towered Warships (樓船官 louchuan guan), 55, 280 
Officer of Merit (功曹 gongcao), 235 
Ou River 甌江, 44 
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Ou Xing 區星, 103-104 
Oukou 甌口, 443, 448 
Oule 甌羅 [state], 38n 
 
Palace Attendant (侍中 shizhong), 133, 424n, 552 
Palace Cadet of the Heir (太子中庶子 taizi zhong shuzi) [Jin office], 
543n 
Palace Gentleman [of Wu] (中郎 zhonglang), 550 
Palace Library [of Wu] (中書 zhongshu), 551, 553 
Gentleman (郎 lang), 551, 553, Libationer (祭酒 jijiu), 551; Prefect (令
ling), 551, 560 
and see Private Library and libraries 
Palace Writers (中書 zhongshu) [Shu office], 551n 
Palace Writers (中書 zhongshu) [Wei office], 551n 
Pan 潘, the Lady [empress of Sun Quan], 529n 
Pan Jun 潘濬, 404-405, 500 
Pan Lin 潘臨x, 336 
Pan Mi 潘祕, 86n 
Pan Zhang 潘璋, 403n, 418-420, 467, 518 
Pang Tong 龐統, 272-273n 
Pang Xi 龐羲, 362-363 
Panyu 潘禺, 9, 30, 31, 34, 52, 343, 446 
Paracels, 42 
Parthia (安息 Anxi), 480 
pearls, 36, 53 
Pei 沛 kingdom, 14, 54, 57, 231, 356 
Pei Qian 裴潛, 249 
Pei Songzhi 裴松之, commentator to Sanguo zhi, 73, 95, 98, 112, 122, 
128, 130, 194, 200, 202, 205-206, 208-209, 215, 270-71, 533-
536, 538, 545-546, 548-549, 555-562, 566-571, 573-577 
Peng Qi 彭綺, 441n 
Pengcheng 彭城 commandery, 160, 162, 218, 236, 496 
Pengli 彭蠡 Lake, 51-52, 192, 236-237, 239, 312, 326-327, 413 
Pengze 彭澤, 189 
Piling 毗陵, 50, 473 
population, 8, 17, 20, 22, 25, 27, 32-33, 35, 41, 46, 49, 51, 54, 56, 60, 87, 
102, 340 and see census, colonisation and migration 
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pottery, 48 
Poyang Lake [modern], 11, 51-52, 146 
Poyang 鄱陽 lake and marshland, 227, 236, 287, 312, 338 
Poyang 鄱陽 [region], 51, 220, 237, 258, 260, 285, 287, 289, 326-327, 
330-334, 338, 347, 384, 557 
Poyang 鄱陽 commandery, 326, 349, 440, 504 
Poyang 鄱陽 county, 186-187, 322, 336 
Prefect (令 ling)/magistrate [of a county], 60 and see by place-name 
Princess Quan 全公主, 511 and see Sun Luban 
Princess Zhu 朱公主, 511 and see Sun Luyu 
Private Library (祕書 mishu/bishu) of Shu, 543n, 551n and see sub 
Eastern Pavilion; Gentleman (郎 lang), 551 
Private Library (祕書 mishu/bishu) of Wei, 552n 
Proscribed Party (黨錮 danggu), 570 
Protector of the Army at the Centre (中護軍 zhong hujun), 227-228 
Protector of the Army on the Right (右護軍 you hujun), 467 
province (州 zhou), 60 and see by name 
provisional appointment (jia 假), 82n and see acting and temporary 
Puyang River 浦陽江, 46, 75n 
 
Qian Bo 錢博, 444 
Qiang 羌 people, 96-97, 99 
Qiantang 錢唐 estuary, 46, 169 
Qiantang 錢唐 county, 49, 78n, 85, 184n, 497 
Qianxiang 乾象 "Celestial Appearances" calendrical system, 450 
Qiao 譙 city, 316-317, 383, 436 
Qiao 橋, the Lady [wife of Sun Ce], 214, 227, 336 
Qiao 橋, the Lady [wife of Zhou Yu], 227 
Qichun 蘄春commandery, 404n, 435 
Qin 秦 dynasty (221-207), 20, 24, 27-30, 45, 48, 138-139, 319, 455, 457 
Qin Ling 秦嶺 range, 2, 53, 363, 390, 439, 487 
Qin Lun 秦論, 479-480n 
Qing 清 dynasty (1644-1911), 582 
Qing 靑 province, 132, 134, 248, 462 
Qinghai [modern region], 314 
Qu'a 曲阿, 50, 136, 149, 153, 158-159, 164-165, 167, 171, 177, 182-183, 
229, 234, 303 
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Quan Rou 全柔, 184n. 497 
Quan Zong 全琮, 334, 441, 476, 518, 520, 522 
Quang Tri [modern city], 38 
Quanling 泉陵, 373 
Que Jian 卻儉, 358 
Quebei 芍陂 lake, 56, 317 
Qujiang 曲江, 52 
Quyang Spring 曲陽泉, 201 
 
Rao Zhu 饒助, 321n 
Red Cliffs (赤壁 Chibi), 214, 263-275, 277, 279n, 285, 287-291, 293, 
299-302, 306-307, 310, 312, 317, 328, 330, 333, 339, 349, 354-
355, 372, 377, 381, 384, 389-390, 423, 433, 486, 491, 495-496, 
550, 575, 579, 585-587 
Red River, 33, 34, 38, 341, 343, 344, 350, 442, 444, 447, 478 
refugees, 8-9, 326-327, 339 and see migration 
Registrar (主簿 zhubu), 115 
religion, 57 
Ren Yan 任延, 10 
rhapsody (賦 fu) see sub voce in Part II 
rice cultivation, 5, 59 
Rice Sect/Five Dou of Rice 五斗米道, 357, 358, 361 
Richard II, King of England, 584 
Richard III, King of England, 575, 584, 588-589 
Rinan 日南 commandery, 39, 41-42, 341, 343, 344, 444-445 
Romance see Sanguo [zhi] yanyi in Part II 
Rome/Roman empire (大秦 Daqin), 42 
Rongyang 滎陽, 57-58 
Ru River 汝水, 20, 58, 120, 122 
Ruan Ji 阮籍, 525 
Runan 汝南commandery, 20-21, 54, 57, 92, 94, 109, 118, 150, 171, 219, 
249, 385, 402, 495, 496, 564 
Ruxu River 濡須水, 319 
Ruxu 濡須 fortress, 274n, 281, 318-321, 323, 368, 383, 421, 428, 431-
432, 435, 440, 467, 492, 585 
Ryukyu Islands see Tanzhou 
 
Sages of the Bamboo Grove 竹林七賢, 525 
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Saigon/Ho Chi Minh City [modern city], 446 
Samarkhand, 529 
Santong 三統 "Three Sequences" calendrical system, 450n 
scholarship in Wu, 525-528 
Seven Masters of the Jianan period 建安七子, 525 
shadow plays (皮影戲 piying xi), 581 
Shakespeare, 584, 588 
shamanism, 13, 17 
Shamoke 沙摩柯, 424n 
Shandong [modern province], 57, 134, 157 
Shandong peninsula, 14, 54, 57, 202, 481, 496-497 
Shang Sheng 商升, 170 
Shang/Yin 商/殷 dynasty, 514 
Shanghai [modern city], 46 
Shangliao 上繚饒庸山, 186, 188, 326 
Shangrao 上饒, 330 
Shangyong 上庸 commandery, 392, 412 
shanmin 山民 "hills people," 324 and see shanyue 
Shanxi [modern province], 449 
Shanyang 山陽 commandery, 243, 249 
 Duke (公 gong) , 98n and see Liu Xie, Emperor Xian of Han 
Shanyin 山陰, 49, 328 
shanyue 山越 "southern barbarians/non-Chinese of the hills," 324-334, 
337-338 
shanzei 山賊 "hills bandits," 324 and see shanyue 
Shao 邵 family of Kuaiji, 563 
Shaoban 芍陂 lake, see Quebei 
Shaoxing [modern city], 49 
Shaxian 沙羡, 190, 293 
She 歙 county, 330-331 
Shen Dan 申耽, 392n, 412 
Shen Hang 沈珩, 470-471 
Shen Yi 申儀, 392n 
Sheng Xian 盛憲, 232 
Shenting 神亭, 183 
Shenxi [modern province], 3, 20, 97, 390, 449, 462 
Sheyang marsh 射陽澤, 50 
Shi 士 family of Cangwu, 34, 341-350, 444-446 
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Shi Ci 士賜, 341, 344 
Shi Hui 士䵋 [brother of Shi Xie], 344 
Shi Hui 士徽 [son of Shi Xie], 444-445 
Shi Huang 史璜, 349n 
Shi Kuang 士匡, 445-446 
Shi Le 石勒 [ruler of Later Zhao 後趙], 141 
Shi Ren 士仁 or Fushi 傅士 Ren, 400-401 
Shi Weizi 石威則, 206n 
Shi Wu 士武, 344, 347, 350 
Shi Xie 士燮, 42, 246, 288, 341-353, 442-447, 569 
Shi Xin 士廞, 350 
Shi Yi 士壹, 342, 344, 351-352, 445-446 
ships and shipping, 31, 34-35, 42, 55, 190, 240, 263, 268-270, 275-286, 
371, 394, 431, 437, 486, 492, 495 
Shitou 石頭 hill, 318 
Shixin 始新, 331 
Shiyang 石陽, 293, 438 
Shouchun 壽春, 56-58, 147-154, 158-159, 171, 188, 219, 227, 317, 435, 
482, 492 
Shu [or Shu-Han 蜀漢], state founded by Lu Bei, 408, 429, 450, 454-
462, 534; 
history office of, 544n 
Shu 舒 county in Lujiang, 55-56, 67, 147-148, 150 
Shuofang 朔方, 32n 
Si River 泗水, 58, 93, 209 
Si 斯 clan of Kuaiji, 328 
Si Cong 斯從, 328 
Si Nhiêp, 347 and see Shi Xie 
Sichuan [modern province], 3, 20, 24, 246, 296, 298, 342, 356, 363, 447, 
482, 492, 575 
Sifen 四分 "Quarter Day" calendrical system, 450 
Siku quanshu 四庫全書 editors, 541, 567 
Sili 司隸 [capital province], 462 
Silk Road, 449 
silk-farming, 11 
Sima 司馬 family, 438, 482, 483 
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Sima Biao 司馬表, compiler of Xu Han shu and Hou Han shu Treatises, 
7, 141, 208, 537, 564n 
Sima Guang 司馬光, compiler of Zizhi tongjian, 455-457, 542 
Sima Qian 司馬遷, compiler of Shi ji, 4-5, 8, 20, 26, 30-31, 47, 51, 450n, 
458, 536-537, 542, 553 
Sima Rui 司馬叡 [founding Emperor Yuan 元 of Eastern Jin], 455-457, 
502n 542 
Sima Xiangru 司馬相如, 23, 530 
Sima Yan 司馬炎 [Emperor Wu 武 of Jin], 141, 456, 554 
Sima Yi 司馬懿, 438-440, 481, 558, 585 
Sima Zhao 司馬昭, 482 
Sima Zhi 司馬芝, 249 
Six Stratagems (六韜 Liutao) [book], 386n 
Sogdiana (康居 Kangju), 529 
Song dynasties: 
 Liu Song 劉宋 (420-479), 502n, 576n 
 Northern Song 北宋 (960–1127), 282n, 469n, 579, 581-582, 584 
 Southern Song 南宋 (1127–1279), 49, 282n, 580-582, 584 
Song Jun 宋均 see Zong Jun 宗均 
South China Sea, 41 
Southern Dynasties 南朝, 455 
Southern Jiang 南江, 47 and see Yangzi River 
Staff of Authority (節 jie), 61, 444, 467 
State Historian on the Left (左國史 zuo guoshi), 552, 554 
State Historian on the Right (右國史 you guoshi), 552 
Study of the Mysteries (玄學 xuanxue), 526, 528 
Su Fei 蘇飛, 238n 
Su Shi 蘇軾 [style Dongpo 東坡], 579 
Sui 隋 dynasty (581-618), 58, 455 
Sun 孫 family of Wu commandery, 72, 77, 114, 147-148, 152-153, 170, 
175, 184, 195, 213-217, 223, 226, 228, 232, 234, 237, 311, 324, 
333, 336, 420, 458, 493-494, 509n, 511, 589 
Sun孫, the Ladies [daughters of Sun Jian], 86n 
Sun孫, the Lady [concubine of Liu Bei], 86n, 294, 294-295n, 371 
Sun Ba 孫霸, 483-484 
Sun Ben孫賁, 75n, 114, 136, 154, 159-160, 171, 175, 189, 197, 228, 
260-262 
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Sun Ce 孫策 [style Bofu 伯符], 14, 34, 62, 85, 146-199, 224n, 260, 303, 
326, 467, 485, 493-497, 503, 518, 521, 524, 546-549, 558, 560, 
562, 566n, 567, 569, 571, 574 
Sun Deng 孫登, 224n, 427, 429, 470-471, 483, 499, 527, 529 
Sun Fen 孫奮, 195n 
Sun Feng 孫奉, 498n 
Sun Fu 孫輔, 114, 171, 180, 189, 193, 228, 260-261, 347 
Sun Gao 孫高, 234 
Sun Gao/Hao 孫暠, 217n 
Sun Hao 孫皓 [ruler of Wu], 457, 483, 485, 525, 529, 550, 552-553, 559, 
565 
Sun He 孫河 [cousin of Sun Jian], 150, 152, 231, 233-234, 237, 311 
Sun He 孫和 [son of Sun Quan], 483-485, 497, 499, 522, 553 
Sun Huan 孫奐, 422 
Sun Jian 孫堅, 25n, 70-145, 146, 177, 420, 484, 489, 494-495, 497, 547-
548, 557, 569 
Sun Jiao 孫皎, 397 
Sun Jing 孫靜, 114-115, 169, 234 
Sun Jun 孫峻, 484, 511, 522 
Sun Kuang 孫匡, 85, 197 
Sun Lang 孫朗/Ren 仁, 85 
Sun Lang 孫朗 "Young Gentleman Sun" [i.e. Sun Ce q.v.] 164-65 
Sun Liang 孫亮 [ruler of Wu], 484, 550-552 
Sun Lin孫隣 [son of Sun Ben], 262n 
Sun Lin 孫林 [cousin of Sun Jun], 484, 500, 511, 522, 529 
Sun Luban 孫魯班, the Lady, 511, 522 
Sun Luyu 孫魯育, the Lady, 511 
Sun Ren孫仁 see Sun Lang 
Sun Qiang 孫羌, 75n, 114, 260 
Sun Quan 孫權 [ruler of Wu], 14, 72, 85, 147, 213 et passim 
Sun Shao 孫紹, 215, 234, 464-465, 496-497, 555-556, 560 
Sun Sheng 孫盛, 193, 209, 380, 524, 566, 572 
Sun Wu 孫武, 72-73 
Sun Xiang 孫香, 171 
Sun Xiu 孫休 [ruler of Wu], 484, 552-553 
Sun Yi 孫翊, 85, 147, 215, 230, 522 
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Sun Yu 孫瑜, 234, 237, 308n, 321, 327, 575, 586 
Sun Zhong 孫重, 73, 569 
Suzhou [modern city], 44, 74, 501 
 
Tadun 蹋頓, 245 
Tai Lake 太湖, 44, 46, 47, 105, 289, 323 
Taichu 太初 "Grand Beginning" calendrical system, 450n 
Taimo 太末, 75n, 328 
Taishi Ci 太史慈, 62, 167-168, 180-186, 193-194, 220, 237, 326-327, 
497 
Taiwan [Yizhou 夷洲], 44, 480-481 
Tang 唐 dynasty (618–907), 52, 58, 278, 455, 494, 556, 559, 576, 578 
Tang River 唐水, 18 
Tang Ze 唐咨, 436n 
Tangming 唐明 [state], 446 
Tanzhou [Ryukyu Islands?], 481 
Tao Qian 陶謙, 151n, 152-153, 156-157, 162, 171, 218, 251, 326 
Taoism, 14-15, 88, 202-204, 348, 356-60, 526, 528-529, 568-570 and see 
Gan Ji, Zhang Lu, Yellow Turbans 
taxation, 28, 105, 315, 339, 476, 505, 507 
temporary appointment (jia 假), 82n and see acting and provisional 
Teng Yin 滕胤, 484, 494, 511 
Thanh Hoa [modern city], 38 
Tianzhu 天竺 [ India], 43n 
Tong Zhi僮芝, 186-187, 193 
trade and transport, 19, 22, 24-25, 27-28, 31, 33-44, 50, 52-53, 56-59, 80, 
352, 446, 464, 507-508 
Tripitika, 529 
trireme, 280 
tuntian 屯田 see agricultural colonies 
 
Vast Canal complex (鴻溝 Hong gou), 57 
Vietnam, 29, 33, 37-40, 288, 310, 340, 347, 444-446, 478, 482 
 
Wan 宛 city, 18-20, 22, 24, 94-95, 115, 117, 393, 396n, 432 
Wang 王 family of Langye, 113n 
Wang 王, Grand Empress-Dowager (huang taihou 皇太后) of Former 
Han, 139-140 
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Wang 王, the Lady [concubine of Emperor Ling], 106 
Wang Bi 王弼, 526, 561 
Wang Biao 王表, 529 
Wang Can 王粲, 243-244, 249, 525, 562 
Wang Chong 王充, 543n 
Wang Fan 王蕃 [mathematician/astronomer], 450n 
Wang Fan 王範 [official/historian], 527, 565 
Wang Jin 王金, 444 
Wang Kuang 王匡, 121-122, 127 
Wang Lang 王朗, 159, 168-170, 192-195, 218n, 328, 495, 501, 562 
Wang Lei 王累, 364 
Wang Mang 王莽, 19-20, 48, 54, 58, 64, 68, 139-140, 341 
Wang Pu 王誧, 176, 178 
Wang Rui 王叡, 25n, 104n, 112-114, 117, 119 
Wang Shen 王沈, 543n 
Wang Sheng 王晟, 170-171, 183 
Wang Xiang 王祥, 113n 
Wang Yin 王隠, 565n 
Wanling 宛陵, 47, 230 
warfare, methods and techniques, 275-286, 485-492 
Warring States 戰國 period, 457 
Wei River 渭水, 3, 53, 96, 317, 362, 439, 449, 458, 462 
Wei 魏 [state founded by Cao Cao], 411 et passim and see Emperor 
 Duke (公 gong), 382 
King (王 wang), 382 
Wei 魏 commandery, 91 
Wei 魏 family of Kuaiji, 500-501, 504, 509n 
Wei Li/Sa 衛颯, 11, 28 
Wei Sa 衛颯 see Wei Li 衛颯 
Wei Teng 魏滕, 208n, 504 
Wei Yao 韋曜 see Wei Zhao 韋昭 
Wei Zhao 韋昭, 139-140, 550-554, 556 
Wen Ping 文聘, 248, 293, 355, 438, 439, 585 
Wenzhou [modern city], 44-46 
West River/Xi Jiang 西江, 32-33, 35, 37, 341, 350, 478 
wheat, 59 
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White Tiger Yan 嚴白虎, 167-168, 170-171, 179, 183, 197-198, 230 
White Wolf Mountain 白狼山, 245-246 
Wild Goose Canal (鴻溝 Hong gou) see Vast Canal, 57 
women, status and influence of, 522 
wu 巫 (shaman), 12, 13, 15 
Wu Gorge 巫峽, 418 
Wu Pass 武關, 19, 24, 133 
Wu Shan 巫山 range, 18 
Wu "Territory" 吳地, 47 
Wu 吳 [ancient state], 44, 72, 282n 
Wu 吳 [state founded by Sun Quan], 37, 415 et passim 
Wu 吳 commandery, 47, 49-50, 57, 67, 70-71, 77, 105, 146, 149, 167-
171, 176-180, 183-184, 194, 197-198, 202, 207, 220, 226, 228-
230, 232, 257, 289, 312, 319, 323, 333-335, 337, 349, 443, 467, 
470, 473, 493, 495-497, 501, 518, 522, 525, 550, 558, 560, 563 
 King (王 wang), 415, 425, 429, 559 and see Sun Quan 
Wu 巫 county in Nan/Yidu commandery, 342, 418-419, 501 
Wu 吳 county in Wu commandery, 44, 67, 74, 85; marquis 180, 415n 
Wu 吳 family of Wu commandery, 85, 152, 509n 
Wu 吳, the Lady [wife of Sun Jian], 85-86, 147, 148, 152, 170, 208n, 
215, 219, 223, 224n, 226, 521 
Wu Fan 吳範, 14, 504, 529 
Wu Jing 吳景, 85, 150-152, 154, 158-162, 166, 171, 175, 182, 230, 232 
Wu Ju 吳巨, 348, 349, 350 
Wu Miao 吳邈, 480n 
Wu Zhan 吳展, 509n 
Wu Zixu 伍子胥, 541n 
Wuchang 武昌, 350, 413, 452-453, 460, 466, 492, 529n, 554 
Wuchang [modern city], 265n 
Wucheng 烏程, 217n; Marquis, 105, 176 
Wugong Shan 武功山 range, 18 
Wuhan [modern city], 21, 48, 187, 190, 213-214, 238, 255, 293, 492 
Wuhu 湖蕪, 337-338 
Wuhu [modern city], 48, 56, 320, 333 
Wuhu 烏湖 people, 36n 
Wuhuan 烏桓 people, 208, 245, 317, 487 
Wulin 烏林, 267 and see Red Cliffs 
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Wuling Shan 武陵山 range, 18 
Wuling 武陵 commandery, 10, 11, 25-26, 28, 113-114, 290-291, 404, 
419, 422, 424, 500 
Wuqi 五溪 "Five Gorges," 10, 442 
Wuqi 五溪 people, 10 
Wuyi Shan 武夷山 range, 30n, 45-46 
Wuzhou [modern city], 32, 341 
 
Xi Jiang 西江, 32 and see West River 
Xi Guang 錫光, 10 
Xi Kang 嵇康, 525, 561 
Xi Zuochi 習鑿齒, 566-567 
Xia River 夏江, 21 and see Han River 
Xiahou Dun 夏侯惇 [style Yuanrang 元讓], 206n, 383-384 
Xiahou Shang 夏侯尚, 428, 432 
Xiahou Yuan夏侯淵, 377, 390, 423, 487 
Xiajun 下雋, 300n, 385 
Xiakou 夏口, 21, 238-241, 254-255, 263, 279n, 452, 490 
Xian Shan 峴山 range, 135 
Xiang River 湘江, 8, 10, 13, 18, 24-28, 33, 52, 102, 104, 241, 266, 285, 
290, 296, 302, 341, 355, 375-376, 398, 443 
Xiang Jun 項峻, 550, 555-556 
Xiang Kai 襄楷, 200-202 
Xiang Yu 項羽, 305n 
Xiang'an 襄安, 321n, 323n 
Xiangguan 湘關, 398n 
Xiangyang 襄陽, 22-24, 119, 135-136, 149, 187, 241, 247-249, 251-255, 
269, 292, 298, 392-394, 401, 410, 414, 433, 438 
Xianyang 咸陽, 24 
Xiaoting 猇亭, 422-423 
Xiapi 下邳 kingdom/commandery, 58, 86-88, 93, 162, 236, 303, 349, 
496-497 
Xicheng 西城, 412 
Xie 謝, the Lady [concubine of Sun Quan], 565 
Xie Cheng 謝承, 565 
Xie Yiwu 謝夷吾, 14n 
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Xihua 西華, 94-95 
Xiling Xia 西陵峽 gorge, 21, 418, 467 
Xiling 西陵, 467 
Xin River 信江, 330 
Xin'an River 新安江, 330-331 
Xincheng 新城 commandery, 412, 439 
Xindu 新都 commandery, 331, 338 
Xing Zhen 邢貞, 470 
Xining River 西寧河 [or Huang Shui 湟水], 314 
Xionger Shan 熊耳山, 18, 120, 126 
Xiongnu 匈奴 people, 141, 459 
Xisai 西塞 Mountain, 189-190 
Xu 許 city, 139, 196, 205, 209, 221-223, 316, 349, 371, 395, 396n, 411 
and see Xuchang 許昌 
Xu 徐 province, 50, 57-58, 62, 86-87, 152, 156-158, 162, 171, 173, 175-
176, 218-219, 290, 319, 349, 387-388, 436, 462 
Xu 許 family of Wu commandery, 67 
Xu 徐, the Lady [wife/widow of Sun Yi], 233-234, 560 
Xu Chang 許昌, 17, 80-81, 83, 87, 90, 93 
Xu Deng 徐登, 14 
Xu Feng 徐鳳, 174n 
Xu Gan 徐幹, 526 
Xu Gong 許貢, 168, 170, 178, 198, 199, 200, 230, 495, 567 
Xu Guang 許廣, 141 
Xu Huang 徐晃, 394, 398n 
Xu Jing 許靖, 348n 
Xu Kun 徐琨, 163 
Xu Qiu 徐璆, 139 
Xu Rong 徐榮, 121-122, 137 
Xu Shao/Zhao 許韶/昭 [rebel] 80-81n 
Xu Sheng 許生 [rebel], 80-81n 
Xu Sheng 徐盛 [officer of Wu], 333, 337-338, 420-421, 436, 470, 496 
Xu Xiang 徐詳, 384 
Xu Yu 許戫/郁, 67 
Xu Zhao 許昭, 171 
Xu Zhao 許昭 see Xu Shao [rebel] 
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Xuchang 許昌 city, 81n, 411, 435-437, 530 
Xue Li 薛禮, 160, 163, 319 
Xue Ying 薛營, 550, 553-554, 556 
Xue Zong 薛綜, 342-343n, 471-472, 525, 554n 
Xuefeng Shan 雪峯山 range, 18 
Xuling 徐陵, 431 
Xun Bozi 荀伯子, 563n 
Xun Shuang 荀爽, 562 
Xun You 荀攸, 563 
Xun Yu 荀昱, 344n, 439n, 563 
Xun Yue 荀悅, 526, 537-538, 562 
Xunyang 尋陽, 323, 398, 400, 439 
Xupu 胥浦, 38 
Xuwen 徐問, 35 
Xuyi 盱眙, 86-87 
 
Yan 兗 province, 134, 149, 156-157, 176, 462 
Yan 剡 county, acting magistrate, 328 
Yan 嚴 family of Wu commandery, 67, 509n 
Yan Jun 嚴畯, 236, 387, 552 
Yan Lian 顏連, 321n 
Yan Xiang 嚴像/象, 197, 231 
Yan Yan 嚴顏, 367, 369 
Yan Yin 嚴隠, 509n 
Yandu 盬都, 83, 85-87, 147 
Yang 揚 province, 17-18, 53, 43-58, 65, 71, 83, 131, 147, 152, 156, 158-
159, 173, 175, 185, 191, 197, 218, 231, 317, 337, 355, 371, 389, 
403, 420, 448, 467 
Yang Qiu 楊秋, 362 
Yang Xi 楊戲/羲, 543n 
Yangcheng 陽城, 131, 133 
Yangping Pass 陽平關, 390 
Yangren 陽人, 122-126 
Yangxian 陽羡, 67, 167, 220 
Yangzhou [modern city], 50, 149 
Yangzi River 江, passim 
GENERAL INDEX 
 
555 
 Northern Jiang 北江, Middle Jiang 中江, Southern Jiang 南江 
and Branch Stream 分江水, 47 
Yangzi Gorges, 296, 309, 372, 402, 413, 418, 425, 442, 452, 462, 467, 
483, 485, 486, 492, 586 
yanyi 演義 "popular elaboration"/Romance, 584 and see Sanguo [zhi] 
yanyi in Part II 
Yanying 鄔郢 see Ying 郢 
yao 要 (supernatural practices), 15 
yao ze 要賊"heretic rebels," 15 
Ye 鄴 city, 317, 382-383, 395, 396n, 530 
Yellow River 河, 2, 4n, 54, 57-58, 91, 94, 111, 121-122, 127, 131-132, 
149, 197, 245, 324, 362, 387, 449, 513 
Yellow Sea, 481 
Yellow Turban rebellion/Yellow Turbans 黃巾, 70, 88-91, 94-97, 103, 
114, 147, 226, 251, 357-358, 407, 452, 489 
Yi 益 province, 20, 24, 246, 297, 302, 307-308, 351, 354-375, 391-392, 
402, 404, 409, 424-425, 429, 447, 450, 524, 564, 575 and cf. 
Yizhou commandery 
Yi 黟 county, 330 
Yichang [modern city], 291, 402, 419 
Yicheng 宜城, 119, 135 
Yichun 宜春, 52, 105 
Yidao 夷道, 419-423 
Yidu 宜都 commandery, 402, 419 
Yiling 夷陵, 291, 419-423 
Yin Guan 殷觀, 308n 
yin si 淫祀 "wrongful customs and evil ceremonies," 11-15 
Ying 郢 [ancient city], 23 
Ying River 潁水, 20, 58, 131 
Yingchuan 潁川 commandery, 20, 21, 92, 94, 118, 121, 131 134, 553, 
562 
Yinling 陰陵, 56 
Yiyang 益陽, 24n, 373 
Yizhou 益州 commandery, 32n, 41, 351, 447 and cf. Yi province 
Yizhou 夷洲 "Barbarian Island," 44 and see Taiwan 
Yong Kai 雍闓, 351, 447-448 
Yongan 永安 "Perpetual Peace" city, 425, 433n 
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Yongchang 永昌 commandery, 447 
Yongning 永寧 commandery, 365n 
Yongning 永寧 county, 44, 46, 328 
You 幽 province, 91, 132, 246, 387, 462 
You Tu 尤突, 332, 334 
Youbeiping 右北平 commandery, 226, 496 
Youfufeng 右扶風 commandery, 364 
You[jiang]kou 油江口, 290 
"Young Gentleman" 郎 see Sun Ce and Zhou Yu 
Youting 遊艇 "Patrol Boats," 277 
Yu River 鬱水, 32 and see West River/ Xi jiang 
Yu 豫 province, 21, 57, 117-118, 120, 125, 130-132, 256n, 462 and see 
Yuzhou 
Yu 禹 [legendary ruler], 3 
Yu 虞 family of Kuaiji, 500-501, 509n 
Yu Bo 虞勃, 558 
Yu Fan 虞翻, 192-194, 217n, 401, 404n, 497, 501, 514-515, 525, 529, 
561, 566n 
Yu He 俞河, 150n and see Sun He 河 
Yu Huan 魚豢, 545 
Yu Ji 于吉, 200 and see Gan Ji 
Yu Jin 于禁, 378, 394, 396, 404, 414 
Yu Mi 于麋, 160, 163, 165 
Yu Pu 虞浦, 557, 565 
Yu Xi 虞喜, 128, 140, 206, 555-556 
Yu Xu 虞詡, 6n 
Yu Yu 虞預, 566 
Yuan River 沅水, 10, 25, 28 
Yuan 元 dynasty (1271–1368), 580-581 
Yuan 袁 family of Runan, 109-110, 118, 124, 129, 173-174 
Yuan Cheng 袁成, 129-130n 
Yuan Feng 袁逢, 129-130n 
Yuan Gonglu 袁公路, 174n, 185 and see Yuan Shu 
Yuan Hong 袁宏, compiler of Hou Han ji, 538 
Yuan Hui 袁徽, 344n 
Yuan Shang 袁尚, 216n, 245-246 
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Yuan Shao 袁紹 [style Benchu本初, 109, 110, 111, 112, 126, 145, 173, 
179n, 213, 314n, 317, 388, 486, 573, 574 
Yuan Shu 袁術 [style Gonglu 公路], 70-71, 109, 111-112, 116-120, 124, 
126, 133, 137, 146, 150, 171, 174, 179n, 185, 188, 219-220, 311, 
314n, 326, 340, 494, 497, 547 
Yuan Tan 袁譚, 245 
Yuan Tang 袁湯, 563 
Yuan Wei 袁隗, 109 
Yuan Xi 袁熙, 245-246 
Yuan Yao 袁燿/曜, 195n 
Yuan Ye 袁曄, 575, 586 
yuanben 院本 theatre scripts, 580 
Yue 越 people, 30-31, 35, 38, 42, 44-45, 230, 571 
Yue "Territory" 越地, 31 
Yue 越 [ancient state], 44, 282n, 318 
Yue Zi 樂資, 99n 
Yuexi 越嶲 commandery, 447 
Yufu 魚復, 365n, 425 
Yuhang 餘枕, 78n, 171, 331 
Yulin 鬱林 commandery, 33, 344, 444 
Yunmeng marshland 雲夢澤, 23, 25 
Yunnan [modern province], 41, 351, 447 
Yuqian 於潛, 75n 
Yuyao 餘姚, 207 
Yuzhang 豫章 commandery, 11, 45, 51-53, 55-56, 59, 105, 164, 171, 180, 
185, 187-189, 192, 197, 227-228, 234, 237, 252, 260-, 261, 323, 
326, 330, 332, 410, 466 
Yuzhong 榆中, 97 
Yuzhou 豫州, 256n and see Liu Bei 
 
Zaju 雜劇 "variety dramas, 581 
 Zang Min 臧旻, 83, 84, 85 
Zangke 牂牁 commandery, 447 
Zhadu 查瀆, 169 
Zhai Rong 筰融, 162-164, 166, 527 
Zhaisang 柴桑, 239, 255, 267 
Zhang Hills 鄣山, 47-48 
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Zhang River 漳水, 22 
Zhang 鄣 commandery, 48 
Zhang 張 family of Wu commandery, 509n 
Zhang Bao 張寶, 89 
Zhang Bo 張勃, 557-559 
Zhang Bu 張隱, 552 
Zhang Chang 張暢, 509n  
Zhang Daoling 張道陵 see Zhang Ling 張陵 
Zhang Fang 張方, 564n 
Zhang Fei 張飛, 251-253, 293, 369, 371, 377, 390-391, 418, 582 
Zhang Feng 張奉, 471-472 
Zhang Han 張暢, 509n 
Zhang He 章河/何 [rebel], 17 
Zhang He 張郃 [general of Cao Cao], 377, 390, 487 
Zhang Heng 張衡 [Taoist leader], 357 
Zhang Heng 張衡 [Later Han scholar], 527, 530 
Zhang Hong 張纮, 153, 172, 174, 195, 218, 220-225, 230, 319n, 469, 
525, 548, 549 
Zhang Hua 張華, 543, 568 
Zhang Jin 張津 [style Ziyun 子雲], 204, 206, 348, 350 
Zhang Jiuling 張九齡, 53 
Zhang Jue 張角, 88-93, 96, 202, 357 
Zhang Kai 張闓, 509n 
Zhang Liang 張梁/良, 89 
Zhang Liao 張遼, 322, 377-378, 381, 383, 490 
Zhang Ling 張陵/Daoling 道陵, 356, 357 
Zhang Lu 張魯, 297, 354, 356-357, 359, 361-364, 367, 369, 376, 382, 
443 
Zhang Mancheng 張曼成, 94 
Zhang Song 張松, 307n, 363-364, 367 
Zhang Wen 張溫 [official of Later Han], 97-100 
Zhang Wen 張溫[official of Wu], 471, 522-524, 555-556 
Zhang Xian 張羨, 241, 340, 347 
Zhang Xi 張喜, 313n 
Zhang Xiu 張脩 [Taoist leader], 357-359, 361 
Zhang Xiu 張休 [official of Wu], 499, 527 
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Zhang Yan 張儼, 558-559 
Zhang Yi 張懌, 241 
Zhang Ying 張英, 160-163 
Zhang Yun 張允, 272n 
Zhang Zhao 張昭, 212, 215-216, 218-220, 223, 225-228, 256, 260, 288, 
305, 466, 470-471, 496, 499, 501, 514-515, 523, 527, 529, 548, 
555 
Zhang Zhi 張騭, 561 
Zhang Zi 張咨/資, 112, 115-116, 119 
Zhangling 章陵 commandery, 248 
zhanjian 戰艦 "Combat-Junks," 277 
Zhao Bing 趙炳/昞, 14 
Zhao Chongguo 趙充國, 314 
Zhao Tuo 趙佗, 30, 38, 347, 350-351 
Zhao Wei 趙韙, 362 
Zhao Yu 趙昱, 162n, 218n 
Zhao Yun 趙雲, 253, 369, 371, 425 
Zhao Zi 趙咨, 470 
Zhe River 浙水, 46, 49, 52-53, 476 
Zhejiang [modern province], 44-45, 75, 171, 323, 330, 475, 478 
Zheng/Trung 徵 sisters, 38 
Zheng Achun 鄚阿春, the Lady, 566n 
Zhenyang 辰陽, 11 
Zhi Qian 支謙, 527 
Zhong 仲 [or Chong 沖] dynasty of Yuan Shu q.v., 173 
Zhong Yao 鍾繇, 363 
Zhongchang Tong 仲長統, 526 
Zhongmou 中牟, 197, 572 
Zhongzhou island 中洲, 431 
Zhou 周 dynasty, 44, 304, 455, 457, 542, 568 
Zhou 周 brothers of Kuaiji, 130 and see Zhou Ang, Zhou Xin and Zhou 
Yu 
Zhou family 周 of Lujiang, 67, 148, 150, 228, 499 
Zhou Ang 周昂, 130-131, 134 
Zhou Chao 周朝, 103-104 
Zhou Fang 周魴, 440 
Zhou Fei/Pei 周斐/裴, 564n 
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Zhou Gongjin 周公瑾, 224n, 298 and see Zhou Yu of Lujiang 
Zhou Gu 周谷, 220 
Zhou Pei 周裴 see Zhou Fei 
Zhou Shang 周尚, 158, 171 
Zhou Shen 周慎, 99-100 
Zhou Tai 周泰, 225, 333, 421, 467, 495, 525 
Zhou Xin 周昕, 130, 154, 169 
Zhou Yu 周喁 of Kuaiji, 130-134 
Zhou Yu 周瑜 of Lujiang [style Gongjin公瑾], 132n, 148, 158, 171-172, 
175, 189, 193, 218, 224n, 226-228, 236-239, 258-274, 276, 290-
292, 297-299, 302-303, 306, 308-309n, 310, 327, 371, 381, 496, 
498-499, 514, 516, 518, 579, 583, 585-587 
Zhou Zhao 周昭, 550, 552-553 
Zhouling 州陵, 300n, 385 
Zhu 朱 family of Danyang, 497 
Zhu 朱 family of Wu, 497, 509n 
Zhu Dan朱誕, 509n 
Zhu Fu 朱符, 343-344 
Zhu Gan 朱贛, 6n 
Zhu Guang 朱光, 322, 326, 411 
Zhu Huan朱桓, 333, 431, 467, 520 
Zhu Ji 朱紀, 336n 
Zhu Ju 朱據, 511n, 523 
Zhu Jun 朱儁/雋, 36n, 66n, 78n, 92-95, 97, 114, 343, 547 
Zhu Kai 朱凱, 296n 
Zhu Ran 朱然, 333, 338, 420-421, 432, 467 
Zhu Xi 朱熹, 456, 580 
Zhu Ying 朱應, 479n 
Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋, founding emperor of the Ming 明 dynasty, 276n 
Zhu Zhi 朱治, 168, 171, 178, 230, 262, 333, 473, 495 
Zhuge Dan 諸葛誕, 482 
Zhuge Jin 諸葛瑾, 236, 252, 372, 414, 419, 438, 467, 469, 476, 496, 527 
Zhuge Ke 諸葛恪, 476, 484, 494, 499, 511, 527, 551, 556, 561 
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Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮, 236, 247n, 251-252, 255-256, 263, 267, 270-271, 
273-274, 287, 290, 303, 369, 412, 434, 439, 447-448, 450, 458-
460, 462, 469-470, 482, 496, 523-524, 534, 558, 562, 579-580, 
582-587 
Zhuge Xuan 諸葛玄, 252 
Zhuguan 珠官 commandery, 446n and see Hepu commandery 
Zhuo 涿 commandery, 91, 250 
Zhuyai 珠崖 commandery, 36-37 
Zhuyai 珠崖 county, 37 
Zigui 秭歸, 392, 402, 404, 418, 419 
zong 宗 "clans," 326 
Zong Jun 宗均, 11, 16; also as Song Jun 宋均, 11n 
zouge 走船 "Flying Barques," 277 
Zu Lang 祖郎, 154, 180, 182-183, 220, 260, 326-327 
Zu Mao 祖茂, 115n, 121 
Zuo Si 左思, 500, 504, 530 
 
  
 
 
Part II: Chinese Literary and Historical Works 
 
Items in this part of the Index refer primarily to works discussed in 
the main text or in the notes. Works which are merely cited are listed 
in the Bibliography. 
The characters were written by May Wang for the first edition in 
1990. 
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"Burning the Armada" [drama], 270n 
Cao Man zhuan [book], 561 
"Capture and Release of Cao Cao" [drama], 
573n 
Chenliu qijiu zhuan "Accounts of Venerable 
Men and Ancient Affairs of Chenliu" 
[book], 564n 
Chibi huaigu "Meditations on the Red Cliff' 
[poem], 579 
Chu ci anthology 12-13 
Chu sanzang ji ji "Collection of Notes 
concerning the Translation of the Tripitika" 
[book], 527n 
Chuguo xianxian zhuan "Accounts of Worthy 
Men of the Past of the Country of Chu" 
[book], 564n 
Chunqiu zuozhu qi, "Helpful Forecasts from 
the Spring and Autumn Annals", 82n 
Classic of Changes, 22ln, 386, 526, 568 
Classic of History, 6, 221n, 386 
Classic of Poetry, 221n, 386 
Collected Works of Cao Cao [book], 562 
Collected Works of Kong Rong [book], 562 
Collected Works of Wang Lang [book], 562 
Collected Works of Zhuge Liang [book], 562 
Da zhao "Great Summons" [poem], 13 
Daode jing [book], 50ln, 526n 
Dawen "Answers to Questions" [book], 559n 
Dian Jue "Authoritative Account" [book], 135, 
215,217,545 
Diaries of Activity and Repose, 537 
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